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Preface
The Centre of Excellence for the Defence Against Terrorism
(COE-DAT) provides decisionmakers with a comprehensive understanding
of terrorism and counterterrorism in order to transform the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and nations of interest to meet future security
challenges. This transformation is embedded in NATO’s three declared
core tasks of collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security.
COE-DAT recognizes that counterterrorism is an extremely broad security
challenge. COE-DAT also recognizes that military forces alone will not
be able to defeat terrorism, nor should military forces be the lead agency in the
fight against terrorism. Terrorism evolves from local grievances and as such
requires a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach that includes
strategic cooperation and the collective action of nations, civil society, and
the international community.
As a strategic-level think tank for the development of Alliance
activities to defend against terrorism and sitting outside the formal
NATO Command Structure, COE-DAT supports NATO’s Long-Term
Military Transformation by anticipating and preparing for the ambiguous,
complex, and rapidly changing future security environment. COE-DAT
is able to interact with universities, think tanks, researchers, international
organizations, and global partners to provide critical thought on the inherently
sensitive topic of counterterrorism.
This project traces back to the middle of 2019 as part of the after-action
review process of COE-DAT’s sixth iteration of our Critical Infrastructure
Protection Against Terrorist Attacks (CIPATA) course. Recommendations
on potential ways to transform the CIPATA course to better serve NATO
and partner nations set in motion a series of events that ultimately led to the
development of this book. One of the most important events was the adoption
of a formal partnership between the US Army War College Strategic Studies
Institute (USAWC SSI) and NATO COE-DAT.
USAWC SSI is the US Army’s premier strategic-level think tank, tasked
to deliver independent, multidisciplinary research and analysis on international
security, geostrategy, and other topics for the US Department of Defense and
the broader national security and interagency communities. This partnership
enables our two organizations to cooperate rapidly and collaborate to provide
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research, analysis, and educational support on security issues in support
of NATO, its Allies, and partner nations.
We recognized the emerging challenges of the twenty-first-century’s
security environment are inf luencing the way nations need to build their
concept of critical infrastructure protection. Indeed, the protection of national
critical infrastructures has shifted to a risk analysis–based approach focused
on developing security and resilience, hence the focus on critical infrastructure
security and resilience (CISR).
NATO Allies understand the continuous transformation of securing
critical infrastructure because resilience is one of NATO’s seven key
competencies. Although CISR is primarily an individual Ally’s responsibility,
protecting key global critical infrastructure is a strategic-level issue and
challenge. Considering that global critical infrastructure—such as global
transportation, f inancial and telecommunication networks, and supply
chains for energy or medical supplies—is an international security concern,
NATO, along with the European Union and the United Nations, needs
to be involved.
A lthough NATO and other nations are currently developing
and/or implementing their own strategic and operational approaches
to infrastructure protection, a comprehensive approach was needed on how
to strengthen national and global, critical infrastructure security and resilience.
To answer this need, COE-DAT and USAWC SSI conducted a two-year
research effort drawing upon the leading international subject matter experts
on critical infrastructure protection from government, academe, and industry.
The culmination of this research effort is this handbook, and though there
are many books on CIP, there is no joint publication within NATO in terms
of critical infrastructure.
The aim of this project, therefore, is to f ill this gap by approaching
the subject from a military point of view and collecting the best
practices in CISR. The book f irst def ines CISR and the many threats
to it, presents critical infrastructure–sector case studies, and finally provides
tools nations can use to strengthen CISR policies and practices.
Based on the success, energy, and interest garnered during the writing
of this f irst book, a continuation volume two—again in collaboration
with the USAWC SSI—began in late 2021. While this first volume sets
the stage, the second volume will focus on Article 3, covering the capability
and capacity for defense (military) and civil preparedness and resilience.
The aim of the second volume is to relate CISR efforts to NATO’s seven
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baseline requirements. The two volumes individually and collectively
are intended to be resources for Allies and partners to develop and
improve their respective CISR efforts, but they can also be used
as a teaching resource.
COE-DAT, in cooperation with the USAWC SSI, offers this publication
to the NATO community, partner nations, other nations of interest,
and academia to promulgate “good practices” in the global f ight
against terrorism. The strategic relationship between the USAWC SSI
and NATO COE-DAT led to this book becoming reality.

Daniel W. Stone
Colonel, US Air Force
Deputy Director, COE-DAT
January 2022
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Executive Summary
In 2014 NATO’s Center of Excellence-Defence Against Terrorism
(COE-DAT) launched the inaugural course on “Critical Infrastructure
Protection Against Terrorist Attacks.” As the CIPTA course garnered
increased attendance and interest, the core lecturer team felt the need
to update the course in critical infrastructure (CI) taking into account the
shift from an emphasis on “protection” of CI assets to “security and resiliency.”
What was lacking in the fields of academe, emergency management, and the
industry practitioner community was a handbook that leveraged the collective
subject matter expertise of the core lecturer team, a handbook that could serve
to educate government leaders, state and private-sector owners and operators
of critical infrastructure, academicians, and policymakers in NATO and
partner countries. Enabling NATO’s Collective Defense: Critical Infrastructure
Security and Resiliency is the culmination of such an effort, the f irst
major collaborative research project under a Memorandum of Understanding
between the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (SSI),
and NATO COE-DAT.
The research project began in October 2020 with a series of four
workshops hosted by SSI. The draft chapters for the book were completed
in late January 2022. Little did the research team envision the Russian
invasion of Ukraine in February this year. The Russian occupation
of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant, successive missile attacks
against Ukraine’s electric generation and distribution facilities, rail transport,
and cyberattacks against almost every sector of the country’s critical
infrastructure have been on world display. Russian use of its gas supplies
as a means of economic warfare against Europe—designed to undermine
NATO unity and support for Ukraine—is another timely example of why
adversaries, nation-states, and terrorists alike target critical infrastructure.
Hence, the need for public-private sector partnerships to secure that
infrastructure and build the resiliency to sustain it when attacked. Ukraine
also highlights the need for NATO allies to understand where vulnerabilities
exist in host nation infrastructure that will undermine collective defense and
give more urgency to redressing and mitigating those fissures.
The conceptual framework for this handbook addresses key aspects
of which users need to have a baseline knowledge. What is critical infrastructure
and why is it important for NATO and an individual nation’s security?
Threats and attacks to CI may occur from many vectors, including kinetic
attacks conducted largely by terrorists to cyberattacks by terrorists, nation-states,
xxi
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and their proxies, to hybrid threats. Among the many critical infrastructure
sectors, there are designated lifelines, ones that are vital due to their importance
to the well-being of society, the continuity of government operations, economic
impacts, and the deleterious, cascading effects on other CI sectors. There has
been a recent shift in the critical infrastructure community of practitioners
from an emphasis on merely the “protection” of key vital infrastructure assets
to building in “security and resilience” of that infrastructure. What then
are the tools that nation-states and owners and operators of CI can
employ to achieve these twin goals?
To provide an understanding of these important CI topics, SSI and
COE-DAT brought toget her lead ing inter nat iona l e x per ts.
This multidisciplinary team consisted of industry practitioners, US and
European policymakers, members from the intelligence community,
research laboratory experts, and academicians. Enabling NATO’s Collective
Defense: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resiliency consists of three major
sections. The first section includes four chapters that focus on what we mean
by “critical ” infrastructure and why and how it has been targeted.
There has been an evolution of physical attacks, mainly by terrorists,
to sophisticated cyberattacks by adversaries and to more complex hybrid
means. Chapter 1, “Understanding Critical Infrastructure,” by Ron Bearse
sets the stage for the book by answering the following questions: What is
critical infrastructure? Why is it important? What is the difference between
critical infrastructure protection (CIP) and critical infrastructure security
and resilience (CISR)? What is involved in implementing CISR policy in
and across the North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations? Bearse suggests
that CISR is a quintessential societal task for maintaining national security,
economic vitality, and public health and safety in a world filled with increasing
levels of risk. For NATO member states, building and enhancing CISR at the
national level is necessary to safeguard societies, people, and shared values
and also provide the foundation for credible deterrence and collective defense.
Chapter 2, “Physical Threats to Critical Infrastructure,” by Malcolm
Baker, Ronald Bearse, and Ray Mey details kinetic threats to CI by terrorists
with a useful case study regarding the 2013 attack by an al-Qaeda affiliate
on the Amenas oil and gas facility in Algeria. They also examine natural and
other physical threats to infrastructure, as well as future man-made threats that
are of greatest concern to NATO, including chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, explosive (CBRNE) devices, drones and unmanned aerial vehicles,
precision strike weapons, and an electromagnetic pulse attack.
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Chapter 3, “Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructure,” by Salih Biçakci
examines how risks against critical infrastructure are on the rise in the
cyber domain. He writes that while the COV ID-19 pandemic has
compelled businesses to adopt practices to accommodate a more remote
workforce, it has also presented malevolent attackers an unprecedented
opportunity to test cybersecurity systems and exploit vulnerabilities.
The pandemic has demonstrated the need for the dependable and
continuous operation of electricit y, natural gas, oil, water and
wastewater systems, and telecommunications. His chapter provides
an overview of a critical infrastructure’s technical layers and systems and its
potential organizational vulnerabilities to cyberattacks related to the human
workforce and management. He highlights the various categories of threat
actors (opportunistic attackers, competitors, insider threats, advanced
persistent threats, and hacktivists) and concludes with an overview of recent
primary attack types that threat actors employ to exploit vulnerabilities
in critical infrastructure.
The fourth and last chapter in section one is “Hybrid Threats to US and
NATO Critical Infrastructure” by Carol V. Evans. She provides an analysis
of several major hybrid threat vectors to critical infrastructure with the
potential to attack, undermine, or compromise US and NATO warfighting,
force projection, and sustainment capabilities. The first threat vector is the
deliberate cyber infiltration by adversaries of the energy infrastructure that
supports US installations and bases. This infiltration enables adversaries
to interfere with the US military’s ability to deploy and sustain forward combat
forces and equipment. A second hybrid threat vector is adversarial targeting
of US and NATO logistics, with the potential to degrade US overseas force
projection as well as NATO mobility and sustainment within the theater.
The third hybrid threat stems from China’s strategic penetration, ownership, and
control of key defense industrial-base infrastructure and supply chains in Europe
via its Belt and Road Initiative and foreign direct-investment activities.
This vector provides an opportunity to undermine US and NATO
interoperability and political unity. Dr. Evans’s chapter concludes
by highlighting US and NATO measures to redress and mitigate these threats
by investing in CISR through organizational capacity building, development
of policy frameworks, and the implementation of host country baseline
resilience requirements.
The second section centers on giving readers an appreciation of the
critical “lifeline” infrastructure sectors, namely, energy and transport
(including civil aviation and mass transit rail), water, and communications.
Leading this section is Chapter 5, “European Energy and the Case of Ukraine,”
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by Theresa Sabonis-Helf. Written prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine
in February 2022, Dr. Sabonis-Helf posits that potential electricity
interruption in the West is becoming both increasingly catastrophic
for urbanized areas and more attractive to threat actors seeking disruption.
The avenues for disruption are becoming greater as energy systems become
larger, “smarter,” and more internationally linked. The intertwined relationship
between electricity security and cybersecurity calls for an understanding
of CISR that recognizes both sets of vulnerabilities. Dr. Sabonis-Helf
argues that the case of Ukraine is thus instructive. Ukraine’s experience of
energy security and cybersecurity reveals significant risks and offers insight
into NATO’s efforts to enhance civil preparedness and collective CISR
among Allies and partners. It also illustrates the complexities that Ukraine
and Europe are facing today and will face in the future.
Chapter 6, “Civil Aviation,” by David Harell analyzes the aviation
infrastructure sector and the threats it faces, including primary aircraft
bombings and ground attacks on airports by terrorists. To understand the civil
aviation sector, he writes it is important to know why the aviation industry
is so critical, what makes it so volatile, and why it is such an attractive target
for terrorists. He provides several key reasons for the industry’s vulnerability:
its rigidity, its predictability, and its difficulty in keeping up with evolving
terrorist threats. Harell uses multiple case studies—which span the 20 years
after the 9/11 attacks—to illustrate these vulnerabilities. He also examines the
aviation security responses to these terrorist attacks and identifies important
lessons to be learned. He concludes with recommendations and best practices
that can assist in reducing the vulnerabilities across international civil aviation.
Chapter 7, “Mass Transit Railway Operations,” by Adrian Dwyer explains
the inherent vulnerability of open transport networks, such as railway
operations, to terrorist action. He showcases those methods of attack that
have often been used, drawing on case study data from Great Britain,
continental Europe, the United States, Japan, and India. From the perspective
of NATO, the targeting of rail networks across its member states can disrupt
military logistics, the civilian supply chain, and economic prosperity more
generally. Dwyer maintains that strategic risk assessment is an important
means to manage diverse terrorist threats and inherent vulnerabilities
of mass rail transit.
Chapter 8, “Water Sector Resilience and the Metropolitan Washington
Case,” by Steve Bieber provides an eye-opening analysis of how fragile
the supply of this vital resource can be and how other sectors of critical
infrastructure are highly dependent on water. Bieber identifies the risks
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and threats to the water sector; outlines key steps in resilience planning;
illustrates challenges and solutions to security and resilience initiatives using
a case study from Washington, DC; and offers recommendations for developing
water-sector security and resilience. He explains that the security and resilience
of the water sector is a key enabler of a nation’s civil preparedness, with military
implications as well. Terrorist threats to water delivery or contamination
of water sources can impact a nation’s ability to move and sustain its military
forces and project military power when required. From the perspective
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, threats to the water sector
in one member state could have ripple effects that limit or diminish NATO’s
military mobility and force projection in support of its essential core tasks.
Chris Anderson’s Chapter 9, “Communications Resilience,” completes
the handbook ’s second section on the lifeline CI sectors. Communications
form the critical backbone of the modern world, and resilient and trustworthy
communications are fundamental to national security and emergency
preparedness. Communications play many critical roles for NATO,
he writes, including: command and control, military operations, distribution
of intelligence and warning signals, crisis management and coordination,
and citizen preparedness. Anderson provides an in-depth overview
of the communications sector and explains the ways in which the integrity,
availability, or confidentiality of communications systems may be degraded
or compromised. He shows the risks to the communications sector using
recent natural, man-made, cyber, and kinetic incidents that have impacted
communications systems and related infrastructure. He provides important
recommendations for improving communications resilience against terrorist
attacks and other threats.
The third section of Enabling NATO’s Collective Defense: Critical
Infrastructure Security and Resiliency provides readers and users of
the handbook with the tools necessary to deter and mitigate attacks
against critical infrastructure as well as the means to build long-term
security and resiliency within host nation infrastructure, thereby enabling
NATO’s collective defense. There are six chapters in this section. It begins
with Chapter 10 by Ron Bearse and Alessandro Lazari, who employ their
respective policy-making purviews to collaborate on “Comparing Policy
Frameworks: CISR in the United States and the European Union.” The US and
EU CISR policies and practices are the most advanced frameworks in the world,
and many countries have emulated the US and EU models. Their chapter describes
the key underpinnings and characteristics of each respective policy framework,
the reasons why these frameworks came into being, and how they were adapted
over time. The intent of this chapter is to help Allies and partners better
xxv

understand these two CISR policy frameworks so they can apply the key
principles and tenets to enhance the CISR posture in their respective countries.
In Chapter 11, “Information and Intelligence Sharing,” Chris Anderson
and Raymond Mey discuss the important role of information and intelligence
sharing between governments and state or private sector owner operators
of critical infrastructure. These activities are essential to the success
of any CISR effort across the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
They explain that key infrastructure stakeholders need to share information
to understand comprehensive infrastructure risk so they can then
determine the most efficient and effective means to mitigate these dangers.
This process involves building trust, shared and practiced communications
methods, and structured, multidimensional information sharing.
Anderson and Mey provide some best practices of public-private
information-sharing programs from the United States. These practices include
the Department of Homeland Security Critical Infrastructure Partnership
Advisory Council (DHS CIPAC), Protected Critical Infrastructure Information
(PCII) program, and Cyber Information Sharing and Collaboration Program,
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Joint Terrorism Task Force
( JTTF), the Domestic Security Alliance Council (DSAC), and InfraGard.
One information-sharing program common in the United States and
Europe is an Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC),
which is a critical infrastructure sector-specif ic organization to share
information about threats and vulnerabilities.
Chapter 12, “Critical Infrastructure Interdependency Modeling
and Analysis: Enhancing Resilience Management Strategies,” by Duane
Verner provides a tour-de-force overview of the need for NATO member
states and partner nations to understand infrastructure interdependencies
since they operate in concert with each other. Catastrophic events can
cascade across these interconnected systems and hamper the ability of
critical infrastructure operators to remain operational. Modeling and analysis
of these interdependencies are key components to an effective risk-management
strategy and to determining where resources are needed to build resiliency.
Verner summarizes general approaches to model and assess critical
infrastructure, and he proposes a f lexible CISR framework to inform the
development of resilience management strategies. NATO Allies and partners
can use this framework to reduce the risks posed to critical infrastructure and
to foster greater resilience through cross-sector collaboration.
How NATO can best manage and assess security risk in a constantly
changing environment is the starting point for Geoffrey French’s Chapter 13
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on “Security Risk Assessment and Management.” As he points out, organizations
and communities need formal processes to determine, prioritize, and address
risks. The promise of risk management is that with sufficient uniformity and
consistency, government or private-sector leaders can make better decisions
through the ability to aggregate risks at different levels. His chapter explores
in depth the concepts of risk assessment and risk management and reviews a set
of selected risk-management frameworks—from the International Organization
for Standardization (ISO), NATO, US Government Accountability Office
(GAO), and the US National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)—
that have been designed or adapted for security risk management. French then
demonstrates how a national-level governmental risk program can encourage
and guide risk-management practices as well as coordinate the constellation
of public- and private-sector organizations involved in critical infrastructure
operations to foster a mutually supportive environment for CISR.
W hile Biçakci ’s earlier chapter describes the various cyber
threats to CI, Sungbaek Cho provides users of this handbook
with some important cybersecurity tools to mitigate those very threats.
In Chapter 14, “Enhancing Cybersecurit y of Industrial Control
Systems,” Cho offers a brief overview of the characteristics of industrial
control systems (ICSs) and why they are subject to cyberattacks in terms
of the vulnerability of the components as well as the prevalent practice
in modern critical infrastructure to operate ICS in more open interconnections
with business networks. He highlights these vulnerabilities with some major
cyber event case studies, including: Stuxnet (2010), BlackEnergy (2011),
Ukraine Blackout (2015), RWE’s Nuclear Power Plant in Germany (2016),
TRITON (2017), and the Colonial Pipeline (2021). The chapter offers
best practices and tools for critical infrastructure stakeholders, owners,
and operators to protect their systems and enhance security and resilience
against cyberattacks. Cho recommends the utilization of risk management
methodologies, basic hygiene practices, and essential cybersecurity measures.
Although NATO is taking steps to improve its collective ability to defend
against and respond to cyberattacks against Allied critical infrastructure,
individual member states form the f irst line of defense. Cho suggests
national governments should establish mandatory cybersecurity requirements
for critical infrastructure—ensuring owners and operators comply
with these requirements—and provide security advice as needed. He also
advocates for establishing an institutional cooperation mechanism (such
as a public-private critical infrastructure security council and a joint cyber
response team) so the CI stakeholders’ unique capabilities can be integrated
at the national level.
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Malcolm Baker provides the final chapter in the “tools to build CISR”
section and f ittingly it focuses on “Crisis Management and Response.”
Crisis management is an essential component of the Alliance’s Strengthened
Resilience Commitment announced in June 2021 as part of the NATO 2030
initiative. Baker, however, asks whether the Alliance’s current philosophy
of crisis management is keeping up with mainstream developments
in contempora r y crisis management and thought leadership.
Further, within the construct of CISR efforts, is NATO’s crisis
management approach still fit for its purpose—or could it be improved?
For NATO, understanding crisis management exclusively in terms of armed
conf lict and other hostilities may no longer be appropriate or optimal, he
suggests (especially in light of the various physical, cyber, and hybrid threats
outlined earlier in chapters 2–4). Baker recommends that effective CISR
measures can be improved by developing and implementing robust crisis
management structures and processes. The key elements of effective crisis
management are early warning, an effective strategy, good communication,
leadership, and swift decision making. Baker offers a proven crisis-management
framework, based on the British Standards Institution, using a staged approach
of: anticipate and assess, prepare, response, and recovery. Finally, he reviews
new developments in resilience and crisis management and offers suggestions
for how NATO could better align its activities to support NATO 2030.

Dr. Carol V. Evans
Editor
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
and US Army War College Press
US Army War College
November 2022
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Understanding Critical Infrastructure
Ronald Bearse

This chapter sets the stage for this book by answering the following
questions: W hat is critical infrastructure? W hy is it important?
What is the difference between critical infrastructure protection (CIP)
and critical infrastructure security and resilience (CISR)? What are
some of the key terms def ined in national CISR policy? What are the
core areas of activity or work streams involved in implementing CISR
policy in and across the North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations?
The answers to these specific questions provide the contextual basis for
understanding why CISR is a quintessential societal task for maintaining
national security, economic vitality, and public health and safety in a world
filled with increasing levels of risk. For NATO member states, building and
enhancing CISR at the national level is necessary to safeguard societies, people,
and shared values and also provide the foundation for credible deterrence and
defense and the Alliance’s ability to fulfill its core tasks of collective defense,
crisis management, and cooperative security.1

What Is Critical Infrastructure?
Although there is no standard or universal def inition of critical
infrastructure, many Western nations have essentially def ined the term
as the physical and cyber systems and assets that are so vital to the country
1. “Strengthened Resilience Commitment,” NATO (website), June 14, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en
/natohq/official_texts_185340.htm.
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that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact
on the nation’s physical or economic security or public health and safety. 2
Certain socioeconomic activities are vital to the day-to-day economic
functioning and security of nations. While there is less consensus on which
sectors qualify as critical infrastructure, most countries with an established
national CIP or CISR policy identify some or all of the sectors listed in figure 1-1
as critical infrastructure. 3 Most people know critical infrastructure on a daily
basis as the power used in their homes, the water they drink, the transportation
they rely on for freedom of movement, and the systems they use to communicate
with family, friends, and coworkers.4

Figure 1-1. List of commonly identified critical infrastructure sectors
(Diagram by TSAT)

To illustrate the relationships between critical infrastructure sectors,
figure 1-2 uses blue and red boxes to identify and distinguish various sectors. 5
The red boxes—transportation, water, energy, and communications—
are known as lifeline sectors. Given their unique nature, there are four main
characteristics that distinguish lifeline sectors from other sectors of critical
infrastructure. 6 First, lifeline sectors provide necessary services and goods
2. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), A Guide to Critical Infrastructure Security and
Resilience (Washington, DC: CISA, 2019), 4, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Guide
-Critical-Infrastructure-Security-Resilience-110819-508v2.pdf.
3. “Critical Infrastructure Sectors,” TSAT (website), accessed September 27, 2021, https://tsat.net/market
/critical-infrastructure/critical-infrastructure-sectors/.
4.

CISA, Guide to Critical Infrastructure, 4.

5. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 2015 Energy Sector-Specific Plan (Washington, DC: DHS,
2015), 19, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-energy-2015-508.pdf.
6. National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC), Strengthening Regional Resilience
(Washington, DC: NIAC, 2013), 18, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/niac-regional
-resilience-final-report-11-21-13-508.pdf.
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that support most homes, businesses, communities, and levels of government.
Second, they deliver services that are commonplace in everyday life,
but disruption of the service has the potential to develop life-threatening
situations. Third, lifeline sectors involve complex physical and electronic
networks that are interconnected within and across multiple sectors.
Finally, a disruption of one lifeline sector has the potential to affect or
disrupt other sectors, creating cascading or escalating failures. The blue boxes
along the outer ring illustrate the other critical infrastructure sectors that
typically depend on the lifeline sectors for continuous operations.

Figure 1-2. Relationships between critical infrastructure sectors
(Diagram by US Department of Homeland Security)

The previous section described how most nations def ine critical
infrastructure, but how does NATO define it? Within NATO, Allied Command
Operations (ACO) uses several definitions to identify and understand the types
of infrastructure available within a given area of responsibility. ACO defines
critical infrastructure as “a nation’s infrastructure assets, facilities, systems,
networks, and processes that support the military, economic, political and/or
social life on which a nation and/or NATO depends.” 7 ACO also describes
three subcategories of critical infrastructure based on the respective level of
impact to national services and/or NATO operations, as listed below. 8

7. Allied Command Operations (ACO), Infrastructure Assessment, ACO Directive 084-002
(Mons, Belgium: ACO, 2019), 4.
8.

ACO Directive 084-002, 4.
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 Critical national infrastructure: Assets, facilities, systems,
and networks identified by the territorial host nation that are
integral to the continued delivery and integrity of the essential
services upon which the nation relies, the destruction or
compromise of which would lead to severe military, economic,
political, or social consequences to the nation.
 Mission vital infrastructure: Assets, facilities, systems, and
networks within the joint operations area which NATO/troop
contributing nation forces rely on for fielded capability, the
destruction or disruption of which singularly creates a decisive
disadvantage to the NATO mission.
 Key infrastructure: Assets, facilities, systems, and networks
within the joint operations area which host nation or NATO/
troop contributing nation forces rely on for fielded capability,
the destruction or disruption of which, either singularly or
collectively, creates a significant disadvantage to the host
nation or NATO mission.
An important question NATO must consider is to what extent its overall
mission readiness depends on the assured availability of critical infrastructure,
most of which is owned by private sector companies in its various member
states. Today, and for some time now, the answer to this question is that NATO
depends considerably on this assured availability of critical infrastructure.
During large operations or exercises, for example, an estimated 90 percent
of military transport relies on civilian ships, railways, and aircraft.
See chapter 4 for a discussion on how US and NATO reliance on assured access
to the global shipping infrastructure poses threats to Allied force projection
and military mobility.
The chapter thus far has discussed how Western nations define critical
infrastructure and why they do so. Simply, without the goods and services these
critical infrastructure sectors provide, the consequences can be catastrophic
for a nation’s public health and safety, environment, national security, and/or
economy. Furthermore, since many such systems and networks operate across
borders, any threat or attack against them could have national, regional, and
even global implications. What are some of the other reasons why critical
infrastructure is important?
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Why Is Critical Infrastructure Important?
Today, citizens in many countries demand or expect critical infrastructure
systems and the functions they fulfill to be available 24 hours a day. Adversaries,
however, are penetrating and disrupting various parts of critical infrastructure
with little or no repercussion. One such example occurred in May 2021 when
a small group of hackers launched a ransomware attack on Colonial Pipeline,
the largest pipeline network in the United States for delivery of ref ined
petroleum products. See chapter 14 for more detail on the Colonial Pipeline
case. Colonial shut down its main lines for five days, disrupting half the fuel
supply for the eastern part of the country. Worried drivers drained supplies
in gas stations in the southeastern states, airlines rerouted f lights to airports
with available fuel, traders had to deal with unexpected price volatility, and
companies scrambled to locate new sources of fuel.9
The Colonial Pipeline attack reveals the importance of building resilience.
Events like this one are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to predict,
but much can be done to prepare for them. Organizations not only need
to improve the security of their systems, but also their ability to respond
to an incident and spring back quickly after a disruption. These capabilities
can identify in advance the actions to take in response to a large disruptive
event.10 Organizations must know what to do, develop the capabilities
to do it, and then rehearse their crisis response actions—all in advance
of an incident.11
Evidence also suggests that the cyberattack against Colonial Pipeline
was not particularly sophisticated, yet it managed to paralyze a significant
part of the fuel supply of the world’s largest economy. The Colonial
Pipeline attack and many similar attacks before and since are made possible
by the ongoing automation of traditional manufacturing and industrial
practices, making these domains more vulnerable while not necessarily
posing a direct threat to them. The fourth industrial revolution’s emphasis
on modern smart technology is driving societies toward more intelligent
and smarter operational networks in domains like energy, water, traff ic
management, air traff ic control, and defense systems, to name a few.12
9. Rich Isenberg et al., “Building Cyber Resilience in National Critical Infrastructure,”
McKinsey & Company (website), June 30, 2021, https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/risk-and
-resilience/our-insights/building-cyber-resilience-innational-critical-infrastructure.
10. Isenberg et al., “Building Cyber Resilience.”
11.

Isenberg et al., “Building Cyber Resilience.”

12. Isenberg et al., “Building Cyber Resilience.”
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Advances in automated technolog y—such as sensors, the Internet
of Things, and cybersecurity protections—can help those responsible
for securing critical infrastructure understand potential threats,
run diagnostics, predict potential changes in their systems, and strengthen
the security and resilience of these critical infrastructure systems
more eff iciently. Together, these characteristics of the current threat
environment represent one of the most serious national security concerns
since the development of the atomic bomb, and they demonstrate why
writing a handbook such as this one is necessary to enhance collective
CISR posture.
Today, countries are trying to understand the threats they face—
some of which are seen and others unseen—and what they might be missing.
Those responsible for CISR constantly engage in a process to figure out
which threats should be at the top of the list, how others should be ranked,
and, given that ranking, what resources they should allocate against those
threats. What models and tools are useful to better understand the threats and
consequences of attacks on critical infrastructure? Which practices or solutions
should countries implement to prevent, deter, mitigate the consequences
of, respond to, and recover from events that can disrupt or destroy critical
infrastructure? What are the intelligence gaps, and how should stakeholders
fill those gaps?13
The reality is that any number of factors can cause disruption or destruction
to critical infrastructure, including poor design, operator error, natural causes
(such as earthquakes, lightning strikes, space weather, and climate change),
or intentional human actions like theft, arson, terrorism, or criminal attack.
Other factors increasing the risk to critical infrastructure include:
 Poor infrastructure and lack of adequate security controls
 Increased use of information and telecommunication
technologies to support, monitor, and control critical
infrastructure functionalities
 Growth of the world ’s population and its transition
from rural to urban areas, which stresses the utilization
of older infrastructure to its limits

13. James B. Comey, “Protecting Critical Infrastructure and the Importance of Partnerships” (address, Miami,
FL, July 7, 2014), https://www.f bi.gov/news/speeches/protecting-critical-infrastructure-and-the-importance
-of-partnerships.
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 Growing dependencies and interdependencies across critical
infrastructure sectors (see chapter 12 for more in-depth
analysis on these relationships)
 Adversaries’ enhanced understanding that a successful attack
to critical infrastructure systems can create havoc
 Nations’ dependence on critical infrastructure that is partially
or completely located outside their jurisdictional authority
and over which they have little or no control
Several chapters in this book delve more deeply into the subjects of
vulnerability, threat, and risk. See chapters 2–4 for an overview of threats
and threat actors. Nevertheless, it is instructive at this point to share the
poignant observation made by information security expert Ben Rothke,
who asserted in 2013: “The biggest threat to critical infrastructure is the
result of decades of insecurity; combined with an inadequate response to
current known threats and vulnerabilities.” 14 Rothke’s observation continues
to haunt governments and companies alike because it underscores the urgent
need for all critical infrastructure stakeholders to foster the t ype
of cooperation, coordination, collaboration, communication, and
concentration required to harness the expertise necessary to strengthen
collective CISR posture demonstrably.

What Is the Difference between CIP and CISR?
Humankind has been protecting critical infrastructure since the
invention of the wheel; however, over the last 20 years, most national critical
infrastructure policies and strategies in the West have evolved from focusing
solely on protection of critical infrastructure to making it more secure and
resilient. This shift is primarily due to the impossible task stakeholders face
in trying to protect all critical infrastructure systems from the growing
number of risk factors they face.
Under the CISR construct, the terms security and resilience certainly
support the idea of protection, but they have specific meanings. Security means
reducing the likelihood of successful attacks against critical infrastructure
or the effects of natural or man-made disasters, through the application
of physical means or defensive cybersecurity measures. Resilience is the ability
of critical infrastructure to resist, absorb, recover from, or successfully adapt
14. Helena Brito, “What Is the Biggest Threat to Critical Infrastructure?,” FireEye (blog), July 10, 2013,
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/07/biggest-threat-critical-infrastructure.html.
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to changing conditions. Resilient infrastructure is robust, agile, adaptable,
and able to withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions, deliberate
attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents.
Given the increasing natural and man-made threats and vulnerabilities
modern societies face—which have exposed the limits of traditional risk
assessment and risk mitigation efforts—the concept of CISR seems particularly
useful to inform policies that mitigate the consequences of such events and
speak to the vital need for nations to develop and implement a comprehensive
risk management strategy. See chapter 13 for analysis and recommendations
regarding risk assessment and management strategies.
Transitioning from the goal of protecting to that of improving
security and resilience requires a change in focus of education and training
to ensure that core CISR work streams are completed and well-managed.

Key Work Streams in CISR Planning and Operations
While the process of establishing, implementing, and sustaining
a demonstrably effective national CISR policy is difficult in any country,
there are three essential tasks: assessing risk, improving security, and
enhancing resilience. The process of accomplishing these three tasks
is extraordinarily complex and a continuing challenge because it requires
numerous streams of work be performed by all relevant stakeholders:
multiple government agencies, critical infrastructure owners and operators,
academicians, subject-matter experts, international organizations,
and technology vendors. Some of the major work streams include:
 Establishing clear roles and responsibilities for all stakeholders
 Identifying and determining the criticality of national
infrastructure
 Mapping critica l infrastr uct ure dependencies and
interdependencies
 Determining critical infrastructure vulnerabilities
 Using applicable risk assessment, analysis, and management
approaches
 Establishing crisis management capabilities
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 Establishing public-private partnerships between government
and private sector owners and operators of critical
infrastructure
 Establishing and implementing collaboration and information
sharing mechanisms between government and critical
infrastructure owners and operators
 Developing and exercising continuity of operations and
information technology disaster recovery plans
 Providing physical and cybersecurity and resilience measures
 Ensuring the integrity, security, and continuity of critical
infrastructure supply chains
 Fostering the local, regional, national, and international
cooperation, collaboration, coordination, communication,
and concentration required to produce demonstrably effective
results
 Expanding opportunities to develop and deliver CISR
education and training
 Implementing a robust test, training, and exercise program to
determine the extent to which current CISR policy, legislation,
plans, procedures, systems, and research and development
efforts are meeting, falling below, or exceeding prescribed
requirements, established standards, and increasingly stringent
stakeholder expectations
To implement a national CISR policy successfully requires great
leaders and top-notch managers. While the work streams identified above
define much of what needs to be done, the extent to which a nation
effectively develops and implements “the what” is a function of how well
the people responsible for leading and managing these work streams
foster the collaboration, cooperation, coordination, communication, and
concentration (5Cs) that are indispensable to building and sustaining
a viable risk-based, CISR posture. This fact cannot be emphasized enough.
For over 30 years, CIP and CISR capabilities have waxed and waned
depending on how well leaders execute these 5Cs.
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Looking Back and Looking Ahead
While it is important to look ahead, NATO member states can also
learn from the past. One instructive example from the Roman Empire is the
link between deteriorating conditions of the vast Roman aqueduct system—
certainly an early example of critical infrastructure—and the eventual
fall of the empire. In the third century BC, the Romans constructed
aqueducts throughout the empire to bring water from outside sources
into cities and towns to supply public baths, latrines, fountains, and
private households, and to support mining operations, milling, farms, and
gardens. However, as the administration of the day gradually neglected the
aqueducts and did not implement sufficient security and resilience measures
against an array of threats and vulnerabilities (to include general wear and
tear, intentional rerouting by local farmers, or deliberate destruction
or hindering by enemies) many aqueducts ceased to function.15
In the twentieth century, threats to critical infrastructure were almost
exclusively tangible, physical threats which could be countered with tangible,
physical defenses. Those kinds of tangible, physical threats continue
today—as do natural disasters, such as hurricanes, f loods, and wildfires—
and they can cause serious harm to people and nations.16 In the twenty-first
century, however, critical infrastructure has become increasingly connected
to the Internet. This increased connectivity is cause for global concern
because much of the critical infrastructure that nations rely on for health,
power, and security are susceptible to cyber threats. Attackers can now use
virtual control systems to deliver physical threats or make virtual threats
to physical infrastructure. This combination of virtual and physical threats
is growing exponentially, especially as virtual connections to physical
infrastructure via the Internet of Things become increasingly mainstream.17
Such attacks will become more common and are likely to be more destructive.
Beyond continuing to invest in the latest technology to help fend off
these threats, having a strong CISR posture will minimize the impact
of these attacks and make targets inherently less valuable from the
adversary’s perspective.

15. David Deming, “The Aqueducts and Water Supply of Ancient Rome,” Groundwater 58, no. 1
(January–February 2020): 153.
16. Chris Jensen, “What Is Critical Infrastructure and How Should We Protect It?,” Tenable (blog),
June 26, 2019, https://www.tenable.com/blog/what-is-critical-infrastructure-and-how-should-we-protect-it.
17.

Jensen, “Critical Infrastructure?”
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In 2019, security industry expert Pierre Bourgeix sounded the alarm
regarding the increasing threats to critical infrastructure and the need
to respond with enhanced security and resilience:
We are on the precipice of a world that is completely
connected. From smart cities to smart buildings, with the
use of machine learning and deep learning, we are closer
than ever to being completely converged. This connection
is also our Achilles’ heel that may lead to a disaster that
we cannot possibly imagine. The need for our understanding
of these threats from the lowest to the highest parts of our
organizations is crucial. However, the time for education
is growing short—either we get it or it is game over.18
From climate change to cyberattacks, infrastructure systems must
operate in an increasingly uncertain future in which it is impossible to avoid
or even predict all shocks and stresses. Therefore, it is essential for critical
infrastructure stakeholders to prepare for the threats they can anticipate,
and to be able to respond to the unexpected so that they can provide the
essential services upon which society depends.19 As Donald Rumsfeld,
the then US defense secretary, famously said:
There are known knowns; there are things we know we know.
We also know there are known unknowns; we know there are
some things we do not know. But there are also unknown
unknowns—the ones we do not know we do not know.
And if one looks throughout the history of free countries,
it is the latter category that tends to be the difficult ones. 20
Indeed, the known unknowns refer to the threats and risks of which
critical infrastructure stakeholders are aware. Unknown unknowns are
the risks that come from situations that are so unexpected that they would
not be considered. To identify the future threats to critical infrastructure,
stakeholders must try to envision them. It is certain that the years ahead will
be marked by turbulence, fueled by unconventional conf lict, fraught
18. Pierre Bourgeix, “Critical Infrastructure Security in a Converged and Interconnected World,”
Security InfoWatch (website), February 8, 2019, https://www.securityinfowatch.com/critical-infrastructure
/article/21067817/critical-infrastructure-security-in-a-converged-and-interconnected-world.
19. Bourgeix, “Critical Infrastructure Security.”
20. Donald H. Rumsfeld, “DoD News Briefing—Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers” (presentation,
Pentagon, Washington, DC, February 12, 2002).
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with natural and technological disasters, and complicated by the issues
resulting from the increasing complexity of and societal dependence
on critical infrastructure.
As this handbook stresses throughout all its chapters, enhanced
CISR is essential to NATO’s ability to function in crisis management,
collective defense, and/or external operations. Securing a nation’s
critical infrastructure systems and making them more resilient against a wide
range of current, emerging, and future risks is a complex and continuing
challenge. In fact, it is one of the most difficult things a nation can do.
Failing to achieve CISR goals and objectives, however, will reduce NATO’s
mission capability, and also adversely impact member states’ collective societies
because critical infrastructure is the foundation on which vital societal and
economic functions depend. Therefore, one of the quintessential societal
tasks necessary for maintaining national security, economic vitality, and
public health and safety in a world filled with risk will be the continuing
development, establishment, and maintenance of a demonstrably effective
national CISR posture. Working together, sharing lessons to be learned,
good practices, case studies, methods, tools, approaches, and experiences, and
discovering the unknown unknowns will promote and enhance local, regional,
national, and global CISR today and in the future.
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Physical Threats to Critical Infrastructure
Malcolm Baker, Ronald Bearse, and Ray Mey

The September 11 (9/11) attacks on the United States demonstrated
the vulnerability to the physical and kinetic threats posed by terrorists.
These attacks also validated how determined, patient, and sophisticated
terrorists have become in both planning and executing their operations.
More than two decades later, the consequences of not securing critical
infrastructure remain severe.
The basic nature of free societies greatly enables operations and
tactics employed by terrorists, competitive states, and other malicious
actors while hindering these societies’ ability to predict, deter, mitigate the
effects of, respond to, and recover from malevolent attacks against them.
Therefore, it is imperative for member states of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) to develop and sustain demonstrably effective critical
infrastructure security and resilience (CISR) policies, plans, and procedures
to reduce the risks to critical infrastructure posed by an ever-increasing list
of credible threats, whether they are physical, cyber, or hybrid in nature.
Nearly every day, threat actors commit cyberattacks against elements
of critical infrastructure. Many of these cyberattacks receive a great deal
of public and political attention because they harm NATO member states
and partner nations, but physical attacks against critical infrastructure
also remain dangerous threats, and they drive CISR planning and efforts
on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.
Most people have some level of personal experience with the COVID-19
virus and have witnessed how the pandemic, a biological event, has wreaked
13
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havoc and caused damage across multiple critical infrastructure sectors
in the United States, across NATO member states, and in the majority
of the world’s countries. Unfortunately, many people have also experienced
firsthand some form of natural disaster, which ultimately causes billions
of dollars in damage, adversely affects public health and safety, and
perhaps even cripples or destroys some type of critical infrastructure.
Many readers of this book also have an appreciation for the damage and
destruction to critical infrastructure that occurred because of the 9/11 attacks.
A less known but still disruptive event took place in 2016, when a monkey
knocked out Kenya’s entire power grid after falling onto a transformer
at the Gitau Hydroelectric Power Station.1 Such an unbelievable scenario—
along with the examples of a terrorist attack, natural disaster, and biological
event—illustrates that the current risk environment is very complex and
uncertain as threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences have all evolved since
the start of the twenty-first century.
This chapter provides a general overview of the current and emerging
physical threats to critical infrastructure in a straightfor ward and
thought-provoking manner. The chapter will proceed in three major sections.
Each section represents one of the three basic categories of physical threats
to critical infrastructure: (1) natural threats, (2) man-made threats, and
(3) accidental or technical threats. Each of these sections will examine the
nature of the threat to critical infrastructure, provide a few examples for
each type of threat, and then examine relevant case studies to identify
key insights and learning points to consider. The chapter will prioritize
man-made threats, which is the longest section and contains multiple
examples and case studies of the different types of threat in this category.
The chapter will conclude with an overview of considerations for Allies
and partners to enhance their CISR policies and practices to contend
with the challenges emanating from physical threats to critical infrastructure.

Natural Threats
Natural events and disasters occur on a daily basis around the
globe. This category includes such diverse natural threats as the effects
of climate change, earthquakes, tsunamis, land shifting, volcanic eruptions,
forest fires, hurricanes, f loods, drought, and, in some circumstances, even time
and animals. Natural threats pose a significant risk to critical infrastructure,
1. Jeff Postelwait, “Strangest Animal-Caused Power Outages,” T&D World (website), May 27, 2021,
https://www.tdworld.com/electric-utility-operations/media-gallery/21165503/strangest-animalcaused-power
-outages?slide=10&id=21165503.

14

Chapter 2

Physical Threats to Critical Infrastructure

as the following examples clearly demonstrate. In 1993, a severe f lood of the
Missouri River threatened the safety of the Cooper nuclear power station
in Nebraska. The Kobe earthquake in Japan in 1995 destroyed critical
transportation, maritime, and chemical infrastructures. In 1998, tornadoes
with wind speeds between 113 to 156 miles per hour hit the Davis‐Besse
nuclear power station in Ohio, and while this particular incident did not
produce any long‐term effects, it knocked out several critical systems, making
the station more vulnerable to disaster. The widespread damage to energy
and chemical infrastructures caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
in the United States in 2005 illustrates the threat posed by extreme
weather. Events related to extreme weather, particularly lightning and storms,
have historically posed the biggest threat to critical energy infrastructure.
Climate hazards like extreme weather events, higher temperatures,
droughts, f loods, wildfires, storms, rising sea levels, soil degradation, and
acidifying oceans are intensifying and threatening infrastructure, health, and
water and food security. Irreversible damage to ecosystems and habitats—
degraded by air, soil, water, and marine pollution—will undermine the
economic benefits they provide. Extreme weather events, many worsened
by the accelerating sea level rise, will particularly affect urban coastal
areas in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Western Hemisphere.
Damage to communications, energy, and transportation infrastructure
could affect military bases located in low-lying areas, inf lict economic costs,
and cause human displacement and loss of life. 2 Even what seem like unlikely
events (such as a meteor hitting a major city and causing damage to multiple
critical infrastructure sectors) are in the realm of the possible.
The frequency and costs of natural disasters are increasing, and they
often pose a credible threat to specific elements of critical infrastructure
located in the impact zone of the disaster. Due to the interconnectedness
of critical infrastructure, sometimes a natural disaster in one area of a country
will cause cascading effects across multiple critical infrastructure sectors,
some as far away as the other side of the country or even in a neighboring
country. The bottom line is that any threat assessment methodology must
take into account the likelihood of damage or destruction to critical
infrastructure resulting from natural hazards. Doing so enables both
government and private owners and operators of critical infrastructure
to better understand and manage the physical risks to critical infrastructure.
2. Daniel R. Coats, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community: Statement
for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Washington, DC: Office of the Director
of National Intelligence, January 29, 2019), 23, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA
-SFR---SSCI.pdf.
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Man-made Threats
Malevolent forces is a term used to describe the human actors who
threaten to physically attack, disrupt, or destroy the normal operations
of critical infrastructure. These forces include foreign and domestic terrorist
organizations, elements working on behalf of a competitive foreign power,
and individuals with malicious intent toward the government or a particular
organization who are “super-empowered” by information, communications,
and other technological advances. 3 This threat category includes not only war,
terrorism, and hybrid warfare, but also rioting, financial crimes, economic
espionage, and the possible use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,
and explosive (CBRNE) materials to inf lict great harm. Traditional acts
of sabotage and the intentional tampering, modification, or manipulation
of physical systems and processes—such as physically moving a railway
switching apparatus, opening and closing energy piping, and suppressing
signals or alarms on critical nodes of energy and transportation infrastructure—
remain a threat to critical infrastructure as well. Given this wide variety
of threat actors and methods of attack, it is important to balance the likelihood
and consequences specif ic threat vectors pose. See also the importance
of plausibility outlined in chapter 7. This section will examine several types
of man-made threats that are most grave and of greatest concern to NATO,
and illustrate key concepts using case studies, beginning with the attack
against the oil and gas facility at In Amenas, Algeria.

Case Study: In Amenas, Algeria
On January 16, 2013, approximately 32 heavily armed terrorists
from an al-Qaeda aff iliate attacked the In Amenas oil and gas facility
in Algeria.4 In an unprecedented, planned, and coordinated attack that
spanned four days, it was one of the largest terrorist attacks ever conducted
on an oil and gas facility. One of the largest gas developments in Algeria,
the facility at In Amenas is operated as a joint venture between Statoil,
British Petroleum, and Sonatrach, Algeria’s national oil company.
The vast facility covers over 2,700 square kilometers—an area almost
equivalent to the size of Luxembourg—and is situated about 1,300 kilometers
from the Algerian capital of Algiers and roughly 50 kilometers west of the
3. Toffler Associates, Five Critical Threats to the Infrastructure of the Future: Leading Infrastructure Protection
Experts Discuss Strategies for Protecting Your Enterprise (Manchester, MA: Toffler Associates, 2008), 2,
https://www.somanco.com/documents/Five%20Critical%20Infrastructure%20Threats.pdf.
4. Thomas Joscelyn and Bill Roggio, “Al Qaeda-linked Group Claims Credit for Kidnappings in Algeria,”
Long War Journal (website), January 16, 2013, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/01/al_qaeda
_commander_c.php.
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Libyan border. Given its strategic importance, there was a multilayered security
arrangement in place to protect the oil and gas facility.
The People’s National Army and the Gendarmerie from the Algerian
armed forces provided the outer layer of security for the facility,
working separately and in support of one another. As in most other
countries, the government was responsible for protecting the facility
against terrorist attacks, including prevention, intelligence gathering,
and border controls, including along the Algerian-Libyan border and in the desert
zone surrounding the facility. In fact, the Algerian government had established
a militarized zone around In Amenas with the army responsible for securing
the wider desert area and the gendarmes providing security in the immediate
vicinity of the facility. Regarding the inside the perimeter, Statoil, British
Petroleum, and Sonatrach were responsible for inner security at In Amenas,
and they provided an unarmed civilian guard force for this purpose.
The internal guard force provided access control and other protective
security measures as well as training and contingency planning to protect
the facility’s people and assets.
To initiate, the terrorists first attacked a bus carrying workers to the
facility and then launched near-simultaneous assaults on the workers’
living compound and oil and gas production area. Terrorists took control
of the facility in just over 15 minutes. The situation entered a siege phase
as terrorists searched for expatriate workers in the living and production areas.
Although the attackers seized expatriate workers and corralled them together
as hostages, they did not take any Algerian workers captive, or they allowed
them to escape. The terrorists demanded the withdrawal of Algerian
military forces from the vicinity and requested free and safe passage
to Mali. The terrorists also demanded safe passage from the living compound
to the production area buildings so that they could regroup together
in one stronghold.
The Algerian military launched a helicopter strike against the attackers
in the living compound, which prompted the terrorists to use the hostages
as human shields. Subsequently, the terrorists tried to move the hostages
in vehicles from the living compound to the production area. When the
Algerian military interdicted the attackers’ convoy, the terrorists returned fire
and detonated improvised explosive devices (IED). Ultimately, the military
succeeded in securing the living accommodations and resolving the situation,
but at considerable cost in terms of human life. During the terrorists’ assault
and the military response, 40 people from 10 countries were killed along
with 29 of the 32 terrorists.
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The In Amenas attack captured global media attention given the
nature of the attack and the type of critical infrastructure facility
that the terrorists targeted. Among the many f indings uncovered
during the post-incident investigation, Statoil’s f inal report concluded
that the multilayered securit y arrangements failed to protect the
living area and production areas from the terrorist attack because
of an overreliance on the Algerian military to protect the facility.
Furthermore, there was a lack of a strong security culture among the facility’s
senior executives, who did not believe that a credible threat existed and
thus did not invest in security preparedness and resources to protect the facility.
Following the release of the Statoil report, the In Amenas facility created
a new security organization, implemented a security improvement
program, introduced internal security governance structures, and developed
and implemented a new security risk and threat assessment process.
Underpinning all of these measures was a commitment to improve
training and multiagency cooperation.
As the In Amenas attack illustrates, critical infrastructure
stakeholders must deal with the problem of dynamic and evolving adversaries.
Since these threat groups typically have rapid planning cycles, are constantly
adapting their strategies, and can adopt new tactics to adjust to updated
security measures, NATO member states and partner nations must consider
how to stay ahead of such adversaries.5 One answer to this vital question is that
Allies and partners must keenly focus on ensuring their critical infrastructure
systems are made more secure and resilient against the current and emerging
threats and hazards they are most likely to encounter. While the list of threats
posed by malevolent actors is quite extensive, there are several types of these
man-made threats that are of greatest concern, which this section will now
explore in detail.

Insider Threat
The insider threat is a major man-made physical threat to critical
infrastructure that is often overlooked and underestimated despite the growing
number of attacks perpetrated in this manner. In fact, insiders pose the greatest
threat—especially if they are working with a foreign state or other high-level
threat groups—because of their detailed knowledge of system operations and
security practices. Insiders are often company employees or suppliers, and
they can act either as the main conspirators or as accomplices and informants
5.

Toffler Associates, Five Critical Threats, 2–3.
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to outside actors. Unlike external actors, who can only gain access to elements
of critical infrastructure by means of violent acts or subterfuge, insiders have
undisputed advantages. Given their access and placement to observe a facility’s
processes undisturbed over time, the knowledge insiders possess or the ease
with which they can acquire it is of high value to a wide range of potential
malevolent actors.
For the foreseeable future, the list of possible insider threats to critical
infrastructure includes disgruntled employees seeking revenge, hackers
testing their skills, criminals seeking financial gain, foreign intelligence
operatives seeking sensitive government or industrial information, and
terrorist groups or hostile nations conducting attacks on vital services (such
as electric power, transportation, energy, or telecommunications systems).
Along with the physical threat insiders pose to critical infrastructure,
the insider threat also affects the cyber domain where the anonymity
of cyber threat groups makes it diff icult to identify those responsible
for an intrusion or to ascertain their intentions. With these factors
in mind, methodologies for conducting risk assessments of specific systems
and vulnerable locations within critical infrastructure should include each
employee’s role within the system as well as all visitors to the site or facility.
For instance, when analyzing the threat of a person-borne IED (PBIED) used
to attack an aircraft, personnel conducting an assessment should consider,
separately, both a PBIED smuggled onto the aircraft by a passenger and
one brought on board by crewmembers and/or other airline employees.
Implementation of effective personnel hiring and vetting procedures is a key
preventive measure owners and operators of critical infrastructure can take
to enhance organizational security.
The insider threat has existed since the earliest civilizations, with stories
of insider threats present in nearly all cultures. Examples from American
history include everything from Benedict Arnold’s betrayal to recent
unauthorized and devastating disclosures of classif ied information.
Along this spectrum, there is a common narrative: trusted and capable people,
often facing enormous life challenges, exploit their access and trusted status
to betray their organization and ultimately harm the nation.
Given the resources that foreign adversaries are dedicating to exploit
or coopt insiders within organizations they seek to penetrate, insider
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threats will be an enduring part of the threat and risk landscape for most
critical infrastructure entities for years to come. 6
Since insider threats are inherently a human problem, critical infrastructure
stakeholders ultimately need to adopt human solutions to counter them.
See also chapter 3 for its discussion of the importance of human capital
in defending against cyber threats. While technology can help organizations
understand their employees’ activities in the cyber and virtual realms,
the most powerful weapons critical infrastructure owners and operators have
to counter insider threats are the personnel who comprise the organization’s work
force. To help mitigate these threats, organizations need to identify abnormal
or suspicious activity among their employees and then respond accordingly
in ways that foster trust and leverage the workforce as a partner.7
Insider threats are an increasingly important threat vector to critical
infrastructure in the context of broader security risks as well as those related
to supply chains and cybersecurity. While insider threats can cause damage
through economic espionage, sabotage, workplace violence, fraud, and
other misuse of corporate resources, the various threat activities can include
deliberate actions by insiders working with foreign intelligence services
or other actions by insiders with malicious or criminal motives.
Finally, insiders can unknowingly commit mild to severe security breaches
due to simple carelessness, utter negligence, or complete disregard for simple
security rules and procedures.
In summary, the insider threat is very real. It represents a significant
risk to critical infrastructure assets and is a hazard that critical
infrastructure stakeholders must consider in the process of assessing
and managing overall risk.

CBRNE Threat
The malevolent use of CBRNE materials is another type of man-made
physical threat to destroy or damage critical infrastructure. In the hands
of malicious actors, these materials pose a signif icant threat to the
populations, infrastructure, economies, and security of NATO member states.
Therefore, securing the public, emergency responders, agricultural
6. National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC), Insider Threat Mitigation for U.S. Critical
Infrastructure Entities: Guidelines from an Intelligence Perspective (Washington, DC: Office of the Director
of National Intelligence, 2021), 2–4, https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/news/20210319-Insider
-Threat-Mitigation-for-US-Critical-Infrastru-March-2021.pdf.
7.

NCSC, Insider Threat Mitigation, 4.
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resources, and critical infrastructure against these threats must always
be a priority. This section examines each element of the CBRNE acronym—
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives—
to understand the nature of the threat and outline potential measures
to mitigate these threats and enhance CISR policy and practices.
The first category in CBRNE, chemical materials, poses a daunting
challenge because threat actors can access these materials with relative
ease. NATO member states and partner nations manufacture and store
chemicals in abundance due to their role as an integral part of modern life.
Malevolent actors such as terrorists, extremists, and saboteurs can
use chemicals common in industrialized nations to create improvised
explosives, incendiaries, chemical agents, or even an improvised
chemical weapon. Some of the more common types of chemicals
that threat actors could use in improvised chemical weapons include
acids, ammonia, benzene, chlorine, and propane. These chemicals are
manufactured or stored in various locations, such as manufacturing plants,
industrial facilities, gas stations, and research laboratories. Since chemicals
are routinely transported using other critical infrastructure sectors—
such as rail networks, waterways, roads, and aircraft—they are easy targets
for sabotage and even more difficult to protect.
The use of man-made sarin gas to attack the Tokyo subway system
in 1995 is a sobering reminder of the vulnerabilities and impact associated
with the weaponization of dangerous chemicals. See chapter 7 for more
detail on this attack. It is also a vivid reminder of the potential dangers
associated with the motivations of malevolent groups, whether foreign
or domestic terrorists, proxy forces, elements working on behalf
of an adversarial foreign power, or the lone wolf attacker with malicious
intent toward a government, organization, or company.
The next category among CBRNE materials, biological threats,
involves the intentional and accidental release or dissemination of biological
agents like bacteria, viruses, fungi, or toxins—spread through the air, water,
or in food—to cause illness, death, and panic. Although the possibility
of attack is relatively low because of the challenges to cultivate, weaponize,
and deploy biological agents, acts of bioterrorism can still harm critical
infrastructure. Recent outbreaks of Escherichia coli (E. coli) highlight how
easily a biological attack on critical agricultural infrastructure could undermine
consumer confidence and cause a host of public health problems.
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In a recent example, a meat distributing company in the United States
had to recall more than 14 tons of beef due to a potential contamination
with E. coli. 8 This example demonstrates that agriculture and food systems
are vulnerable to diseases, pests, or poisonous agents that occur naturally,
are unintentionally introduced, or intentionally delivered by threat actors.
Certain insects, for instance, can destroy forests or agricultural zones,
causing billions of dollars in economic damage. Consequently, research
facilities studying invasive species must manage the risk of their uncontrolled
or unauthorized release.
The current global pandemic attributed to the emergence and rapid
spread of the COVID-19 virus in Wuhan, China, represents a physical
biological threat vector. Biological agents have the potential to kill millions
of people across the world with deleterious impacts on critical infrastructure,
not to mention the trillions of dollars required to respond to and recover
from the socioeconomic damage inf licted.9 The impact of COVID-19,
as well as the possible weaponization and release of new viruses or other
biological agents, demands that nations strengthen their ability to detect,
deter, destroy, or prepare for, mitigate the effects of, respond to and recover
eventually from the release of such toxins.
Many “lessons-to-be-learned and applied” will be discussed, defined,
and shared across the globe, but the unfortunate fact remains that lessons
that should be learned often are not. Consequently, when key lessons are
disregarded or not learned at an institutional, collective level, similar events
that occur in the future are susceptible to unfolding in much the same way
with the same results. Together, this wide spectrum of possible biological
threats cannot simply be disregarded, even if some are more likely to occur
than others. As chapter 13 highlights in its robust examination of assessing
and managing risk, once governments identify which infrastructures are truly
critical, all hazards that pose a significant risk to them should be clearly
defined, assessed, and considered in defining and managing risk.
The use of radiological and nuclear weapons, the third and fourth categories
of threat within the CBRNE framework, represents another dangerous
physical threat against critical infrastructure. The bad news on this front
is that increasingly well-organized and well-funded terrorist organizations,
8. David K. Li, “Over 28,000 Pounds of Ground Beef from Oregon Recalled over Possible E. Coli
Contamination,” NBC News (website), January 7, 2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/28000
-pounds-ground-beef-oregon-recalled-possible-e-coli-contamination-rcna11414.
9. “WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard,” World Health Organization (website), accessed
January 24, 2022, https://covid19.who.int/.
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which now have easy access to the expertise needed to build a bomb,
have declared their intent to seek the materials necessary for building and
using weapons of mass destruction. Although the probability of a terrorist
group building even a crude clear device or sabotaging a nuclear power
plant is low, the international community cannot afford to be complacent.
The good news is that international political leaders largely share the same
threat perception of nuclear terrorism and increasingly are cooperating
on this key policy issue to mitigate the risks emanating from it.
According to a report by the Arms Control Association and the
Fissile Materials Working Group that compiles data from 2010–16,
countries made sizable progress to curb nuclear terrorism and strengthen
and improve nuclear security.10 These voluntary national commitments
represent some of the most tangible and innovative nuclear security
protocols in existence, and countries are actively practicing and implementing
them across the globe. There is no credible evidence that any terrorist group
has succeeded in obtaining the necessary multi-kilogram critical mass
amounts of weapons-grade plutonium required to make a nuclear weapon.
Even if a group did possess a few kilograms of f issile material,
a crude terrorist-built design would require far more material and pose a huge
technical challenge. At the same time, security practitioners cannot simply
dismiss such a possibility.
The prospect of terrorists or other malevolent actors building and detonating
a so-called dirty bomb—otherwise known as a radiological dispersal device
(RDD)—is considerably higher because constructing an RDD is no more
complicated than building an IED. An RDD combines conventional explosives
with materials containing radioactive isotopes, some of which can be found
in products such as equipment to treat cancer, photocopiers, watches, and even
household smoke detectors containing the radioactive isotope Americium 241.
The detonation of an RDD would likely have a greater psychological impact
on the affected population compared to the physical damage it would cause.
Given the feasibility of an RDD attack, critical infrastructure stakeholders
must consider to what extent response forces are prepared to mitigate the
physical and psychological effects of the explosion, and what impacts such
an event would have on facilities and systems.
Beyond the damage to property and critical infrastructure, the
malevolent use of CBRNE materials has the potential for long-lasting effects
on the mental health and psyche of the citizenry and first responders involved
10. Sara Z. Kutchesfahani and Kelsey Davenport, “Why Countries Still Must Prioritize Action to
Curb Nuclear Terrorism,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (website), August 3, 2018, https://thebulletin
.org/2018/08/why-countries-still-must-prioritize-action-to-curb-nuclear-terrorism/.
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in such an incident. For instance, the physical and psychological trauma
of the bombing of the Afred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City
and the 9/11 attacks in the United States led to post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) and increased the use of and addiction to anxiety drugs. Among the
nearly 37,000 members of the World Trade Center Health Registry, roughly
14 percent suffered from PTSD and 15 percent from depression more than
a decade after the attacks, and studies indicate approximately 10 percent
of first responders were still dealing with PTSD more than a decade later.11
Similarly, the adverse mental and psychological effects of the COVID-19
pandemic show the heavy toll on societies that could result from physical
attacks impacting critical infrastructure. Adversaries have learned from these
and other catastrophic events, and are certainly factoring in these types
of effects into their prosecution of physical attacks and use of hybrid threat
vectors to divide Western societies.
The f inal threat category in the CBRNE family, explosives, is the
most common type of man-made physical threat to critical infrastructure.
This category involves the use of explosives such as IEDs, rockets, and
grenades to cause damage, disruption, or destruction of critical infrastructure.
Beyond conventional explosives, this category also includes tools as simple
as lighters and matches, crude incendiary devices, vehicle-borne IEDs, and
homemade explosive vests. In this sense, something as simple as a petrol
bomb or Molotov cocktail, coupled with a threat actor’s malicious intent,
can create disastrous consequences, damaging or destroying a critical
infrastructure’s physical facilities and disrupting or halting the essential
services they provide. Therefore, security measures for critical infrastructure
need to consider more than just protection against conventional IEDs.
Some potential protective measures include: timely, accurate information;
advanced automated surveillance (such as CCTV), detection devices for indoor
and outdoor use, prioritization of threats by installed systems (to avoid constant
false alarms), communications interoperability, and, of growing importance,
the resilience of the organization or facility following an attack.

Drone Threat
Another type of man-made physical threat to critical infrastructure is the
malevolent use of drones. Drones are any vehicle that can travel autonomously;
though commonly treated as synonyms, drones and unmanned aerial vehicles
11. Jonathan Strum, “The Effect 9/11 Had on Mental Health in America,” Recovery Village (website),
September 10, 2019, https://www.therecoveryvillage.com/mental-health/news/9-11-effect-mental-health/.
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(UAV) are not entirely the same. An autonomous aerial drone does not require
human intervention but can f ly using its onboard autopilot, computer, and suite
of sensors. Although a UAV does not require a human pilot or crewmembers
to be on board the aircraft for it to f ly, human operators typically pilot the
UAV remotely from the ground.12 The UAV is a component of an unmanned
aircraft system, which includes not just the UAV but also everything required
for it to function: the ground-based control module, its global positioning
system module, its system of communications with the UAV, and the person
on the ground controlling the UAV.13 Despite these nuanced differences, this
section will use the generic term drone to refer to the category of physical threat
posed by the entire spectrum of fully and semi-autonomous aerial systems.
When operated by tech-sav v y lone-wolf actors, terrorist groups,
domestic and transnational criminal organizations, or subservient proxies
operating in combat locations, disputed territories, or even terrain overlooking
vulnerable critical infrastructure nodes, drones pose a significant threat
to critical infrastructure. Therefore, critical infrastructure security risk
assessment and management processes need to incorporate this physical threat
vector into overall CISR posture. Depending on its power and size, a drone can
transport contraband, chemicals, or other explosives or weaponized payloads.
These systems are also capable of silently monitoring a large area from the sky
for nefarious or strategic intelligence purposes, and can even be used to perform
cyberattacks involving the theft of trade secrets, technologies, or sensitive
information affecting critical infrastructure. There are numerous examples
of malicious activities using drones to target critical infrastructure and other
sensitive sites or personnel. In France, seven nuclear power plants confirmed
unauthorized drone f lights above their facilities in 2014, while Greenpeace
activists intentionally crashed a drone into a French nuclear power plant near
Lyon in 2018.14 These examples show that drone attacks are an emerging
physical threat vector to carry out attacks against critical infrastructure—
a trend that is likely to increase in the years ahead.
Available for as little as $1,200, top-selling quadcopters can carry items
weighing up to one kilogram. Threat actors could exploit the accessibility and
12. “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), and Autonomous Drones:
What’s the Difference?,” MissionGo (website), accessed on January 24, 2022, https://www.missiongo.io
/unmanned-aerial-vehicles-uav-unmanned-aerial-systems-uas-and-autonomous-drones-whats-the-difference/.
13. “What’s the Difference between Drones, UAV, and UAS? Definitions and Terms,” Pilot Institute
(website), March 22, 2020, https://pilotinstitute.com/drones-vs-uav-vs-uas/.
14. Clay Taylor, “No Trivial Offense: Drones Disrupt Nuclear Power Plant Security,” Dedrone (blog),
August 19, 2020, https://blog.dedrone.com/en/no-trivial-offense-drones-disrupt-the-security-of-nuclear
-power-plants.
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mobility of quadcopters to transport a camera to film bridges, government
buildings, stadiums, or motorcades, looking for security f laws or even
conducting attacks using lightweight explosive devices. Due to their physical
and operational characteristics, many types of drones can evade detection
and create challenges for the owners and operators of critical infrastructure.
Given the continued accessibility and versatility drones provide, malevolent
actors will likely use drones in any of the following capacities. First, they can
use drones for reconnaissance of critical facilities to gather intelligence on the
site layout, guard movements, or other information that could help in carrying
out a physical attack. Second, threat groups can use drones to drop explosives
intended to damage critical or sensitive infrastructure in transportation
hubs and other areas of public gathering. Third, drones can deliver weapons
or other materials for use in an attack. Finally, drones can provide air support
and overwatch to support a ground attack. To demonstrate the lethality
of drone attacks against critical infrastructure, it is appropriate now to examine
the case study of the Saudi Aramco attack.
On September 14, 2019, Houthi rebels based in Yemen claimed
responsibility for using a combination of drones and cruise missiles to attack
two strategic oil facilities in Saudi Arabia operated by the state-owned
company, Saudi Aramco. Reports indicated 19 points of impact at the oil
processing plant at Abqaiq—the largest in the world—and the Khurais
oilfield, which started fires that caused considerable destruction and disruption
to the facility operations.15 Although Houthi rebels took credit for the attack,
some Western intelligence agencies dispute this claim. The advanced drone
technology used in these attacks represented a dramatic escalation in the
conf lict and in the rebels’ capability to mount such attacks, suggesting that
this attack was a state-sponsored or state-enabled act of terrorism in the region.
Despite the uncertainty regarding the specific threat actors behind the
attack, the damage to the very heart of Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure was
indisputable. The attacks damaged more than half of the depressurization
units and three of the stabilization columns at the Abqaiq oil facilities,
decreasing Saudi Arabia’s daily oil production by some five million barrels
per day over 10 days.16 This loss, which represents about five percent of global

15. “Saudi Oil Attacks: Drones and Missiles Launched from Iran -US,” BBC (website), September 17, 2019,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-49733558.
16. Katie McQueen and James Leach, “A Year after Abqaiq Attacks Saudi Aramco Still Seen Vulnerable,”
S&P Global Commodity Insights (website), October 13, 2020, https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en
/market-insights/latest-news/oil/101320-feature-a-year-after-abqaiq-attacks-saudi-aramco-still-seen-vulnerable.
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oil production, caused global oil prices to jump to a 20-year high as a result.17
The security at the Abqaiq plant was deemed extremely high, so the destruction
caused by the attacks increased concerns of a broader regional conf lict and
heightened global tensions that similar or further attacks against critical
infrastructure could intensify.18 Perhaps most alarming is that the attacks
against the Abqaiq facility, which some experts refer to as the crown jewel
of the Saudi oil infrastructure and the beating heart of the global oil system,
brought into question Saudi Arabia’s valued reputation as a dependable, stable
oil supplier to the global market.19
The considerable post-incident learning included the balance of threat,
risk, and harm when considering how to make critical infrastructure more
secure. The nature of oil, gas, and energy production illustrates the extensive
interdependencies with other infrastructure sectors, economic futures,
and global markets. Operators of critical infrastructure provide services
that are difficult to protect from the air without support by the military
or security forces. Mitigating threats to oil and gas facilities is quite
different from countering threats to other forms of critical infrastructure,
including modes of transportation such as aviation and railways.
See chapters 6 and 7 for further insight into securing against threats
to civil aviation and rail. These case studies effectively demonstrate that
security practitioners cannot take security arrangements and efforts
to mitigate threats in a specif ic sector and then apply them uniformly
across all critical infrastructure sectors. It is necessary to have a balance
based on threat, plausibilit y, credibilit y, and propor tiona lit y.
See chapters 7 and 13 for a discussion of these concepts as part of a broader
strategic risk assessment framework.
This brief survey of how malevolent forces have used drones in the past
begs the question of how long it will be before threat actors escalate their
tactics and use drones more extensively for targeting critical infrastructure.
One such danger is drone swarming, which is a tactic that employs several
drones simultaneously to coordinate operations and accomplish tasks that
a single drone cannot. In this configuration, each drone may perform a similar
function or have unique, specialized roles, such as gathering information,
17. Laila Kearney, “Oil Jumps Nearly 15% in Record Trading after Attack on Saudi Facilities,”
Reuters (website), September 15, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-oil/oil-prices-surge-15-after
-attack-on-saudi-facilities-hits-global-supply-idUSKBN1W00UG.
18. Michael Safi and Graeme Wearden, “Everything You Need to Know about the Saudi Arabia Oil
Attacks, Guardian (website), September 16, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/16/saudi
-arabia-oil-attacks-everything-you-need-to-know.
19. McQueen and Leach, “A Year after Abqaiq Attacks.”
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carrying weapons or explosives, or relaying communications. Drone swarming
requires advanced capabilities, including the ability for individual drones
to maintain spacing, avoid in-f light collision, and predict where
other drones in the swarm will be at a given time. 20 To reach this level
of sophisticated capability, drone swarms typically rely on real-time sensing,
artif icial intelligence, computer vision algorithms, and communications
based on radio frequency, cellular, or satellite communications. By using
a single ground control station to control the drone swarm, threat actors
could simplify deployment and equipment requirements, and effectively
operate the drones autonomously so that an operator does not have to control
multiple drones in real time. 21 Without being too far-fetched, it is possible
to imagine drone swarms capable of maneuvering against active defense
measures, identifying targets, and delivering payloads as diverse as chemical
agents over population centers or explosives against targets like oil fields
or water treatment facilities. 22
Examining the threat drones and drone swarms pose to critical
infrastructure highlights the need for NATO member states and partner
nations to take vital steps to enhance their CISR posture. In one such example,
NATO’s Communications and Information Agency has developed a low-cost
prototype solution for rapidly detecting, identifying, and localizing small
drones that may pose a threat. This prototype, known as the ARTEMIS
system, employs electromagnetic waves to identify drones and advanced
techniques to detect and classify radio frequency signals that the drones are
using. The equipment has been successful in open field testing, with very
promising results for use in mitigating the threat posed by commercial drones.

Threat of Precision Strike Weapons
Although rarely considered in homeland security assessments, precision
attacks using missiles—traditionally thought of as conventional weapons—
pose a threat to principal critical infrastructure systems across NATO.
Precision missiles can engage targets at extended ranges, from 100 yards
to thousands of miles. While the military already employs certain measures
20. “Drone Swarm Technology,” Unmanned Systems Technology (website), accessed on February 11, 2022,
https://www.unmannedsystemstechnology.com/expo/drone-swarm-technology/.
21.

“Drone Swarm Technology.”

22. Zachary Kallenborn and Philipp C. Bleek, “Drones of Mass Destruction: Drone Swarms and the
Future of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons,” War on the Rocks (website), February 14, 2019,
https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/drones-of-mass-destruction-drone-swarms-and-the-future-of-nuclear
-chemical-and-biological-weapons/.
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to thwart such stealthy attacks abroad and defend key military installations,
other nodes of critical infrastructure are poorly defended or not defended
at all, making them relatively soft targets. With an ever-increasing potential
for terrorists to procure missile technologies and weapons, precision missile
strikes could represent an enduring threat from both terrorists and rogue
states. To understand the numerous precision weapons that could threaten
critical infrastructure across NATO member states, this section will examine
the threats posed by short-range and long-range systems.
In the category of short-range systems, the most common weapon is the
man-portable air defense system (MANPADS), which was originally developed
to defend against military aircraft. Since MANPADS have precision strike
capabilities, are globally available, and come in a variety of configurations,
terrorists have traditionally used them to target passenger aircraft.
See chapter 6 for examples of terrorist attacks against civil aviation using
MANPADS. Given their relatively small size—some systems weigh only
35 pounds and measure six feet long—MANPADS are easy to conceal and
transport, making them ideal weapons of choice for threat actors looking
to target vulnerable points at ground facilities, such as power plants or oil
and gas facilities. Similarly, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) are readily
accessible on the weapons black market and equally easy to hide and transport.
Malevolent actors could quite easily store ATGMs, along with their guidance
system and ammunition, in a car trunk and use them to target any number
of critical infrastructure nodes, such as major f inancial facilities,
water treatment plants, and even primary government buildings.
Among long-range precision weapons systems, the threat cruise missiles
pose to critical infrastructure is also growing. While relatively few nations
have land-attack cruise missiles, many have anti-ship cruise missiles. Although
the primary function of these systems is to target ships at sea, malevolent
forces could also modify them to target critical infrastructure or simply use
them as weapons of terror by launching them indiscriminately at populated
areas. In the same way, ballistic missiles are becoming a more prevalent
threat. Although few nations possess intercontinental ballistic missiles, many
do have ballistic missiles capable of operating at shorter ranges.
Malicious actors could smuggle these missiles on cargo ships and transport
them globally for use against critical infrastructure targets or population
centers in Alliance member states and partner nations.
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Electromagnetic Pulse Threat
Another physical threat vector is an electromagnetic pulse (EMP)
event and the catastrophic effects such an event would produce.
An EMP event is a short burst of high-energy electromagnetism, which
under certain circumstances can disrupt or destroy electrical and electronic
capability. Since much of modern life depends on electricity and electronics,
a widespread EMP attack could cause a major catastrophe. When interacting
with the earth’s magnetic f ield, these powerful pulses have the ability
to damage electronic and electrical equipment like computers, cell phones,
transformers, transmission lines, and the broader critical communications
infrastructure. See chapter 9 for an overview of the communications network
as a lifeline sector. Even worse, the design of many electrical grids means that
damage to certain electrical systems, the lifeblood of any modern society,
could cause failures throughout a number of systems—including banking,
energy, transportation, food production and delivery, water, emergency
services, and cyberspace—across an entire country or region.
Extreme electromagnetic incidents caused by an intentional, man-made
EMP attack or a naturally occurring geomagnetic disturbance (also called
space weather) could cause significant damage to critical infrastructure sectors,
such as the electrical grid, communications and transportation, networks,
and water and wastewater systems. 23 Cascading effects are likely to follow,
with the impacts of an attack initially compromising one or more elements
of critical infrastructure, then spilling over into additional sectors, and
expanding beyond the initial geographic regions. Intentional attacks using
high-altitude nuclear detonations, specialized conventional munitions,
or nonnuclear directed energ y devices can lead to EMP events.
Depending upon the specific characteristics of the weapon and the attack
profile employed, the effects of an EMP event can vary in scale from local
to regional to continental. 24
Governments all over the world, and particularly their respective military
forces, have been dealing with EMP threat assessment since the early years
of the Cold War. This process is a tough assignment because the required
technical information is subject to change—especially for a nonnuclear EMP
event—and the motivational aspects stemming from political concerns and
23. National Coordinating Center for Communications, Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Protection and
Resilience Guidelines for Critical Infrastructure and Equipment (Arlington, VA: National Cybersecurity
and Communications Integration Center, 2019), 2, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0307
_CISA_EMP-Protection-Resilience-Guidelines.pdf.
24.

National Coordinating Center for Communications, Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP), 2.

30

Chapter 2

Physical Threats to Critical Infrastructure

the economic situation are difficult to evaluate and predict. Defense analyst
Peter Pry, who formerly chaired the US Congressional EMP Commission,
points out that detonating a nuclear weapon roughly 200 miles above the
United States could cause an EMP event covering almost the entire North
American continent, and malevolent actors or groups could build and employ
an EMP generator powerful enough to cripple a major metropolitan area. 25
Whether resulting from an attack or a natural event, the risks emanating
from an EMP event are considerable and they merit continued attention and
action by critical infrastructure stakeholders across NATO countries.

Accidents and Technical Threats
The f inal physical threat category this chapter examines, accidents
and technical threats, includes a host of disasters due to acts of omission
or commission, technical or infrastructural failures of various kinds, and
situations or events that result directly from human error. Among these
threats are technical failures to power grids and water treatment facilities,
faulty safety systems, aging infrastructure that causes a water main to rupture
or hazardous materials to release, and even monkeys (or other things) falling
into places they should not. Together, the consequences of these threats range
from mild to severe.
Examples of these types of incidents include radiation leaks at nuclear
power plants, toxic gas emissions from chemical plants, lethal emissions
from fertilizer production plants, and human death and environmental
destruction caused by oil and gas platform catastrophes. The release of deadly
radioactive materials following the 1986 Chernobyl and 2011 Fukushima
nuclear plant accidents are two specif ic examples in recent memory.
The catastrophic effects of these two incidents also highlight the devastating
potential use of these materials in the hands of malevolent actors.
With the growing use of and reliance on nuclear energy, theft of nuclear
materials and terrorist motivations to attack and release radiological materials
are realities that demand robust security, safety support, and regulatory
oversight to counter.
The pace with which modern economies have become inextricably
linked over the past two decades, especially through the great strides made
in information and communication technology, has exposed the societies
25. Edd Gent, “US Air Force Is Guarding against Electromagnetic Pulse Attacks. Should We
Worry?” LiveScience (website), March 11, 2021, https://www.livescience.com/air-force-emp-attacks
-protection.html.
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and critical infrastructure of NATO member states to a set of unprecedented
threats and vulnerabilities. Even simple wear and tear poses a constant
challenge to critical infrastructure. Although critical infrastructure does
not fail because of advanced age or lagging maintenance alone, aging assets
can degrade performance and lead to functional obsolescence, both of which
increase the risk of failure. Incidentally, accidents attributed to the use
of farm equipment, such as using a backhoe to dig in the ground, account
for more disruption of communications systems per day than any other physical
event. What is unfortunate about the threats from accidents and technical
failures is that any one of them has the potential to produce unacceptable losses
in terms of human casualties, property destruction, economic effects, or public
morale and confidence. This stark reality is precisely why all three categories
of physical threat—natural disasters, man-made events, and accidents and
technical failures—must be taken into consideration when determining risk
to specific elements of critical infrastructure in any sector.

More to Consider: Threats to Port Facilities
Maritime transport—comprised of dry bulk ships, container ships, and oil
tankers—accounts for 80 percent of the world’s trade volume and 70 percent
of its trade value, making major sea ports the hubs of all global economic
activity. 26 Many critical infrastructure facilities in NATO member states
are located along coastlines, to include oil and gas terminals, desalination
plants, and nuclear plants that require large amounts of water for the cooling
process. These major ports present a target rich environment for malevolent
actors; the right target, in the right location, at the right time using the
right threat vector could cause enormous damage to port facilities and to the
societies and economies they support. Security and resilience planners as well
as owners and operators of port facilities have much to consider when thinking
about the physical threats to major ports. To get a better sense of the challenges
of protecting these vital facilities, stakeholders in sea ports must consider
the port from a geospatial perspective, which requires an examination
of the water around the port—both the surface level and under the water—
as well as the port facilities on land and the airspace above them.
Regarding the physical threats emanating from the water surrounding
port facilities, several terrorist organizations have demonstrated their intent
to develop capabilities to conduct kinetic strikes from the sea, in particular
26. Myrto Kalouptsidi, “The Role of Shipping in World Trade,” Econofact (website), June 9, 2021,
https://econofact.org/the-role-of-shipping-in-world-trade.
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those that combine the use of scuba divers and explosives. 27 There are two
predominant methods divers employ to attack ports: they either attach some
sort of a mine to a craft adjacent to the port or they emplace a mine on the
port’s channel bed. Divers may find it challenging to transport and emplace
a large quantity of explosives that would be required to have a significant
impact when attacking most large vessels. Nevertheless, a strategically placed
charge could cause significant damage and difficulties for cruise ships, naval
vessels, or a single-hulled tanker filled with components that support a wide
variety of critical infrastructure. This idea is not far-fetched, as an example
from December 2014 illustrates. Then, Egyptian security forces arrested
members of a terrorist cell in Sinai for attempting to carry out an attack
against Egyptian warships. During the arrest, security forces found scuba
diving gear among the members of the terrorist cell, which was already
complicit in previous attacks using small arms weapons and missiles to conduct
ambushes and hijackings against Egyptian naval vessels. 28
Similarly, waterside port security must account for attacks from a number
of platforms malevolent actors could use, including fast boats, jet skis,
shipping containers, and remotely piloted boats. When considering which
types of attacks are plausible, there are two specif ic examples that are
especially helpful. The first attack vector, pursued by terrorist groups like
al-Qaeda, is to smuggle an IED into a ship-borne container for detonation
against targets far from the original launch site as a form of power projection
for terrorist groups. 29
A second potential attack mode is to create a swarm that combines
suicide boat drones and piloted suicide boats—effectively a maritime version
of the aerial drones and drone swarms described in the previous section.
This attack vector is similar to how the Japanese Imperial Navy and Army
used Shinyo suicide boats, capable of carrying more than 500 pounds
of explosives and traveling nearly 30 miles per hour, to cause significant
damage to US ships during World War II. 30 In the modern context,
Houthi rebels used a remote-controlled boat loaded with explosives—
likely provided by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps—to attack the Royal
27. Meghan Curran, Soft Targets & Black Market: Terrorist Activities in the Maritime Domain
(Broomfield, CO: One Earth Future, 2019), 10–12.
28. Norman Cigar, The Jihadist Maritime Strategy: Waging a Guerrilla War at Sea (Quantico, VA:
Marine Corps University, 2017), 17–18, https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/MES/Monographs/MESM_8
_MAY_2017_lo.pdf?ver=2018-10-16-110147-393.
29.

Cigar, Jihadist Maritime Strategy, 28.

30. Bob Hackett and Sander Kingsepp, “Shinyo! Battle Histories of Japan’s Explosive Moorboats,”
Combined Fleet (website), November 26, 2011, http://www.combinedfleet.com/ShinyoEMB.htm.
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Saudi Navy’s frigate Al Madinah in January 2017. 31 While this attack vector
is similar to the suicide boat attack against the USS Cole in 2000, the capability
to conduct unmanned attacks represents a more dangerous threat because
malevolent forces can be bolder and more lethal when their own lives are not
directly at stake. With respect to physical threats to land-based port facilities,
the vehicle-borne IED is, for good reason, still the weapon of choice for
most terrorists. These mobile weapons can pack large amounts of explosives
into a vehicle, and the bigger the vehicle, the bigger the explosion.
Not only can threat actors drive a vehicle-borne IED directly to the target
location, these attacks can also be difficult to detect and prevent.
As this chapter discussed earlier, malevolent forces can take
advantage of the availabilit y and mobilit y of drones to target
land-based port facilities from above with the goal of crippling key machines
or neutralizing the work force either temporarily or permanently.
Such attacks can be devastating enough during routine port operations and
daily business. They can be even more damaging when NATO member states
are in the process of mobilizing military forces and equipment in support
of collective defense, crisis management, or other external operations.
See chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of the importance of maritime
transportation to NATO operations and the challenge posed by hybrid threats.
The difficulty of building and maintaining secure, resilient ports is certainly
formidable. However, signif icant investments of thought and resources,
the development of advanced situational awareness capabilities for a common
operating picture, and the deployment of effective threat countermeasures
and state-of-the-art protection systems are helping to secure major ports.
This accomplishment represents some of the very best CISR efforts
in a number of nations.

Increasing Sophistication and Outsourcing
of Physical Threats
Since the 9/11 attacks, the ability to monitor, detect, and defend against
a wide range of physical threats to critical infrastructure has increased
considerably, as demonstrated by the vast number of video-surveillance
cameras—and their attendant software and human controllers—surrounding
almost every critical infrastructure site or facility in many Western nations.
31. Sam LaGrone, “Navy: Saudi Frigate Attacked by Unmanned Bomb Boat, Likely Iranian,”
USNI News (website), February 20, 2017, https://news.usni.org/2017/02/20/navy-saudi-frigate-attacked
-unmanned-bomb-boat-likely-iranian.
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Unfortunately, as the defenders have become more sophisticated, so too have
the attackers and their capabilities. 32
Since private-sector entities own and operate much of the critical
infrastructure in the West, expensive security measures inevitably compete
against an array of economic considerations, creating a reality in which
security alone is never the deciding factor. This dynamic creates two unique
vulnerabilities. The first, resource disparity, is based on the fact that securing
critical infrastructure against physical threats can be an expensive venture that
requires the allocation of significant resources but must contend with other
competing priorities as well. Often there are not sufficient resources to address
all potential security challenges, or there is not a strong enough rationale
to justify spending money on security instead of improving business efficiency
or enhancing operations. Large companies and organizations are more likely
than small companies to be able to afford such expenditures. The second
vulnerability, outsourcing complexity, highlights the tendency for companies
and organizations to focus on core competencies, and outsource all else
to outside providers, to include areas such as transportation, utilities,
healthcare, and f inancial-service providers. Quite often, physical and
cyber protection services are also outsourced, making optimized defense
more complicated. 33
Given the trend of emerging physical threats against critical infrastructure,
governments and private industry need to be cognizant of the responsibility
they shoulder and therefore remain vigilant in their efforts to anticipate and
counter physical threats to the greatest extent possible. It is essential that
security managers learn to monitor physical threats and constantly innovate
for maximum resilience, for the cost of failure is just too high.

Nexus between Threat and Risk
An accurate threat assessment relies on detailed knowledge and
understanding of the intentions and capabilities of the potential threat actors,
whether an act of nature, a proxy force, malevolent non-state actors, terrorists,
or an insider with malicious intent. A quality security risk assessment considers
the likelihood—including both threat and vulnerability—and consequences
of unwanted events perpetuated by a host of threat actors. Vital to any credible
32. Johnathan Tal, “America’s Critical Infrastructure: Threats, Vulnerabilities and Solutions,”
Security InfoWatch (website), September 20, 2018, https://www.securityinfowatch.com/access-identity/access
-control/article/12427447/americas-critical-infrastructure-threats-vulnerabilities-and-solutions.
33.
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CISR program is the ability to juxtapose a given threat in relation to the
risks and vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure systems and the current
capabilities of relevant stakeholders. Unless there is strategic commitment
to a security program based on threats and risks to critical infrastructure,
it will be virtually impossible to create a demonstrably effective national
CISR architecture, culture, and policy.
Understanding a threat actor’s intentions requires detailed knowledge
and understanding of the actor’s beliefs, background, worldview, goals, and
capabilities to act on any malicious intent by conducting a physical attack.
In the case of natural threats or threats due to accidents or technical
failures, such knowledge involves scientific predictions of the likelihood
of natural disasters or the failure of infrastructure components due to factors like
time and stress. Security experts agree the myriad of debilitating and harmful
acts that malevolent forces can perpetrate against critical infrastructures are
diverse, constantly changing, and becoming more sophisticated and difficult
to thwart. However, if critical infrastructure is to be secured effectively
and made more resilient, then those stakeholders with this charge need
to understand thoroughly the spectrum of plausible physical threats that
exist today or lie just over the horizon—a place where the unknown
unknowns, introduced in chapter 1, often emerge.
Risk is the potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident,
event, or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood—a function of threats
and vulnerabilities—and the associated consequences. Risk management is the
process of identifying, analyzing, and communicating risk while accepting,
avoiding, transferring, or controlling it to an acceptable level and cost.
Risk management focuses resources on those threats and hazards that are
most likely to cause significant, unwanted outcomes to a specific critical
infrastructure system or sector, and informs actions designed to prevent
or mitigate the effects of those incidents. It also increases security and
strengthens resilience by identifying and prioritizing actions to ensure
continuity of essential functions and services, and to support enhanced
response and restoration. Risk management facilitates decision making and
the setting of priorities among all stakeholders.
A risk management framework sets out an approach to fulfill three key
functions in a consistent manner. First, the framework aims to identify,
analyze, and allocate resources to deter, detect, disrupt, and prepare
for threats and hazards to critical infrastructure. Second, the risk
management framework enables decisionmakers to prioritize and
direct efforts to reduce vulnerabilities, and address physical features
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or operational attributes of critical infrastructure systems that are vulnerable
to exploitation or susceptible to a given hazard. Finally, it helps stakeholders
proactively mitigate the potential consequences of incidents or prepare
to limit them effectively if they do occur. The risk management framework
can be applicable to all levels of government or private sector organizations.
It should cover all threats and hazards and varying factors across critical
infrastructure sectors, in addition to individual assets and systems.
See chapter 13 for an in-depth explanation of the nature of security risk
assessment and management as well as relevant best practices.
The types of physical threats identif ied in this chapter have the
potential to harm, damage, incapacitate, or destroy critical infrastructure.
The intent and capability of an adversary, the adversary’s access to a critical
infrastructure target, and the opportunity to act upon these threat motives
contribute to if, when, and how threat groups actually execute an attack.
Threats to critical infrastructure vary in intent, capability, potential or intended
targets, attack methodologies, and opportunities. Rather than focusing
on one type of threat or hazard at a time, nations should identify all threats
and hazards that pose the greatest risks to their critical infrastructure.
This process allows for more effective and eff icient planning and
resource allocation.
Critical infrastructure has long been subject to risks associated
with many of the physical threats discussed in this chapter, but now serious
risks and threats emanate from the cyber domain as well. These risks stem
from a growing integration of information and communications technologies
with critical infrastructure and from adversaries focused on exploiting potential
cyber vulnerabilities. As physical facilities become more reliant on complex
cyber systems for operations, critical infrastructure will become increasingly
vulnerable to certain cyber threats. Many of these cyber threats can cause
similar levels of damage, disruption, and destruction as a number of physical
threats. See chapters 3 and 4 for their discussion of the nature of the threats
in the cyber domain and the combination of physical and cyber threats
in a hybrid manner.
Connections and interdependencies between infrastructure elements
and sectors mean that damage, disruption, or destruction to one
infrastructure element by a physical (or cyber) event can cause cascading
effects that impact continuity of operations in other sectors or systems.
Identifying and understanding interdependencies (two-way) or dependencies
(one-way) between infrastructure elements and sectors are important
for assessing the risks and vulnerabilities, and for determining which steps
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may be taken to increase security and resilience. See chapter 12 for further
explanation of the dependencies and interdependencies between critical
infrastructure sectors, and the potential for cascading or escalating effects.
For example, the electric grid relies on integrated information and
communication systems from other critical infrastructure sectors
in order to operate, while the electric grid also powers lifeline sectors
(such as transportation and water treatment systems).

Conclusion
The current threat environment is changing in ways that require
new kinds and levels of attention. Critical infrastructure across NATO member
states is in both the geopolitical battle space and the target of extensive
criminal activities. The foreign intelligence threat has never been more
complex or dynamic than it is today. Foreign intelligence entities are developing
the capacity to exploit, disrupt, or degrade the critical infrastructure systems
that underpin global energy and f inancial markets, telecommunications
services, government functions, and defense capabilities. 34 By these efforts,
foreign intelligence services seek to inf luence or coerce decisionmakers
during periods of crisis by holding critical infrastructure at risk.
Compared to the rest of the world, NATO member states generally have
had the tremendous privilege of being able to take functioning critical
infrastructure for granted. Clean water, reliable roads, high-quality health
care, dependable electricity, telephones, and e-mail are all so fundamental
to modern life in the West it is impossible to picture life without them.
However, the events of the f irst decades of the twenty-f irst century
demonstrate the need to reevaluate any assumptions of uninhibited access
to these services. Threat elements will likely plan to avoid Allied armed
forces and instead seek to damage those targets which are not well
defended and could cause the most physical and psychological damage.
Malevolent forces are targeting the infrastructures that support the NATO
member states and their armed forces.
For NATO nations, it is vital to understand the nature of these
critical infrastructures, their inherent vulnerabilities and risks, and the
threats they face. As new technologies increase the speed of operations,
the f low of information, or the timeliness of developing a common
operating picture, opportunities for threat actors to damage or destroy
critical infrastructure also increase. When adopting new systems
34.
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or building new critical infrastructure facilities, Allies and partners must
constantly assess the inherent risks and vulnerabilities of these systems as well
as the ways in which malevolent forces could threaten them. This vigilant
assessment helps ensure that every move forward does not expose a weak link
that threat groups can target and attack.
Given the evolving threat environment, critical infrastructure
stakeholders in the private and public sectors and all levels government
must continually assess their security postures against the spectrum
of physical threat actors and threat vectors they face. Assessing the
organization’s overall enterprise security posture and accounting for recent
investments or changes in organizational security are key steps to take.
Additionally, organizations must evaluate to what extent their security
posture aligns with the current and emerging threat environment.
When the security posture and procedures do not align the nature
of the threat, it is vital that organizations identify the mismatch and
know which leaders in the organization are accountable for correcting
such a def iciency in the security program, and how they should
go about it. If existing policies and practices cannot answer such questions,
critical infrastructure organizations need to conduct a security posture
review and assessment. 35 With such a strong commitment to assessing
risks and threats, and taking the steps to mitigate them, NATO
member states and partner nations can strengthen the culture of security
and resilience needed to mitigate the broad array of physical threats
to critical infrastructure. Such measures will contribute to the security
and prosperity of individual nations and also put the broader Alliance
in a better position to fulfill NATO’s core tasks.

35.

NCSC, Insider Threat Mitigation, 10.
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The risks against critica l infrastr uct ure are on the rise,
particularly in the cyber domain. While the COVID-19 pandemic has
increased the average household’s online activity and compelled businesses
to adopt practices to accommodate a more remote workforce, it has also
presented malevolent attackers an unprecedented opportunity to test
cybersecurity systems and exploit vulnerabilities. Within the first six months
of the pandemic, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Cyber
Division reported a 400 percent increase in total cyberattacks compared
to pre-pandemic levels, while Interpol highlighted an “alarming rate
of cyberattacks aimed at major corporations, governments, and critical
infrastructure.” 1 The pandemic has also demonstrated the signif icance
of the digital infrastructure for the continuity of modern life. The dependable
operation of electricity, natural gas, oil, water and wastewater systems, and
telecommunications is vital for the functionality of a state and the essential
services it provides. In this sense, critical infrastructure stakeholders are
responsible for establishing a cybersecurity posture with implications
for national security.
In the cyber domain, two perspectives prevail: an offensive mindset
or a defensive mentality. From the defensive perspective, those responsible
1. MonsterCloud, “Top Cyber Security Experts Report: 4,000 Cyber Attacks a Day since
COVID-19 Pandemic,” CISION PR Newswire (website), August 11, 2020, https://www.prnewswire.com
/news-releases/top-c yber-securit y-exper ts-repor t-4-0 0 0 -c yber-at tacks-a-day-since-cov id-19
-pandemic-301110157.html.
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for defending their systems are facing great uncertainty as they seek
to counter and mitigate the challenging array of threats in the cyber domain.
In a way, the offensive approach is simpler since attackers focus
exclusively on f inding a system vulnerability to breach and exploit.
This chapter prioritizes the offensive perspective and thus will adopt
an adversarial perspective to focus on the vulnerabilities, risks, and threats
to critical infrastructure in the cyber domain. For an overview of the defensive
mentality, see chapter 14 for its discussion of the cybersecurity tools and
best practices for securing critical infrastructure.
To design a successful attack, threat actors must comprehend the nature
of the target and its relevant components and relationships. From the offensive
outlook, the ultimate goal is first to find a single vulnerability to gain access
to the computer systems, which the attacker will later exploit to elevate
privileges within the system. The offensive mentality ref lects security practices
abundant in the natural world. In nature, for example, predators use two
primary tools—stealth and strategy—to capture their prey. 2 In the cybersecurity
sector and associated literature, one helpful depiction of this offensive mindset
is Lockheed Martin’s Cyber Kill Chain® model, which identifies the seven
steps cyber threat actors must take to achieve their goals. 3 Based on its
knowledge base of tactics, techniques, and procedures that adversaries have used
in cyberattacks, MITRE’s ATT&CK® methodology elaborates on these seven
steps in a framework that diligently outlines a possible adversarial approach.4
The matrix outlines the phases of a cyberattack, beginning with an initial
period of preparation—consisting of reconnaissance and weaponization—
and continuing with key steps such as execution, persistence, privilege
escalation, defense evasion, and lateral movement.
Since every critical infrastructure system is situated in a unique
operating environment, attackers must first understand the landscape and
the targeted organization. Critical infrastructure can be understood as a
colossal gear mechanism that only fulfills its specific function if all gears work
as designed; any design or organizational f law, therefore, quickly becomes
a vulnerability. Second, most critical infrastructure assets and systems
are owned and operated by the private sector. Thus, they are generally
business-oriented facilities that must operate within specif ic economic
limitations. Finally, critical infrastructure inherently involves the human
2. See Raphael D. Sagarin and Terence Taylor, eds., Natural Security: A Darwinian Approach to a Dangerous World
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).
3. “The Cyber Kill Chain,” Lockheed Martin (website), n.d., accessed September 2, 2021, https://www.lockheedmartin.com
/en-us/capabilities/cyber/cyber-kill-chain.html.
4. “ATT&CK Matrix for Enterprise,” MITRE (website), n.d., accessed September 2, 2021, https://attack.mitre.org.
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dimension because critical infrastructure assets and systems are (1) owned
and operated by the human workforce, and (2) they provide essential services
to end users, so any disruption will impact daily life.
This chapter will provide an overview of a critical infrastructure’s
technical layers and systems, followed by an examination of its various
layers of technology, and then a discussion of its potential organizational
vulnerabilities related to the human workforce and management. Next, the
chapter will introduce the difference in mentality between cyberattackers
and defenders, highlight the various categories of threat actors, and
conclude with an overview of the rising and recent primary attacks types
to demonstrate the various approaches cyber threat actors employ
to exploit the vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure.

Technical Layers and Structures in Critical Infrastructure
Infrastructures are large-scale, manufactured systems that operate
interdependently to produce and distribute essential goods—such as energy,
water, and data—and services, including transportation, banking, and
health care. 5 Critical infrastructure plays an essential role in the vitality
of a society and the functionality of the state. See chapter 1 for an overview
of the relationship between lifeline sectors and other critical infrastructure
sectors. Based on factors like their geography, natural resources, and
economies, states differ in which infrastructure systems they classify as critical.
See chapter 12 for a comparison of which sectors some countries classify
as critical infrastructure. In an oil-producing country, for example,
the priority to protect oil ref ineries is much higher than in others.
Each critical infrastructure sector has unique requirements and practices
given the different services and goods these sectors provide. Among the
various types of critical infrastructure facilities, there are differences
in design, planning, functionality, organization, and specification properties
depending on the sector. For example, the design and function of nuclear
power plants are notably different from telecommunications or water
systems. For a better grasp of cybersecurity of critical infrastructures,
it is important to note that—despite the differences outlined above—
systems also have similarities on the organizational and technical layers that
merit further exploration.

5. Enrico Zio, “Critical Infrastructures Vulnerability and Risk Analysis,” European Journal for Security Research 1 (2016):
99, https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s41125-016-0004-2.pdf.
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Connectedness and Technical Complexity
By nature, critical infrastructures are inherently complex, distributed
systems that resemble a tree with its roots buried in the soil and its
branches in plain sight. It is therefore more appropriate to model the
interconnectedness of these structures as a system-of-systems, which consists
of “multiple, heterogeneous, operationally distributed, occasionally
independently operating systems embedded in networks at multiple levels
that evolve over time.”6 The complexity of a system-of-systems affects both
the protection requirements and crisis management procedures. There are
two significant types of complexity present in these critical infrastructure
systems. First, the level of connectedness between systems means that
any malfunction could create a cascading effect among similar facilities.
Second, the connectedness also affects other sectors that are not similar
in kind but nonetheless dependent. See chapter 12 for a detailed
discussion of cascading and escalating failures resulting from dependencies
and interdependencies bet ween critica l infrastr uct ure systems.
For instance, any glitch in the telecommunication sector would quickly
affect all sectors that depend on telecommunications for their operations.
To illustrate this concept of connectedness, figure 3-1 shows how a power
outage in Italy in 2003 affected several other critical infrastructure sectors
within Italy and across national borders.7

6. Daniel DeLaurentis, “Role of Humans in Complexity of a System-of-Systems,” in Digital Human
Modeling, ed. Vincent G. Duffy (Berlin: Springer, 2007), 363.
7. Wolfgang Kröger and Enrico Zio, Vulnerable Systems (London: Springer, 2011), 13.
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Figure 3-1. Impacts of the Italian blackout on other sectors
(Diagram by Springer)

The complex nature of these dependencies, which increases
the potential for signif icant crises and cascading or escalating
failures, highlights the need for cross-sector coordination, planning,
and exercises before cyberattacks occur. 8 Unfortunately, the general lack
of cooperation, communication, and participation in comprehensive exercises
across critical infrastructure sectors is a vulnerability that malevolent
cyber actors could exploit. One security expert notes:
Complex systems like the electric power grid, water networks,
transportation networks, and communications networks tend
to self-organize into a critical state, and, once in this state, any
8. Gianluca Pescaroli and David Alexander, “Critical Infrastructure, Panarchies and the Vulnerability
Paths of Cascading Disasters,” Natural Hazards 82 (2016): 187–88, https://link.springer.com/content
/pdf/10.1007/s11069-016-2186-3.pdf.
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change to the system can start a chain reaction. These chain
reactions manifest as cascading avalanches, nuclear power
plant meltdowns, and electrical power grid collapses. When
a sand pile reaches a critical state, the addition of a single grain
of sand may lead to avalanches of unpredictable size—even
extreme avalanches that completely destroy the sand pile.9
Communications between and among government authorities and
critical infrastructure owners and operators is, therefore, a crucial element
of CISR policy and practice. See chapter 11 for examples of multidirectional
information sharing and blue-sky coordination between the public and private
sectors. In a critical infrastructure facility, there are several unique levels
of operation, including business, management, core production, supply chain
(third parties), and perimeter security. To sustain the proper functionality
of the facilities, coordination and communication between these layers
are critical. In the core production layer, two types of technologies are
essential: information technologies (IT) and operational technologies (OT).
Although similar in some ways, IT and OT are each unique enough to require
operators and defenders to have a particular knowledge and special insight
to work with them. The integration of these technologies is a vital element
of robust cyber systems.
In addition to the operational complexity of connectedness, there is
a temporal effect on these facilities. The industrial control system (ICS)
architecture is comprised of layers of solutions, processes, and procedures.
Underlying and ensuring the sustained operations of critical infrastructure
is an ICS structure that consists of several types of control systems,
such as supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA), distributed control
systems, and programmable logic controllers. A hallmark of Industry 4.0
is the prevalence of Internet of Things (IoT) components in the critical
infrastructure domain. The increase of wireless communication between
nonhuman components also pushes the limits of wireless communication
protocols and creates additional responsibilities in cybersecurity.
In ICS management, several components have to function together
to sustain the operation of critical infrastructure. Adding to the
complexity of the ICS, the critical infrastructure network is comprised
of several IT and OT components made by different vendors and typically
with different lifespans, dissimilar updates, and varied support
requirements. When critical infrastructure owners and operators prioritize
9.

Ted G. Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2015), 49.
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functionality and productivity over the security of ICS components,
cybersecurity risks increase in the critical infrastructure ecosphere.
Thus, when it comes to implementing CISR policy and ensuring continued
operation of critical infrastructure, the facility’s chief security officer plays
a crucial role in mitigating the vulnerabilities, risks, and threats in the cyber
domain. ICS components are not publicly circulated devices or components,
so targeting them requires attackers to have intimate knowledge of the
components—a reality that decreases the number of adversaries with the
degree of specificity needed to attack OT components. On the other hand,
the attacks targeting ICS components have predominantly originated
from advanced persistent threat groups or those with state sponsorship.
The ICS structure, built by components from different vendors, requires
considerable planning to integrate the necessary updates, upgrades, and
security patches and to ensure this renewal process does not hinder the
overall function of the system. Since it can be challenging to know how
these various components will function after completing the renewal process,
those responsible for these upgrades and updates could be hesitant
to introduce any change that may threaten the system’s ability to work
as designed. As a result, the SCADA and ICS components that enable the
operation of critical infrastructure often do not receive most of the updates
and security patches they require.

Layers of Technology: Information Technology,
Operational Technology, and the Industrial Internet of Things
The functionality of different computer protocols within a given critical
infrastructure enhances the system productivity but complicates the security.
The IT and OT systems within a critical infrastructure’s core production
area are connected and synchronized to sustain the production or servicing
of the facility. As its name indicates, designers of OT have in mind the
ability to perform specif ied actions that ensure operational continuity
of the critical infrastructure. As a result, during the operational design
of OT systems, f unctiona l it y is the priorit y, not securit y.
Engineers, in principle, do not connect the OT systems directly to the Internet
during the design phase, but use firewalls to keep OT systems separate.
Since information technology focuses on the computer and telecommunication
systems that perform data input, storage, recover y, transmission,
data processing, and data protection, it prioritizes data and the proper data
handling procedures. Innovations in the IT realm change and improve
rapidly, and most IT infrastructures could quickly embrace and adopt the
latest technological advancements with little effort. In a critical infrastructure
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environment, an IT network forms the foundation for the business and
enterprise levels while the tightly coupled nature of IT and OT systems
in the core production area presents an important vulnerability.
In the 1980s, OT and IT systems functioned primarily in an independent
manner. In the 1990s, OT systems started to connect to IT systems to centralize
the management. In the 2000s, OT engineers built IT-compatible systems
to improve the communication problems between two systems. The boundaries
between IT and OT systems thus started to blur in the networks. Today, OT
systems also cooperate with cloud computing and wireless technologies.
Simply put, operational technology is the computing capacity to fulfill
an operation and monitor devices, various industrial processes, and some
industry events. See f igure 3-2 for a typical network architecture for
OT industrial systems.10 OT systems perform important functions, including
production-line management, mining-operations control, and oil and gas
monitoring. The operational technology prioritizes the process required
to keep the system functional, so enhancing the availability, precision, and
reliability of OT services is essential. In the critical infrastructure sector, OT
systems regularly monitor the processes and support the manufacturing and
defense utilities.

Figure 3-2. Typical OT industrial systems network architecture
(Diagram by Applied Sciences)
10. Jaco Prinsloo, Saurabh Sinha, and Basie von Solms, “Review of Industry 4.0 Manufacturing Process
Security Risks,” Applied Sciences 9, no. 23 (2019): 3, https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/9/23/5105
/pdf?version=1574739445.
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Unlike most IT systems, which are highly controlled and regulated
by system administrators, OT systems typically are not governed by the
same limitations or access rules. To protect the functionality of OT systems,
they should not be as accessible as the IT systems. Compared to IT systems,
OT systems are far more diff icult to recover and restore in the event
of a failure, and any OT network failure can yield catastrophic results or lead
to an “end-of-life” scenario.
Over time, OT systems have gradually become more secure,
though this progress does not match the considerable efforts focused
on securing IT systems. With limited firmware upgrades, the supported
lifetime of an OT component is between 10 –20 years. In contrast,
the hardware, software and protocols of IT systems are rapidly changing.
This difference in the pace and types of changes between these two systems
creates compatibility and communication problems. The technological changes
in IT and OT systems can challenge critical infrastructure operators’ ability
to adapt to the changes and manage the process of installing updates and
patches. Given these challenges, critical infrastructure facilities require
strategic plans to manage this process and ensure the proper blend of security
upgrades and continued business operations.
A signif icant segment of OT systems is the ICS architecture,
which consists of systems that monitor and control industrial processes
with the assistance of programmable logic controllers or discrete process
control systems. SCADA systems, which are responsible for managing the
ICS, have two main components. The first is the human machine interface.
The second is the historian, which provides a graphical user interface
for operators to observe the status of a system easily, receive any alarms
indicating out-of-band operation, or enter system adjustments to manage
the process under control. In addition to SCADA, key programs in the
OT systems category include computer numerical control, buildingmanagement systems, and building-automation systems. The OT systems
also have their own communication protocols that differ from those used
in IT systems. OT systems also frequently use remote terminal units (RTU)
to connect one or multiple devices (actuators and monitors) to manage
or monitor a process from close proximity or from thousands of kilometers
away from the headquarters.
Beyond IT and OT systems, the newest element inf luencing the
operations and cybersecurity of critical infrastructure is Industry 4.0,
which enables the intelligent networking of machines and processes
to increase efficiency. The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) refers to the
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use of the IoT in industrial sectors, and it enables machine-to-machine and
artificial-intelligence applications in several categories. Although not without
risks, these machine-to-machine applications can simplify the complicated
production or control processes. In critical infrastructures, the primary
distinction between IIoT devices lies at the intersection of IT and OT
layers. The IIoT can also optimize visibility of the supply chain and logistics
by utilizing smart sensors and actuators. This networking structure can
also enhance the OT security community’s knowledge and understanding
of its networks.11 In the OT environment, the challenge is determining
whether the problem is an unusual incident resulting from an attack or simply
a basic software error.

Social Complexity and Socio-technical Structures
While the technical complexity of computer systems has been a topic
of study for years, the concept of social complexity is unique and comparatively
new. A conventional understanding of security focuses on securing nonhuman
components in the operational zone and looks to automation as the ideal tool
to control all possible outcomes. The automation and restriction of nonhuman
components require less effort than dealing with social unpredictability.
The problem is that critical infrastructures are business-oriented service
sectors and have to cooperate with several third-party partners. It is possible
to leverage automation as a means to minimize the human workforce,
but not without exposing the critical infrastructure to other vulnerabilities.12
The modern approach to social complexity, however, understands the whole
of the network and its human and automated components within the facility.
Engineers, together with their cell phones, access cards, tokens, and server
rooms, should be considered in a networked mentality. This perspective would
reveal just how many components are connected and demonstrate the levels
of complexity in a facility.
The actor-network theory (ANT) understands each element as a node
in a particular organization or structure.13 The micro-level understanding
11. David Masson, “SANS ICS Security Summit 2021 Recap: Industry on the Move,” Darktrace (blog),
March 26, 2021, https://www.darktrace.com/en/blog/sans-ics-security-summit-2021-recap-industry-on
-the-move/.
12. Federico Maggi and Marcello Pogliani, Rouge Automation: Vulnerable and Malicious Code
in Industrial Programming (Irving, TX: Trend Micro Research, 2020), https://documents.trendmicro.com/
assets/white_papers/wp-rogue-automation-vulnerable-and-malicious-code-in-industrial-programming.pdf.
13. Karin Hedström, Gurpreet Dhillon, and Fredrik Karlsson, “Using Actor Network Theory
to Understand Information Security Management,” in Security and Privacy—Silver Linings in the
Cloud, ed. K. Rannenberg, V. Varadharajan, and C. Weber (Berlin: Springer, 2010), 43–54,
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-642-15257-3_5.pdf.

50

Chapter 3

Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructure

of the critical infrastructure in a networked mode can help the protection
level see and assess the vulnerabilities and weaknesses more easily by giving
clues about the specific interactions between the various elements in a facility.
The ANT approach also can present a holistic perspective on the security
of critical infrastructure. When an attacker decides to target a specific critical
infrastructure, the next step will be to find the right vulnerability to exploit
and thus gain initial access to the system. Attackers pursue this goal via
hardware additions, trusted relationships, replication through removable
media, and external remote services.14 In this context, the theft of an engineer’s
mobile device or unauthorized access to a manager’s virtual private network
accounts could quickly become vulnerabilities that jeopardize the functionality
of the entire system.15 The practice of ANT can also assist critical
infrastructure operators and cybersecurity teams to identify potential
consequences if and when they happen.
Additionally, temporal changes can also impact critical infrastructure
systems. There are times when economic and political considerations
or natural disasters compel critical infrastructure operators to expand the
facility’s output capacity to respond to new service demands for a period
of time. There are also situations in which a facility begins under public
ownership but then transfers to private sector management or when the
layout of the facility changes for reasons such as renovations or additional
construction. High turnover among the workforce at these facilities can affect
the requisite expert knowledge to ensure efficient operations, even if specific
blueprints and records are available to new workers.
In most critical infrastructures, the nature of operations—
namely, uninterrupted service—means there is reduced visibility and
control during the system’s functionality. Facilities tend to coordinate their
production levels with the facilities in kind to organize the distribution
of the product that customers demand. Electricity, watering, sewage, and
telecommunications sectors primarily work on similar principles. From an
organizational structure, critical infrastructure facilities are mainly divided
into two sections: (1) the production plant and the management layer, and
(2) the services and distribution lines. For the first category, various equipment
14. Sergey Golovanov, “DarkVishnya: Banks Attacked through Direct Connection to Local
Network,” SecureList (website), December 6, 2018, https://securelist.com/darkvishnya/89169/;
and “Steal macOS Files with the USB Rubber Ducky,” Null Byte (website), July 14, 2017,
https://null-byte.wonderhowto.com/how-to/steal-macos-files-with-usb-rubber-ducky-0177336/.
15. Kensington, Locking Down Mobile Devices to Keep Business Data Safe: Physical Security Solutions
Are Bridging the Gap between Productivity and Protection (San Mateo, CA: Kensington, 2018),
https://www.kensington.com/siteassets/documents/kensington-lockingWP-277450-june2018-FINAL.pdf.
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and tools limit physical access to the facility where production occurs.
Inside the plant, the physical and cybersecurity teams work to control any
anomaly to prevent breaches while operators monitor sensors to manage the
operation of the facility. In the second category, the distribution lines and
services have limited protection from any threat because the attack surface
is significant due to its vast size. In some sectors, security of these different
lines and services relies on something as minor as a lock pad or a protected
box to deter a would-be adversary from attacking or targeting the system.
An expert could easily utilize these nodes to harm or disrupt the critical
infrastructure and the services it provides.
For example, many electricity and telecommunications companies
use service cars and trucks that typically remain parked in the facility
garage under limited perimeter security or observation during off hours.
From a business perspective, these companies seek cost-effective means to work
and store equipment. This minimal level of security, however, offers threat
actors an opportunity to conduct hostile reconnaissance or obtain identification
badges, working vests, helmets, and even work computers or special tools
in some cases. An inherent vulnerability of facilities with such a comprehensive
network is the difficulty in protecting all personnel, locations, and equipment
at all times. The expansion of the network that enlarges the attack surface
is also a vital consideration for CISR planning and efforts.

Seeking Gaps in the Organization and Business
Management Levels
Human Capital, Culture, and Security
In critical infrastructures, the human element is one of the most
significant factors to the system’s operations and effective functionality.
Initial steps in planning and building critical infrastructure generally prioritize
details related to perimeter security, digital security, and operational safety
with comparatively less emphasis on the necessary investment in the human
element. Most of the key security concepts—such as situational awareness,
strategic communications, suspicion, resilience, and a culture of security—
are fundamentally rooted in the critical infrastructure’s human capital:
the people who own, manage, and operate the system. Since even the most
sophisticated systems are worthless without a qualified human workforce,
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some researchers define the human component as one of the interdependencies
of critical infrastructure.16
Understanding the human dimensions of the workforce, both on
duty and off duty, is essential to an effective CISR practice. In most
critical infrastructure facilities, there are three major categories for the
workforce: technical, nontechnical, and management. In each category,
these subordinate teams leverage their unique skills and capabilities, and
cooperate to achieve a common goal. In this way, each team develops its own
working culture, while the entire organization also builds a security culture
that aims to mitigate threats and build resilience. The human resources
(HR) department is the unit primarily responsible for understanding and
organizing the workforce. In practice, however, HR departments focus
mainly on background security checks rather than understanding individual
differences in the workforce that can contribute to or hinder cooperation,
which are key elements to the overall security posture. One vulnerability
inherent to critical infrastructure is the lack of situational awareness,
which is “the knowledge of where you are, where other friendly elements are,
and the status, state, and location of the enemy.” 17 Within this definition
are three levels of situational awareness: (1) perceiving the critical factors
in the environment, (2) understanding at those factors mean, particularly
when integrated with the decisionmaker’s goals, and (3) anticipating how
these factors will inf luence the system in the near term.
Building cooperation among the elements of the workforce requires specific
coordination and communication skills that form the pillars of situational
awareness. Often, the HR department is best suited to undertake these efforts
to improve the organizational culture, communications, and cooperation.
Without intentional effort to improve cooperation between departments
and their personnel, it is possible for gaps or blind spots to form within the
organization, leading to vulnerabilities that adversaries could easily exploit.18
Efforts to build normal, healthy communications and cooperation between
departments can prevent the formation of departmental subcultures at the
expense of organizational cultures and enhance the overall CISR posture
within the organization.
16. Joshua Barnes and Kenneth Newbold, “Humans as a Critical Infrastructure: Public-Private
Partnerships Essential to Resiliency and Response,” First IEEE International Workshop on Critical
Infrastructure Protection (Piscataway, NJ: IEEE, 2005), https://doi.org/10.1109/iwcip.2005.13.
17. Brian T. Bennett, Understanding, Assessing, and Responding to Terrorism: Protecting Critical
Infrastructure and Personnel (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons, 2007), 292.
18. Ross Anderson, Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems
(Indianapolis: Wiley & Sons, 2020), 79.
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Most organizations have red teams that serve to test an organization’s
security posture and pursue ways to enter a facility by physical or cyber
methods. In a realistic example, red team members could use a company
vest, hard hat, or fake identif ication badge and approach the entrance
as a subcontractor or third-party services maintenance team. In this attempt,
the red team might use valid and accurate data obtained with various methods
to convince the gatekeeper to authorize entry.19 Any lack of coordination
among the departments—such as notifying security of a lost identification
card or stolen uniform items—could enable a true malevolent actor, not just
a red team member, to access the facility. To build a robust security culture
and framework, HR departments can help foster trust among the workforce,
enable op en com mu n ic at ions , a nd i nc re a s e co ord i n at ion.
Empowering individual workers and building a strong organizational
culture promotes personal responsibility and encourages the workforce
to take ownership of conditions in the facility, including security.
See the discussion of airport security communities in chapter 6 for a similar
concept. Failing to address these differences between departments can lead
to vulnerabilities and failures that red teams or true threat actors can exploit
with social engineering techniques.
Ultimately, the management level is responsible for the organizational
culture and security at the facility. Owners and managers should take steps
to improve trust and cooperation between departments and also encourage a
culture in which the workforce can contribute to and, when appropriate, participate
in the decision-making process. These efforts can engage the organization’s
human capital and encourage the workforce to report problems when they arise,
especially from the security perspective. This participatory approach would
also enable change management and ease the process of adaptation required
to enhance CISR policies and practices.

Business Management and Coordination in Critical Infrastructure
The business layer is one of the central departments in critical
infrastructures. Since many sectors of critical infrastructure are under
private ownership—and thus earn a profit from their services—the business
mindset sometimes prevails over core security and safety practices. In addition
to coordination and communications within the organization, the management
level is also responsible for fostering secure and healthy communications
with the external regulatory bodies to ensure the facility’s continued
operations. These communications also include measures to share information
19. Wil Allsopp, Unauthorised Access: Physical Penetration Testing For IT Security Teams
(West Sussex, UK: Wiley, 2009), 29.
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and intelligence regarding possible threats. See chapter 11 for a discussion
of multidirectional information and intelligence sharing. Figure 3-3
depicts the role and key relationships the business layer has within and outside
the organization.

Figure 3-3. Role of the business layer

The business layer is also responsible for managing the facility’s effective
operations in the face of threats such as cyberattacks. One of the most
rewarding investments managers can make is to conduct regular, unannounced
exercises to train employees, enhance cooperation, and minimize the effects
of a cyberattack. Such exercises expose the workforce to some of the
uncertainty and stress of a real cyberattack and instill proper responses,
improve decision making, and make these behaviors a more natural ref lex.
Exercises can also expose cognitive biases in the workforce, including
overconfidence in friendly capabilities and an underestimation of threats
to the organization’s systems. Unfortunately, the turnover in the workforce,
the demands of daily business, and the perception that exercises are too
disruptive combine to limit the conduct of these valuable exercises and the
benefits they can yield. If the business layer blindly trusts the technological
investments and ignores the human component in these socio-technological
systems, then the organization is more susceptible to damaging cyberattacks.
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Finally, the business layer is the focal point for leading change management
initiatives. While the business mentality resists making changes that may
disrupt the facility’s operations, updating the digital components is essential
to cybersecurity in critical infrastructure. In fact, evidence indicates that
implementing necessary changes generally offers substantial benefits to critical
infrastructures and outweighs the costs for these upgrades. 20 To help senior
managers initiate and sustain significant changes, it is vital to define the
roles and responsibilities for the various layers of the organization and the
workforce across different departments. 21 Executive leaders should also gain
a better understanding of the technical layer to manage the facility during
crises and mitigate likely threats.

Mindsets and Threat Actors
A Difference in Mentality: Attackers and Defenders
Successful security efforts rest on three key pillars: (1) precautions
to guard and protect the design and structure, (2) sensors and alarms to alert
the systems in the event of a breach or any malign activity, and (3) human
capacity. Even if a critical infrastructure is f lawless in its design and able
to detect any abnormality, only the human dimension—managers, operators,
and the broader workforce—can determine the appropriate responses when
problems arise. The threats malicious cyber actors pose to critical infrastructure
are complex, as this analogy describes:
Today’s cyber security environment is like playing 1,000
simultaneous chess matches against different opponents
of varying skill levels. While it is simple to defend the
board against 98% of the more junior players (script
kiddies), the top 2% require real effort and strategy.22
In the security of critical infrastructure, offensive and defensive
mindsets define the rules in the cyber domain. Defenders do not know who
20. Thomas Lauer, Change Management: Fundamentals and Success Factors (Berlin: Springer, 2021), 69,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-62187-5.
21. Software Engineering Institute, Configuration and Change Management (Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie
Mellon University, 2016), 10, https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/c3vp/crr_resources_guides/CRR
_Resource_Guide-CCM.pdf.
22. Stephen Horvath, “Effective Cyber Defense Is More about Mindset than Budget,” Telos
(website), March 19, 2015, https://www.telos.com/2015/03/effective-cyber-defense-is-more-about
-mindset-than-budget/.
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will attack the system, when they will do so, or how they will go about it.
Since the threat vector is not readily apparent, defenders must maintain
a sharp focus 24 hours per day in all relevant fields of protection, and any
signals have to be handled with particular caution due to the uncertainty
of the threat. Defenders conduct highly repetitive work—without knowing
whether or not their efforts are yielding positive results—that can become
so routine that defenders are distracted and lose focus of signs of adversarial
activity. The mission of cyber defense does not provide immediate gratification,
nor is it well understood by critical infrastructure operators and managers.
On paper, it is easy to sustain such an effort, but in reality, cyber defense
over an extended period of time is a challenging mission. On the other hand,
attackers have a goal in mind, the motivation to succeed, and time to test all
possible ways to achieve their desired outcome. Throughout the targeting
and attack process, adversaries are engaged, focused, and attentive to details
that enable them to find and exploit system vulnerabilities. Attackers are
typically not prone to the same temptations of dullness or routine that
defenders face; rather, the offensive mentality is marked by a strong motivation
to overcome obstacles.
Although training and exercises have an important place in developing
security and resilience in critical infrastructure, genuinely simulating potential
attackers is not an easy task. As a sort of “devil’s advocate,” red teams play
a crucial role in demonstrating the possible consequences of adversarial
attacks. Red teams’ cyber and physical penetration tests primarily target
the management level of the facility and focus predominantly on issues that
could lead to a disruption of normal business operations. Often, red teams
inform relevant parties prior to any simulated attacks, and they are bound
by specific ethical rules in the conduct of the attack. Here, being ethical and
demonstrating a genuine attack psychology are mutually exclusive because
real-world attackers have no ethical code to consider or obey. This duality
of the security mindset cannot easily be changed with conventional tools.
In the age of hybridity and asymmetry, attackers hold several advantages
over defenders. One crucial advantage for attackers is the vertical hierarchy
of public sector or state-run critical infrastructure systems. When faced
with an abnormality or attack, defenders in the targeted entity must inform
several managerial groups, and the facility’s senior management must
notify the state authorities to deal with the consequences of such an attack.
Any attack, however, requires a time-sensitive response and prompt action
to ensure the facility continues its service.
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Threat Actors
For those being attacked, a fundamental and natural question is:
Who is the attacker? Demonstrating a conventional and traditional
understanding of cyber threats, the cybersecurity literature outlines specific
categories of attackers and identifies hackers, crackers, lamers, script kiddies,
and lone wolves as the main threat actors. Although the actors along this
spectrum vary in their capacities, these distinct categories are no longer
relevant because today “the question of knowing the full name of the attacker
becomes less relevant than knowing who the enemy is and who the sponsors
are; for instance, a state actor or a terrorist organization.” 23
Given their complex networks, unique organizational structures, and role
in sustaining modern life, critical infrastructures are distinct from other
types of targets. Researchers indicate a rising trend of low-sophistication
attacks against critical infrastructure—particularly ICS and Internet-exposed
OT—carried out by amateur threat actors who lack expertise and deep
knowledge in the sector. 24 In one such example, attackers claimed to have
successfully penetrated a German rail-control system, but in they reality had
only compromised a web interface for a model train set. 25 Despite such failures
by amateurs, a broad range of threat actors seek to attack critical infrastructure,
each with different capability levels and motivations. 26 A general profile
of potential attackers includes the following groups.
 Opportunistic attackers. These attackers have no specific
target but try to spread their malware as much as possible
to increase the chance of success.

23. Clement Guitton, Inside the Enemy’s Computer Identifying Cyber Attackers (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2017), 3.
24. Keith Lunden, Daniel Kapellmann Zafra, and Nathan Brubaker, “Crimes of Opportunity:
Increasing Frequency of Low Sophistication Operational Technology Compromises,” Mandiant (website),
May 25, 2021, https://w w w.mandiant.com/resources/increasing-low-sophistication-operational
-technology-compromises.
25. Dawn Blizard, “Critical Infrastructure Attack Trends: What Business Leaders Should Know,”
Security Intelligence (website), August 19, 2021, https://securityintelligence.com/articles/critical-infrastructure
-attack-trends-business-leaders/.
26. “5 Cyber Attack Motives Your Industry May Face,” Otorio (blog), July 10, 2019,
https://www.otorio.com/blog/5-types-of-cyber-attackers-your-industry-may-face/.
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 Industrial opportunistic attackers. A variation of opportunistic
attackers who target the industrial sector in particular.
These attackers try to exploit any zero-day attack or announced
vulnerability to catch their targets unprepared with relatively
little effort.27
 Competitors. These attackers target and steal infrastructure
data, such as blueprints or technical information. These events
often involve international competitors from within the sector
or nation-state intelligence services that practice cyber espionage,
and it is rather difficult to distinguish between these two parties.
 Insider threats. These attackers are current or former disgruntled
employees who make their attack for a variety of reasons.28
 Advanced persistent threats. These attack groups can arrange
large-scale, advanced attacks and are tracked by the security
community, but are difficult to stop.29 These highly qualified
attackers could be state-sponsored actors intending to execute
cyber sabotage or cause chaos in the target country by disrupting
or stopping the service.
 Hacktivists. These attackers have ideological goals in mind
that legitimize their attack. They are not interested in the results,
but in furthering their ideological position by undermining the
target organization.30
Critical infrastructure owners and managers can also use a simple scale
to assess the possible levels of cyber threat against the facility—from one
(unsophisticated) to five (advanced), for example—to determine the appropriate
threat level against which they plan to defend. 31 Determining this appropriate
level of defense allows critical infrastructure management teams to calibrate
27. Bob Rudis, “The Dynamic Opportunistic Attacker Landscape,” OPTIV (website), March 17, 2020,
https://www.optiv.com/insights/discover/blog/dynamic-opportunistic-attacker-landscape.
28. Marco Rocchetto and Nils Ole Tippenhauer, “On Attacker Models and Prof iles for
Cyber-Physical Systems,” in Computer Security—ESORICS 2016, ed. Ioannis Askoxylakis et al.
(Cham, CH: Springer, 2016), 427–49.
29. “Groups,” MITRE ATT&CK (website), n.d., accessed on September 5, 2021, https://attack.mitre
.org/groups/.
30. Sara Ligaard, Norgaard Hald, and Jens Myrup Pedersen, “The Threat of Digital Hacker Sabotage
to Critical Infrastructures,” in Image Processing and Communications Challenges 5, ed. Ryszard S. Choras
(Cham, CH: Springer, 2014), 379–90.
31. Deb Bodeau, Jenn Fabius-Greene, and Rich Graubart, “How Do You Assess Your Organization’s
Cyber Threat Level?,” MITRE (website), accessed on August 22, 2021, https://www.mitre.org/sites/default
/files/pdf/10_2914.pdf.
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their cybersecurity measures to the match the level of threats they face.
Ultimately, this step gives managers a better understanding of their capacity
to defend against cyberattacks, helps them make necessary preparations
and investments, and directs their responses if attacks exceed the projected
threat levels.

Current and Emerging Cyber Threats
Every year brings new attack vectors or modus operandi for the threats
that mark the era. There are also common methodologies that threat actors
prefer to practice that are becoming increasingly popular. This reality means
more attack tools are readily available to more potential attackers through
an easy and quick online search. In addition to primary cybersecurity essentials,
it is crucial to understand the threat landscape to protect networks and
enhance CISR posture. IBM’s 2021 Security X-Force report, which depicts
the most prevalent types of cyberattacks in 2019–20, demonstrates an
increase in the use of ransomware, remote access Trojans, and business e-mail
compromise in the past few years (see figure 3-4). 32 Additionally, the escalation
in data theft, which is also associated with phishing and social engineering,
is a methodology attackers prefer, especially in preparation for more
sophisticated attacks. Among these various attack types, this section will
examine the use of ransomware, business e-mail compromise, credential
stuffing, and supply-chain attacks against critical infrastructure targets.

32. IBM Security, X-Force Threat Intelligence Index (Armonk, NY: IBM Corporation, 2021), 7,
https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/M1X3B7QG.
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Figure 3-4. Breakdown of cyberattacks by type, 2019–20
(Diagram by IBM)

Ransomware
Ransomware is not simply a malign software that targets a user’s data,
it is a combination of two concepts: ransom and ware. First, ware refers
to the malware or malicious software that allows ransomware to encrypt all
the data in the infected computer system with various levels of asymmetric
encryption. Second, ransom alludes to ransomware’s targeted campaign and
particular business plan to hold a target’s data captive and release it only
after receiving a payment. Research indicates that private sector businesses
experienced a ransomware attack every 11 seconds in 2021, up from one every
40 seconds in 2016. 33
Ransomware types of software design have been on the market since 1989.
That year, Joseph L. Popp conducted the first-ever ransomware attack when
he distributed 20,000 f loppy disks alleged to contain information on AIDS
to the attendees of the World Health Organization’s International AIDS
Conference. The Trojan encrypted the names of the files on the customer’s
computer and hid the directories and then demanded $189 to give owners access
to their files. The phases of ransomware attacks, like encryption and asking
for a ransom payment to restore access, have essentially remained the same
33. “2021 Must-Know Cyber Attack Statistics and Trends,” Embroker (blog), n.d., accessed on
September 29, 2021, https://www.embroker.com/blog/cyber-attack-statistics/.
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over time, though the distribution methodolog y has changed.
Today, ransomware has a high likelihood of success with a relatively low
chance of discovery. As a result, ransomware has become a tool of choice
for cyber threat actors to make money with limited efforts. The increase
in ransomware campaigns against critical infrastructure has risen since 2019
and has accelerated during the COVID-19 pandemic (see figure 3-5). 34

Figure 3-5. Rise of ransomware attacks against critical infrastructure
(Diagram by Temple University)

A recent example of a major ransomware attack occurred on May 7, 2021,
against Colonial Pipeline, one of the leading American pipeline operators and
sources of fuel for the eastern United States. The attack halted the pipeline’s
operations, caused fuel shortages and panic buying at gas stations across the
region, and led to delays in scheduled airline f lights. The Colonial Pipeline
attack represents the first time a cyberattack using ransomware affected
so many people in their normal daily routines. 35 The success of the Colonial
Pipeline attack and the recent upward trend indicate that ransomware attacks
are here to stay. So, it is important to understand the nature of a ransomware
attack to enhance CISR posture and prepare for these attacks. Figure 3-6
provides a helpful depiction of the life cycle of a ransomware attack and the
broad stages it encompasses. 36
34. Aunshul Rege, “Critical Infrastructure Ransomware Incident Dataset Version 11.4,” Temple
University (website), n.d., accessed on September 5, 2021, https://sites.temple.edu/care/ci-rw-attacks/.
35. Charlie Osborne, “Colonial Pipeline Attack: Everything You Need to Know,” ZDNET (website),
May 13, 2021, https://www.zdnet.com/article/colonial-pipeline-ransomware-attack-everything-you
-need-to-know/.
36. “How Ransomware Happens and How to Stop It,” CERT NZ (website), n.d., accessed
on August 23, 2021, https://www.cert.govt.nz/it-specialists/guides/how-ransomware-happens-and-how-to
-stop-it/.
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Figure 3-6. Life cycle of a ransomware attack
(Diagram by CERT NZ)

Even though f igure 3-6 presents a ransomware campaign in three
sections—initial access, consolidation and preparation, and impact on target—
this model does not account for the negotiation process. To understand
a ransomware incident from start to finish, it is helpful to examine the six
major phases that comprise the life cycle of a ransomware attack, which has
many similarities to the Cyber Kill Chain® discussed earlier in the chapter.
The f irst step of a ransomware attack is the distribution campaign,
in which attackers seek potential victims to infiltrate relatively easily and
with minimal time and effort. Cyber threat actors use several methods
to find appropriate targets, such as vulnerability indexing search engines. 37
For instance, attackers using Shodan—a search engine for Internet-connected
devices—or similar Internet scanning programs could find potential targets.
As part of step one, the attacker tries to infect malicious files (payload)
to the target in several ways, such as a phishing attack, a watering-hole attack,
an exploit kit, or a drive-by-download.
37. Benjamin David, “More than Two-Thirds of Organizations Are Targets of at Least One
Ransomware Attack,” InfoSecurity Magazine (website), September 29, 2021, https://www.infosecurity-magazine
.com/news/two-thirds-organizations-ransomware/.
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Stage two, infiltration and staging, begins when the attacker discovers
ways to access the targeted network. Here, the attacker tries to understand
the network and the limitations of its account. Later, the attacker uses
stealth and camouf lages executable programs to understand the scene better.
The staging phase is mainly related to checking the local configurations
and seeking registry keys for various rights and proxy settings, user privileges,
and accessibility. Attackers cautiously use Internet Protocol analytic tools
to understand the capability of the target.
After inf iltration and staging, the third stage is scanning, in which
attackers focus on the details that will ensure the success of the attack.
All IT and OT systems have their own peculiarities, but the business
models and sectoral software in which they operate can change the settings.
Attackers check the backup structure and critical files to halt the business
activity, and inspect the target’s f inancial condition to determine the
ransom amount. Finally, attackers try to obtain administrative privileges
to control the security systems, like the security information and event
management tools, endpoint detection and response systems, and
virtualization platforms.
In the fourth stage, encryption, attackers encrypt the target’s f iles
in priority order without being noticed by the antivirus software.
Typically, attackers prioritize the files used in daily operations during the
encryption process because these files tend to be essential for the continuity
of the business. Since encryption is a time-sensitive race that the attackers
try to complete as soon as possible—to prevent the target from using backups
to restore the system—they often prefer weekends to start their encryption
operations. The attacker also downloads critical data of the target system
to be used as leverage in the next step of the attack cycle.
Step five, discovery and ransom demand, begins when the targeted business
systems are disrupted or halted—often on the first day of the work week—
and the business owner receives a note from the ransomware attack group.
In most cases, this note is a text file on the desktop that includes a countdown
timer, a list of frequently asked questions regarding the ransomware
operation, and the attackers’ demand for a specific ransom amount to decrypt
the target’s files.
The f inal phase, negotiation and settlement, starts when the target
understands that its systems are paralyzed by a ransomware campaign.
Identifying how the attackers breached the targeted system and learning
which ransomware variant encrypted the data are vital elements to managing
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the negotiations. Since the critical infrastructure sectors are also part
of national security, notifying the law enforcement, relevant state institutions,
and the insurance carrier are important initial steps. Communications
with the attackers are essential to resolving the crisis, but before beginning
direct negotiations the target should analyze all possible outcomes and
alternative plans.
Once the targeted institution decides to begin negotiations,
the organization should designate a lead negotiator and determine how to make
decisions throughout the process. During the negotiations, the designated
negotiator should demand some form of proof from the attack group—
such as the system’s directory plans and proof of decryption capability—
to understand the ransomware group’s intentions and capacit y.
The attackers, in most cases, search the target network in-depth, so they know
the target’s financial capacity to pay a ransom. The negotiator should ask
for a discount before the final settlement between the targeted institution and
the attack group, which is the last step of the process. After the settlement,
the target should conduct a deep forensic analysis of the incident and take
the necessary steps to prevent future cyberattacks.
According to a cyber alert issued by the US Cyber Security and
Infrastructure Agency, an unnamed natural-gas compression facility
based in the United States was the target of a ransomware attack in 2020.
Using a spear-phishing link to obtain initial access to the organization’s
IT and OT networks, the attackers deployed commodity ransomware
to encrypt data on these networks for maximum destruction and then
requested a ransom payment. On the OT network, human machine interfaces,
data historians, and polling servers all experienced loss of availability,
a loss of real-time operational data that ultimately resulted in a partial loss
of view for human operators. 38 Although the facility maintained control
of its programmable logic controllers and overall operations, the facility’s
emergency response framework prioritized physical safety threats over cyber
incidents. Thus, the facility management decided to stop its operations
for two days.

38. “Alert (AA20-049A): Ransomware Impacting Pipeline Operations,” Cyber and Infrastructure Security
Agency (website), October 24, 2020, https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-049a.
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In summary, the ransomware attacks against this compression facility
and the Colonial Pipeline discussed earlier in this section illustrate the
recent increase in ransomware campaigns and the rising risks they pose
to critical infrastructures.

Business E-mail Compromise (BEC)
Accompanying the rise in ransomware campaigns over the past few
years is the increase in attacks on business e-mails, also known as e-mail
account compromise. The FBI recorded a distinct increase in these types
of attacks since 2015—with a sharp uptick in the monetary losses due
to these attacks since 2017—to the cost of more than $26 billion
through 2019 (see figure 3-7). 39

Figure 3-7. Annual losses due to business e-mail and e-mail account compromise
(Diagram by the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center)

In 2020, the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center received
19,369 complaints regarding business e-mail compromise.40 The concept
of BEC is a sophisticated scam that targets unsuspecting executives and
employees into making payments or sending sensitive data to fraudulent
accounts. The scam is frequently carried out by using techniques like social
engineering or computer intrusion, which manipulate users into sending
39. Ryan Terry, “Business Email Compromise Results in $26B in Losses over the Last Three Years,”
Proofpoint (blog), September 12, 2019, https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-protection/business-email
-compromise-results-26b-losses-over-last-three-years.
40. “Internet Crime Report 2020,” Federal Bureau of Investigation (website), n.d., accessed on September 5,
2021, https://www.ic3.gov/Media/PDF/AnnualReport/2020_IC3Report.pdf.
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money or data. Since these attacks are highly targeted and include no payload,
they are notoriously difficult to prevent. The established threat detection
solutions that analyze e-mail headers, links, and metadata often miss these
types of attacks. In a typical BEC example, HR or financial representatives
receive e-mails that appear to be from higher-level employees, requesting them
to update their direct-deposit information for the pay period. The financial
information provided to HR or payroll representatives generally leads directly
to the criminal’s account. These types of attacks typically target the high-level
management in a critical infrastructure environment and compel them to send
technical or other information that could disrupt the critical infrastructure’s
services or lay the groundwork for a more destructive cyberattack in the future.

Credential Stuffing
Increasing digitalization brings with it the problem of authentication
on various platforms. As a result, credential stuffing—a type of cyberattack
that obtains compromised usernames and passwords to access user accounts—
is increasing in frequency. Citizens of NATO member states and partner
nations need numerous usernames and passwords to access state services,
bank accounts or automated teller machines, e-mail and social media
accounts, and a host of other functions for daily life. Given the limitations
of human memory, people tend to reuse similar and predictable passwords
for their accounts and services. The increase of data leaks and breaches
on various sites has compromised a massive number of usernames and
passwords. In a recent study on the use of passwords, results show that
even after being notified that their personal data had been compromised,
only about one third of users created new passwords, most of which
were not strong or unique. 41 Another recent study indicated that f ive
billion unique user credentials are circulating on dark net forums,
where cybercriminals are selling bank accounts and domain administrator
access credentials to other criminals in the different outlets of the dark web
(see figure 3-8 for the 11 different categories of account listings by percentage).42

41. Sruti Bhagavatula, Lujo Bauer, and Apu Kapadia, “(How) Do People Change Their Passwords
after a Breach?,” IEEE (website), n.d., accessed on September 12, 2021, https://www.ieee-security.org/TC
/SPW2020/ConPro/papers/bhagavatula-conpro20.pdf.
42. Digital Shadows Photon Research Team, From Exposure to Takeover: The 15 Billion Stolen
Credentials Allowing Account Takeovers (San Francisco: Digital Shadows, 2021), 2, 8,
https://resources.digitalshadows.com/whitepapers-and-reports/from-exposure-to-takeover.
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Figure 3-8. Listing of compromised accounts on the dark net
(Diagram by Digital Shadows)

In credential stuffing, an attacker sets up a botnet to log the compromised
credentials into the platforms while simultaneously changing the Internet
Protocol addresses. Attackers record the successful logins and either obtain
identifiable information or money from this account or store it for future use.
In the advanced form of the credential stuffing, the attackers conduct data
scraping and scanning to sites like LinkedIn, Facebook, Twitter, and Amazon
by using Open Bullet types of software to find real people and determine
their affiliations.
A recent example of credential stuffing is the Colonial Pipeline ransomware
attack. The attackers accessed Colonial Pipeline via a virtual private network
(VPN) service, which was built to access the company’s network remotely.
At the time of the attacks, the VPN account was still functioning but
not active. There is no specific information regarding where the attackers
obtained these credentials. The VPN account’s password, however, has been
discovered among the leaked passwords on the dark web.43 Another example
is the cyberattack against the video surveillance startup Verkada, in which
150,000 cameras were compromised by a hacktivist collective known
43. William Turton and Kartikay Mehrota, “Hackers Breached Colonial Pipeline Using Compromised
Password,” Bloomberg (website), June 4, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-04/hackers
-breached-colonial-pipeline-using-compromised-password.
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as APT-69420 Arson Cats. The hackers initiated a credential-stuffing attack
by gaining “super admin” level access to Verkada’s system using a username
and password they found in the public domain on the Internet.44
The results of the studies and examples of credential stuffing attacks
cited in this section point to the reality that if a person has one compromised
account, it can easily lead to multiple accounts being compromised. This point
also blurs the distinction between personal and work accounts, and reveals
the risks that employee password management practices, or lack thereof,
can pose to critical infrastructure systems in the form of credential stuffing.

Supply Chain Attacks
Beyond the vulnerabilities and risks inherent to the human workforce, most
critical infrastructures rely on supply chains with ever-changing cyber defense
postures and moderate to high-level dependencies on external organizations.
Supply chain attacks are a means to target and exploit legitimate trusted
relationships between critical infrastructures and the external organizations
that enable their operations. The ultimate goal of these attacks is to gain access
to and compromise a vendor’s systems, and then expand this access deeper
into the affiliated organizations. Supply chain attacks typically include two
significant stages. First, cyber-threat actors stealthily infiltrate the supplier
company and its networks. The second step, to introduce the malware across
the network, is much easier than the first one. Since the supply chain nodes
and the supplier already have an established and trusting relationship, users
tend to accept any updates and patches coming from the supplier.
A recent example of a supply chain attack is the SolarWinds attack
in 2020, which shocked cybersecurity experts because it affected thousands
of clients across the globe. SolarWinds’s primary product, Orion,
is a performance-monitoring platform to optimize the IT infrastructures
of the companies who use the service, totaling some 300,000 customers.
In the SolarWinds attack, cyberattackers used a known product
(Orion) within a trusted relationship to compromise these companies
and institutions, effortlessly gaining access to their protected systems.
On December 13, 2020, a well-known cybersecurity f irm, FireEye,
released a report on the SolarWinds attack, noting the threat actors were
conducting a global intrusion campaign using malware named SUNBURST.
According to the report:

44. “150,000 Verkada Security Cameras Hacked—to Make a Point,” Malwarebytes Labs (blog), March 12, 2021,
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/iot/2021/03/150000-verkada-security-cameras-hacked-to-make-a-point/.
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FireEye has uncovered a widespread campaign that we are
tracking as UNC2452. The actors behind this campaign
gained access to numerous public and private organizations
around the world. They gained access to victims via
trojanized updates to SolarWind’s Orion IT monitoring
and management software. This campaign may have
begun as early as Spring 2020 and is currently ongoing. 45
It was later confirmed the attackers gained access to SolarWinds’s Orion
software in March 2020 and inserted a malicious code into the dynamic
link library of Orion’s update program. As soon as the companies using
Orion updated the program—the first stage of this supply chain attack—
this code activated a backdoor, which controls the setting of the network
and transfers the necessary information to the command-and-control server
of the cyber-threat actors. In the second stage, the threat actors gained
an astonishing level of access, with capabilities such as privilege escalation
and lateral movement (see f igure 3-9 for an overview of the stages
of the SolarWinds attack).46
Estimates indicate roughly 18,000 customers installed the Orion security
updates in March 2020, meaning that some 6 percent of SolarWinds’s customer
base had infected systems and were vulnerable for the majority of 2020 prior
to FireEye identifying the cyberattack.47 Since the customer base consists
of users from across the public and private sectors, the attack affected
a number of high-profile organizations—such as AT&T, CISCO, McAfee,
Microsoft, the New York Times, Symantec, and Visa—numerous universities,
and US government agencies, including: the Departments of Commerce,
Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, State, and Treasury; the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention; and the National Nuclear Security
Administration.48 This list is not exhaustive, and it is highly likely many
more organizations suffered from the attack.

45. FireEye, “Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple
Global Victims with SUNBURST Backdoor,” Mandiant (blog), accessed on July 23, 2021,
https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises
-with-sunburst-backdoor.
46. Edward Cost, “What Is a Supply Chain Attack? Why You Should Be Worried about Your Vendors,”
UpGuard (blog), accessed on September 21, 2021, https://www.upguard.com/blog/supply-chain-attack.
47. Sam Ingalls, “FireEye, SolarWinds Breaches: Implications and Protections,” eSecurity Planet (website),
December 18, 2020, https://www.esecurityplanet.com/threats/fireeye-solarwinds-breaches-implications
-protections/.
48.

Ingalls, “FireEye, SolarWinds Breaches.”
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Figure 3-9. SolarWinds supply chain attack operation
(Diagram by Microsoft)

Just five days before it warned the public about the SolarWinds attack,
FireEye announced that “a nation with top-tier offensive capabilities” had
inf iltrated its network and stolen the company’s suite of red team tools,
which FireEye used to mimic potential adversary attack and exploitation
capabilities as it developed more effective cybersecurity products. 49
In response to the SolarWinds attack, which gave the threat actors access
to FireEye’s high-end security tools as well as sensitive information and
critical cybersecurity infrastructure, analysts initially pointed to Russia
as the source of the cyberattack. It took several months to collect the
forensic evidence from the SolarWinds attack and understand the damage
it had caused. Given the challenges in the attribution of cyberattacks,
US authorities were initially cautious about announcing what group carried
49. FireEye, “FireEye Red Team Tools,” Mandiant (website), December 8, 2020, https://www.mandiant
.com/resources/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools; and Ingalls, “FireEye, SolarWinds Breaches.”
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out the attack. In April 2021, however, the National Security Agency,
the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, and the FBI released
a joint cybersecurity advisory attributing the SolarWinds attack—and
several others as well—to Russian Foreign Intelligence Service actors known
as APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes. 50

Conclusion
The role of cybersecurity within CISR efforts presents particular
distinctions and difficulties in several key areas. Dynamics such as rapidly
changing technology, the nature and challenges of private-public cooperation,
business-minded security investments, varied levels of experience among the
workforce, and supply-chain problems combine to create a hyper-competitive
landscape. These challenges simply illuminate the stark reality that there
are limits to what and how much stakeholders can truly secure in critical
infrastructure. Vulnerabilities change, threats evolve, and maintaining the
necessary human capital in the workforce becomes increasingly difficult
from year to year. The conf licts and frictions in the physical domain also
exist in the cyber domain.
To sustain operations, government agencies try to regulate all possible
aspects of critical infrastructure by focusing on the threats posed by malevolent
forces. Well-written regulations, however, do not automatically address the
requirements and expectations of the various critical infrastructure sectors
nor do they facilitate much-needed technological improvements. The element
of uncertainty also hinders the psychology required to make changes and
preparations to enhance resilience. Additionally, cybersecurity teams are
often severely short of personnel, and they suffer from limited training
time to complete regular certifications and thus adapt to new technological
developments and practices used by adversaries. Under these conditions,
it is laborious to pursue CISR efforts with a traditional security mindset.
Limited resources require new perspectives and practices.

50. “Cybersecurity Advisory: Russian SVR Targets U.S. and Allied Networks,” Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure SecurityAgency, April 2021, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Apr/15/2002621240/-1/-1/0/
CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_
UOO13234021.PDF.
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The question of what mindset to adopt and how to do it, however, is one of the
most challenging questions facing critical infrastructure stakeholders. In a recent
interview, cybersecurity expert and business executive Dmitri Alperovitch offers
a potential way ahead in forming a new cybersecurity perspective:
I’ve been saying for 10+ years that intrusions are inevitable,
no one is immune, and everyone needs to start thinking
about this in terms of “we will likely get breached, we will
likely get compromised, but how do we stop the damage
from being done?” . . . The right way to think about
security strategies going forward is to assume a breach,
hunt continuously for any presence of adversaries on
your network, and kick them out as quickly as possible. 51
The cyber domain—and the increasing connectedness it brings to nearly
all aspects of modern life—offers few clear borders or lines of defense
to keep adversaries away. This situation creates an ambiguity that requires
critical infrastructure stakeholders to adopt new perspectives and implement
new CISR policies that can survive and succeed under these conditions.
The best possible alternative as the way forward to building more resilient
and secure systems is to adopt a zero-trust mentality and “assume breach”
mindset for the future.52 This new security mindset should focus on investment
in human capital and improving the training, situational awareness, and overall
capability of the critical infrastructure cybersecurity workforce.

51. Dmitri Alperovitch, “SolarWinds Breach: An RSAC Interview with Dmitri Alperovitch about Who,
How and Why,” RSA Conference, December 14, 2020, YouTube video, 6:46, https://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=3kpaV4FNzc0.
52. Microsoft Cyber Defense Operations Center, “Strategy Brief,” Microsoft Corporation (website),
n.d., accessed on September 9, 2021, https://download.microsoft.com/download/4/6/8/4680DFC2-7D56
-460F-AD41-612F1A131A26/Microsoft_Cyber_Defense_Operations_Center_strategy_brief_EN_US.pdf.
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Hybrid Threats to US and
NATO Critical Infrastructure
Carol V. Evans

Protecting critical infrastructure is a vital, strategic security concern and
challenge for the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Adversaries are actively targeting critical infrastructure in the Allied member
states—particularly the energy, transportation, information, communications,
and the defense industrial base (DIB) sectors—as a potential means
to undermine military capability, force projection, mobility, and sustainment.
To provide an understanding of adversarial hybrid threats to critical
infrastructure and the innovative ways in which the United States and
NATO are countering them, this chapter is structured in three sections.
The first section addresses the evolution in the nature of the threat to critical
infrastructure. The technological convergence between communications and
information technology, with cyber connectivity to critical infrastructure
systems, has shifted the threat paradigm from kinetic to a cyber and hybrid
means of attack. This relatively recent development has created opportunities
for adversaries to exploit vulnerabilities in the critical infrastructure
upon which US and NATO armed forces depend. Section two provides
an analysis of several hybrid threat vectors with the potential to attack,
undermine, or compromise US and NATO warfighting, force projection
and sustainment capabilities. The f irst vector contains hybrid threats
to the US homeland—in particular, the deliberate infiltration of the energy
infrastructure which supports US installations and bases to interfere
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with the military’s ability to deploy and sustain forward combat forces and
equipment. A second hybrid threat vector is adversarial targeting of US and
NATO logistics, with the potential to degrade US overseas force projection
as well as NATO mobility and sustainment within the theater. The third
hybrid threat stems from China’s strategic penetration, ownership, and control
of key DIB infrastructure and supply chains in Europe via its Belt and Road
Initiative and foreign direct investment activities. This vector provides an
opportunity to undermine US and NATO interoperability and political unity.
Finally, the chapter concludes by highlighting US and NATO measures
to redress and mitigate these threats by investing in critical infrastructure
securit y and resilience through organizational capacit y building,
policy frameworks, and implementation of host countr y baseline
resilience requirements.

Kinetic-Cyber-Hybrid Threats to Critical Infrastructure
The nature of the threat to the critical infrastructure in the United States
and NATO countries has evolved significantly from one that was based
primarily on kinetic attacks by terrorist organizations to the exploitation
of cyber and hybrid means by nation-states, proxies, and other adversaries.
Beginning in 2001, there was a rapid escalation of high-prof ile attacks
involving critical infrastructure in Allied countries by al-Qaeda and other
terrorist organizations. These include the 9/11 attacks against the Pentagon
and World Trade Center, the 2004 Madrid commuter and Atocha train
station bombings, the 2005 London transport bombings, the coordinated
series of terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015, and the Atatürk airport shootings
and suicide bombings in 2016. All of these examples required the attackers
to be present physically and to use kinetic means (see chapter 2 for an overview
of physical terrorist threats and chapters 6 and 7 for greater detail on these
examples and others against the civil aviation and rail sectors).
The emergence of cyberspace, however, has provided a new delivery
mechanism that has increased the speed, frequency, and power of attack
against US and NATO critical infrastructure. The effectiveness of cyber
tools has been augmented by the rapid interconnectivity of information and
communication systems with critical infrastructure systems, including the
rollout of the Internet of Things and the creation of smart cities (see chapters 3
and 14 for in-depth discussion on cyber threats and actors, and recommendations
for managing cybersecurity risks). As the then US Director of National
Intelligence, Admiral Dennis Blair, observed, “The growing connectivity
between information systems, the Internet, and other infrastructures
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creates opportunities for attackers to disrupt telecommunications,
electrical power, energy pipelines, financial networks, and other critical
infrastructure.” 1 This information-communications-digital-cyber revolution—
consisting of the interdependent networks of informational technology
infrastructures (hardware, software, data, and protocols) and information
(the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded
processors and controllers)—created an attack vector by which the cyber
realm has now become the favored, go-to weapon by adversaries of the
United States and NATO. For adversaries, the cyber domain provides anonymity
and lower risk of detection and personal injury, and requires few resources
to access a wide range of diverse targets—all with the ability to operate
from nearly any geographic location. Hence, the proliferation in cyberattacks
against US and NATO infrastructure, as it is possible to attack strategic
targets with minimal exposure, without physically being present or having
to confront defensive forces.
These attacks are increasing in regularity and sophistication by China,
Russia, Iran, and North Korea. According to US intelligence sources,
China “presents a persistent cyber . . . attack threat to our core military
and critical infrastructure systems,” while Russia “poses a cyber espionage,
inf luence, and attack threat to the United States and our allies,”
and “. . . is now staging cyber-attack assets to allow it to disrupt or
damage US civilian and militar y infrastructure during a crisis.” 2
Operation Cleaver—an extensive, global surveillance and inf iltration
campaign—has been attributed to Iran. The targets of this campaign included
oil and gas, energy and utilities, mass transportation, airlines, airports,
hospitals, telecommunications, DIB, chemical companies, and government
and military networks in NATO countries: Canada, France, Germany, Turkey,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. 3 Among the world’s most
sophisticated threat groups, North Korea’s Reconnaissance General Bureau—
commonly known as the Lazarus Group or APT38—has launched
spear-phishing attacks against employees of American energy, aerospace,
and technology companies, as well as the US Departments of State and
1. Director of National Intelligence Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Annual Threat Assessment
of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Armed Services Committee: Statement for the Record,
March 10, 2009, 39–40.
2. Daniel R. Coats, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community: Statement
for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Washington, DC: Office of the Director
of National Intelligence, January 29, 2019), 5, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019
-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf.
3. Tony Bradley, “Cylance Unveils Details of Iran-based Hacking in ‘Operation Cleaver’
Report,” CSO (website), December 3, 2014, https://www.csoonline.com/article/2854686/cylance
-unveils-details-of-iran-based-hacking-in-operation-cleaver-report.html.
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Defense. The group was also responsible for the 2017 WannaCry ransomware
attack, which brought the UK National Health Service to a halt.4 In 2021,
the US Department of Justice charged three North Korean computer
programmers affiliated with APT38 with a range of high-profile cyberattacks.
Of note, North Korean cyber teams have recently targeted financial institutions
and virtual currency exchanges to generate funds to support the country’s
ballistic missile program. 5
Russia’s invasion and annexation of Crimea in 2014 and support
for a separatist insurgency in eastern Ukraine led to the emergence
of “hybrid warfare” and other terms such as “grey zone conf lict,”
and “unrestricted warfare” to describe what was considered to be a new form
of warfare. 6 Hybrid warfare also has been applied to Russian activities
in Georgia and in the Baltic countries of Estonia and Latvia (both members
of NATO and the European Union). Such activities triggered concern
“that Russia will seek to use the Russian minority to gain inf luence
in the Baltics, use covert action to seize territory, use subversion to justify
a conventional attack, or other wise use deniable or covert means
to gain inf luence in the Baltics and undermine the EU and NATO.” 7
Implicit in these hybrid warfare examples is the inherent ambiguity of Russian
actions that would impede a timely and coordinated response from NATO,
thereby undermining its credibility and commitment to the eastern Allies,
and effectively giving Russia veto power over Euro-Atlantic enlargement.
The concept of hybrid warfare has spawned a lively debate in recent years
among military strategists and academics, with many experts contending
that there is nothing new in this type of warfare and that its analytic utility

4. Graham Cluley, “US Charges North Koreans in Relation to Global Cyber Attacks,” Tripwire (website),
February 18, 2021, https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/featured/us-charges-north-korean-hackers
-wannacry-sony-pictures-attack/.
5. Edith M. Lederer, “UN Experts: North Korea Using Cyber Attacks to Upgrade Nukes,” AP News
(website), February 9, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/technology-global-trade-nuclear-weapons-north-korea
-coronavirus-pandemic-19f536cac4a84780f54a3279ef707b33.
6. Matthew Kofman and Michael Rojansky, A Closer look at Russia’s “Hybrid War” (Washington, DC:
Wilson Center, April 2015), 1–2, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents
/publication/7-KENNAN%20CABLE-ROJANSKY%20KOFMAN.pdf; and Keir Giles, Russia’s ‘New’
Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s Exercise of Power (London: Royal Institute
of International Affairs, March 2016), 7–9, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2016/03/russias-new-tools
-confronting-west-continuity-and-innovation-moscows-exercise-power.
7. Andrew Radin, Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics: Threats and Potential Response (Santa Monica, CA:
Rand Corporation, 2017), 1.
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should be contested. 8 Indeed, NATO has moved away from the use of hybrid
warfare to the larger construct of hybrid threats. Under this rubric, hybrid
warfare is a component in a range of hybrid threat activity. The latter is not
expected to trigger Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. According to NATO,
hybrid threats:
combine military and non-military as well as covert and overt
means, including disinformation, cyberattacks, economic
pressure, deployment of irregular armed groups and use of
regular forces. Hybrid methods are used to blur the lines between
war and peace, and attempt to sow doubt in the minds of target
populations. They aim to destabilize and undermine societies.9
In this respect, the hybrid threat concept underscores the systemic
vulnerabilities of democratic states by revisionist adversaries and authoritarian
states, which require countermeasures involving a whole of government
approach and civil-military cooperation.10
Hybrid threats provide a useful framework to understand why critical
infrastructure is increasingly weaponized by US and NATO adversaries.
Infrastructures are attractive targets to coerce, intimidate, and apply
pressure on a target state, as demonstrated by Russian cyberattacks against
Ukraine’s electric grid in 2015 and 2016, and against a range of critical
infrastructure in the days and hours before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
in February 2022. Adversaries can also use kinetic means to achieve
those effects without necessarily engaging in open military activity.
A good example of this type of hybrid threat occurred in 2017,
when Russian naval ships hindered the installation of an undersea
electricity cable between Sweden and Lithuania by obstructing the Nordbalt
cable-laying vessels. The power cable was laid to increase energy supply
in both countries and to facilitate the exchange of power between the
Baltic and Nordic electricity markets, thereby decreasing their combined

8. Antulio J. Echevarria II, Operating in the Gray Zone: An Alternative Paradigm for US Military
Strategy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press, 2016), 1,
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/425/.
9. “NATO’s Response to Hybrid Threats,” NATO (website), March 16, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps
/en/natohq/topics_156338.htm#:~:text=Hybrid%20threats%20combine%20military%20and,and%20use%20
of%20regular%20forces.
10. European Union and Hybrid Centre of Excellence, The Landscape of Hybrid Threats: A Conceptual
Model (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021), 9, https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications
/the-landscape-of-hybrid-threats-a-conceptual-model/.
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energy dependence on Russia.11 The next section will showcase how
adversaries use myriad hybrid threat vectors to create and then leverage
civil-military infrastructure dependencies in ways that have deleterious impacts
to US and NATO military power.

Prepping the Battlespace:
Weaponizing Critical Infrastructure to Challenge US and
NATO Military Supremacy
The deterrent value of US and NATO forces is critical. Deterrence is based
not just on credible military capabilities, force structure, and force projection
but on the ability of critical infrastructure in the United States and NATO
member states to support short-fused response, reinforcement timelines, and
means of sustainment. Penetrating, disrupting, controlling, and destroying
key global critical infrastructure is an advanced instrument by adversaries
to degrade NATO missions and operations. This section will examine
three areas where adversaries are deploying hybrid threats against critical
infrastructure in the United States and Europe to undermine such supremacy.

Hybrid Threats to the US Homeland and Warfighting Capabilities
Adversaries—in particular Russia and China—are deliberately and
effectively targeting the energy infrastructure, especially US electric grids,
necessary to support US military installations and bases to compromise
future warfighting capabilities. The electric grid is the key lifeline sector
that powers all other civil-military infrastructure sectors: water, sanitation,
communications, and transportation. Kinetic attacks on the US power grid
have been considered by Russia and China within the context of preemptive
f irst-strike capabilities.12 Cyberattacks, however, are the primary means
to strike US—and NATO host country—grids, because modern power grid
interconnections rely on complex supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) systems, as well as use of new communication and network
technologies, that provide back door access for potential adversaries.
It is instructive to brief ly examine Russia’s cyberattacks on Ukraine’s
electricity grid as these attacks enabled Moscow to test, prove, and refine
11. Alexandra Brzozowski, “NATO Seeks Ways of Protecting Undersea Cables from Russian Attacks,”
Euractiv (website), October 23, 2020, https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/news
/nato-seeks-ways-of-protecting-undersea-cables-from-russian-attacks/.
12. Terrorism and the EMP Threat to Homeland Security: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary of the
United States Senate, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of
Dr. Peter Pry, Congressional EMP Commission Senior Staff), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG
-109shrg21324/html/CHRG-109shrg21324.htm.
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its cyber warfare capabilities for future employment in the United States
(see chapter 5 for more thorough examination of these cyberattacks).
The linkage between critical infrastructures as an instrument of hybrid
warfare has been on open display in Ukraine, where a Russian cyber army
closely affiliated with the Kremlin, has systematically attacked almost every
sector of Ukraine’s infrastructure since 2015.13 These attacks were set against
the backdrop of Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and continued
military clashes in the eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions in Ukraine.
Most notable were the attacks against Ukraine’s electric grid in December
2015—which left large parts of the capital city, Kiev, and the western region
of Ivano-Frankivsk in the dark—followed by another, more technologically
sophisticated, attack in 2016 against one of Kiev’s transmission substations.14
These cyberattacks were attributed to a Russian group known as Sandstorm,
which deployed its BlackEnergy malware to penetrate specialized computer
architectures that are used for remotely managing physical industrial equipment
and control systems. What was most worrying to cyber experts was that
Sandstorm had already targeted NATO networks, and had compromised the
computers of American and European electric and water utility companies
with the same Trojan malware. This malware provided the group with enough
control to induce blackouts on US soil. As one cyber forensic expert forewarned,
“An adversary that had already targeted American energy utilities had crossed
the line and taken down a power grid [in Ukraine]. It was an imminent threat
to the United States.” 15
In March 2018, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
Department of Homeland Security conf irmed that Russian government
cyber hacker teams had actively “targeted government entities and multiple
US critical infrastructure sectors, including the energy, nuclear, commercial
facilities, water, aviation, and critical manufacturing sectors.” 16 The Russian
cyberattack teams included Sandstorm, Dragonf ly, and Palmetto Fusion,
with some attributed to gaining remote access to actual industrial control
systems and US energy sector networks, including a Kansas nuclear power
13. Andy Greenberg, “How an Entire Nation Became Russia’s Test Lab for Cyberwar,” Wired (website),
June 20, 2018, https://wired.com/story/russian-hackers-attack-ukraine/.
14. Kim Zetter, “Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid,” Wired (website),
March 3, 2016, https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/.
15. Andy Greenberg, Sandstorm: A New Era of Cyberwar and the Hunt for the Kremlin’s Most Dangerous
Hackers (New York: Doubleday, 2019), 53.
16. “Alert TA18-074A: Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other
Critical Infrastructure,” Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency (website), March 15, 2018,
https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A.
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facility.17 Cyberattacks against the US power grid have continued. For instance,
the threat group known both as Xenotime or Triton has compromised electric
facility safety systems to cause potential plant disruption and damage.
According to a researcher at the US cybersecurity firm Dragos, surveillance
of the US electric grid is “indicative of the preliminary actions required
to set up for a future intrusion and potentially a future attack.” 18
Cyberattacks have not been limited to Russian perpetrators only.
China is also assessed to have the ability to shut down the US power
grid through a cyberattack. In 2014, the then Commander of US Cyber
Command and Director of the National Security Agency, Admiral Michael
Rogers, testified that the United States had detected malware from China
on US systems, which enabled Beijing “to shut down very segmented,
very tailored parts of our infrastructure.” 19 Mandiant, a cybersecurity firm,
also confirmed that hackers working on behalf of the Chinese government
were actively penetrating American public utility systems that service
everything from power generation to the movement of water and fuel
across the country. 20
Hybrid threats against US energy infrastructure have come at a time
when a number of factors leave this infrastructure more vulnerable.
In the United States, most electricity consumed by military installations
is sourced from the commercial power grid. In recent years, these military
bases have been used to conduct specialized warfighting activities, intelligence
processing, exploitation and dissemination, and networked real-time
communications for command and control. These activities have greatly
increased US military dependence on energy, particularly electric power.
Decades-long underinvestment in US base facilities—combined
with this increased reliance on privately owned infrastructure largely
outside of the military’s control—is a major compounding factor that
provides another source for adversarial exploitation. Increasing geographic
17. John Kennedy, “US Officially Blames Russia’s ‘Dragonfly’ Hackers for Attacks on Energy Grid,”
Silicon Republic (website), March 26, 2018, https://www.siliconrepublic.com/enterprise/dragonfly-us-russia
-energy-grid-hackers.
18. Andy Greenberg, “The Highly Dangerous ‘Triton’ Hackers Have Probed the US Grid,” Wired
(website), June 14, 2019, https://www.wired.com/story/triton-hackers-scan-us-power-grid/.
19. Cybersecurity Threats: The Way Forward: Hearing before the House Select Committee on Intelligence,
113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Admiral Michael Rogers, Commander, US Cyber Command and
Director, National Security Agency), https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/Speeches-Testimony/Article-View
/Article/1620360/hearing-of-the-house-select-intelligence-committee-subject-cybersecurity-threat/.
20. Jamie Crawford and National Security Producer, “The U.S. Government Thinks China Could
Take Down the Power Grid,” CNN (website), November 21, 2014, https://www.cnn.com/2014/11/20/politics/
nsa-china-power-grid/index.html.
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concentration of infrastructure is one such factor. For example, over 31 percent
of US naval ship-building and repair capacity is in and around Norfolk,
Virginia. 21 Department of Defense (DoD) installations and associated
infrastructure depend on continuous, assured power to support missions and
operations both in the continental United States and abroad. Any extended
loss of power is what has been acknowledged as a glaring national security
Achilles’ heel. America must expect adversaries to target and attempt
to disrupt its power grid, with potential cascading and escalating failures
in transportation, telecommunications, and other critical infrastructure services
upon which the US military depends (see chapter 12 for further explanation
of these interdependencies and potential failures as well as the necessity
of building resilience strategies that sufficiently account for them).
As one former senior DoD off icial conceded, “The smart thing
to do is to maneuver around those forces, attack the critical infrastructure,
the facilities here in the United States on which we depend to deploy, operate
and sustain our forces abroad.” 22 The willingness and ability of adversaries
to deploy destructive cyber weapons in future warfare with the United States
has immense national security implications. Of immediate concern is the threat
to US deterrence and intrinsic force projection capabilities, for: “[i]t does not
matter how capable, how well trained or how advanced a nation’s forces are
if they can’t get to the front in time.” 23

Hybrid Threats to US and NATO Mobility
and Sustainment Operations
Our deterrence and defense posture is underpinned by
credible forces, both in-place and ready for reinforcement
within Europe and from across the Atlantic.
—2018 NATO Brussels Summit Declaration

21. Paul W. Parfomak, Vulnerability of Concentrated Critical Infrastructure: Background and Policy Options,
Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report PL33206 (Washington, DC: CRS, September 12, 2008), 4,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=RL33206.
22. Paul Stockton, quoted in Cynthia E. Ayers and Kenneth D. Chrosniak, Terminal Blackout: Critical
Electric Infrastructure Vulnerabilities and Civil-Military Resiliency, Issue Paper 1-13 (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, US Army War College Press, October 2013), 5.
23. Omar Lamrani, “Why Logistics Will Be Key to Any U.S. Conflict with Russia and China,”
Rane Worldview (website), December 17, 2018, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/why-logistics-will
-be-key-any-us-conflict-russia-and-china/.
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NATO . . . must invest in its ability to monitor and defend
against any Chinese activities that could impact collective
defense, military readiness or resilience in the Supreme Allied
Commander Europe’s (SACEUR) Area of Responsibility.
—NATO 2030: United for a New Era
The ability of the United States and NATO to project forces depends
on mobility and sustainment, the latter of which is underpinned by secure
and robust logistics. As the United States and NATO gear up to meet great
power competition with Russia and China, strategic mobility to project
and sustain military forces into these respective theaters will be critical.
Further, strategic mobility is at the heart of a credible deterrence posture
and, in this new hybrid threat environment, the capacity to project forces
is vulnerable. Mobility begins with military facilities in the continental
United States and does not end until the troops and equipment are postured
forward and prepared for operations in theater. Indeed, the ability of the
United States to mobilize its military capability for rapid response to crises,
conf licts, and wars is what makes NATO credible as well.
This section analyzes how adversaries are identifying key US and NATO
war-supporting logistics infrastructure and mobilization nodes to disrupt
the timely preparation, deployment, and sustainment of military forces and
material from the US homeland, as well as within NATO’s member states.
It f irst examines how adversaries may use hybrid threats to disrupt the
projection of US military forces beyond North America and degrade the ability
of the United States to conduct a sustained NATO war effort by targeting
critical infrastructure.
Adversarial targeting of war-supporting infrastructure is not new.
The Soviet Union understood that military personnel and supply reinforcements
from the US homeland would prolong any future conf lict in the European
theater, resulting in a favorable disposition for NATO. Accordingly,
Soviet military and intelligence establishments focused on damage to the
US mobilization base and supporting infrastructures, including US military
facilities and naval bases, commercial ports, railways, other transportation
nodes, and lifeline infrastructure sectors. The Soviets conducted assessments
of how US forces prepared for strategic deployment from the United States,
what they mobilized, what kind of resources were required to transport and
sustain deploying troops, and what military and civilian entities were involved
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in that coordination. 24 An open source modeling assessment conducted
by Argonne National Laboratory highlighted that successful attacks
on US critical infrastructure would have serious military disruption impacts
including longer movement times, effective loss of assets, and shortfalls
in critical skills and material. 25
While the then Soviet Union mapped out the US DIB logistics
infrastructure for kinetic targeting purposes, today’s adversaries have the
capability to carry out attacks through hybrid threat modes. This ability means
the US homeland can no longer be considered a sanctuary, and adversaries
have the strategic reach and means to attack key nodes and dislocate force
projection activities. Today’s contested deployment environment is one
in which national security policymakers and military planners can
no longer assume logistics can arrive in the European theater unchallenged.
A contested environment becomes even more problematic given that
forward-deployed US forces in Europe—with their rotational and force
posture rebalancing requirements—are insufficient, which places an even
larger premium on the need for rapid reinforcements of troops, munitions, and
material. Yet, deploying military capabilities while under attack is a scenario
for which the US defense and homeland security establishments remain largely
underprepared. 26 Indeed, a recent study suggests that since the United States
has not had “a comprehensive strategy to protect its civilian population and
defense industrial base, or to mobilize and sustain the nation during time
of war” since 1993, “America risks losing its next war with one or more
major nation states.” 27
Compounding these challenges are signif icant critical weaknesses
in US transportation and logistics infrastructure that undermine its force
projection and sustainment capabilities and provide additional threat
vectors to be exploited by adversaries. One such weakness is a nearterm, crippling shortfall in strategic mobility which has been recognized
as an unacceptable risk in force projection. At present, US Transportation
24. See Graham H. Turbiville Jr., “Prototypes for Targeting America: A Soviet Assessment,” Military
Review 82, no. 1 (January/February 2002): 3–9.
25. John Hummel, James F. Burke Jr., and William B. Cunningham, “Modeling the Impacts on
National Security from Disruptions in CONUS Critical Infrastructures” (presentation, 72nd Military
Operations Research Society Symposium, US Military Academy, West Point, NY, June 21, 2005).
26. See Bert Tussing and Barrett Parker, “The Multi-Domain Battle: What’s in it for the Homeland?”
War Room (website), November 10, 2017, https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/multi-domain
-battle-whats-homeland/.
27. H. Quinton Lucie, “How FEMA Could Lose American’s Next Great War,” Homeland Security
Affairs 15 (May 2019): 2, https://www.hsaj.org/articles/15017.
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Command (USTRANSCOM)—the functional combatant command responsible
for providing air, land, and sea transportation to meet US mobility needs—
has sufficient transport aircraft to lift only one armored brigade combat
team, with its roughly 5,000 troops and several hundred military vehicles,
to a theater of operations. The picture is equally dismal for US strategic
sealift capacity, as 70 percent of the organic f leet will be over 60 years old
in 2034. 28
In addition to an aging organic sealift f leet, TRANSCOM acknowledged
that a reduction in US-f lagged vessels, insuff icient naval escorts, and
a dwindling merchant marine f leet and seamen, are other competing,
deleterious factors to strategic sealift capacity. 29 In 2018, the US Army warned
the House Armed Services Committee that the nation’s surge sealift capacity—
which the Army and Marine Corps would rely on to transport up to 90 percent
of their equipment in support of a major war or crisis—would fall below
its requirement by 2024. 30 The Army noted in its information paper to the
Committee that these sealift capacity shortfalls “undermine the effectiveness
of US conventional deterrence as even a fully-resourced and trained force
has limited deterrent value if an adversary believes they can achieve
their strategic objective in the window of opportunity before American land
forces arrive.” 31
TRANSCOM’s mobility mission is heavily reliant on private sector
commercial air, ground, and maritime transportation providers, which are
very vulnerable to cyberattacks and energy disruptions. In his 2018 Senate
testimony, General Darren McDew, the then commander of TRANSCOM,
noted that its “logistics enterprise is more susceptible to these malicious [cyber]
activities than other military organizations based on our unique relationships
with commercial partners.” 32 This vulnerability is especially apparent as
90 percent of TRANSCOM’s military logistics and global operations are
executed on unclassif ied commercial networks. 33 The Russian-launched
28.

Lamrani, “Why Logistics Will Be Key.”

29. Posture of the United States Transportation Command: Hearing before the Senate Committee on Armed
Services, 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of General Darren W. McDew, Commander, US Transportation
Command), 10, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/18-04-10-posture-of-the-united
-states-transportation-command.
30. David B. Larter, “US Army Warns of Crippling Sealift Shortfalls during Wartime,” Defense News
(website), November 11, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2018/11/12/us-army-warns-of
-crippling-sealift-shortfalls-during-wartime.
31.

Larter, “US Army Warns.”

32. Posture of United States Transportation Command, 18.
33.

Posture of United States Transportation Command, 18.
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NotPetya cyberattack in 2017 is instructive on potential future risks
to TRANSCOM. This cyberattack, which originally targeted Ukraine,
had the unintended effect of bringing one of TR ANSCOM’s major
transport providers, Maersk, and its entire global port, shipping, logistics,
and container operations to a halt for more than 10 days. Over 76 ports
and 800 vessels were affected and cost Maersk an estimated $300 million
to bring back its network systems. 34 The disruption to global supply chains
caused by the NotPetya attack were enormous. Ssee chapter 5 for more detail
on the nature and impacts of the NotPetya cyberattack.

Hybrid Threats from the People’s Republic of China
Turning to the threats to NATO mobility and sustainment operations
in the European theater, increasing analysis needs to be directed at Chinese
hybrid activities and, in particular, to General Secretary of the Chinese
Communist Party Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Signif icant investments in Europe’s maritime infrastructure have been
channeled through the BRI’s twenty-f irst-century Maritime Silk Road,
which consists of three blue water passages and massive investments in port
infrastructure, including deep sea ports and facilities, industrial free-trade
zones, energy storage, pipelines, and refining facilities. The People’s Republic
of China (PRC) contends that the Maritime Silk Road is needed to secure its
sea lanes of communication and trade routes for its energy, natural resources,
and supply chain needs.
Two of the Maritime Silk Road’s blue water passages, the ChinaIndian Ocean-Africa-Mediterranean passage and the China-Europe-Arctic
Ocean route, are being developed to link and expedite trade and investment
from China into Europe, the PRC’s largest trading partner. Within Europe
itself, China has rapidly expanded its port facility and terminal operations
portfolios. Major Chinese port infrastructure projects include the Italian
ports of Trieste, Venice, and Ravenna; the Slovenian port in Capodistria; and
the Croatian port in Fiume. Additionally, Chinese state-owned companies—
led by China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO), the world’s fourth largest
container shipping f leet—have acquired controlling and minority stakes
in 13 European ports. In Zeebrugge, Belgium’s second largest port,
COSCO owns 90 percent of the country’s only terminal operator.
In Spain, COSCO has a 51 percent stake in and managerial control
of the largest terminal in Valencia as well as a 40 percent stake in Noatum
34. Andy Greenberg, “The Untold Story of NotPetya, The Most Devastating Cyberattack in History,” Wired
(website), August 22, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code
-crashed-the-world.
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Container Terminal in Bilbao. It also has minority stakes in other terminals
in Antwerp, Las Palmas, and Rotterdam. Together these ports account
for roughly 10 percent of Europe’s shipping container capacity. 35
Massive PRC investments in both the port infrastructure and port
operations of Piraeus, Greece, have drawn attention and consternation
by some EU and NATO observers. Piraeus is the only deepwater port in the
eastern Mediterranean that has the capacity and infrastructure to allow the
transshipment of cargo and the harbor depth to allow the docking of very
large container ships. It has a major strategic advantage for container shipping
over the northern European ports of Hamburg and Rotterdam because Piraeus’s
location reduces a week of transit time from Asia at a cost savings of roughly
$2 million per trip. 36 Of note to the United States and NATO, Piraeus is also
Greece’s largest naval base as well as a hub for NATO and the US Navy’s
Sixth Fleet operations in the Mediterranean Sea.
China recognized the geostrategic value of the port of Piraeus, which
Xi Jinping refers to as the “head of the dragon.” In 2016, just six years
after its initial investment, COSCO became the majority stakeholder
in container terminals in Piraeus, operating two of the ports’ three terminals
via its subsidiary, Piraeus Container Terminal. 37 COSCO also has operational
control of the third terminal via its majority stake in Piraeus Port Authority,
which increased from 51 to 67 percent following a recent amendment to the
2016 agreement. 38 Piraeus is slated to become the Mediterranean’s biggest
container port and a major global transshipment node based on the entrepôt
model of Singapore. 39
China’s Maritime Silk Road investments in the port of Piraeus have
raised alarm in Brussels regarding the susceptibility of f inancially
35. Joanna Kakissis, “Chinese Firms Now Hold Stakes in over a Dozen European Ports,” NPR (website),
October 9, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2018/10/09/642587456/chinese-firms-now-hold-stakes-in-over-a-dozen
-european-ports#:~:text=In%20the%20past%20decade%2C%20Chinese,of%20Europe’s%20shipping%20
container%20capacity.

36. John Psaropoulos, “Greece and China Hail Strategic Partnership, as US and EU Look On,” Al Jazeera
(website), November 11, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/11/11/greece-and-china-hail-strategic
-partnership-as-us-and-eu-look-on.

37. Charlie Lyons Jones and Raphael Veit, Leaping across the Ocean: The Port Operators behind
China’s Naval Expansion (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, February 2021), 21,
https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2021-02/Leaping%20across%20the%20ocean
.pdf?VersionId=mrEJH8QwypEHHxT0jxjtml8ucEeiZJfz.
38. David Glass, “Cosco Completes Increased Stake in Piraeus Port Authority,” SeaTrade Maritime
News, October 12, 2019, https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/ports-logistics/cosco-completes-increased
-stake-piraeus-port-authority.
39. Helena Smith, “Xi Jinping Comes to Greeks Bearings Gifts,” Guardian (website), November 12, 2019,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/12/xi-jinping-comes-to-greeks-bearings-gifts.
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weaker EU states to foreign inf luence and coercion. These investments—
and other BRI investments discussed later in this chapter—also spurred
the need to develop a coherent foreign investment review framework
at the EU level, and the enactment of more stringent foreign investment
screening measures to monitor acquisitions of strategic critical infrastructure
in EU member states.
For NATO, however, there are many more concerning security implications
arising from PRC investments in European ports. Of immediate importance
is assured access to European port infrastructure and facilities needed
to deploy, move, and sustain NATO troops and material quickly and over time
in a crisis, conf lict, or war. According to one NATO observer, PRC control
over European maritime infrastructure “could decrease allies’ willingness
to move military forces—including sensitive technologies—through the port
and its surrounding networks. This could lead to disrupted planning and
fewer military exercises, decreasing NATO’s ability to defend the Baltic States
during a crisis with Russia.”40 Of further note is the reliance on special
deepwater facilities required for vessels of the US sealift force. The denial
of or impediment to such port access would have a deleterious impact
on US force projection capabilities from the homeland as well. Of major
concern is that NATO lacks detailed situational awareness of PRC ownership
and control of maritime infrastructure and transportation nodes in Europe
as well as understanding of how such activity could impede the Alliance’s
mobility capabilities.
The larger geostrategic issue for NATO regarding the relationship
between targeted PRC commercial investments in port infrastructure and
control of global port operations is the desire by Beijing to create so-called
“strong points” to enable the naval expansion of the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) and support future Chinese naval expeditionary warfare capabilities.41
The PLA navy has enlarged its operations in the Mediterranean and
Baltic Seas, and the Arctic region over the past decade. Chinese investments
in ports in the Mediterranean Sea, Baltic Sea, Indian Ocean, and
along Africa’s coastline attend to possible PLA navy basing access, but also
offer the potential for sabotage, surveillance, and intelligence collection

40. Lauren Speranza, “China is NATO’s New Problem: The Alliance Has Been So Focused on Moscow
That It HasMissed Beijing’s Growing Clout across Europe,” Foreign Policy (website), July 8, 2020,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/08/china-nato-hybrid-threats-europe-cyber/.
41. Isaac Kardon, “Research & Debate—Pier Competitor: Testimony on China’s Global Ports,” Naval War
College Review 74, no. 1 (Winter 2021): 128, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss1/11.
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of allied military vessels and operations that routinely use and rely
upon these ports.
PRC control over European and Baltic port infrastructure may enable
enhanced Sino-Russian military and naval cooperation. Since 2012, China
and Russia have held an annual bilateral naval exercise known as “Joint Sea.”
The intent of this exercise series is to improve tactical and operational
capabilities, conduct Joint operations, and increase interoperability
between the Chinese and Russian navies. Recent Joint Sea exercises have been
held in controversial locations—including the Mediterranean Sea (2015),
South China Sea (2016), and the Baltic Sea (2017)—ref lecting Beijing’s and
Moscow’s respective support for each other’s key security priorities.42
These developments have prompted NATO to move mobility and logistics
to the forefront of operations regarding force posture and sustainment
capabilities. The 2018 NATO Brussels Summit provided a def initive
declaration of the importance of force projection, mobility and sustainment:
“We are committed to strengthening our ability to deploy and sustain our
forces and their equipment, throughout the Alliance and beyond, and aim
to improve military mobility by land, air, or sea as soon as possible, but no later
than 2024.”43 As a result, two new NATO commands have been established.
First, Joint Force Command ( JFC-NF) in Norfolk, Virginia, became
operational in 2020. Its mission is to ensure and protect sea lines
of communication and security in the Atlantic Ocean, given increasing
presence of Russian submarine activity and future PLA Navy activities in the
North Atlantic. Second, NATO established the Joint Support and Enabling
Command ( JSEC) in Ulm, Germany, under the operational command
of SACEUR to support, coordinate, and safeguard rapid movement of troops
and equipment across European borders.44 According to NATO spokesperson
Oana Lungescu, “The new command in Ulm will help our forces become

42. Alec Blivas, “Sino-Russian Military Exercises Signal a Growing Alliance,” Proceedings 147, no. 6
(June 2021), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/june/sino-russian-military-exercises-signal
-growing-alliance.
43. “Brussels Summit Declaration,” NATO (website), July 11, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq
/official_texts_156624.htm?selectedLocale=uk.
44. Sergei Boeke, “Creating a Secure and Functional Rear Area: NATO’s New JSEC Headquarters,”
NATO Review, January 13, 2020, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2020/01/13/creating-a
-secure-and-functional-rear-area-natos-new-jsec-headquarters/index.html.
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more mobile and enable rapid reinforcement within the Alliance,
ensuring we have the right forces in the right place at the right time.”45
In addition to creating JFC-NF and JSEC, NATO has significantly
expanded its exercises to focus on logistics as a domain of warfare.
Exercise Trident Juncture in 2018, for example, was the largest NATO exercise
since the Cold War and was intended to showcase the Alliance’s ability
to respond together in an Article 5 operation. 46 The recent exercise
Steadfast Defender 21 tested NATO readiness and military mobility
from North America to the Black Sea region, involving both JFC-NF and
JSEC. The intent of this exercise—which deployed a division-size force
from the United States to Europe, required those forces to pull equipment
from Army prepositioned stocks in Europe, and then moved the personnel
and equipment across the theater to multiple training areas—was to test the
rapid reinforcement by North American forces using a scenario that involved
denial of access of critical European ports.47
The US European Deterrence Initiative—known as the European
Reassurance Initiative until 2018—has been another important mechanism
by which the United States has enhanced the forward presence and sustainment
of its forces in Europe.48 The primary focus of the European Deterrence
Initiative has been “in resilient joint reception, staging, onward movement,
and integration ( JRSOI) which has resulted in infrastructure improvements
to airf ields and other transportation nodes as well as prepositioning
of supplies.”49 In concert, the EU—in coordination with NATO—is addressing
host nation military logistics through a Permanent Structured Cooperation
project focused on enhancing military mobility and ensuring the movement
of troops and equipment efficiently across European borders. 50
45. John Vandiver, “New NATO Command in Germany Will Move Troops and Tanks to Hot Spots,”
Stars & Stripes (website), September, 18, 2019, https://www.stripes.com/theaters/europe/new-nato
-command-in-germany-will-move-troops-and-tanks-to-hot-spots-1.599395.
46. Jim Garamone, “NATO Admiral Discusses Complex Security Environment, Results of Trident
Juncture,” Department of Defense (website), February 21, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News
/Article/Article/1763179/nato-admiral-discusses-complex-security-environment-results-of-trident-juncture/.
47. “Exercise Steadfast Defender 2021 to Test NATO Readiness and Military Mobility,” NATO
(website), May 6, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_183459.htm.
48. See Michelle Shevin-Coetzee, The European Deterrence Initiative (Washington, DC: Center for
Strategic and Budget Assessments, January 25, 2019), https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/the
-european-deterrence-initiative.
49. United States European Command and United States Transportation Command: Hearing before the
Senate Committee on Armed Services, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of General Curtis M. Scaparrotti,
Commander, US European Command), 15, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc
/Scaparrotti_03-05-19.pdf.
50.

United States European Command and United States Transportation Command (2019), 14.
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Hybrid Threats to the US and European Defense Industrial Bases
China, in particular, has made it a national goal to acquire
foreign technologies to advance its economy and to modernize
its military. . . . It is comprehensively targeting advanced US
technologies and the people, the information, businesses and
research institutions that underpin them.
—Kari A. Bingen, 2018
the then US deputy undersecretary of defense for intelligence
To achieve this national goal, China has used an effective combination
of industrial, trade and investment policies. China analysts have largely
focused on the PRC’s illicit means to acquire these technologies through
espionage, cyber operations, evasion of US export control restrictions, and
through coercive intellectual property sharing requirements on foreign
companies investing in the Chinese market. Only recently has the
focus turned to Chinese overseas strategic investments—assisted
by Beijing-backed investment vehicles, such as the China Investment
Corporation, and massive sovereign wealth funds—in the DIB sectors
of the United States and NATO member states. 51 Beijing has employed
three investment tools: foreign direct investment and acquisitions
of US and European dual-use companies; BRI infrastructure investments,
particularly in the Baltic states and southern European countries;
and the promotion of Chinese state-owned and private sector champions
to dominate key markets—especially in telecommunications—as part
of Beijing’s “Go Out” strategy. Taken together, these activities are potential
hybrid threats for the United States and NATO as they have the net effect
of the PRC gaining access and control over key DIB infrastructure in a crisis.
There is also the longer-term creation of strategic dependencies that enable
coercion, intelligence exploitation, and the means to divide Europe and weaken
Alliance solidarity.
Regarding Chinese foreign direct investment and acquisitions
in the European DIB, examples include the 2008 takeover of the British
f irm Dynex Semiconductor by a subsidiary of the large state-owned
China South Rail. This takeover enabled the PLA to manufacture
51. For additional information, see White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy,
How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States
and the World (Washington, DC: White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, June 2018).
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insulated-gate bipolar transistor semiconductors—a critical component
in electromagnetic aircraft launch systems used for the PLA Nav y’s
next-generation aircraft carriers and railguns.52 Another high-profile example
from 2016 was the PRC Midea Group’s acquisition of the robotics firm Kuka,
a key player in Germany’s industry 4.0.
Beijing has also made signif icant investments in southern European
power grids. For example, the State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC)
has invested heavily in grid operators in Portugal and Italy. In 2012,
the SGCC became the primary shareholder in Redes Energéticas Nacionais,
Portugal’s national grid company, making it the dominant shareholder in the
Portuguese power grid. Likewise, another Chinese state-owned enterprise,
China Three Gorges, has sought to take control by increasing its 23 percent
stake in Energias de Portugal, the largest Portuguese power utility company
whose assets include the Alqueva Dam. In 2014, the SGCC took a stake
in Italy’s CDP Reti, which owns gas and power transmission networks,
and in 2017, it purchased 24 percent of ADMIE, an independent grid
operator in Greece. With these strategic purchases, Beijing controls large
interconnections of the southern European grid.
Of note, power grid acquisition strategies of Chinese state-owned actors
have not been as successful in northern Europe. For instance, efforts to buy
14 percent of Eandis, a Belgian distributor of gas and electricity, and
a 20 percent stake in Germany’s high-voltage energy network, 50 hertz,
both failed. 53 As the world’s premier supplier of transformers, China poses
the problem of supply chain dependency and integrity concerns for US and
European grid security. In 2020, the then President Donald Trump issued
Executive Order 13920, “Securing the United States Bulk-Power System,”
focusing on the corruption of supply chains for transformers and other
bulk power equipment and the danger of adversaries using compromised
equipment to cut off the f low of power to defense installations and other
critical government facilities. 54
Both Russia and China have also used foreign investments in strategic
geographic locations for intelligence gathering on US and NATO
52. Atlantic Council, The China Plan: A Transatlantic Blueprint for Strategic Competition (Washington, DC:
Atlantic Council, March 2021), 67, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/chinaplan-transatlantic-blueprint/.
53. “China Eyes Role as World Power Supplier,” Financial Times (website), June 6, 2018, https://www.ft.com
/content/bdc31f94-68aa-11e8-b6eb-4acfcf b08c11.
54. “Executive Order on Securing the Unites States Bulk-Power System,” Exec. Order 13920,
May 1, 2020, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-securing-united
-states-bulk-power-system/.
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military movements. A telling example is the Russian-owned real-estate
company in Finland, Airiston Helmi, which was created to house Russian
personnel and large transport platforms in a strategically important area
of Finland’s archipelago. Airiston Helmi is also conveniently located
along the major transit strait for cargo vessels, near a basing location
for Finnish naval combat vessels, and in the vicinity of key seabed
communication cables. Similarly, in 2016, the Anbang Group—a Chinese
company with close connections to Beijing—attempted to purchase the iconic
Hotel del Coronado on Coronado Island in San Diego, which is home to several
key US Navy facilities on the Pacific coast, such as Naval Amphibious Base
Coronado, Naval Special Warfare Command, and Naval Air Station North
Island, home of Carrier Strike Group 1. 55 Across the Atlantic in Scotland,
another Chinese company purchased Rosslea Hall hotel, just a few miles
from Faslane, which is the home port to the entire UK f leet of four
Vanguard-class ballistic missile nuclear submarines—the sole UK nuclear
deterrent—as well as eight nuclear-powered attack submarines. 56
Recent analyses have focused on deleterious PRC investments in European
CI under China’s BRI.57 Under the overarching BRI umbrella, China launched
the 17+1 Initiative that includes 12 EU member states and f ive Balkan
countries, with major infrastructure loans going toward the construction
of high-speed rail networks, port infrastructure, telecommunications, bridges,
and highways. Despite being NATO members, several southern European
countries—in particular Italy, Greece, and Portugal—have joined the BRI,
providing China with critical gateways and a trans-Eurasian bridgehead
to the EU market. Arguably, Chinese BRI investments in Europe are part
of a deliberate strategy by Beijing to target the economically weaker EU and
NATO members, and draw them into China’s orbit. In addition, the PRC’s
Digital Silk Road undersea telecommunications cables connecting China
to Europe have raised the specter of NATO host country communications
dependencies on a near peer competitor. Undersea cables have significant
strategic importance. Roughly 400 undersea cables carry 98 percent
of international Internet data and telephone traff ic around the world.
US companies have largely owned and operated these telecommunications
55. David Kilcullen, The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2020), 169.
56. Ruth Ingram, “Scotland’s Rosslea Hall Hotel and Other CCP Trojan Horses in Britain,”
Bitter Winter (website), March 17, 2021, https://bitterwinter.org/scotlands-rosslea-hall-hotel-and-other
-ccp-trojan-horses-in-britain/.
57. See John R. Deni et al., Chinese Investment in Post-Pandemic Europe: Security Risks in Infrastructure,
Defense Technology, and Political Influence (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College
Press, forthcoming).
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links, providing a sense of security to the United States and Allies
that are concerned about sabotage or surveillance. China’s Huawei
Marine and Hengtong Optic-Electric Company—of which Huawei
Technologies is the third-largest shareholder—are building the highly
sensitive “Peace” cable that will travel over land from China to Pakistan,
then undersea via the Horn of Africa to its termination in the port city
of Marseille, France. Huawei Technologies is also making the equipment
for the Peace cable landing stations and its underwater transmission gear.
This strategic positioning provides the PRC national telecommunications
giant with the ability to divert or monitor data traff ic, or, in the event
of a conf lict, to sever links to nations. 58 One example of this vulnerability
in undersea communications is the Arctic Connect data cable, which will
link Asia and Europe through the northern sea route along the Arctic coast.
Ref lecting this global security concern, the then US Secretary of State
Mike Pompeo urged the international community to “ensure the undersea
cables . . . are not subverted for intelligence gathering by the People’s Republic
of China at hyper scale.” 59
China’s strategic penetration of key DIB infrastructure sectors through
the promotion of its state-owned enterprises and national champions—
especially in 5G telecommunications—has enormous potential to erode the
US and European DIB, and create vulnerable supply chain dependencies.
Huawei’s recent bid to provide 5G information and communications technology
networks in the United States and Europe is highly relevant and poses several
security concerns for NATO in part because 5G networks are also far more
vulnerable to cyberattacks than their predecessors. 60 For example, should
the United States and Europe be dependent on China to provide a key
dual-use DIB infrastructure? Through its control of the world’s wireless
and telecommunications backbone, will the PRC use 5G as a “Trojan horse”
for commercial and military espionage and hybrid threat purposes?
Dependency on PRC 5G supply chains raises the additional issue
of system and component vulnerabilities. The recent SolarWinds intrusions
into US government and private sector networks that were accomplished
58.

Atlantic Council, China Plan, 66.

59. Bloomberg Businessweek, “China’s 7,500-Mile Undersea Cable to Europe Fuels Internet Feud,”
Bloomberg (website), March 5, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-05/china-s-peace
-cable-in-europe-raises-tensions-with-the-u-s.
60. See Tom Wheeler and David Simpson, Why 5G Requires New Approaches to Cybersecurity: Racing
to Protect the Most Important Network of the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution,
September 3, 2019), https://w w w.brookings.edu/research/why-5g-requires-new-approaches-to
-cybersecurity/?amp.
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through compromised soft ware supply chains highlight this exact
vulnerability. The United States and NATO are highly cognizant of the
vulnerability of defense supply chains containing material made in China as well
as the consequences of PRC technology embedded in communications systems,
especially as most military communications are carried over commercial
telecommunications infrastructure. Indeed, the most recent US National
Counterintelligence Strategy emphasizes that adversaries are targeting supply
chain vulnerabilities and conducting other pre-attack operations so that they
can “exploit, disrupt and damage US and Allied critical infrastructure and
military capabilities during a crisis.”61
In the United States, the Trump administration’s response to Huawei
efforts to dominate the US 5G market was swift and decisive. It banned
Huawei from all federal contracts for telecommunications equipment and
services, and US government contractors were prohibited from doing business
with Huawei as well. 62 The US Department of Justice filed formal charges
of fraud, obstruction of justice, and theft of trade secrets against Huawei
in January 2019. The Trump administration also exerted considerable
political pressure on its allies within the “Five Eyes” intelligence community—
comprised of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the
United States—to ban Huawei from their respective markets.
Concerned about the larger implications of Chinese investments and
other adversarial activities involving the DIB infrastructure, the US Congress
passed the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018,
which expanded the powers of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States to prevent foreign adversaries from gaining control of defense
industrial infrastructure assets. 63 In 2018, the then president Trump issued
Executive Order 13806, which mandated an assessment of the broader
US DIB sector. That assessment concluded, “All facets of the manufacturing
and defense industrial base are currently under threat, at a time when
strategic competitors and revisionist powers appear to be growing in strength
and capability.”64
By contrast, Europe has been divided in recognizing and acknowledging
the potential security vulnerabilities and dependencies created by Chinese
61. National Counterintelligence Securit y Center, National Counterintelligence Strategy:
2020–2022 (Washington, DC: White House, January 7, 2020), 3.
62.

National Defense Authorization Act of 2019, P.L. 115-232 (2018), sec. 889(f)(3).

63. National Defense Authorization Act of 2019, sec. 1701-1703.
64. Department of Defense (DoD), Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial
Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States (Washington, DC: DoD, September 2018), 8.
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investments in infrastructure. Even as Europe is awakening to the strategic
implications of PRC investments, the approach to China from governments
within the Alliance remains very uneven. In October 2019, the then chancellor
Angela Merkel allowed China’s Huawei and ZTE greater market access
into Germany’s 5G networks. Since Germany is both a key NATO Ally and
China’s largest bilateral trading partner, Merkel’s decision has had multiple
international security implications. One NATO analyst contends that it
threatens NATO security and the operations of the US armed forces based
in Germany, and contravenes US intelligence warnings. 65
By leveraging its presence in Europe’s DIB infrastructure, Beijing has
wielded powerful political inf luence and effective veto power within the EU
on several occasions. Hungary and Greece, for example, sought to block any
direct reference to China in an EU statement regarding the ruling by the
Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague that struck down the PRC’s
legal claims in the South China Sea. 66 In another high-profile incident,
Greece blocked an EU statement at the United Nations criticizing China’s
human rights record. 67 Sounding the alarm over the long-term implications
of European BRI investments on EU unity, Sigmar Gabriel—the then
foreign minister of Germany—warned, “If we do not succeed, for example,
in developing a single strategy toward China, then China will succeed
in dividing Europe.”68
The security and dependency of host nation critical infrastructure—
such as data cables, 5G networks, electricity grids, transportation, and
logistics infrastructures—on China has alarmed NATO. Chinese involvement
in key infrastructure projects in Europe has raised concern and garnered
increasing attention by NATO regarding Beijing’s intentions and the need
for a shared Allied policy on China. On the occasion of NATO’s
70th anniversary meeting in London in December 2019, Secretary General
Jens Stoltenberg warned, “What we see is that the rising power of China
65. John R. Deni, “Opinion: Germany’s Refusal to Ban China’s Huawei from 5G Is Dangerous for the
West,” Newsweek (website), October 30, 2019, https://www.newsweek.com/germanys-refusal-ban-chinas
-huawei-5g-dangerous-west-opinion-1468520.
66. Erik Brattberg and Etienne Soula, Europe’s Emerging Approach to China’s Belt and Road
Initiative (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 18, 2019),
https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/19/europe-s-emerging-approach-to-china-s-belt-and-road-initiative
-pub-77536.
67. Robin Emmott and Angeliki Koutantou, “Greece Blocks EU Statement on China Human Rights
at UN,” Reuters (website), June 18, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-un-rights/greece-blocks-eu
-statement-on-china-human-rights-at-u-n-idUSKBN1990FP.
68. Lucrezia Poggetti, “China—One Europe? German Foreign Minister’s Remarks Irk Beijing,”
Diplomat (website), September 9, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/one-china-one-europe-german
-foreign-ministers-remarks-irk-beijing/.
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is shifting the global balance of power . . . we have to address the fact
that China is coming closer to us, investing heavily in infrastructure. . . .
So, of course, this has some consequences for NATO.”69
A recent NATO report was more direct in identifying the potential
consequences that adversaries’ ability to penetrate DIB infrastructure would
have on NATO security: “The degree and impact of foreign direct investment
in strategic sectors—such as airports, sea ports, energy production and
distribution, or telecoms—in some Allied nations raises questions about whether
access and control over such infrastructure can be maintained, particularly
in crisis when it would be required to support the militar y.” 70
Incremental progress has been made recently with a new EU regulation
establishing a framework for screening foreign direct investments in European
critical infrastructure and technologies. In 2019, the EU established
a foreign investment review framework on the grounds of security or public
order but left individual member states with the authority for screening and
decision making.71 As with issues of energy security, NATO is grappling
with dependency on European host country infrastructure and the
vulnerabilities this dependency poses for logistics, secure communications,
interoperability, and other requirements to enable mobilization, force
projection, and sustainment.

NATO Measures to Redress Vulnerabilities
from Hybrid Threats
NATO has developed a multifaceted and loosely coordinated approach
to overcome the critical infrastructure vulnerabilities created by hybrid threats
from adversaries. Initial Allied efforts have focused on building organizational
capacity with the establishment of NATO Centres of Excellence (COE)
to support critical infrastructure protection. Key examples include the COEs
for: Defence Against Terrorism (Ankara, Turkey) in 2004; Cooperative Cyber
Defence (Tallinn, Estonia) in 2008; Energy Security (Vilnius, Lithuania)
in 2012; and Maritime Security (Istanbul, Turkey) in 2020. The activities
69. Holly Ellyatt, “China is ‘Coming Closer’ but We Don’t Want a New Adversary, NATO Chief
Says,” CNBC (website), December 2, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/02/jens-stoltenberg-rising-power
-china-must-be-addressed-by-nato.html.
70. Wolf-Diether Roepke and Hasit Thankey, “Resilience: The First Line of Defense,” NATO Review
(website), February 27, 2019, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2019/02/27/resilience-the-first-line
-of-defence/index.html.
71. Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 Establishing
a Framework for the screening of Foreign Direct Investments into the Union, European Parliament,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/452/oj.
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of these centers have been bolstered by the work of the European COE
for Countering Hybrid Threats based in Helsinki, Finland. Together, these
COEs raise awareness and support the security and resilience of critical
infrastructure through training, education, and sharing best practices among
government, academic, private sector, and other subject-matter experts.
In parallel, NATO has developed a much-needed policy framework
for how to respond to hybrid threats to NATO’s collective defense. This policy
was promulgated at the 2018 Brussels Summit. Per the summit declaration,
NATO aff irmed that while “the primary responsibility for responding
to hybrid threats rests with the targeted nation, NATO is ready, upon Council
decision, to assist an Ally at any stage of a hybrid campaign. In cases of hybrid
warfare, the Council could decide to involve Article 5 of the Washington
Treaty, as in the case of armed attack.” 72
NATO has also developed and deployed tools to strengthen critical
infrastructure resilience among member states. NATO’s hybrid threat
toolbox includes greater situational awareness through more deliberate
intelligence and information sharing via the creation of a joint intelligence
and security division at NATO headquarters in 2017, as well as other
information sharing mechanisms with the EU and the private sector.
See chapter 11 for additional best practices in information and intelligence
sharing. The Cooperative Cyber Defence COE has enhanced assistance
for cyber defense through the deployment of mobile computer emergency
response teams and better coordination of computer emergency and
incident response capabilities between the EU and NATO. See chapter 14
for an overview of recommendations for improving cybersecurity capabilities.
Other initiatives have focused on analyzing NATO member states’
energy interdependencies and vulnerability to hybrid threats and interference,
as well as mitigation measures to increase the resilience of energy infrastructure
in Europe. See chapter 5 for discussion of these threats and of integrating
Ukraine’s energy infrastructure into the European grid. NATO is increasingly
using exercises and war games—such as Defender-21 and Locked Shields—
to identify hybrid threats to critical infrastructure that would undermine
NATO force deployment and logistics capabilities. Locked Shields,
for instance, is an annual exercise that enables cybersecurity experts to enhance
their skills in defending national information technology systems and other
critical infrastructure under real-time attacks. Additionally, NATO has
established counter-hybrid support teams to be utilized in a crisis or to assist
72. “Brussels Summit Declaration.”
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in building national counter-hybrid capacities. NATO first deployed one
of these counter-hybrid teams in November 2019 to assist Montenegro,
then a new NATO Ally, in its efforts to mitigate critical infrastructure hybrid
threat vulnerabilities.73
Recognizing that NATO is dependent on host country critical
infrastructure that is owned and operated largely by the private sector,
recent NATO efforts have been concentrated on improving the resilience
of Allied civilian infrastructure to respond to and recover from hybrid threats
and attacks. Private-sector critical infrastructure owners and operators, driven
by business models of cost, often have not invested in building redundancies
or implementing cybersecurity measures, thereby making them vulnerable
to hybrid threats—as a plethora of recent cyberattacks against key global
critical infrastructure illustrates all too well.
The principle of resilience is established in Article 3 of the Washington
Treaty, which identifies NATO’s first line of defense as the responsibility
of each Ally to “maintain and develop individual and collective capacity
to resist armed attack” through “continuous and effective self-help and mutual
aid.” 74 NATO recognizes that a higher level of national resilience is increasingly
required in the dynamic hybrid threat environment as outlined above.
At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO announced the implementation
of seven baseline country requirements for measuring and improving
national resilience and civil preparedness. These requirements involve
strengthening resilience in seven strategic sectors: continuity of government,
energy, population movement, food and water resources, mass casualties,
civil communications, and transport systems.75 To support this effort,
NATO created resilience advisory support teams to provide expertise to help
member states assess and build resilience.
These various measures have been tremendously important in bringing
the twin issues of security and resilience of critical infrastructure to the
forefront and engendering much-needed coordination between and among the
EU, NATO, and individual states. NATO, however, still needs to decipher key
host country infrastructure dependencies and identify where vulnerabilities
73. Michael Rühle and Clare Roberts, “Enlarging NATO’s Toolbox to Counter Hybrid Threats,”
NATO Review (website), March 19, 2021, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/03/19/enlarging
-natos-toolbox-to-counter-hybrid-threats/index.html.
74. “Resilience and Article 3,” NATO (website), June 25, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
topics_132722htm.
75. Wolf-Diether Roepke and Hasit Thankey, “Resilience: The First Line of Defense,” NATO Review
(website), February 27, 2019, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2019/02/27/resilience-the-first-line
-of-defence/index.html.
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in private or foreign ownership of critical national infrastructure could
impede its missions related to force projection, mobility, and sustainment
operations in a contested hybrid threat environment. Identifying key
mission functions to supporting critical infrastructure and their associated
vulnerabilities is the approach that the department has implemented
in the United States and that could be expanded to include NATO.
With the introduction of the Mission Assurance Strategy in 2012, there was
a major paradigm shift from protecting defense CI assets toward strengthening
the resilience of DoD missions. The strategy def ines mission assurance
as a “process to protect or ensure the continued function and resilience
of capabilities and assets—including personnel, equipment, facilities, networks,
information and information systems, infrastructure, and supply chains—
critical to the performance of DoD MEFS [mission essential functions]
in any operating environment or condition.” 76 Recognizing that
over 90 percent of US infrastructure resides in the private sector,
the strategy also calls for strengthening DoD partnerships with those
commercial infrastructure owners and operators. The strategy has been
augmented by other policy directives that require and provide all DoD
services, departments, and agencies with guidelines and procedures for
identifying, assessing, managing, and monitoring risks to strategic missions.77
At present, mission assurance programs at the levels of the Joint
Staff, the Off ice of the Secretary of Defense, and the Services apply
to installations located in the continental United States and the supporting
domestic critical infrastructure. Hence, there is a key opportunity for the
DoD to collaborate with NATO to implement a mission assurance-based
program that would provide a rigorous risk assessment and management
framework, model and identify critical infrastructure dependencies
using subject-matter expertise—such as Argonne National Laboratory—
and provide well-proven mitigation measures to ensure critical infrastructure
resilience and redundancy of vital nodes for NATO mission sets.

76. Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Policy) [OUSD (P)], Mission Assurance Strategy (Washington, DC:
DoD, April 12, 2012), 1, https://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/Documents/MA_Strategy_Final_7May12.pdf.
77. See OUSD (P), Mission Assurance, DoD Directive 3020.40 (Washington, DC: DoD,
November 29, 2016); and OUSD (P), Mission Assurance (MA) Construct, DoD Instruction 3020.45
(Washington, DC: DoD, August 14, 2018).

101

Evans

Conclusion
Adversaries are actively targeting US and NATO critical infrastructure
to undermine military capability, force projection, mobility, and sustainment.
In some cases, adversaries are penetrating this infrastructure to identify
vulnerabilities for later exploitation, and in others, critical infrastructure
is being weaponized as a form of hybrid threat. While the United States
and NATO grapple with the challenges of this ongoing and future form
of threat activity, partner countries are well-advised to learn from their
experiences. Internationalization of investments and supply chains—
coupled w ith rapid advances in communications, computing,
artificial intelligence and other technologies—are creating new global and
regional critical infrastructure interdependencies. These new infrastructure
interdependencies will place a premium on greater civil-military and
public-private sector coordination.
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European Energy and the Case of Ukraine
Theresa Sabonis-Helf

Developed states require a continuous inf lux of energy resources
from either domestic or foreign sources. In wartime, the ability to supply fuel
to the battlefield can be decisive. Even in peacetime, denial of energy resources
can be catastrophic. Interruption of oil supply can cause transportation
to grind to a halt; interruption of gas supply plunges societies into heating,
electricity, and industrial crises; and interruption of electricity casts populations
into darkness and silence. Although any supply disruption poses critical
challenges, the vulnerability of electricity systems is increasingly urgent.
Both the data intensity of everyday life and the societal effort to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions are moving modern societies increasingly
toward electrification.
While electrif ication is more important in the twenty-f irst century,
the West’s electricity infrastructure remains a product of the twentieth century,
posing new strategic challenges to collective thinking about security and
resilience. Potential electricity interruption is becoming both increasingly
catastrophic for urbanized areas and more attractive to actors seeking
disruption. Simultaneously, the avenues for disruption are becoming greater;
as systems become larger, “smarter,” and more internationally linked, the new
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technologies being incorporated into the grid invite new avenues of attack.1
The intertwined relationship between electricity security and cybersecurity
calls for an understanding of critical infrastructure security and resilience
(CISR) that recognizes both sets of vulnerabilities. Here, the case of Ukraine
is instructive. Ukraine’s experience of energy security and cybersecurity
in recent years reveals significant risks and offers insight into the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization’s efforts to enhance civil preparedness
and collective CISR among Allies and partners, including Ukraine.
It also illustrates the complexities ahead.
The shift in demand of all energy toward electrical energy is evident
in market and policy trends. In 2018, electricity accounted for 19 percent
of total world energy consumption, but that number is rising rapidly. In its
2021 Net Zero by 2050 report, the International Energy Agency (IEA) noted
that, if the world is to meet its climate change abatement goals, electricity
should comprise nearly half of all energy by 2040. 2 This was a significant
upward revision from its 2019 prediction that electricity would increase
to between 20–31 percent by that date. 3 Based on its stated policies,
the European Union is expected to lead this transition. EU policies favor
investing in cross-border electricity projects, and policies aiming for at least
30 million electric vehicles by 2030 have caused electric vehicle sales to triple
since 2019.4
Substantial gains in efficiency, room for more renewable energy, and
emissions reductions can all result from growing reliance on electricity
grids, but this change also represents a shift in critical infrastructure risk.
Drinking and wastewater systems, food, health care, communications, and
financial services depend on reliable electricity. See chapter 1 for discussion
of the relationship between lifeline sectors and other critical infrastructure
sectors. In addition, the world faces rising demand for electricity from data
centers, which already rank among the largest consumers of electricity.
Acknowledgments: The author would like to express her gratitude to Rayanne Fujimoto and Hans Johnson,
outstanding graduate students in the Georgetown University Master of Science in Foreign Service Program,
who made substantial contributions to this chapter.
1. National Commission on Grid Resilience (NCGR), Grid Resilience: Priorities for the Next Administration
(Washington, DC: NCGR, 2020), 5.
2. International Energy Agency (IEA), Net Zero by 2050 (Paris: IEA, 2021), 27, https://www.iea.org/reports
/net-zero-by-2050.
3. IEA, World Energy Outlook 2019 (Paris: IEA, 2019), 253, https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy
-outlook-2019/electricity.
4. Kate Abnett, “Electric Car Sales Surge as Europe’s Climate Targets Bite,” Reuters (website),
June 29, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/business/sustainable-business/electric-car-sales-surge-europes-climate
-targets-bite-2021-06-29/.
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Experts estimate the global electricity demand of data centers will increase
15-fold by 2030. 5 Further electrification of the f leet will make transport
more dependent as well, and integration of grids increases the ability
to spread vulnerabilities.
A lthough this shift toward electrif ication brings new risk,
energy-importing states have demonstrated the ability in the past to meet
new energy sector risks successfully. This chapter will offer a brief overview
of the evolution of European concerns and approaches to securing
energy supply, with an emphasis on the contemporary issues associated
with securing power grids. Ukraine has suffered dramatic power grid
disruptions in recent years, and Europe is pursuing a strategy of enhancing
Ukraine’s energy security by tying its systems more closely to Europe—
a strategy that necessitates significant shifts in policy and strategy for both
Ukraine and the EU.

Brief History of European Energy Security Concerns
The security of energy supply has long been a strategic preoccupation
of importing states. When Winston Churchill, the then first lord of the
admiralty, announced his decision in 1911 to convert the Royal Navy
from coal to oil battleships, he made a conscious decision to trade the security
of domestic coal supply for the speed and f lexibility of oil, even though
it would be imported. He famously argued that “safety and certainty in oil lie
in variety and variety alone.”6 Secure f low of supply—through multiple routes,
numerous suppliers, and secure transport—has remained a military and foreign
policy priority for European states ever since. In each era, energy supply crises
sparked innovation and strategies for collective security. In World War II,
Operation Pluto, a clandestine project to create and operate a cross-Channel
undersea pipeline supplying petroleum, was critical to the success of the
Normandy invasion, and set the precedent for undersea pipelines that are now
a staple of energy transmission.7 Energy supply was a vulnerability for both

5.

Kate Crawford, Atlas of AI (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021), 42–43.

6. Daniel Yergin, The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World (New York:
Penguin Books, 2011), 265.
7. Arnold Krammer, “Operation PLUTO: A Wartime Partnership for Petroleum,” Technology and
Culture 33, no. 3 (1992): 441–42, https://doi.org/10.2307/3106633.
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sides, as historians offer ample evidence that the Axis powers both suffered
from key vulnerabilities in oil and sought to disrupt Allied supply. 8
The f irst great shock to supply in peacetime was the 1973 oil crisis.
The panic and price spiral that resulted from targeted reductions in supply
led importing states to establish the IEA. Under the IEA treaty, members are
obliged to create strategic reserves of oil, equal to 90 days of net oil imports,
and share the reserves in crisis.9 Although mandatory sharing of the reserves
has been invoked only three times in the IEA’s history, maintaining strategic
reserves has come to be regarded as a best practice.
In the wake of the Iranian Revolution, the world experienced a second
oil shock in the 1970s, which led Europe to begin considering alternative
fuels and embrace imported natural gas. With West Germany in the lead,
Europe determined to build a natural gas pipeline from Siberia to Europe
as a solution to the problem of overreliance on an unstable Persian Gulf.
Despite US objections and equipment embargoes, the 3,300-mile pipeline
with a capacity of 32 billion cubic meters per year was completed in 1984.10
Europe pledged that it would not become more than 30 percent dependent
on Soviet gas supply. This “acceptable level of dependence” became
standard practice during the Soviet period and incentivized pursuit
of gas pipeline imports from North Africa to supplement Soviet natural
gas. According to energy scholar Thane Gustafson, economic necessity
overcame political concerns for both the Soviets and Europeans.
The Soviet Union, whose economy by the 1980s was collapsing from decades
of centralized control, became as dependent on hard currency revenues
from natural gas sales as Europe was on Soviet hydrocarbons.11
Moscow, aspiring to keep this essential market, safeguarded a reputation
for reliability and proved to be a consistent, non-politicized supplier to states
that paid world prices.
Europe enjoyed the advantages of natural gas, which creates less local
pollution and greenhouse gases compared to other fossil fuels. It became
popular for electricity as well as heat and industry, providing more f lexibility
8. Daniel Yergin, “Blood and Oil: Why Japan Attacked Pearl Harbor,” Washington Post (website),
December 1, 1991, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1991/12/01/blood-and-oil-why
-japan-attacked-pearl/1238a2e3-6055-4d73-817d-baf67d3a9db8/; and Marshall I. Goldman, Petrostate: Putin,
Power, and the New Russia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 33–54.
9. “Oil Stocks of IEA Countries,” International Energy Agency (website), June 11, 2021,
https://www.iea.org/articles/oil-stocks-of-iea-countries.
10. Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Windfall (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018), 167–68.
11. For additional information, see Thane Gustafson, Crisis Amid Plenty: The Politics of Soviet Energy
under Brezhnev and Gorbachev (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).
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for power producers. Unlike coal and nuclear power plants, electricity
output from gas plants can be easily calibrated to meet f luctuating demand.
Natural gas-f ired power plants can therefore operate at a prof it and
with less f inancial risk across a wide range of demand scenarios,
while sources such as coal or nuclear lose money if not operated close
to full capacity. Gas plants also require less up-front capital investment
and environmental permitting than coal, nuclear, and hydro plants, and thus
have much shorter lead times.
Given these advantages, it is not surprising natural gas began to dominate
electricity production in Europe and was increasingly used in industry as well.
Gas posed a new challenge, however, in terms of security. While oil supply
could be secured by multiple routes, natural gas supply requires constant
load and pressure, is more difficult to store than oil or coal, and—because
it has to be managed across the supply chain—gives power to the transmission
system operators.12 Energy scholar Margarita Balmaceda terms the problem
networkness, or the “degree to which the overall functioning of the system
may be dependent on the network working properly as a network.” 13
The degree to which Europe relied on a source that was highly
network-dependent became evident with the 2004 expansion of the EU
to include states that already had Soviet infrastructure tying them to
Russia, and long-standing bilateral energy relationships with Moscow.
By contrast to the European experience of non-politicized supply, the former
Eastern bloc states had long experience with politicization of both price
and supply. The Czech Republic, all three Baltic states, Hungary, Poland,
Slovakia, and Slovenia each had long-standing energy relationships with
Moscow, and Russia attempted to continue its bilateral, by-country approach,
reinforced by annual contracts and old Soviet pipeline infrastructure. As
time went on, and tensions rose with specific states, Russia found all of
Europe getting involved in what it had previously seen as bilateral agreements.
In addition, transit problems began to emerge. Territory that had been part
of one former Soviet state now became multiple sovereign states, and the
logistics and logic of transit became much more complex as each state pursued
its own interests and faced its own transition challenges.
Russian disputes with Ukraine in the winters of 2005, 2006, and 2007—
stemming from Russia’s disapproval of anti-Russian political actors, but also
from Ukraine’s failure to pay for its contracted gas imports and disappearance
12. Margarita M. Balmaceda, Russian Energy Chains: The Remaking of Technopolitics from Siberia
to Ukraine to the European Union (New York: Columbia University Press, 2021), 210.
13. Balmaceda, Russian Energy Chains, 64.
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of gas from the strategic reserves—came to involve Europe. In December 2008,
when bilateral negotiations broke down and Russia exited the talks vowing
to reduce f lows of gas to Ukraine, the ensuing crisis took 21 days to resolve.
Murmurs of concern about energy vulnerability grew louder. By the end
of this crisis, Europe resolved to find an approach that would limit Russia’s
power in natural gas supply.14 NATO also responded, declaring a role for the
Alliance in energy security at the Bucharest Summit in 2008 and establishing
the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence in Vilnius in 2012.15
In 2009, Europe undertook signif icant changes to laws governing
energy trade between Russia and Europe. Recognizing the challenge
of networkness, the EU adopted legislation known as the Third Energy
Package to connect European energ y markets in new ways and
reduce Moscow’s ability to pressure a single member. In addition,
the EU designated gas and electricity as priority areas for active intervention
in infrastructure development.16 At the time, many European states lacked
interconnectors which would enable them to supply each other with gas
in a crisis. Establishing such an interconnector system became a critical
component of limiting Moscow’s ability to shut off natural gas to select
countries. Prompted by the first European directive on security of gas supply,
inter-European interconnection capacity significantly improved—increasing
18 percent between 2009 and 2017—as Europe invested in four new
cross-border pipelines and converted nine existing lines to two-directional
interconnections during this period.17 Further improvements were made
by requiring transit states to become gas hubs instead, equipped to import gas
from at least three sources, and possessing natural gas storage capability.18
These two requirements led to a significant increase in liquefied natural
gas (LNG) import capability, and thereby reduced the threat to supply
from overland monopoly sources.
Actual physical destruction of pipelines did not touch Europe in this
era, but in the former Soviet Union several infrastructure crises led to the
14. Theresa Sabonis-Helf, “Russia and Energy Markets,” in New Realities: Energy Security in the 2010s
and Implications for the US Military (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press,
February 2015), 15–45.
15. Arnold C. Dupuy et al., “Energy Security in the Era of Hybrid Warfare,” NATO Review (website),
January 13, 2021, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/01/13/energy-security-in-the-era-of
-hybrid-warfare/index.html.
16.

Balmaceda, Russian Energy Chains , 212.

17. Yassine Rqiq et al., “Assessing the Impact of Investments in Cross-Border Pipelines on the Security
of Gas Supply in the EU,” Energies 13, no. 11 (2020): 11, https://doi.org/10.3390/en13112913.
18. “Bulgarian Gas Hub Plans Raise Eyebrows in Brussels,” Euractiv (website), June 27, 2018,
https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/bulgarian-gas-hub-plans-raise-eyebrows-in-brussels/.
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creation of alternate routes. The Chechens in Grozny repeatedly destroyed the
pipelines bringing oil from Azerbaijan into Russia, which caused Azerbaijan
to begin reconstruction in 1994 of a disused pipeline, the Baku-Supsa oil
pipeline. Commissioned in 1999, that modest-capacity line (145,000 barrels
per day) which transited Georgia to the Black Sea provided proof of concept
that Georgia could serve as an effective transit state despite its civil conf licts.
Construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the parallel
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline followed, both coming online
in 2006 despite Russian pressure.
Europe also met the security of supply threats with diversif ication
of pipeline routes. New lines including Nordstream I, the recently completed
Nordstream II, Turk Stream, and the Southern Gas Corridor—although
only the last carries non-Russian gas—help reduce the threat of interruption
at a single site. Europe has further ensured security of supply with the increased
use of LNG. The significant cost difference between pipeline gas and LNG,
however, makes the latter more attractive as an emergency source than
a continuous one. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, Europe’s average
utilization rate of its existing LNG terminals was just 25 percent.19
In addition, the market is changing. The European Investment Bank stated
its intent to phase out investment in gas infrastructure by the end of 2022. 20
It may be optimistic to assume that the net-zero goals will be met, since
the bank has already changed its original 2021 deadline for phasing out
fossil fuels, but the cost-effectiveness of redundant natural gas infrastructure
is very much in question. 21
As the previous examples have shown, a change in source—from coal
to oil or oil to gas—shifts the risk as well. The new age is no exception.
The shift toward renewable energy gives a growing role to electricity, and
if Europe is on the verge of an electricity age, the twentieth-century grid
must be better understood and secured against twenty-first century threats.
Renewable energy is generally produced domestically, reducing dependence
on the long import chains characteristic of fossil fuels. But in order to make
grids work most effectively, the engineering imperative is to (1) connect
19. King & Spalding, LNG in Europe 2018: An Overview of LNG Import Terminals in Europe (Atlanta:
King & Spalding, 2018), 29, https://www.kslaw.com/attachments/000/006/010/original/LNG_in
_Europe_2018_-_An_Overview_of_LNG_Import_Terminals_in_Europe.pdf?1530031152.
20. Kira Taylor, “Not Quite over Yet: EIB Spent Euro 890 Million on Fossil Gas since Phase Out,
Activists Say,” Euractiv (website), May 4, 2021, https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment
/news/not-quite-over-yet-eib-spent-e890-million-on-fossil-gas-during-phase-out-activists-say/.
21. Jonas Ekblom, “European Investment Bank to Cease Funding Fossil Fuel Projects by End-2021,”
Reuters (website), November 14, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-europe-eib/european
-investment-bank-to-cease-funding-fossil-fuel-projects-by-end-2021-idUSKBN1XO2OS.
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them across time zones so that f luctuations in demand are less severe,
(2) include countries with differing sources so that seasonal hydro
or time-of-day solar power is optimized, and (3) establish highly f lexible
markets so that electricity purchases can shift readily. This electricity grid,
from a critical infrastructure perspective, has even more networkness than
natural gas supply lines. A shared grid is one in which domestic electricity
must be secured against outside attack, and energy partners, even if they are
allies, must be held to high standards so that their system vulnerabilities
do not radiate out to the larger grid.
Europe is determined to enter the new era of electricit y.
Under the European Climate Law adopted in 2020, the EU is required
to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 55 percent below the 1990 baseline
by 2030. Experts estimate this means that fossil fuel consumption would
need to decline some 36 percent from 2020 to 2030, with electricity filling
the gap. 22 The shift toward electricity transmission and storage is clear
in EU policy and funding priorities. The 2019 list of EU Projects
of Common Interest, traditionally focused on strategic energy projects,
includes 149 projects, of which 100 are focused on electricity transmission and
storage, and six are smart grid deployments. 23 The EU Directorate-General
for Energy develops and implements a European energy policy aimed
at establishing a competitive and affordable market for technologically
advanced energy; promoting sustainable energy production, transportation,
and consumption in line with the EU’s 2050 decarbonization goals; and
enhancing conditions for safe and secure energy supply “in a spirit of solidarity
between EU countries ensuring a high degree of protection for European
citizens.” 24 These desires led the EU to emphasize the importance of extending
the European grid to neighboring states even as Europe strives to improve
the resilience of the existing grid.
Shifting markets and proliferating routes have not assuaged NATO’s
concern about the rise in threats to energy, and the new threat in an era
of transboundary electricity is an emerging strategic challenge. NATO
def ined three roles for itself in energy security: (1) raising awareness,
22. Mason Inman, Greig Aitken, and Scott Zimmerman, Europe Gas Tracker Report 2021
(San Francisco: Global Energy Monitor, April 2021), 8, https://globalenergymonitor.org/wp-content
/uploads/2021/03/GEM-Europe-Gas-Tracker-Report-2021.pdf.
23. “Key Cross Border Infrastructure Projects,” European Commission (website), July 2, 2020,
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/topics/infrastructure/projects-common-interest/key-cross-border-infrastructure
-projects_en.
24. “European Commission Directorate General for Energy Explores World Energy Council Global
Scenarios,” World Energy Council (website), March 13, 2017, https://www.worldenergy.org/news-views/entry
/european-commission-directorate-general-for-energy-explores-world-energy-council-global-scenarios.
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to include intelligence-sharing on energy development; (2) supporting protection
of critical energy infrastructure through the inclusion of energy-related
scenarios in exercises, sharing best practices, and providing training
courses; and (3) enhancing energy efficiency in the military. 25 While energy
remains a largely domestic and nonmilitary issue, NATO has increased its
attention to the problems, and has also recognized the important connection
between hybrid conf lict and energy. See chapter 4 for more detail on the
nature of hybrid threats.
Beginning with the Chechen wars, Russia pursued a hybrid strategy
of conf lict in former Soviet regions. Since hybrid attacks seek low-cost,
high-yield ways to inf luence the policies of states, NATO has recognized
that energy is an attractive target. In 2020, the NATO Science and
Technology Board formally created a research task group dedicated to energy
security in an era of hybrid warfare. This group has the task of analyzing
“the hybrid-energy threat and its impact on NATO’s military preparedness
and ability to execute a mission, its members’ infrastructural resilience and
ability to participate in a NATO mission, and, ultimately, the coherence
of the Alliance.” 26 The case of Ukraine is likely to feature prominently
in their assessment, since it provides a rich array of examples of the links
between hybrid warfare and twenty-first-century energy security.

The Case of Ukraine
Ukraine offers multiple examples of the troubling intersection of energy
security, hybrid warfare, and cyberattacks. Russian actors successfully attacked
the Ukrainian grid in December 2015, in what is recognized as the first
hacker-induced blackout of a region and among the first cyberattacks to cause
physical disruption of systems. Cyber techniques brought down Ukraine’s
grid again in December 2016. The second attack was more sophisticated
and designed (albeit unsuccessfully) to do longer-term damage to the grid.
A year later, yet another cyberattack—targeted at Ukraine’s business sector
rather than its infrastructure—damaged the electricity grid yet again,
but it more famously created an estimated $10 billion in damage, most
of which was outside of Ukraine. Although they differed in targets
and sophistication, each cyberattack had some common elements and,
most importantly, a common origin. The US Department of Justice found
25. Julijus Grubliauskas and Michael Rühle, “Energy Security: A Critical Concern for Allies and
Partners,” NATO Review (website), July 26, 2018, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2018/07
/26/energy-security-a-critical-concern-for-allies-and-partners/index.html.
26.

Dupuy et al., “Energy Security.”
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in 2020 that the Sandworm group, sponsored by Russia’s Main Intelligence
Directorate, was behind all three attacks. 27
NATO countries contributed significantly to getting the lights back
on as rapidly as possible, and to reducing future vulnerabilities. They found,
however, that identifying the source of the cyberattack took some time,
thus making it difficult for supporters to organize a diplomatic response.
The cyberattacks were particularly problematic for the EU, which had
already made commitments to integrate Ukraine into its own grid.

Setting the Ukrainian Context: Early Energy Conflict
In spite of its shock value, the f irst attack on Ukraine’s grid
in December 2015 was not a “bolt out of the blue.” Energy had already
played an important role in Russia’s war objectives in Ukraine. Extensive
development underway in the Black Sea off the coast of Crimea would have
reduced Ukraine’s energy dependence on Russia and thereby Russia’s leverage.
Russian victory in Crimea cost Ukraine some 80 percent of its oil and
gas deposits in the Black Sea due to uncertainty about offshore rights. 28
In addition, since the major Soviet legacy natural gas trunk lines lie
below the Donbas, Russia assumed that physical control of these lines would
likely increase Russia’s control of Ukraine’s behavior. Energy is therefore
rightly regarded as playing a role in Russian objectives in the conf lict.
Ukraine’s behavior as a transit state—especially its theft of Russian gas
from the large strategic reserves—contributed to declining reliability of
supply for Europe and increasing concern on Europe’s part regarding its
dependence on Russia. Since 2014, Ukraine has placed its gas storage facility—
one of the world ’s largest—under European regulatory structures,
thus increasing transparency, destroying Russia’s ambition to take
over regulation of the facility, and providing added security to Europe
against Russian price and supply manipulation. As a ref lection
of the energy-related tensions between the states, Ukraine stopped
purchasing natural gas directly from Russia in 2015 and now reimports
gas from Europe instead, even though it remains a transit state
for Russia. EU-US cooperation ensured that Russia would contract
27. Department of Justice, “Six Russian GRU Officers Charged in Connection with Worldwide
Deployment of Destructive Malware and Other Disruptive Actions in Cyberspace,” Department
of Justice Office of Public Affairs (website), October 19, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/six-russian
-gru-officers-charged-connection-worldwide-deployment-destructive-malware-and.
28. Ariel Cohen, “As Russia Closes in on Crimea’s Energy Resources, What Is Next for Ukraine?,”
Forbes (website), February 28, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2019/02/28/as-russia-closes
-in-on-crimeas-energy-resources-what-is-next-for-ukraine/?sh=5495736f29cd.
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to use Ukraine as a transit state until 2024, despite the Kremlin’s desire
to cut off Ukraine transit at the end of the 10-year contract that expired
in December 2019. 29 Each of these examples illustrates that energy remains
important in Russian grievances.

The Russo-Ukraine War Begins
In addition to playing a role in the objectives of the conf lict and
grievances between the parties, energy was also a key tool of conf lict.
Energy and water infrastructure shared by Russia and Ukraine was
physically targeted by actors loyal to Ukraine early in the war. A brief recap
of the conf lict will help illustrate this point.
In February 2014, following several months of protests in Kiev,
the then president Viktor Yanukovych f led the country, and a pro-Western
government formed in his wake. In March 2014, the Crimean Peninsula,
with a majority ethnic Russian population, voted to secede from Ukraine and
join the Russian Federation. The vote, which received criticism due to alleged
Russian interference, was not recognized by the international community
or by Ukraine. Russia, however, recognized the referendum and annexed
the peninsula. Shortly after the annexation, local separatists and Russian
“little green men” launched a secessionist war in the Donbas region, which
borders Russia and has an ethnic Russian majority. As the conf lict dragged
on—killing more than 10,300 and injuring nearly 24,000 between 2014 and
October 2021—Ukrainian forces limited the territory held by the separatists
but could not displace them entirely. 30 Figure 5-1 depicts the conf lict areas
in Crimea and the Donbas region in 2014. 31
On November 20, 2015, with a hot war in the Donbas still underway,
saboteurs loyal to Kiev blew up key pylons connecting Crimea to Ukraine’s
grid, destroying Crimea’s access to Ukrainian electricity. Until this time,
Crimea had continued to import 80 percent of its wintertime electricity
from Ukraine, despite its decision to secede. The Ukrainian government did
not claim credit for the sabotage, but also did not rush to fix the damage.

29. RadioFreeEurope/Radio Liberty, “Russia, Ukraine Reach Five-Year Gas-Transit Deal,”
RadioFreeEurope/Radio Liberty (website), December 31, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/long-russia
-ukraine-reach- five-year-gas-transit-deal/30353000.html.
30. Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Global Conflict Tracker, “Conflict in Ukraine,” CFR (website),
October 11, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine.
31. “Donbass Map - 2014,” Global Security (website), October 11, 2021, https://www.globalsecurity
.org/jhtml/jframe.html#https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/images/map-donbass-2014
.jpg%7C%7C%7CDonbass%20Map%20-%202014.
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Crimea’s 1.9 million residents were plunged into darkness. 32 With no land
connection to Crimea, Russia struggled to supply generators and establish
replacement power for its new client republic. Crimea was still in crisis and
largely in the dark when the first cyber-induced power outage hit Ukraine
on December 23, 2015.

Figure 5-1. Russia-Ukraine conflict areas (2014)
(Map by Global Security)

The Cyber War Begins (BlackEnergy and KillDisk)
In the afternoon of December 23, 2015, electricity systems in three
Ukrainian regions, including Kiev, began shutting down. Despite desperate
efforts by operators, malicious actors were able to take control remotely
of more than 50 substations. Many of the control center operators watched
helplessly as the malware invalidated their passwords and as remotely controlled
32. Anna Shamanska, “Why Ukraine Supplies Electricity to Crimea, and Why It Stopped,” RadioFreeEurope/
RadioLiberty (website), November 24, 2015, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-crimea-power-supply-electricity
-explainer/27384812.html.
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cursors moved across their screens. 33 By the end of the attack, 130 megawatts
of generating capacity dropped from the grid, leaving some 225,000 customers
across Ukraine without electricity. 34 The situation was made worse by a denial
of telephone service attack that used automated systems to overload the phones,
making it impossible for customers to report outages, and making it difficult
for power stations to communicate with each other. By pulling all supervisor
control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems off line and functioning
in manual mode, operators restored power in one to six hours, but the
substations were not fully operational for months. 35
The attackers managed to take over systems by way of remote logons,
obtained through spear phishing and breaching of data systems. 36
Expert analysis noted that the attack began six months prior with relatively
sophisticated e-mail spear-phishing attacks that appeared to be off icial
correspondence from the Ukraine Energy Ministry. At least one user at each
of the six targeted distribution centers was taken in by the spear phishing,
which then released a BlackEnergy macro into key systems when the file
was opened. 37 Once within the systems, these macros completed network
reconnaissance, siphoned off credentials and passwords, and accessed the
control center, providing the attackers full information about the system.
At the appointed time, the system attackers took control, opening breakers
to shut the systems down. The entire operation took approximately 60 minutes.
After bringing down the grid, attackers used KillDisk malware to destroy
some systems in each of the three master stations. 38 The attack focused on
the distribution sector, which is the most decentralized sector of the grid.
More than two months later, critical devices at 16 substations remained
damaged, and breakers had to be controlled manually. 39
In previous months, BlackEnergy and KillDisk malware had been found
in and had done damage to Ukrainian government agencies, television
33. Kim Zetter, “Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid,” Wired (website),
March 3, 2016, https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/.
34. David E. Whitehead et al., “Ukraine Cyber-induced Power Outage: Analysis and Practical
Mitigation Strategies,” in 70th Annual Conference for Protective Relay Engineers (Piscataway, NJ:
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2017), 1–2, https://doi.org/10.1109/CPRE.2017.8090056.
35.

Whitehead et al., “Ukraine Cyber-induced Power Outage,” 3.

36. Joe Slowick, CR ASHOVERRIDE: Reassessing the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Event as a
Protection-Focused Attack (Hanover, MD: Dragos, August 15, 2019), 2–3, https://www.dragos.com/wp-content
/uploads/CRASHOVERRIDE.pdf.
37.

Whitehead et al., “Ukraine Cyber-induced Power Outage,” 2.

38.

Whitehead et al., “Ukraine Cyber-induced Power Outage,” 3.

39. Zetter, “Inside the Cunning.”
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networks, and the state rail company, and had also been found in Polish
energy firms and even in some power and water utilities in the United States.40
The use of this malware in the electricity grid was still shocking because
it represented sophisticated long-term planning and is widely understood
to be the first instance of a hack successfully taking down a power grid.
Although some argued that the cyberattack was retribution for Ukraine’s
role in denying electricity to Crimea, systems intrusions had already begun
in March, prior to the Crimean blackout. Evidence suggests, however,
that the preexisting attack plan may have been rushed to implementation
after the physical attack on the Crimean grid.41

The Cyber War Escalates (CrashOverride)
The second attack against Ukraine’s electricit y grid occurred
on December 17, 2016, when, just before midnight, a cyberattack on the electric
transmission station outside of Kiev took down 20 percent of its capacity.
This attack targeted a transmission facility rather than distribution facilities
as the previous attack had done.42 The automated attack opened every circuit
breaker in a key transmission station.43 Ukraine’s electricity company, Ukenergo,
and Ukrainian cybersecurity experts asserted the attack was similar to the
first one, but subsequent analysis revealed something more concerning.
The attack had been engineered to inf lict physical damage on the
electrical equipment. A Dragos cybersecurity team researching the incident
concluded that the power outage was supposed to be the first stage of a larger,
more ambitious attack. While the power was down, the attackers had launched
an attack on the protective relays, apparently to disable fail-safe devices
and make it dangerous to restart the grid. The Dragos report concludes the
hackers had intended to cause extensive damage after the power was restored.44
Based on the previous response in 2015, the attackers expected that company
engineers would rush to restart the systems manually. By disabling the failsafe devices, the attackers intended for workers who were restoring the system
to trigger a current overload, which would have caused potentially
40. Andy Greenberg, “How an Entire Nation Became Russia’s Lab for Cyberwar,” Wired (website),
June 28, 2017, https://www.wired.com/story/russian-hackers-attack-ukraine/.
41. Zetter, “Inside the Cunning.”
42. Kim Zetter, “The Ukrainian Power Grid Was Hacked Again,” Motherboard Tech by Vice (website),
January 10, 2017, https://w w w.vice.com/en/article/bmvkn4/ukrainian-power-station-hacking
-december-2016-report.
43. Andy Greenberg, “New Clues Show How Russia’s Grid Hackers Aimed for Physical Destruction,”
Wired (website), September 12, 2019, https://www.wired.com/story/russia-ukraine-cyberattack-power
-grid-blackout-destruction/.
44.

Slowik, CRASHOVERRIDE, 9.
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catastrophic damage resulting in long disruptions to energy transmission,
damaging power generation assets, and injuring workers.45 This type of cyber
disruption is relatively rare, and, as this instance illustrates, it is difficult to
implement successfully but threatens severe consequences. It is notable that
this early use of a cyber weapon was both state-sponsored and aimed at energy
infrastructure, specifically targeting the transmission and generation sectors, on
which the whole grid depends. See chapter 14, which discusses this attack among
10 major cyber incidents.
Although the attack failed, largely due to attackers’ errors, the level
of ambition and novel approach is notable. It made use of software to manipulate
industrial control systems, rather than using the manual interaction of hackers
in real time with the systems, as had been done in 2015.46 The attackers used
a malware known as CrashOverride. This malware targeted protective relays,
which automatically open circuit breakers if dangerous conditions threaten
to damage transformers. The attackers were aware of a security f law
in the relays that made it possible to put them into firmware update mode,
which would render the relays unusable until rebooted manually.47 The malware
failed only because the attackers failed to enter the Internet protocol addresses
of the protective relays properly.48
Even if these addresses had been input correctly, it is not certain that
the attack would have succeeded. 49 Malware-induced physical sabotage
has been attempted “in the wild” only two other times: the Stuxnet attack
on Iranian nuclear facilities in 2009 and the Triton/Trisis attack on the
Saudi Petro Rabigh oil refinery in 2017. The Triton/Trisis attack, linked to
Moscow’s Central Scientific Research Institute of Chemistry and Mechanics,
shut down the Saudi plant but did not damage it. 50 In other words, the
CrashOverride attackers used cutting edge, unproven methods, though they
did have some evidence that their approach might work. In 2007, tests at the
Idaho National Laboratory demonstrated that corrupting the protective relay
in an electricity transmission system could destroy a 27-ton generator.

45.

Greenberg, “New Clues.”
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47. Greenberg, “New Clues.”
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Mike Assante, the project lead on this secret project, served on the team
investigating the Ukraine attack and noticed the similarities in approach. 51
It is not surprising that the seriousness of the attack was not initially
recognized in Ukraine since it came amid a wave of hundreds of other
cyberattacks. In July 2016, a massive phishing campaign targeted government
organizations. Then in December 2016, attacks unfolded against the
Ukrainian Ministry of Finance, the State Treasury, the Pension Fund, the
State Administration of Railway Transport, and the Defense Ministry. 52
Afterwards, the then President Petro Poroshenko reported that in the
last two months of 2016, hackers targeted government institutions some
6,500 times, with the recent attacks on the State Treasury preventing
the timely payment of salaries and pensions. 53 Denial-of-service attacks hit the
Defense Ministry a week after the State Treasury attacks and took down its
website in an apparent effort to disrupt updates about the conf lict in Donbas. 54

Collateral Damage:
A Cyberattack on the Ukrainian Economy (NotPetya)
Unlike the first two cyberattacks, the third attack did not specifically
target energy infrastructure, though energy infrastructure became involved
as the crisis unfolded. In February 2017, the US National Security Agency
(NSA) warned Microsoft that the NSA’s EternalBlue code—which exploited
f laws in a Windows protocol, making it possible to take over a vulnerable
computer remotely—had been stolen. Microsoft issued a patch in March, but
there were still computers all over the world that had not yet been updated. 55
WannaCry in April and NotPetya in rapid succession made efficient use
of EternalBlue in their malware.
NotPetya was unleashed in Ukraine in June 2017, just before the
Constitution Day holiday. The attackers deliberately infected M.E.
Doc, a business software widely used in Ukraine. When customers went
to the website for an update, the malware accessed personal computers all
51. Andy Greenberg, “How 30 Lines of Code Blew Up a 27-ton Generator,” Wired (website),
October 23, 2020, https://www.wired.com/story/how-30-lines-of-code-blew-up-27-ton-generator/.
52.

Zetter, “Ukrainian Power Grid.”

53. Natalia Zinets, “Ukraine Hit by 6,500 Hack Attacks, Sees Russian ‘Cyberwar’” BBC (website),
December 29, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-cyber-idUSKBN14I1QC.
54. Reuters, “Ukraine’s Defence Ministry Says Website Hit by Cyber Attack,” Reuters (website),
December 13, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-cyber/ukraines-defence-ministry-says
-website-hit-by-cyber-attack-idUSKBN1421YT.
55. Andy Greenberg, “Hold North Korea Accountable for WannaCry—and the NSA, Too,” Wired
(website), December 19, 2017, https://www.wired.com/story/korea-accountable-wannacry-nsa-eternal-blue/.
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over Ukraine and beyond. NotPetya became the fastest-propagating malware
ever seen. 56 Although energy systems were not the primary target of this
attack, Ukraine’s transmission system operator, Ukrenergo—still recovering
from the cyberattacks of 2015 and 2016—was hit just before it completed
safety upgrades. Kyivenergo, Ukraine’s heat and energy company, was also hit
along with five other power companies. 57
Even though NotPetya demanded a payment of $300 in bitcoin
from owners of computers it infected, it was not ransomware. 58
Instead, the malware permanently destroyed data even as its victims
were reading the ransom note, erasing master boot systems and causing
computers to be unable to find their operating systems.59 Ukraine was hit
particularly hard. In addition to the energy infrastructure, multiple national
media outlets, four hospitals, two airports, and more than 22 banks,
automatic-teller machines, and card payment systems were damaged in the
attack. An estimated 10 percent of all the computers in the country were
destroyed by the NotPetya attack. 60
The damage, however, was not limited to Ukraine, but impacted
organizations in an estimated 65 countries as well.61 A White House assessment
estimates more than $10 billion in damages. 62 Perhaps the most famous
victim of NotPetya was Maersk, a major global maritime shipping company.
Maersk became infected through a single laptop belonging to a f inance
executive in Odessa. Maersk reported that NotPetya infected most of its
network within seven minutes and destroyed 49,000 laptops in the organization
while paralyzing global shipping. 63 Among the companies that reported
56. Andy Greenberg, “The Untold Story of NotPetya, the ‘Most Costly Cyberattack in History,’ ”
Wired (website), August 22, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia
-code-crashed-the-world/.
57.
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58. Riley Griffin, Katherine Chiglinsky, and David Voreacos, “Was It an Act of War? That’s Merck
Cyber Attack ’s $1.3 Billion Insurance Question,” Bloomberg (website), December 3, 2019,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-12-03/merck-cyberattack-s-1-3-billion-question-was
-it-an-act-of-war.
59.
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61. Jai Vijayan, “3 Years after NotPetya, Many Organizations Still in Danger of Similar Attacks,”
Dark Reading Newsletter (website), June 30, 2020, https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence
/3-years-after-notpetya-many-organizations-still-in-danger-of-similar-attacks/d/d-id/1338200.
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63. Eric Parizo, “Maersk CISO Says NotPetya Devastated Several Unnamed US firms,” Dark Reading
Newsletter (website), December 9, 2019, https://www.darkreading.com/omdia/maersk-ciso-says-notpeyta
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losses, the damages are staggering: Merck lost $870 million and suffered
30,000 computers and 7,500 servers crippled by the attack; FedEx/TNT
lost $400 million; Saint-Gobain lost $380 million; and Maersk lost
$300 million. 64 See chapter 4 for an analysis on the potential future risks
to the US Transportation Command—and thus, to US and NATO force
project and military mobility—based on NotPetya’s impact on global shipping.
While cyber experts are divided on whether NotPetya’s impact exceeded
the intentions of its creators, they generally describe it as the closest
example of cyber war to date. As cybersecurity expert Kenneth Geers notes,
“This was the most damaging attack in history, of a scale and a cost that
would far exceed a missile fired from the Donbas into Kiev.”65 The rhetoric
regarding cyber war is more than rhetoric: Merck’s $1.3 billion insurance claim
was declined on the grounds that the attack was an act of war, for which the
company was not covered. 66 Some experts, including Ukraine’s cybersecurity
service, argue that the attack also served as a cleanup effort, enabling hackers
to destroy evidence of espionage or reconnaissance. 67 Other experts, such
as Cisco’s Craig Williams, conclude that the message—that it is dangerous
to do business in Ukraine—was powerfully and deliberately delivered. 68
Regardless of whether the attackers had anticipated the impact of NotPetya,
it did shift the balance as nations began to attribute the cyberattacks
to Russia.

Attribution Evolves
Attribution—the act of identifying who is responsible for a cyberattack—
is notoriously difficult, making it an attractive option in hybrid conf lict.
Most cyber actors cover their tracks, routing their attacks through other
countries or using techniques known to be associated with a different
criminal group to mislead investigators. Within two weeks of the first attack,
the United States sent an expert team to Ukraine to better understand this
type of attack and develop strategies for protecting against it. 69 The team
concluded that the attack showed evidence of some state sponsorship and
64. Griffin, Chiglinsky, and Voreacos, “Was It an Act of War?,” (2019); and Greenberg, “Untold Story
of NotPetya.”
65. Laurens Cerulus, “How Ukraine Became a Test Bed for Cyberweaponry,” Politico (website),
February 14, 2019, https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-cyber-war-frontline-russia-malware-attacks/.
66.

Griffin, Chiglinsky, and Voreacos, “Was It an Act of War?,” (2019).

67. Greenberg, “Untold Story of NotPetya.”
68. Greenberg, “Untold Story of NotPetya.”
69. “ICS Alert: Cyber-Attack against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure,” Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency, n.d., last revised July 20, 2021, https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/alerts/IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01.
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support. The United States, however, was much less eager to attribute an attack
to Russia than it had been to attribute previous attacks to North Korea,
despite a persistent rise in such attacks. See chapter 4 for fascinating detail
on evidence of other Russian-led cyber intrusions and attacks.
Ukraine had long argued that each of the three cyberattacks
described above bore similar “ handw riting” and techniques. 70
Ukrainian experts identified Sandworm early on as the team responsible
for these and many other cyberattacks on Ukrainian soil. As international
experts gathered more information, they, too, began to believe in the likelihood
of state sponsorship.
Within six months of the attack, the US Central Intelligence Agency
allegedly attributed the NotPetya attacks to Russia with high confidence,
but this report was classified.71 Not until February 2018 did US intelligence
agencies conf irm the Russian military’s role in launching NotPetya.
The US statement came a few hours behind British and Danish government
statements, both of which had already condemned the Russian military’s role
in the attack.72 The statement from the then White House press secretary
included the following accusation:
It was part of the Kremlin’s ongoing effort to destabilize Ukraine
and demonstrates ever more clearly Russia’s involvement in the
ongoing conflict. This was also a reckless and indiscriminate
cyber-attack that will be met with international consequences.73
Although clear international consequences were arguably not imposed,
evidence continued to mount as US investigators did their work. By October
2020, the US Department of Justice unsealed an indictment against the
Sandworm hacking group, accusing each of the six members by name and
clearly identifying them as Russian intelligence officers. According to the
statement, “no country has weaponized its cyber capabilities as maliciously
or irresponsibly as Russia, wantonly causing unprecedented damage to pursue
70. Andy Greenberg, “Petya Ransomware Epidemic May Be Spillover from Cyberwar,” Wired (website),
June 28, 2017, https://www.wired.com/story/petya-ransomware-ukraine/.
71. Ellen Nakashima, “Russian Military Was behind ‘NotPetya’ Cyberattack in Ukraine, CIA
Concludes,” Washington Post, January 12, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national
-security/russian-military-was-behind-notpetya-cyberattack-in-ukraine-cia-concludes/2018/01/12/048d8506
-f7ca-11e7-b34a-b85626af34ef_story.html.
72. Greenberg, “Untold Story of NotPetya.”
73. Sarah Huckabee Sanders, “Statement from the White House Press Secretary,” US Embassy and
Consulates in Russia (website), February 15, 2018, https://ru.usembassy.gov/statement-white-house-press
-secretary-021518.
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small tactical advantage and to satisfy fits of spite.” 74 Attacks against the
Ukrainian government and its critical infrastructure were the first offense
described in the statement, followed by explicit reference to BlackEnergy,
Industroyer, KillDisk, and NotPetya.75
There are multiple reasons why the United States was slow to blame Russia
for cyberattacks. Some note that public blame must logically be followed
with retaliation—and there is little consensus on appropriate retaliation—
while others focus on the fact that the United States is also very involved
in covert cyber operations.76 The origins of EternalBlue highlight this
problem as NSA alerted Microsoft to a vulnerability in its system after the
leak of EternalBlue, which had been developed to exploit that vulnerability.77

Learning from Ukraine:
Improving Infrastructure Safeguards
When Ukraine joined the EU Energy Community in 2011, it committed
to reforming its energy sector to comply with European standards and
adopting EU internal energy market legislation.78 In exchange, Ukraine
has received extensive support for energy sector reform, and is increasingly
integrated into European energy systems. In electricity, joining European
energy markets poses a particular problem: Ukraine’s electricity grid
remains synchronized with the Russian grid. This is not unique to Ukraine;
the Baltic states also remain synchronized with the Russian and Belarusian
grids. The effort to move the Baltic states fully into the European grid
began in 2009 and has a target date for completion of 2025.79 This process
remains complex and delicate, as it requires transformation of infrastructure,
fundamental shifts in electricity trade, and acceptance of higher prices. 80
74. Department of Justice, “Six Russian GRU Officers Charged.”.
75.
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76. Dustin Volz and Sarah Young, “White House Blames Russia for ‘Reckless’ NotPetya Cyber Attack,”
Reuters (website), February 15, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-russia-cyber-usa/white
-house-blames-russia-for-reckless-notpetya-cyber-attack-idUSKCN1FZ2UJ.
77. Greenberg, “Hold North Korea Accountable.”
78. “Who We Are,” EU Energy Community (website), n.d., accessed September 28, 2021,
https://www.energy-community.org/aboutus/whoweare.html.
79. European Commission, “Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan,” European Commission
Energy, last updated October 29, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/topics/infrastructure/high-level-groups
/baltic-energy-market-interconnection-plan_en.
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Rather than discouraging the EU, the cyberattacks against Ukraine proved
to be a catalyst for a concerted effort to move Ukraine further into the EU
energy space. In June 2017, the EU executed an agreement with Ukraine and
Moldova to work toward full synchronization of the grids following each
country’s removal of itself from the Russian grid. The set date for completion
is 2023. The goals of integrating Ukraine into the European grid are
to enhance reliability and security of supply, increase competitiveness,
and improve grid resilience as well as to diversify the energy mix for
both Ukraine and Europe. The cost of the synchronization is estimated
at $400 million, while the benefits are estimated to exceed $1 billion annually. 81
As the f irst major step toward Ukrainian-EU grid integration,
one 2,300-megawatt coal power plant at Burshtyn Island was disconnected
from the Ukrainian grid and joined to the European grid. 82 The success
of this project led to proposals for an energy bridge which would allow
one nuclear power plant, Khmelnitski-2, to be moved into the European
grid as well. 83 After initial delays, the tender for this project was awarded
in August 2019 to the Ukraine Power Bridge Company, a consortium
including Westinghouse, EDF, Polenergia International, and the Hungarian
national energy company MVM. 84
By bringing Ukraine into the European grid, the EU will obtain more
insight into the Ukrainian systems, ability to train Ukrainian operators,
and access to additional nuclear power at a time when some EU states—
most notably Germany—are moving away from nuclear power.
Ukraine, which ranks seventh among world nuclear energy producers, remains
strongly pronuclear, with 15 commercially operating nuclear power units. 85
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)

81. Sandeep Kohli, “Ukraine: Facilitating Power System Integration with Europe Project,”
World Bank (website), April 3, 2020, https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents
-reports/documentdetail/989951585894725327/concept-project-information-document-pid-ukraine-facilitating
-power-system-integration-with-europe-project-p171980.
82. International Energy Agency (IEA), Ukraine Energy Profile (Paris: IEA, April 2020), 33,
https://www.iea.org/reports/ukraine-energy-profile.
83. “Nuclear Power in Ukraine,” World Nuclear Association (website), n.d., last updated September 2021,
https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/ukraine.aspx.
84. “Energy Bridge Has Geopolitical Significance, Says Polenergia,” World Nuclear News (website),
December 4, 2020, https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Energy-Bridge-has-geopolitical
-significance,-says.
85. IEA, Key World Energy Statistics 2020 (Paris: IEA, August 2020), 19, https://www.iea.org/reports/key
-world-energy-statistics-2020.
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has provided signif icant assistance for reactor security upgrades. 86
Supporters of EBRD’s assistance argue it is the EU’s best chance to improve
safety and security in Ukrainian energy while simultaneously making nuclear
power available to a decarbonizing Europe.
The grid integration is very ambitious both economically and physically,
and critics note that Ukraine would have to delink from Russia before it can
join the European grid. 87 Economically, such a shift would cut Ukraine off
from the option of importing electricity from Belarus, which is often cheaper.88
From an infrastructure perspective, Ukraine’s transmission network is
massive and ineff icient. EBRD invested approximately $124 million in
improving the grid beginning in 2015, but it is estimated that $5.1 billion
additional investment will be required. 89 From an energy security perspective,
this move greatly enhances Ukraine’s energy security, but due to the highly
networked nature of electricity, it will pose new threats to the European grid.
The problem of Ukraine’s cyber vulnerability is a matter of concern.
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers published a series
of recommendations based on Ukraine’s experience, including a framework
for better protecting substations against attacks like CrashOverride.
EU supporters of electricity integration highlight the extent to which best
practices can be shared with Ukraine, both in nuclear power safety and
in cybersecurity. They also note that since the 2014 Association Agreement
with the EU, Ukraine has become so economically entangled with Europe
that the risk of a “Ukraine contagion” is already apparent. Data f lows and
interactions with Ukrainian Internet networks already threaten Europe,
as evidenced by the NotPetya attack.90 There is little question, however,
that integration of Ukrainian electricity into the EU system represents
exposure to new cyberattack possibilities for Europe.91

86. “Ukraine Prepares to Reduce Output during Pandemic,” World Nuclear News (website), April 30, 2020,
https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Ukraine-prepares-to-reduce-output-during-pandemic.
87. Olena Holubeva, “Ukraine’s Disconnection from Power Grids of Russia and Belarus: Prices
and Consequences,” 112, UA International (website), April 28, 2021, https://112.international/politics
/disconnection-of-ukraine-from-power-grids-of-the-russia-and-belarus-prices-and-consequences-60945.html.
88. Holubeva, “Ukraine’s Disconnection.”
89. Anton Antonenko et al., “Reforming Ukraine’s Energy Sector: Critical Unfinished Business,”
Carnegie Europe (website), February 6, 2018, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2018/02/06/reforming-ukraine
-s-energy-sector-critical-unfinished-business-pub-75449.
90. Cerulus, “How Ukraine Became a Test Bed.”
91. Heng Chuan Tan et al., “Tabulating Cybersecurity Solutions for Substations: Towards Pragmatic
Design and Planning,” 2019 IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies – Asia (Piscataway, NJ:
IEEE, 2019), 1020–1022, https://doi.org/10.1109/ISGT-Asia.2019.8881706.
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Improving Ukraine: Vulnerabilities
Cyber Vulnerabilities
The institute’s study of Ukraine, described previously, identif ies
enforcement of polices and protocols as an important measure that is difficult
to subvert but which has the downside of being intrusive and carrying high
deployment, operating, and maintenance costs.92 Enforcement remains a key
challenge in the Ukraine context, where even the most minimal policies and
protocols struggle to gain traction. A majority of Ukraine’s computers run
on pirated software that does not receive standard security patches and that
may be corrupted.93 As late as 2016, an estimated 82 percent of all software
used in Ukraine was unlicensed.94
The problem extends to official use of software as well as private and
commercial use. In 2020, Ukraine was on the 10-country “Priority Watch
List” of the Office of the US Trade Representative’s Special 301 Report,
which identifies countries with problematic intellectual property (IP) rights
behavior. In this report, “widespread use of unlicensed software by Ukrainian
government agencies” was enumerated among the top three concerns.95
Similarly, a 2020 biannual EU report on IP rights in Ukraine notes that
little progress has been made in the area of IP protection and enforcement,
causing the EU ongoing concern.96 Although the government of Ukraine
is improving the laws governing IP, moving away from illegal software will
take time for the society, including the government, to achieve. Inattention
to safe software is one of many problems in Ukrainian tech. In 2018,
the British tech research firm Comparitech ranked Ukraine the 10th-least
cyber secure country out of the 60 nations researched, estimating 28 percent
of Ukrainian computers and 11 percent of phones were infected with malware.97
Given this context, Ukraine will be challenged to implement important
92.

Tan et al., “Tabulating Cybersecurity Solutions,” 1019.

93. Cerulus, “How Ukraine Became a Test Bed.”
94. “Software Piracy: Why You Shouldn’t Get Scared of Outsourcing to Ukraine,” IT Outsourcing
Review (website), February 7, 2017, https://outsourcingreview.org/software-piracy-why-you-shouldnt-get
-scared-of-outsourcing-to-ukraine/.
95. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2020 Special 301 Report (Washington, DC:
Office of the US Trade Representative, April 2020), 58, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2020_Special
_301_Report.pdf.
96. “EU Report on Intellectual Property Rights Highlights Developments in Ukraine,” EU Neighbors
East (website), January 13, 2020, https://w w w.euneighbours.eu/en/east/stay-informed/news
/eu-report-intellectual-property-rights-highlights-developments-ukraine.
97. “Ukraine Cybersecurity Assistance,” International Trade Administration (website), September 30, 2020,
https://www.trade.gov/market-intelligence/ukraine-cybersecurity-assistance.
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cybersecurity measures without significant shifts in its security culture. See
chapter 14 for an overview of recommended cybersecurity measures.
Recog nizing t he c yber t h reats to energ y inf rast r uct u re,
Ukrenergo established a cybersecurity operations center in 2019, following
the 2018 effort of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine
to coordinate all of the country’s cybersecurity initiatives.98 In addition,
Ukrenergo announced in early 2018 that it was planning a $20 million
cyber defense system for its operations, with a completion target of 2020.99
Meanwhile, Russian-based attacks on energy infrastructure continue,
though none have been as spectacularly successful as the efforts in 2015–18.
Of greatest concern is the cybersecurity of Ukraine’s nuclear power.
In 2018, a group known collectively as the Cyber Alliance—comprised
of four “hacktivist” groups called CyberHunta, Falcons Flame, Trinity and
RUH8—controversially tested their own country’s systems in an effort to find
vulnerabilities. In their reports to the press, Cyber Alliance claimed to have
successfully probed Energoatom and found vulnerabilities that would easily
allow hackers to enter the system of one of its nuclear facilities. See chapter
3 for several striking examples of cyber challenges to nuclear power plants
and the cascading effects such attacks can cause.100

Nuclear Vulnerabilities
According to its off icial documents, Ukraine intends to remain
approximately 50 percent reliant on nuclear energy even as demand
for electricit y rises. Uk raine signed nuclear energ y cooperation
agreements with the EU and hopes to export nuclear-supplied electricity
to the EU in growing quantities. The updated Ukraine Energy Strategy
to 2030 plans for 5,000–7,000 megawatts of new nuclear power at an estimated
cost of $25 billion.101 The nuclear energy sector raises particular concerns
in terms of CI and cybersecurity.

98. “Ukrenergo Develops a Roadmap for Cyber Defense Development and Sets Up a Security
Operations Centre,” Ukrenergo (website), March 19, 2019, https://ua.energy/main-events/ukrenergo
-develops-a-roadmap-for-cyber-defense-development-and-sets-up-a-security-operations-centre/;
and Christopher Miller, “What’s Ukraine Doing to Combat Russian Cyberwarfare? ‘Not Enough,’ ”
RadioFreeEurope/Radio Liberty (website), March 7, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-struggles
-cyberdefense-russia-expands-testing-ground/29085277.html.
99. “Ukraine Power Distributor Plans Cyber Defense System for $20 Million,” Reuters (website),
February 6, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-cyber-ukrenergo/ukraine-power-distributor
-plans-cyber-defense-system-for-20-million-idUSKBN1FQ1TD.
100.
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The Nuclear Threat Initiative Nuclear Security Index, which bases its
analysis on data from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
provides cybersecurity scores for nuclear power facilities in 47 countries.
In its 2016 ratings, Ukraine received only one point (of four possible
points), placing it in the bottom half of countries.102 The index also measures
other aspects of nuclear power plant security—on which Ukraine scores
significantly better—but its risk environment is identified as unfavorable due
to pervasive corruption, low political stability, and ineffective governance.103
There is also some concern regarding fuel for the reactors. Nuclear fuel
supply is less intensively networked than natural gas. Plants can store a year’s
worth of fuel on-site, and most have dry cask storage for nuclear waste.
While Ukraine still receives most of its nuclear services and nuclear fuel
from Russia, it is reducing this dependence by buying American nuclear fuel.
In 2016, Ukraine procured 40 percent of its fuel from Westinghouse, and,
with US encouragement, expects to expand these purchases over time.104
Future EU priorities regarding nuclear power are unclear, as European states
are divided over its desirability, but Ukraine is determined to play a role
in the European grid with its nuclear supplied electricity. The EU, for its part,
has already been very involved in Ukraine’s nuclear energy future, as the next
section will demonstrate.

Improving Ukraine: Assistance
Although the United States was slow to attribute the attacks to Russia,
Ukraine quickly became the place to study cyberattack. Ukrainian authorities
have been consistently willing to provide cyber intelligence in exchange
for assistance in fending off further cyberattacks.105 Ukraine’s information
and intelligence sharing with the EU, NATO, and the United States has been
well-developed. Even before the cyberattacks on energy infrastructure,
the United States and NATO engaged in Ukrainian cybersecurity.
NATO established its Trust Fund on Cyber Defence for Ukraine in 2014,
led by Romania. The project, which was designed to last for two
102. Alexandra Van Dine, Michael Assante, and Page Stoutland, Outpacing Cyber Threats: Priorities
for Cybersecurity at Nuclear Facilities (Washington, DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2016), 14,
https://media.nti.org/documents/NTI_CyberThreats__FINAL.pdf.
103. “NTI Index for Ukraine,” Nuclear Threat Initiative (website), n.d., accessed June 21, 2021,
https://www.ntiindex.org/country/ukraine/.
104.
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years, included the establishment of laboratories that could investigate
cybersecurity incidents.106
Following the cyberattacks on infrastructure and the US-led investigations,
the United States began investing directly in Ukraine’s cybersecurity,
convening regular US-Ukraine Cybersecurity Dialogues beginning
in September 2017. The US Congress adopted the “Ukraine Cybersecurity
Cooperation Act of 2017” and set a course for ongoing support and
consultation.107 The Cooperation Act required the United States to help
with advanced security protection on government computers, protection
of critical infrastructure, and building capacity. The Senate followed with
similar legislation, the “Ukraine Cybersecurity Cooperation Act of 2018.” 108
From 2017–20, the United States convened three Cybersecurity Dialogues
with Ukraine.109 The United States announced f inancial support at the
dialogues, with the Department of State pledging $10 million in 2017 and
an additional $8 million in 2020 in support of Ukraine’s cybersecurity
capabilities. The 2020 funds are part of a US Agency for International
Development cybersecurity project which is committed to investing
up to $38 million over four years to support legal and regulatory reform,
development of the cyber workforce, and private sector engagement.110
The assistance supports Ukraine’s efforts to adhere to recently signed treaties
to improve the security of its cyberspace.
NATO’s efforts to combat hybrid threats rose largely in response
to Russian aggression along NATO’s eastern f lank. See chapter 4 for a more
comprehensive explanation of NATO’s efforts to counter hybrid threats.
Since the 2014 Russia-Ukraine conf lict began, NATO has intensif ied
its cooperation with Ukraine. In 2020, NATO designated Ukraine
106. NATO Trust Fund, “Ukraine: Cyber Defense,” NATO Trust Fund (website), June 2016,
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160712_1606-trust-fund-ukr-cyberdef.pdf.
107. Ukraine Cybersecurity Cooperation Act of 2017, H.R. 1997 (2017), https://www.congress.gov/bill
/115th-congress/house-bill/1997.
108. Ukraine Cybersecurity Cooperation Act of 2018, S.2455 (2018), https://www.congress.gov/bill
/115th-congress/senate-bill/2455.
109. “Embassy Statement on the First US-Ukraine Bilateral Cyber Dialogue,” US Embassy in Ukraine
(website), September 29, 2017, https://ua.usembassy.gov/embassy-statement-first-us-ukraine-bilateral
-cyber-dialogue/; and Office of the Spokesperson, “Second U.S.-Ukraine Cybersecurity Dialogue,”
Department of State (website), November 5, 2018, https://ua.usembassy.gov/second-u-s-ukraine
-cybersecurity-dialogue/.
110. Office of the Spokesperson, “The United States and Ukraine Hold Third Cyber Dialogue,”
Department of State (website), March 3, 2020, https://ua.usembassy.gov/the-united-states-and-ukraine
-hold-third-cyber-dialogue/.
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as an Enhanced Opportunities Partner, and Ukraine, in turn, references
the aims of EU and NATO membership in its 2020 national security strategy.111
Not surprisingly, however, the greatest assistance to Ukraine has
come from the EU. In 2019, EU institutions constituted the lead source
of all overseas development assistance to Ukraine, providing $413 million.
In addition, Germany and Poland made bilateral contributions of $205
million and $81 million respectively, compared to $198 million by the United
States.112 Europe’s leadership of assistance to Ukraine is ref lected in its support
of critical infrastructure as well. Ukraine joined the EU Energ y
Community in 2011, committing to reform its energy sector to comply
with European standards and adopting EU internal energy market
legislation.113 In exchange, the EU provides extensive support to Ukraine,
primarily through workshops and projects under the European Programme
for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP). EPCIP aims to harmonize
approaches to CISR in the transport and energy sectors, with an emphasis
on infrastructure with a transboundary effect. See chapter 10 for in-depth
analysis of EPCIP and the broader EU policy framework for CISR.
The EU has already demonstrated a long-term commitment to Ukrainian
nuclear energy and completed several extremely ambitious investments
in Ukraine and energy security. Most notably, the Chernobyl Shelter
Implementation Plan (2010–19), spent €2.1 billion to contain the radioactive
remains of the destroyed Chernobyl Reactor 4 fully.114 The EU also financed
the completion of three nuclear reactors in Ukraine—Khmelnitski-2, Rovno-4,
and Zaporizhzhya-6—that had been begun in the Soviet era.115
The EU’s decision to include Ukraine in the European grid, which
is facilitated by the European Network of Transmission System Operators
for Electricity (ENTSO-E), is ambitious but has already borne some
fruit. In February 2021, Ukraine’s upper legislative body supported a draft
law making it possible for Ukrenergo to be certif ied under EU rules—
111. Natalya Belitser, “Some Thoughts on the Adoption of Ukraine’s National Security Strategy,”
US-Ukraine Foundation, September 24, 2020, https://usukraine.org/news/articles/some-thoughts-on-the
-adoption-of-ukraines-national-security-strategy/NTk2MTc=/; and “Relations with Ukraine,” NATO (website),
n.d., last updated August 27, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37750.htm.
112. US Agency for International Development (USAID), “Development Cooperation Landscape – Ukraine,”
USAID Foreign Aid Explorer (website), n.d., accessed June 22, 2021, https://explorer.usaid.gov/donor/ukraine.
113. “Who We Are,” EU Energy Community.
114. Axel Reiserer, “Keys Handed Over for Chernobyl New Safe Confinement,” European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (website), July 10, 2019, https://www.ebrd.com/news/2019/keys-handed
-over-for-chernobyl-new-safe-confinement.html.
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an essential component of the ongoing effort to move the entire Ukrainian
grid into synchronization with the ENTSO-E grid.116 Ukrenergo has
also succeeded in transferring datasets to ENTSO-E and has completed
the f irst stage of design of a new SCADA system in cooperation with
the German conglomerate Siemens.117 Improving the human capacity,
particularly improving communications and building trust, is essential
for Ukraine, and such joint projects are beginning to change the culture
for the better. See chapter 3 for a useful discussion of the importance of human
capacity building in countering cyber threats.

A Key Vulnerability Persists
Ukraine has been an important “sandbox” in which other nations have
learned about cyberattacks. It has also been described as a “free-fire zone”
in which Russia has been able to test new cyber weapons with little
restraint. Often ignored by Western commentary is the extent to which
Ukraine itself has been a leader in cyberattacks. Ukraine has an exceptionally
high percentage of software developers, ranking f irst in the world
when measuring software developers per 1,000 inhabitants.118 Given this
percentage and the profound asymmetry of the ongoing conf lict with Russia,
it should not be surprising that pro-Kiev forces engage in extensive
cyberattacks against Russia.
Cyber experts Nadiya Kostyuk and Yuri M. Zhukov conducted a detailed
quantitative analysis—with a data set cataloging 1,841 cyberattacks that
took place between 2014–17—revealing that some 75 percent of the attacks
between Russia and Ukraine originated from pro-Kiev forces.119 Their research
set out to test the effectiveness of cyberattacks as tools of coercion in war and
concludes that cyber warfare did not have a measurable inf luence on kinetic
116. Yaroslava Denkovich, “The Verkhovna Rada Supported the Draft Law on Ukrenergo’s Certification in the
First Reading,” Kosatka Media Electricity News (website), February 19, 2021, https://kosatka.media/en/category
/elektroenergiya/news/verhovnaya-rada-podderzhala-v-pervom-chtenii-zakonoproekt-o-sertifikacii-ukrenergo.
117. Yaroslava Denkovich, “In 2020 Ukrenergo Completed Key Activities to Integrate the Ukrainian
Energy System to ENTSO-E,” Kosatka Media Electricity News (website), March 4, 2021, https://kosatka.media
/en/category/elektroenergiya/news/v-2020-godu-ukrenergo-vypolnilo-klyuchevye-meropriyatiya-po-integracii
-energosistemy-ukrainy-k-entso-e.
118. Ivan Nikitchenko, “Presumption of Guilt: How Microsoft Won a Protracted Battle on Unlicensed
Software in Ukraine,” IP Watch Dog (website), August 31, 2019, https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/08
/31/presumption-guilt-microsoft-won-protracted-battle-unlicensed-software-ukraine/id=112810/.
119. Nadiya Kostyuk and Yuri M. Zhukov, “Invisible Digital Front: Can Cyber Attacks Shape
Battlefield Events?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 63, no. 2 (February 2019): 325, https://doi
.org/10.1177/0022002717737138.
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military operations.120 Even if cyberattacks have proven an ineffective tool
in the conf lict, Kostyuk and Zhukov provide clear evidence that pro-Kiev
cyber forces are highly active.
In fact, Ukrainian hacktivism emerged early in the conf lict, most
notably in the groups comprising the Cyber Alliance, which targets the
Kremlin as well as separatist forces. The Cyber Alliance argues that the
leaks of sensitive e-mails, defacing of websites, denial-of-service attacks,
and spear-phishing all contribute to weakening Russian efforts against
Ukraine.121 The government of Ukraine maintains its distance and
intelligence off icials are on record denying having any ties, though the
organizations themselves assert that they receive limited support from the
Ukrainian intelligence community.122
For their part, the pro-Kiev hacktivist forces are critical of the Ukrainian
government’s efforts to improve domestic cybersecurity. In 2018, Cyber Alliance
controversially tested Ukraine’s systems in an effort to find vulnerabilities.
They reported 200 cases of vulnerabilities, including successful penetration
of classif ied information in the Defense Ministry and, as previously
mentioned, potential access to nuclear power plant systems. 123
Although admired by many, the Cyber Alliance poses a threat to more
than the reputation of the Ukrainian government; their def iant stance
against both Russia and their own state makes them a potential irritant
in the growing relationships with Europe.
Not all cyberattacks originating from Ukraine are focused on disruption
of Russian government or forces loyal to Russia. Ukraine was a notorious
haven for cyber criminals prior to the war, known in particular for ransomware
attacks. Early in the war, the United States tried to help the Ukrainian
government reduce cyber crime and improve its poor record in bringing such
criminals to justice.124 Ukraine has since made significant progress. At the third
US-Ukraine cyber dialogue in March 2020, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
presented an award to Ukraine’s National Cyber Police and the Prosecutor
120. Kostyuk and Zhukov, “Invisible Digital Front,” 325.
121. Christopher Miller, “Inside the Ukrainian ‘Hacktivist’ Network Cyberbattling the Kremlin,”
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (website), November 2, 2016, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-hacktivist
-network-cyberwar-on-kremlin/28091216.html.
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General’s Off ice for their efforts to arrest and extradite cybercriminals
in conjunction with the Bureau.125 In a joint operation in June 2021,
the Ukrainian police arrested multiple suspects linked to the Clop
ransomware gang, accusing them of responsibility for damages of about
$500 million.126
Some of Ukraine’s efforts to rein in cybercrime, however, have been
controversial. In October 2020, in response to growing cyber incidents
during the pandemic, draft laws increased police search powers and
required Internet f irms to provide access to large amounts of user data.
These powers would make investigating cyberattacks easier, but, according
to detractors, would endanger personal data in a country where corruption
remains a critical issue.127 The proposed law, however, is in compliance
with EU standards, which is a top priority for Ukraine. As Ukraine tries
to move closer to the EU and the ENTSO-E grid, harmonization of its
legislation and credible enforcement of it will be important indicators
of Ukraine’s likely success.

Conclusion
The Ukraine case suggests several key lessons in energy security and CISR
for NATO, its member states, and its partners.
 Attacks against critical infrastructure have been committed
with state sponsorship. Even given this knowledge, the need for
responsible attribution may delay a strong response.
 Cyberattacks have increased in their boldness, sometimes with
unanticipated effects.
 The extreme networkness of electricity grids requires that parties
to shared grids agree to and impose CISR standards.
 The intersection of plausible deniability and incomplete control
of cyber actors can pose a danger both to the target state of cyber
activity and to the state that hosts them.
125.
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NATO def ines cyberterrorism as a “cyberattack using or exploiting
computer or communication networks to cause suff icient destruction
or disruption to generate fear or to intimidate a society into an ideological
goal.” 128 The designation f its somewhat uncomfortably with the attacks
in Ukraine, which took place in the context of a ground war between Russia and
Ukraine. As this chapter has demonstrated, in this hybrid conf lict, both states
have tended to use cyber actors whose affiliation with the state is unknown
or incomplete. Such a relationship is advantageous to the attacking state
when it provides plausible deniability. The relationship becomes problematic
when the attackers overreach or miscalculate the effects, potentially creating
a dangerous escalatory cycle. The Russia-Ukraine cyberattacks reviewed
in this chapter illustrate these complex balances. It is not clear that NATO
or the EU can tolerate Ukraine’s continued tacit support of cyber activists,
no matter how much sympathy they may have for the cause. If Ukraine
is to become part of the highly networked electricity system of Europe,
rule of law must extend to cyber activist groups as well as to criminal groups.
Given the ongoing conf lict with Russia, CISR in Ukraine is threatened
by its proximit y to Russia, by its shared energ y infrastructure
(pipelines and grids), by frequent reliance on Soviet legacy technologies,
and by the normalization of cyberattacks in both directions.
Through development assistance and shared practices and standards,
the EU, NATO, and the United States are attempting to reduce Ukraine’s
vulnerabilities. Some progress is evident, but persistent problems
remain. Infrastructure improvements are expensive and slow. Ukraine’s
cyber defenses continue to be hampered, according to Ukrainian critics,
by “poor communication between state institutions, a resistance to change,
a confused policy approach to cyber defense, and a lack of funds to recruit
skilled personnel and buy much-needed equipment.” 129 This criticism could
be levied at many states, including the United States, especially in the wake
of the May 2021 Colonial Pipeline attacks. Given the elevated threat
environment in Ukraine, however, it remains an appropriate focus
of US, NATO, and EU cybersecurity assistance.
Although Kostyuk and Zhukov find no evidence that cyber warfare had
a measurable inf luence on kinetic military operations, the reverse appears
true. Careful examination of escalation of cyberattacks appears to be a useful
signal of coming escalation on the battlefield or border. Russia continues
128. NATO Centre of Excellence – Defence Against Terrorism, Responses to Cyber Terrorism
(Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2008), 119.
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to pair cyberattacks with provocative military actions, as evidenced
in April 2021. While Russian forces were massing on the border
in April, there was a notable uptick in hacks and cyber aggression.
US News & World Report reported that Ukraine, together with US partners,
foiled 350 cyberattacks in March–April 2021 alone. This number is particularly
striking given that Ukrainian intelligence reported only 600 total attacks
in the previous year.130
Since energy has played an important role in the grievances between
Ukraine and Russia, and has been used by both sides as a means in the
conf lict, it continues to be a likely target for cyberattack in the future,
for as long as Russia pursues a hybrid approach. Strengthening critical
energy infrastructure remains an important component of Ukraine’s
security, and increasingly of the EU’s security as well. In the emerging era
of electricity dominance, the vulnerabilities have shifted. Supply chains still
matter, as they did in the eras of oil and gas, but the information chains
within and bet ween allies now constitute a critical vulnerabilit y.
Security of energy supply depends on improving the infrastructure and
the oversight of not only EU member states, but also of its close partners.
The Ukraine case provides a sense of the magnitude of the task and the
potential way forward. Taking liberties with Churchill ’s observation
about oil, it might be said that security now lies in allied cooperation, and
cooperation alone.

Epilogue
This case study was completed months before the Russian invasion
of Ukraine in February 2022. The book went to the press early in the conf lict,
but within the first two weeks it was clear that important events related
to the cyber domain and the security and resilience of critical infrastructure
were unfolding. The cyber element of Russia’s war in the initial weeks was
less aggressive than expected, which New York Times cyber experts posited was
either due to Ukraine having better cyber defenses than Russia anticipated
or to Russia’s command decision to spare infrastructure in order to make
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potential rule by a puppet government in Ukraine easier.131 There is evidence
to support both arguments.
Regarding the f irst hypothesis, the EU provided Ukraine a cyber
defense team that officially constituted on February 22. Led by Lithuania,
composed of members from Croatia, Estonia, the Netherlands, Poland, and
Romania, and sponsored by the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation
defense and security initiative, the team had the collective mission
to “detect, recognize, and mitigate cyber threats.” 132 The EU’s decision
to employ this team was, in part, a response to the rejection of Ukraine’s
application in late 2021 to join NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre
of Excellence as a contributing participant, which would have required
a unanimous vote to succeed. Despite this formal rejection, Allies at the
cyber center promised to provide ongoing support to Ukraine.133
Russia did launch some cyberattacks in the days leading up to its invasion
of Ukraine, with analysts reporting significant cyberattacks against Ukraine
on January 14, February 15, and February 23. The first two attacks were
distributed denial-of-services (DDoS) attacks that targeted government
ministries, banks, and defense agencies. The third attack, which took the form
of a malware release, was potentially the most destructive. Microsoft’s
Threat Center in the United States, however, rapidly detected the new
malware—known as FoxBlade—and blocked its code, provided this
information with the Ukrainian government and, at the request of the
US National Security Council, shared it with several Allies, including
the Baltic states and Poland.134
In response, the Ukrainian government also mobilized its own “IT Army,”
which claimed to have more than 175,000 volunteers within days of being
created on February 26. Prior to the IT Army’s establishment, independent
Ukrainian hackers claimed to have executed successful DDoS attacks
against Russian targets and theft of data from Tetraedr, the Belarusian weapons

131. David E. Sanger, Julian E. Barnes, and Kate Conger, “As Tanks Rolled into Ukraine, So Did
Malware. Then Microsoft Entered the War,” New York Times (website), February 28, 2022,
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/28/us/politics/ukraine-russia-microsoft.html.
132. Sebastian Sprenger, “European Union Cyber Defense Team Deploys to Aid Ukraine,”
Defense News (website), February 22, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/02/22
/european-union-cyber-defense-team-deploys-to-aid-ukraine/.
133. Sebastian Sprenger, “Ukraine Seeks Closer Ties with NATO on Cyber Defense,” Defense News
(website), February 1, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/02/01/ukraine-seeks
-closer-ties-with-nato-on-cyber-defense/.
134. Sanger et al., “As Tanks Rolled into Ukraine,” (2022).
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manufacturer.135 Experts suggested that this group would undertake DDoS
and defensive tasks to free up Ukraine’s IT Army of hackers to go on the
offensive against Russian targets.136
Although Russia conducted limited cyberattacks in the first days of the
war, its direct attacks on Ukrainian critical infrastructure were unprecedented.
Russian troops seized control of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants at Chernobyl
on February 25 and at Zaporizhzhya on March 4. Russian army kinetic attacks
on these nuclear facilities prompted immediate international condemnation.
Additionally, the IAEA accused Russia of undermining two of the seven
critical pillars of nuclear power plant security: that operating staff must
be able to fulfill their duties and make decisions, and that there must be reliable
communications between nuclear power plants, the regulator, and others.137
Although the conditions for the plant operators were quite unfavorable,
Russian forces allowed them to continue management of the Zaporizhzhya
and Chernobyl facilities. The Russian military command made no initial
efforts to close the reactors at Zaporizhzhya, two of which were working
at or near full capacity.
Russia’s choice to allow the reactors to continue operations is particularly
surprising given the fact that Ukraine had successfully de-linked from the
Russian grid in its pursuit of joining the ENTSO-E grid. Ukraine had
previously scheduled the isolation test—the required de-linking from the
Russian electricity system to demonstrate that the Ukrainian grid could
operate reliably in a stand-alone mode—for February 24, the same day
that Russia initiated its invasion. Although it succeeded, the test was only
supposed to last for a few days, at which point Europe would integrate Ukraine
into the ENTSO-E grid. At the time of this writing, however, the members
of ENTSO-E were still deciding whether to connect Ukraine directly
with the European grid, effectively isolating Ukraine.138
Although it is possible for Russia to bring down the isolated Ukrainian
grid without much difficulty, it has yet to do so. It is therefore not clear
whether Russia’s seizure of the nuclear power plants is part of a greater
135. Matt Burgess, “Ukraine’s Volunteer ‘IT Army’ Is Hacking in Uncharted Territory,” Wired
(website), February 27, 2022, https://www.wired.com/story/ukraine-it-army-russia-war-cyberattacks-ddos/.
136. Burgess, “Ukraine’s Volunteer ‘IT Army.’ ”
137. “Update 13—IAEA Director General Statement on the Situation in Ukraine,” International Atomic
Energy Agency (website), March 6, 2022, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-13-iaea
-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine.
138. Suriya Jayanti, “Ukraine’s Electrical Grid Shows How Hard It Is to Escape from Russia’s Grasp,”
Time (website), March 1, 2022, https://time.com/6153039/ukraines-electricity-grid-escape-russia/.
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plan to bring down the Ukrainian grid.139 It may be, alternatively, an effort
to ensure that command and control around the power plants will remain strong
and avoid collateral damage to energy facilities by Russian troops, which was
a well-documented occurrence in the Chechen wars. Given Russia’s
determination to conquer and control Ukraine, it may be that the power
plants, especially the nuclear power plants, are not as attractive as targets
in an open war as they had been in an era of hybrid conf lict. Russia’s seizure
of these critical infrastructures may ref lect its desire to retain control and
security of these facilities in order to govern the territory in the future.

139.

Jayanti, “Ukraine’s Electrical Grid.”
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Nearly every time civil aviation has been signif icantly challenged
by terrorism since 9/11, the aviation security response, or lack of it, has not
been successful in detecting and preventing the attack. In most of these cases,
the anti-terrorism failure was exacerbated by intelligence and/or
counterterrorism (CT) failures. In fact, the last time an attempt to blow up
an aircraft midair was detected and thwarted by airport or airline screening
procedures was the Anne-Marie Murphy incident at Heathrow Airport
in April 1986.1
Terrorists have used multiple attack methods against civil aviation targets,
including: hijacking; smuggling an improvised explosive device (IED)
onto an aircraft by a passenger, by an airport employee (insider threat),
or by concealing it in the cargo or a catering trolley; various types of sabotage;
armed assault at an airport; suicide bombers at airports and on planes;
man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS); and detonating an IED
at an airport. Furthermore, there are additional attack methods that have
been either carried out against other non-aviation targets or have been
operationally considered by terrorists, and thus need to be addressed.
Such examples include ramming into crowds with a vehicle, drone attacks
with an IED, or drone swarm attacks against an aircraft while landing
or taking off. Attacks can also include more than one modus operandi.
1. Philip Baum, “Ann-Marie Murphy and the Hindawi Affair: A 30th Anniversary Review,”
Aviation Security International (website), April 13, 2016, https://www.asi-mag.com/ann-marie
-murphy-hindawi-affair-30th-anniversary-review/.
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To discuss all these means and methods of attack as well as the potential
mitigating measures would not be feasible in one chapter.
This chapter, therefore, will analyze the aviation infrastructure and the
threats it faces, with primary focus on aircraft bombings and ground attacks
on airports. To understand the civil aviation sector, the first section describes
why the aviation industry is so critical, what makes it so volatile, and why
it is so attractive a target to terrorists. The second section highlights several
key reasons for the industry’s vulnerability. The third section uses multiple
case studies—which span the 20 years after the 9/11 attacks—to illustrate
some of these vulnerabilities, examine the aviation security responses
to terrorist attacks, and identify important lessons to be learned.
Finally, the chapter concludes with recommendations and best practices that
can assist in reducing the vulnerabilities across international civil aviation.

Understanding the Civil Aviation Industry
National and Global Critical Infrastructure
Civil aviation is defined by most countries as critical infrastructure due
to the magnitude of the impact aviation has on both the global economy and
the economies of individual nations around the world. Aviation plays a key
role in multiple industries’ supply chains, facilitates both tourism and business,
enables disaster and pandemic response, and enhances the connectivity of the
growing global network. See chapter 1 for discussion of transportation, and
thus civil aviation, as a lifeline sector. The most recent example of its criticality
is the role aviation has played in distributing the COVID-19 vaccinations
globally. Although aviation cargo accounts for less than one percent of the
quantity of goods shipped by the global supply chain, the monetary value
of that percentage is 24 percent of the total value of all goods transported
globally by all modes of transportation. The figures from 2019 demonstrate
the scale of the aviation global infrastructure and illustrate its importance:
(1) 4.3 billion passengers who traveled; (2) 38 million scheduled f lights;
(3) an economic impact of some $2.7 trillion; (4) 61.3 million tons of air freight
transported; and (5) 65.5 million jobs to needed to sustain global air travel. 2
While civilian aviation is not inherently a military domain, it is clear that
enhancing the security and resilience of this lifeline sector is a vital interest
for NATO as an international organization as well as for its member states
and partners.
2. “Slower but Steady Growth in 2019,” International Air Transport Association (website),
February 6, 2020, https://www.iata.org/en/pressroom/pr/2020-02-06-01/.
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A Volatile Industry
Another major characteristic of the aviation industr y is its
volatility. The volatility relates both to economic factors and external
geopolitical factors. The aviation industry is impacted by f luctuating demand,
a rigid cost structure, competitive pricing, and changing and erratic fuel costs.
In addition, the industry can be severely impacted by global events, such as the
9/11 terrorist attacks, the SARS and COVID-19 pandemics, and the global
economic recession in 2008. These factors lead to an industry with low profit
margins which can cause airlines to move from profitability to loss in a very
short space of time. For example, in 2019, prior to the COVID-19 outbreak,
profit margins for most US carriers were between 5 and 6 percent, which
is generally considered low and susceptible.

An Attractive Target
In addition to the industry’s volatility, it has become and continues
to be an attractive target for terrorist attacks since the late 1960s. Since
1963, there have been more than 1,200 terrorist attacks against civil aircraft
and airports, which figure 6-1 depicts by attack type over given periods
of roughly 10 years. 3 This signif icant number of attacks demonstrates
how attractive the aviation industry is for terrorists.

Figure 6-1. Distribution of terrorist attack types against aviation
(Data by Aviation Safety Network)
3. See “Av iation Safet y Database,”
September 28, 2021, http://aviation-safety.net/.
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There are multiple reasons why terrorists see aviation as such an attractive
target, including:
 The ability to achieve a mass casualty event. The majority
of terrorists seek to carry out attacks that will achieve mass
casualties. The higher the number of casualties, the greater
the impact of the attack. By blowing up a plane in f light,
there will likely be no survivors and large, modern planes can
carry loads exceeding 400 passengers.
 The ability to cause signif icant damage to the economy
of an attacked nation. In addition to the direct consequences
of lives lost, there are significant indirect costs, particularly
economic costs. A mass casualt y terrorist attack
against aviation can cause a drop in demand for air travel,
with its negative impact on the volatile aviation industry.
 The intentional downing of an aircraft can be used
as casus belli, which the terrorists may want to provoke.
A terrorist attack against a country’s aviation interests with the
resulting dire consequences has in many cases been considered
casus belli. Israel nearly went to war against Syria following
the attempt to bomb an EL AL plane departing from London
in 1986. The United States went to war in Afghanistan
against al-Qaeda following the attacks of 9/11. In some cases,
it can be the terrorist group’s agenda to achieve an escalation
of hostilities to further its cause.
 The psychological factor in terrorism. Terrorism is about
achieving political objectives by terrorizing the public and
thus putting pressure on governments. The fear of not
being able to board a f light and reach a destination safely—
but rather being blown up midair without any chance
of survival—has a tremendous psychological impact on the
public and the industry.
 National carriers are national symbols. National air carriers
and other iconic airlines are seen by the terrorists as symbols
of their respective nations. An attack against a national
symbol is sometimes a preferred objective for terrorist groups.
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 Immediate media coverage. Due to the centrality of the
aviation industry to everyday life in the Western world,
any event that has a negative impact on the industry
receives immediate media coverage. This coverage may
be disproportionate compared to other sectors. For example,
a security event that causes the evacuation of an airport receives
far greater coverage than a comparable event in another sector.
Terrorist organizations are aware of this dynamic and media
coverage is certainly one of their objectives.
 The adversar y has certain operational advantages.
Although not an exhaustive list, attacking an aircraft in f light
offers adversaries several advantages, such as: (1) an extremely
sensitive environment onboard a pressurized aircraft,
which leaves little margin for error regarding the response and
possible outcome; (2) the relatively small amount of explosives
or limited weaponry required for an attack to have catastrophic
consequences; and (3) no possibility for the aircraft to receive
reinforcements in a hijacking situation.

The Aviation Industry Remains Vulnerable
Almost every time the aviation security (AVSEC) domain has faced
terrorist attacks since 9/11, it has not performed well. In most cases
the poor response was exacerbated by intelligence and/or CT failures.
These failures clearly demonstrate that the aviation industry remains
vulnerable. In addition, there have also been major security breaches
at airports without a nexus to terrorism that add further concern regarding
the vulnerability of the industry.
In table 6-1, the most significant attacks against civil aviation are listed
from 9/11 to the present with a brief description of the nature of the AVSEC
response and an indication of whether intelligence and/or a CT operation
was able to provide any warning or disruption of the attack. The chapter
will later expand on several of the attacks listed in the chart (those marked
with an asterisk*), but not all of them; therefore, readers are encouraged
to research these examples in more detail.
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Table 6-1. Attack plots, AVSEC measures, and intelligence/CT inputs
Security Response
Attack Plot

Anti-terrorism/
AVSEC Measures

Intelligence/CT

• Policy failure
• Catastrophic system failure

• Policy failures
• Failure to “join the dots”
• Failure of “imagination”

*Richard Reid
“Shoe Bomber”
December 22, 2001

Failure: concealed IED not
detected on two occasions and
IED smuggled onto aircraft

FAA issues warning to airports and
airlines on December 11 regarding
the possibility that terrorists might
put weapons in their shoes

Mombasa, Kenya
al-Qaeda Combined
MANPADS Attack and
Suicide Bombings
November 28, 2002

Security forces did not identify
the cell launching the two
MANPADS, which narrowly
missed the aircraft due to
terrorist error relating to
missile’s proximity to target

Lack of intelligence despite large
al-Qaeda operation, including
MANPADS weapon smuggling

*Thwarted Liquids Plot
August 9, 2006

Although airport security was
Plot disrupted by CT operation
not tested, the fact that a liquids
ban was implemented after
the plot demonstrates that
airport security would not have
detected the IEDs

9/11

*Glasgow Airport
Vehicle-borne IED
(VBIED) Attack
June 30, 2007

No curbside antiramming
measures in place, enabling
VBIED driven by suicide
bomber to crash into the
terminal facade and deflagrate

Driver of the VBIED was on the
MI5 terrorist watch list

*Northwest Airlines
Flight 253 over Detroit
“Underwear Bomber”
December 25, 2009

• Regular airport screening
failed to detect IED concealed
on Abdulmutallab’s body
• Northwest Airlines security
procedures at Schipol Airport
fail to detect IED threat

US Senate Intelligence Committee
found 14 intelligence failures
leading up to the attempted attack
aboard

Cargo Plot
October 29, 2010

Cargo security screening
measures fail to detect the IEDs

Intelligence warning arrives after
IEDs have flown on two flight legs

*Brussels Airport
Airside Diamond Heist
February 18, 2013
Downing of Russian
Metrojet
October 31, 2015

Airport security measures fail
N/A
to prevent, detect, or respond
to the severe perimeter breach
and armed robbery of diamonds
from a civil aircraft on the
airside
Failure to prevent IED being
penetrated onto the aircraft
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Security Response (continued)
Attack Plot

Anti-terrorism/
AVSEC Measures

Bombing Onboard
Somali Daallo Airlines
February 2, 2016

• Screening measures
bypassed by insider threat
• Security agent provided
attackers an IED in laptop after
the screening

N/A

Brussels Airport
Suicide Bombings
March 22, 2016

Failure to detect bombers or
prevent them entering airport
during attack deployment

Failure to act adequately on
information received

Istanbul Atatürk Airport
Armed Assault with
Suicide Bombings
June 28, 2016

Islamic State (Da’esh)
Sydney Plane Plot
July 15, 2017

Intelligence/CT

Failure of external checkpoint to
N/A
prevent entry of bombers into
the airport
• It is not known whether the
concealed IED would have
been detected by Sydney
AVSEC screening
• The investigation revealed
the explosives used for the IED
reached Sydney on a cargo
flight from Istanbul

Intelligence warning received
11 days after first attempt to
penetrate IED onto plane aborted
by terrorist

Upon further examination, table 6-1 illuminates three major characteristics
of aviation security that contribute to the vulnerability of civil aviation:
its rigidity, its predictability, and its difficulty in keeping up with evolving
terrorist threats.

Aviation Security Is Rigid
Security systems are comprised of personnel, technologies, and the
regulations and standing operating procedures that determine how these
elements should operate together. These systems are usually large and complex,
consisting of many hundreds of employees and a multitude of technologies.
The inputs of these systems (passengers, luggage, and cargo) are of very high
quantity and frequency. The AVSEC system has to operate in an environment
involving multiple stakeholders and adapting to political and legal constraints
while maintaining high levels of customer service and satisfaction. Like many
systems, aviation security works according to fixed procedures with little space
to react differently to an irregular passenger or incident.
Two case studies demonstrate this rigidity of the system. The f irst
case is that of Richard Reid, later infamously named the “Shoe Bomber.”
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Reid arrived at Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport on December 22, 2001,
to board American Airlines Flight 63 bound for Miami, Florida, but
security agents detained him for questioning and a search of his possessions.
According to witness testimony, the security and airline personnel were
“troubled, indeed perplexed” by Reid’s disheveled appearance and his
emotionless, calm behavior despite being subjected to a thorough inspection.4
He was defined a higher-threat passenger and turned over to the police.
However, the system’s fixed search procedures, including both the French
police and the airport security screeners, did not enable them to detect the IED
concealed in his shoes on two occasions. Consequently, Reid was able to board
the plane the next day with his concealed IED and attempted to detonate it.
The second example that also demonstrates the rigidity of the system
is the case known both as the “Underwear Bomber” or “Christmas Day
Bomber.” Shortly before noon on December 25, 2009, a 23-year old Nigerian
national named Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to perpetrate a
suicide bombing aboard Northwest Airlines Flight 253, which was traveling
from Amsterdam’s Schipol Airport to Detroit and carrying 278 passengers and
11 crew members. Abdulmutallab ignited a small explosive device concealed
in his underwear onboard the Airbus 330 as it was making its descent.
Fortunately, due to the type of materials used as the explosive in the IED,
the device did not explode, but rather def lagrated and burned Abdulmutallab
in the process. Although there had been multiple warning indicators that should
have had him placed him on the Transportation Security Administration’s
(TSA) watch list—thus preventing the attack—there are several AVSEC
indicators which could have been identified. For example, Abdulmutallab
paid cash for a one-way ticket from Lagos to Detroit (via Amsterdam),
traveled to the United States in wintertime without any checked luggage,
requested a window seat over the wing, and, according to witnesses,
acted nervously at the gate in Schiphol airport. Despite all these indicators,
Abdulmutallab was not singled out for any elevated screening procedures.
These two case studies demonstrate how f lexible and adaptive adversaries
can be, continually revising their modi operandi while AVSEC measures
remained relatively rigid. Similarly, aviation security also needs to be f lexible
and able to adapt in real time to developing threats.

4. “Case Study: Richard Reid—The Shoe Bomber,” X-Ray Screener (website), accessed November 9, 2021,
https://www.x-rayscreener.co.uk/profiling/case-study-richard-reid-the-shoe-bomber/.
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Aviation Security Is Highly Predictable
The AVSEC system relies on technologies and processes that have been
in place for more than 30 years, especially in the case of walk-through metal
detector gates and dual source X-ray machines. Even the more advanced
computed tomography scanning machines have been in service since 1995.
Seasoned passengers typically understand why these scanners sound an alarm,
what item they are wearing triggered the alarm, or which particular item
in their carry-on baggage has attracted the screener’s attention. If routine
passengers understand these triggers, how much more do well-trained and
determined terrorists—who have access to these detection technologies—
understand the capabilities and vulnerabilities in the system and take
advantage of them. There are global terrorism online forums, for example,
that specifically discuss the vulnerabilities of aviation detection technologies
like X-ray machines and ways to exploit them, as figure 6-2 shows. 5

Figure 6-2. Online terrorist discussion on how to outsmart X-ray machines
(Image by Möbius)

It is important to understand that the more predictable a security system
is, the less likely the adversary is to be deterred by it. On the positive side,
more advanced computed tomography scanning machines are gradually being
deployed in some airports for screening carry-on luggage in North America
and Europe, but these are more expensive than regular X-ray technology
and consequently are cost inhibitive for many countries. Body scanners, too,
are a significant enhancement to checkpoints, but they are often subject
5. Retired Chief Superintendent Michael Cardash, “Assessment of Jihadist Discussion on Lessons
Learned from IED Attacks on Aircraft,” Möbius, July 2014.
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to psychological sensitivities leading to political pushback, which often
impedes their implementation.

Aviation Security Has Often Struggled to Keep Up with the Threat
Analysis of the development of the threat against civil aviation from the
1960s until the present is characterized by adaptive adversaries constantly
seeking ways to circumvent AVSEC measures. For example, in the 1960s
and early 1970s, hijackings were the most prevalent form of terrorist attack.
This reality led to the implementation of basic security measures (such as
walk-through metal detectors and the screening of passengers’ hand luggage).
To circumvent these anti-hijacking measures, terrorists then focused more
on plane bombings. As a result of the increase of plane bombings by IEDs
in passengers’ checked baggage, screening was improved, which in turn led
terrorists to look for other ways to bypass these new measures. Some examples
of these new measures include the use of MANPADS attacks or smuggling
an IED onto the plane by concealing it in the cargo storage area as opposed
to in a passenger’s luggage, as was the case in the 2006 cargo plot.
The thwarted liquids plot in 2006, which the next section will examine
in greater detail, is an excellent example of security failing to keep
up with the evolving threat. As detection technologies used in aviation
security have improved, terrorists have also adopted ways to overcome these
new technologies by creating more advanced, sophisticated IEDs.
As a brief survey of these examples demonstrates the vulnerabilities in the
aviation industry, the next section will examine several case studies in greater
detail to describe aviation security’s various responses to terrorist attacks and
identify important lessons the AVSEC community must learn.

Case Studies: AVSEC Responses and Lessons to Learn
Thwarted Liquids Plot, United Kingdom (2006)
On the night of August 9, 2006, following a major international
CT operation, British authorities arrested 24 men and charged them with
plotting a series of midair bombing attacks on transatlantic f lights using
explosive liquids onboard by concealing them in energy drink bottles. The plot
was disrupted with the arrest of the cell members who were based in London
and High Wycombe in Buckinghamshire. According to CT officials, the plot
was a multiple suicide bombing mission inspired by al-Qaeda. During the
arrests, police found martyrdom videos that showed cell members bragging
about the attack, and materials from covert operations in east London showed
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the cell members preparing the liquid bombs (see figure 6-3 for illustration
of how the liquid bombs were constructed). 6

Figure 6-3. Depiction of how the liquid IEDs were constructed
(Image by Daily Mail)

During the trial, the Crown alleged that the British terrorist cell planned
to smuggle the IEDs onto the aircraft and blow up at least seven airliners
departing from Heathrow Airport en route to North America with more
than 1,500 people onboard. Beyond the passengers onboard these f lights, the
number of potential casualties must take into account those on the ground
who would have been killed as a result of these attacks—a point that will
be discussed later in the insights section. Video footage of tests conducted
by government scientists, which were played to the jury, showed the devices
producing an explosion powerful enough to blow a hole in an aircraft fuselage.
In May 2012, signif icant intelligence was gleaned from documents
found on a concealed disk in the possession of a 22-year-old Austrian named
Maqsood Lodin, who was being questioned by police in Berlin after returning
from Pakistan. One document, written by Rashid Rauf—a British al-Qaeda
operative at the heart of the group’s terror operations in the United Kingdom—
shed signif icant new light on the plot to blow up transatlantic airliners
departing from Heathrow Airport in 2006. In the document, Rauf wrote:
“We then analysed the various machines that were used for checking baggage
and persons at airports. We found it was very difficult to detect liquids
6. David Williams and Rebecca Camber, “Three Guilty in Liquid Bomb Terror Plot to Murder Hundreds
on Transatlantic Flights,” Daily Mail (website), July 8, 2010, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article
-1293128/Three-guilty-liquid-bomb-terror-plot-murder-hundreds-transatlantic-flights.html.
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explosives. After analysis that it would be possible to take concentrated
hydrogen peroxide onboard, the thought came to our mind: would it be
possible to detonate the hydrogen aboard an airplane?” 7
Immediately after the plot’s disruption, the United States and Canada
banned all liquids and gels from passengers’ hand luggage while in the United
Kingdom no hand luggage was allowed onboard except for a few essentials
(such as travel documents, wallets, and baby food). The new measures caused
massive f light delays and threw most of the aviation world into disarray, but,
over time, the ban was implemented in other countries that allowed passengers
to take onboard only small quantities of liquid or gel. Niki Tompkinson,
the then director of transport security in the UK Department of Transport,
praised the way the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada cooperated
and coordinated their rapid response to this new threat of liquid explosives. 8
These restrictions have largely remained in force until the present.
In 2009, the plot’s ringleader, Abdul Ahmed Ali, and his two closest
associates, Tanvir Hussain and Assad Serwar, were found guilty of conspiring
to bomb at least seven airliners f lying to destinations in the United States
and Canada. The High Court judge imposed life sentences with 30 minimum
prison terms of 32–40 years each, calling the plot “the most grave and
wicked conspiracy ever proven within jurisdiction,” and comparable only
to the 9/11 attacks.9

Liquids Plot: Insights and Analyses
One of the most important issues AVSEC professionals need to understand
is whether the plot would have been successful if there had not been
an intelligence warning and subsequent disruption by the CT operation.
W hi le some have questioned whether the plot was v iable,
Assistant Commissioner Andy Hayman, the then head of specialist
operations at Scotland Yard, wrote: “If the plotters had not been stopped,
I believe they would have been successful.” 10

7. Nic Robertson, Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister, “Document Shows Origins of 2006 Plot
for Liquid Bombs on Planes,” CNN (website), April 30, 2012, https://edition.cnn.com/2012/04/30/world
/al-qaeda-documents/index.html.
8. Niki Tompkinson, “Securing Transport in a Rapidly Evolving Environment” (address, International
Homeland Security and Resilience Conference, London, May 29, 2007).
9. John F. Burns, “Life Terms for Plot to Bomb Trans-Atlantic Flights from London,” New York Times
(website), September 14, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/15/world/europe/15london.html.
10. Richard Greenberg, Paul Cruickshank, and Chris Hansen, “Inside the Terror Plot that ‘Rivaled 9/11,’ ”
NBC News (website), September 15, 2008, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna26726987.
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It is highly likely that had the plot materialized and not been thwarted,
the terrorists would have had little diff iculty inf iltrating the security
screening system in place at the time. The fact that the new security measures
(for example, the ban on liquids and gels) needed to be authorized rapidly
and implemented clearly demonstrates that measures in place at the time
were not able to detect liquid explosives or the type of sophisticated initiating
device the terrorists planned to use. In addition, one of the cell members who
worked as a security screener at Heathrow Airport briefed his fellow cell
members on the security measures in place. The cell’s intimate knowledge
of existing security measures further increases the likelihood that the attack
would have succeeded. Details revealed by Rauf ’s aforementioned document
indicate that the cell carried out significant hostile reconnaissance and had
access to AVSEC detection technologies and procedures, which enabled the
cell members to select their preferred modus operandi. This is an important
insight to understanding the adversaries’ capabilities.
The court’s estimation, based on transatlantic plane passenger loads,
was that at least 1,500 could have been killed in the bombings. The number
of fatalities, however, would have been significantly higher if the terrorists
had chosen to detonate their IEDs while the aircraft were f lying over densely
populated, large cities. These attacks, then, had the potential to exceed the
number of fatalities caused on 9/11.
Another important issue that needs examination is why liquid
explosives were considered a new threat in August 2006 despite the fact
some types of liquid explosives have been around for more than a century.
Of course, not all liquid explosives are viable for terrorist use against aviation
targets due to their sensitivity and difficulty to access. However, PLX—
a liquid explosive invented during World War II—was used by North Korean
intelligence agents to blow up Korean Air f light 858 midair off the coast
of Thailand on November 29, 1987, killing all 115 passengers and
the crew. Here, North Korea’s objective was to destabilize the region in the
period leading up to the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul. The North Korean
agents left the sophisticated IED—consisting of a small quantity of plastic
explosives concealed in a Panasonic transistor radio, a timing mechanism
and detonator, and a bottle of whiskey containing liquid explosives—
in an overhead bin onboard the f light and then disembarked the plane during
a transit stop. Despite this use of liquid explosives for the f irst time
against civil aviation, no new measures were put in place regarding
the detection of liquid explosives. The emphasis, instead, was placed
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on implementing measures to prevent persons from surreptitiously leaving
a f light at an intermediate point.11
On December 11, 1994, liquid explosives were once again utilized
in an attack against a civilian aircraft. In this attack, the notorious al-Qaeda
terrorist Ramzi Yousef—currently in custody for his central role in the first
World Trade Center bombing in 1993—planted a bomb on Philippine Airlines
(PAL) Flight 434, which detonated en route from Manila to Tokyo. The plane
survived the bombing and was able to make an emergency landing in Japan,
but one passenger was killed and 10 more injured in the explosion. Yousef used
nitroglycerine as the explosives component of the IED, concealed the liquid
in bottles of contact lens cleaner with cotton balls serving as a stabilizing
agent, and initiated the IED using a digital watch, two nine-volt batteries
and a lightbulb filament (see figure 6-4).12

Figure 6-4. Reconstruction of the IED used to bomb PAL Flight 434
(Image by Alchetron)

Investigators would later learn that the PAL 434 bombing was a test
run for a far deadlier attack known as the Bojinka plot. In this plot, Yousef
and additional operatives in his al-Qaeda cell planned to blow up 11 aircraft
departing from Asian airports and f lying to the United States. The modus
operandi was again to place an IED on the targeted aircraft and disembark
the aircraft during a transit stop. The IEDs to be used were similar to the
one tested in the PAL 434 bombing, including the use of liquid explosives.13
11. Billie H. Vincent, Bombers, Hijackers, Body Scanners, and Jihadists (Bloomington, IN: Xlibris Corporation,
2012), 50–53.
12. “Philippine Airlines Flight 434,” Alchetron (website), July 28, 2021, https://alchetron.com
/Philippine-Airlines-Flight-434#The-bomb.
13. John Hatzadony, “Oplan Bojinka Revisited,” Transport Security International (website), October 16, 2019,
https://www.tsi-mag.com/oplan-bojinka-revisited-the-plot-and-its-legacy/.
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Fortunately, Yousef ’s plot was uncovered in Manila due to operational errors
his cell committed. Had the plot been successfully executed, the impact could
have been catastrophic and of a similar magnitude to the 9/11 attacks.
Taking into consideration the examples outlined above, three aviation
attack plots all used liquid explosives as a component of their IEDs,
based on the adversary’s knowledge that it would be extremely diff icult
for security screeners to detect this type of threat. It is important
for security policymakers to understand why the intended usage of liquid
explosives in the 2006 plot was considered a new threat, as noted previously.
According to relevant, senior AVSEC officials, there are four main reasons
that the threat was not adequately addressed prior to August 2006:
 Over-compartmentalization created a knowledge gap
between those working in intelligence and those in aviation
security, leading to a situation in which not enough AVSEC
decisionmakers were sufficiently aware of the viability of the
threat or against it.14
 A general acceptance that existing detection technologies
lacked the capability to detect liquid explosives and that
it would take several years to develop such a technology.15
 Many countries believed that the threats they faced in civil
aviation were not significant and that terrorists were focused
mainly on the United States and Israel.16
 Prior to 9/11, many of the large airlines—which had
signif icant inf luence on AVSEC policies—were opposed
to new security measures that could prove costly and negatively
impact customer service and facilitation.17
These four reasons shed important light on risk management issues
that impact the way this threat has been dealt with in aviation security.
The first point deals with the need for AVSEC leaders to have direct access
to intelligence relating to the nature of the threats facing civil aviation.
In response to 9/11, many senior police and military officers moved into the
14. Jacques Duchesneau, former president of Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, interview
with author, March 9, 2021.
15. Billie H. Vincent, author and former senior US Federal Aviation Administration security official,
interview with author, March 3, 2021.
16. Jonathan Zimmerli, former security inspector, Swiss Federal Office of Transport, interview
with author, February 4, 2021.
17.

Vincent, interview with author.

153

Harell

AVSEC domain. These were high-caliber professional security personnel,
but they had a little or no background in aviation security. As they led
their agencies to higher professional levels to counter post-9/11 threats,
it is understandable that many of these officials would have no knowledge
of the type of explosives used in terrorist attacks against aviation a decade
earlier. This is an example of “not knowing what we know”—a familiar problem
in the intelligence and security world in which an organization possesses
information that could have improved its decision-making processes, but,
for a variety of reasons, this critical information was not known or available
to those who could have acted on it.
The second reason, related to a lack of technological capability to counter
specif ic threats, essentially ignored the risk posed by liquid explosives.
The fact that there were no technologies available for detecting liquid
explosives and that it would take considerable time and money to develop
such technology indeed has to be taken into consideration. It is important,
however, to consider other possible responses in the procedural domain that
could provide a certain response to the threat of liquid explosives.
It is a legitimate risk management decision to consider a risk and then
decide not to address it as long as the residual risk is understood. It is necessary,
however, when assessing the level of threat to a country’s aviation interests
to look at aviation as an entire network with the potential for negative,
cascading effects. To illustrate this third point, the case of the “Underwear
Bomber” is instructive. One could assume that the Netherlands in 2009 had
evaluated the threat to its aviation interests as low and thus adopted a less
than robust security posture, but was then was surprised by Abdulmutallab’s
plot. Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian living in London, was given the task
of attacking a US airliner and decided to attack a f light with a transit stop
at Schiphol airport. Had the plot been successful, the Netherlands—though not
the target of the attack—would have been negatively impacted in many ways.
The Netherlands actually has a robust AVSEC system and Schiphol Airport
is considered a leader in the implementation of new security technologies.
The IED concealed in Abdulmutallab’s underwear would have succeeded
in getting through security checkpoints in most airports due to the fact that
in 2009 very few body scanners had been deployed at airports.
Regarding the fourth point, the inf luence of airlines over policies
governing aviation security, this certainly was a contributing factor prior
to the events of 9/11, and it could well be that commercial or other interests
negatively impacted security policy decisions. Take, for example, the TSA’s
2013 decision to allow passengers to board planes with folding pocket knives
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with a blade less than 2.36 inches. The TSA made this risk management
decision to enhance screening and passenger facilitation based on the logic
that a small pocketknife poses no threat to an airplane, since all aircraft
have reinforced cockpit doors that remain locked during the f light and
meal service usually includes metal cutlery that is potentially as dangerous.
This decision, however, created considerable pushback from the f light crew
unions, among others, and in the end, the TSA had to cancel its decision.18

Compliance or Threat-oriented Aviation Security Systems?
Due to the sheer magnitude of passenger movements through airports
both nationally and globally, the AVSEC community has struggled in one
of its key management challenges: to calibrate a security level that will enable
the screening of these passengers in an effective manner and in a reasonable
amount of time. If the security screening level is too high, it can negatively
impact passenger throughput. On the other hand, if the screening levels are too
low, then they will not prevent or deter terrorists from defeating the system.
A country’s level of screening, known as the aviation security standard,
is usually determined by the nation’s AVSEC regulator. The International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO), a specialized agency of the United Nations,
serves as the global forum for international civil aviation and determines the
international standard for aviation security. ICAO’s most significant role
is to develop and adopt standards and recommended practices for international
civil aviation, which are incorporated into Annex 17 of the Convention
on International Civil Aviation, also known as the Chicago Convention.
ICAO’s efforts to prevent and defeat illegal interference against civil aviation
throughout the world is essential to aviation security and the future of civil
aviation.19 As the international standard with which all UN member states
must comply, Annex 17—first adopted in March 1974—is updated on a regular
basis, especially after a terror attack, a major security breach, or a significant
rise in the threat level.
The large disparity in the resources that nations are able to invest
in aviation security leads to significant differences in the level of detection
technologies acquired and the availability of human resources and training
on a country-by-country basis. Annex 17 provides an international standard
which is quite general in nature and can be considered the lowest common
18. Andrew Bender, “TSA Cancels Decision Allowing Knives on Planes” Forbes (website),
June 6, 2013, https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewbender/2013/06/06/tsa-cancels-decision-allowing
-knives-on-planes/?sh=4d592365e55a.
19. “Annex 17,” International Civil Aviation Organization (website), accessed June 25, 2021,
https://www.icao.int/Security/SFP/Pages/Annex17.aspx.
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denominator for aviation screening. Therefore, many states have determined
their own national standards for aviation security screening. For example,
the TSA determines the US standard for aviation security as does the European
Civil Aviation Conference for the European Union and Transport Canada
for Canada. These three national aviation standards are more robust and
stringent than ICAO’s national standard, but even these advanced levels
of security have not always been capable of dealing with adversaries’
capabilities, as this chapter’s case studies demonstrate. AVSEC officers work
hard and invest considerable resources to comply with security standards.
It is, however, important to note that being compliant with the standard
does not necessarily mean being able to prevent, identify, and defeat a threat.
There are many examples in which airports receive high compliance scores
in their audits only to find that their security measures could not prevent
an attack from occurring.
One example occurred at 8:00 p.m. on February 18, 2013, at the
Brussels Airport, when eight masked gunmen in two vans cut through
the airside perimeter fence and drove their vehicles onto the tarmac.
In this very daring heist, the vehicles approached a Fokker 100 aircraft
destined for Switzerland and the thieves, brandishing their weapons, held
up the plane and stole $50 million worth of diamonds. The gunmen were
then able to f lee from the airport without being stopped and, fortunately,
no one was hurt in this incident. The breach, however, must be considered
from a different perspective: what if these gunmen were not thieves,
but terrorists? The fact that eight well-armed gunmen were able to enter
the airside operations area undetected highlights a very signif icant
vulnerability in the airport’s defenses. Here, the main point of failure was
the airport’s perimeter fence: since it was not a “smart fence”—equipped
with sensors to detect intrusion and provide warning of a breach—
the perpetrators were able to penetrate the perimeter without being detected.
If there is no detection, then it is less likely there will be any effective response.
It is important to note that neither the international standard nor the AVSEC
standard in the EU requires airports to install smart fences.
The airport’s spokesman insisted that securit y was entirely
up to international standards, but highlighted that the heist was outside the
scope of modern aviation security. In this case, security measures intended
to deter or prevent “would-be bombers and other threats could not prevent
commando-style raids by heavily armed criminals.” 20 This incident is a classic
20. Andrew Higgins, “Brazen Jewel Robbery at Brussels Airport Nets $50 Million in Diamonds,”
New York Times (website), February 19, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/20/world/europe/thieves
-steal-millions-in-diamonds-at-brussels-airport.html.
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example of an airport being compliant with AVSEC standards but not being
threat-oriented. An airport that decides to correctly invest in a smart fence
is an airport going beyond compliance and seeking to be more capable to deal
with the threats it faces. It is worth noting that this is the same airport that
was attacked by suicide bombers three years later in 2016.

Need for Improved Physical Security Measures in Airport Public Areas
While the airside, checkpoints, international arrivals hall, passport
control, and customs area of the airport are highly regulated and subject
to regular audits, the airport’s public areas—including the curbside,
check-in terminals, and departure halls—do not receive the same regulatory
attention. Consequently, the security levels in these public areas are usually
determined by the airports themselves or by the airport police unit assigned
to protect them, which can lead to signif icant disparity in security
levels between airports even in the same country. When there is lack
of regulatory policy or guidance regarding required security levels for the
public areas, critical issues like stand-off, anti-ramming barriers, facade
protection, and minimum armed security deployment often do not get properly
or professionally addressed.
Terrorist ground attacks against airports since 9/11 have had significant
impact on the airports attacked. One such attack occurred in the international
departure hall at Brussels Airport on March 22, 2016, when two terrorists
from the Islamic State (Da’esh) executed a double suicide bombing
(a third bomber failed to detonate the IED in his bag and f led the airport).
In addition to the 19 fatalities and over 80 injured, the massive destruction
to the departure hall closed the airport completely for 12 days and only
after months of partial operations did the airport resume full operations.
Brussels Airport is Belgium’s sole international airport, which made the
impact of the closure even more substantial. According to multiple sources,
the Brussels Airport and the city’s metro system were under imminent threat,
which prompted Belgian authorities to deploy military personnel to the airport
and other key transport nodes throughout the city. The bombers were not
detected by security personnel at the airport prior to the attack.
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Similarly, the terror attack against Istanbul’s Atatürk Airport in the
evening of June 28, 2016, also involved three suicide bombers as in the Brussels
airport attack, but in this case the terrorists from the Islamic State (Da’esh)
were also armed with automatic weapons. Although this modus operandi
of combining armed assault with a person-borne IED had occurred
in the past—as in the case of the devastating attack against Bandaranaike
International Airport in Sri Lanka in 2001—the Atatürk attack was the
first time the tactic was used against a major Western airport. 21 The security
deployment at the Istanbul Airport was quite different from the one in Brussels
because Turkey had seen a significant upsurge of terrorism in the previous
12 months, including six significant bombing attacks carried out in the first
six months of 2016. Turkish security authorities deployed screening points
at the curbside entrances to the terminals. The deployment of curbside
checkpoints can be a very effective countermeasure against suicide bombers
because they signal a deterrence posture and enable identification of the threat
before would-be bombers can enter the terminal.
As with all security measures, however, there are trade-offs. Curbside
screening points can also create a bottleneck situation where people are stalled
as they wait in line to pass through the security checkpoint and become the
target of attack. The main drawback with curbside screening points is that they
negatively impact facilitation and customer service and are not easily accepted
by the key stakeholders: the airports and the airlines. In the Istanbul Airport
attack, it is likely that the casualty numbers and damage to the airport would
have been significantly higher had all three bombers successfully detonated
their suicide bombs inside the terminal. In fact, the airport was able to resume
f light operations the morning after the attacks, as opposed to the lengthy
closure Brussels Airport experienced. The resilience demonstrated by airport
operators in Istanbul should be commended: the police and security forces
deployed at the airport responded bravely and quickly, which contributed
to mitigating the threat and minimizing the number of casualties and the
damage to the airport.
A f inal case study that deals with a terrorist ground attack against
an airport involves the use of vehicle-borne IED (VBIED). On June 30,
2007, two terrorists drove a sport utility vehicle into the glass doors of the
main terminal (Terminal One) of Glasgow International Airport. The slow
speed of the vehicle prevented the vehicle from actually entering the crowded
terminal. The two terrorists tried to detonate the VBIED, but fortunately
21. Rohan Gunaratna, “Intelligence Failure Exposed by Tamil Tiger Airport Attack,” Jane’s Intelligence
Review 13, no. 9 (September 2001): 14.
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it only burst into f lames and resulted in a delayed, minor explosion. The only
casualties in the attack were the two terrorists, one of whom died and one
of whom was severely burned. Despite the relatively low impact of this attack,
the “what if ?” question is again worth asking. What if the VBIED had been
better constructed and had detonated? What if the vehicle had succeeded
in penetrating into the terminal building? Based on the destruction and
number of casualties that person-borne IEDs caused in Brussels, it is likely
that the VBIED—had it detonated inside the terminal building—would have
exceeded that level of devastation and casualties considerably.
It is important to note that there were no anti-ramming barriers or bollards
along the curbside at the Glasgow Airport prior to the attack. After the
attack, however, bollards were installed along the curb to protect the terminal
from attacks of this nature. See figures 5 and 6 for images of the airport
curbside before and after the attack. 22 Although many airports around
the world are now protected by anti-ramming barriers or bollards along
the curbside, many others still do not have this protection. Again, this
is an example of a lack in regulatory policies for the public areas in airports.

Figure 6-5. Glasgow Airport curbside before the 2007 VBIED attack
(Images by Insider)
22. Steven Wilson, “Glasgow Airport—Then and Now,” Insider (website), June 30, 2017,
https://www.insider.co.uk/news/gallery/glasgow-airport-then-and-now-10713904.
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Figure 6-6. Glasgow Airport curbside after the 2007 VBIED attack
(Image by Insider)

Recommendations and Best Practices to Reduce Vulnerability
While the third section analyzed case studies of terror attacks
against airports and aviation since 9/11 and discussed possible root causes that
have inf luenced the outcomes of these attacks and plots, this final section
presents key recommendations—based on experience and best practices—
aimed at reducing the vulnerabilities identified throughout the chapter.

Develop a More Risk-based AVSEC Screening System
As the previous section discussed, one of the key risk management
dilemmas in aviation security is finding the optimal screening level that ensures
the necessary throughput speed and customer service without compromising
the ability to prevent or deter terrorist attacks. On the one hand, a security
screening level that prioritizes efficient access and minimizes congestion
at airport checkpoints may not be able to detect or prevent a sophisticated
attack against the system. On the other hand, enforcing a screening protocol
that enables the detection of even the most sophisticated, concealed threats
may negatively impact airport throughput in such a manner that airport
operations will not be sustainable. Most nations choose to implement
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a “one size fits all” AVSEC system in which everyone is screened in the same
manner and at the same level.
Since many of the attacks discussed in this chapter were able to penetrate
this type of AVSEC screening successfully, many regulators now promote
a more risk-based approach. Two former administrators of the TSA,
Kip Hawley and John Pistole, were two of the first advocates for moving
toward a more risk-based model of aviation security. 23 A risk-based system
means that passengers considered a higher threat will receive a higher level
of screening while routine, lower threat passengers are screened according
to the minimum standard. Here, physical screening levels can vary
in accordance with a passenger’s potential risk. An important complementary
issue with this recommendation is the decision on which tools to use to identify
passengers with a potential for higher risk. This issue will be addressed further
in the additional recommendations of this section.

Develop and Implement Threat Definitions Aligned
to Adversary Capabilities
The foundation for effective security systems in aviation, and all other
security sectors, should be to define correctly the threat criteria that need
to be addressed and then prepare the response accordingly. Security work
inherently must relate to threats; without threats, there would be no need
for security measures. In the aviation sector, if there were no terrorists
or threat actors with malicious intentions against aviation assets, then there
would be no need for aviation security. Furthermore, securing all aviation assets
against every type of terrorist threat would demand tremendous resources,
which—even if they were available—would almost certainly not be feasible
or cost-effective. The direct consequence of attempting to counter all possible
threats is that security personnel will not be adequately focused on the relevant
threats and thus will provide only a partial solution. For example, continuing
to define nail scissors or small pocketknives as a threat to aviation security
makes it more likely that the efforts screeners undertake to detect these
items will decrease their ability to detect other, more sophisticated and
relevant threats. 24

23. Hugo Martin, “TSA Head Envisions End of One Size Fits All Security Measures,” Los Angeles Times
(blog), March 3, 2012, https://latimesblogs.latimes.com/money_co/2011/03/tsa-head-envisions-end-of-one
-size-fits-all-security-measures.html.
24. A. T. Biggs et al., “Examining Perceptual and Conceptual Set Biases in Multiple-target Visual Search,”
Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics 77 (2015): 844.
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It is important that regulators provide clear definitions of the threat
so that security managers and frontline staff know exactly what they are trying
to detect and defeat. Vague threat definitions can lead to frontline staff not
correctly calibrating their equipment, or, worse still, if a threat is not clearly
defined, then it may not be addressed at all. If ramming into the terminal
is not defined as a threat by the regulator, then airport operators may not feel
obliged to install anti-ramming barriers. In short, threat definitions must
be quantitative, qualitative, and scenario-based, such as an armed assault
on the terminal by an adversary comprising of two to three terrorists armed
with automatic weapons and IEDs.

Utilize Airline Passenger Travel Data
for Risk-based Screening Purposes
Passenger name records (PNR) are commercial records for storing airline
reservations and records related to other travel services. For example, a single
PNR can contain data about a single traveler, an entire family or tour group,
and all services for their trips from multiple providers, such as air and train
travel, hotels, and car rental. PNR data can be most insightful because
it reveals a passenger’s links and connections, activities, tastes, and preferences.
PNR data typically contains credit card numbers, telephone numbers,
e-mail addresses, Internet protocol addresses, and place and mode of payment.
A focused analysis of a passenger’s PNR can provide important indications
that something is amiss and/or irregular. These indications, sometimes termed
red flags, do not always mean that there is illegal activity connected to them.
History shows, however, that in almost all cases, post-attack examinations
reveal that red f lags were present.
At the time of the 9/11 attacks, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the Federal Aviation Agency regulated the airlines to use a computerized
system that utilized both PNR data and a projected profile of a terrorist,
known as the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-screening System (CAPPS).
The objective of the system was to identify potentially high-risk passengers
whose bags would then be screened for explosives and not allowed to be loaded
on the plane until the passenger had himself boarded. Unfortunately, the focus
of the CAPPS system was a f lagged passenger’s checked baggage; the system
had no impact on checkpoint screening levels for passengers and their carry-on
bags. In the case of the 9/11 attacks, CAPPS identified 11 of the 19 hijackers
on three out of the four planes on that fateful day but was unable to intervene
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to prevent the attacks. 25 This failure is a good example of the AVSEC system
being inf lexible and rigid because it was able to detect but not adapt to the
threat of suicidal hijackers. Experts in aviation security understand that
PNR data is currently not being exploited to its full potential. PNR data
contains powerful indicators that should be used to drive a risk-based approach
to screening. In order to adopt this approach, legitimate privacy concerns must
be addressed and international agreements put in place regarding the sharing
and protection of PNR information.

Integrate Behavioral Detection Programs
In addition to utilizing PNR information, another important tool that
can be used for risk-based screening is behavior detection or passenger
observation programs. The concept of behavior detection works much the
same way as using PNR data. While PNR data reveals indicators or red f lags
in a passenger’s records, behavior detection focuses on passengers’ behavior
or their contextual circumstances. It is important to note that this practice
is not racial profiling of any form but rather identifying suspicious behaviors
and activities that fit the profile of aviation terrorists. Suspicious behavior
indicators are the result of the terrorist being under stress, and they include
agitation, aggressiveness, and other behaviors that differ from what bona fide
passengers typically exhibit.
Several countries—including, but not limited to, Israel, Singapore,
the United Kingdom, and the United States—have already implemented
passenger observation programs at airports with notable success in the
detection of criminal activities. ICAO has registered behavior detection
in Annex 17 of the Chicago Convention as a recommended AVSEC practice
for all countries to adopt.

Design and Implement Airport Community Security Programs
Another challenge in aviation security is how to enhance capabilities
without depending on resource-intensive solutions, which are costly and,
in most cases, unavailable. One way to achieve this goal is to involve the entire
airport community in the security effort. Safety officers and their teams will
not achieve a high level of safety without the involvement of all stakeholders
in the facility, institution, or factory where they work. In other words,
it has become accepted that safety needs to be everyone’s business, and this
concept has been highly successful. This same concept can be implemented
25. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Washington, DC:
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004), 1–3.
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in the AVSEC arena with the same levels of success. The idea is to have all
stakeholders at the airport, including non-security employees, contribute
to the security effort. The objective is to effectively utilize non-security
resources as a force multiplier for security. One may ask why these airport
employees should contribute to the security effort in addition to their everyday
job—and without additional payment. In short, it is in their best interest
for the airport to be safe and secure, since a terrorist attack not only
threatens their livelihoods but their lives as well. Therefore, with the right
explanation and justification, it is possible to get most employees to support
such a program.
Airport community security programs do not expect non-security
employees to dedicate a large amount of time to security work, but when
every employee contributes a small amount to security it bolsters the overall
level of security. For example, the ticket agents who check in passengers
for their f lights are usually not involved in any of the airport’s security
processes, but these agents have more interaction with the passengers
than most security personnel at the airport, and thus, they have the best
knowledge of the types of passengers frequenting the different f lights.
With a short, focused training session, these ticket agents can be taught
to identify irregular indicators or red f lag behaviors, and these inputs can
be incorporated into a risk-based screening system. Another example is the
inclusion of airport employees working at information desks in the airport
halls. These employees spend much of their time observing the activities
inside the airport halls and waiting for passengers to request assistance.
Again, with a little training, these employees can assist airport security
by identifying and reporting irregular activities. This training can be done
with all the different employee groups at the airport, to include vendors,
cleaners, baggage handlers, and airport traffic wardens.
These types of community security programs are highly effective and
significant force multipliers that improve local and international aviation
security. To implement such a program requires buy-in from all the relevant
stakeholders and also a central organization to lead, design and implement
such a program. In Singapore, the government implemented such a program
at Changi airport and other border crossings with signif icant success.
The program—known as the threat-oriented person screening integrated
system (TOPSIS)—achieved in its first year of implementation a 60 percent
increase in the detection of criminal activity at the airport without any
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interruption to throughput or passenger service. 26 TOPSIS has had many
additional successes in the homeland security domain, which readers can
further research online. Airport security community programs, like TOPSIS,
represent a modern approach to security that can add significant resources
to enhance airport security, while making it more f lexible and less predictable
to the adversary.

Harden Airport Perimeters
Although there have been no terrorist attacks on the airside of airports
in recent years, there have been other criminal events that involved breaching
the airport perimeter. In addition to the 2013 diamond heist at Brussels Airport
discussed earlier in the chapter, two notable vehicular breaches occurred
at the airports in Lyon, France, in 2018, and in Van Nuys, California,
in 2020. 27 These incidents had no nexus to terrorism, but they clearly
demonstrate the existing vulnerabilities of the airside and highlight the
importance of hardening the perimeter to prevent possible terrorist attacks.
Of course it is not the intention to turn the airport perimeter into a fortress.
What is required is that any attempt to cut, climb, or ram through the
perimeter will trigger an alarm that will allow airport security to respond
and intercept the threat while it is at a distance from the airport terminals
or taxiing aircraft. Some airports have already invested in robust perimeter
fencing but it will take regulatory action to raise the required standard for
all. The following section will further discuss the need for regulatory action
as the next recommendation.

Improve Regulation of the Airport’s Public Areas
As the section on ground attacks previously discussed, there are
no or very minimal security requirements regarding physical security measures
that should be implemented to protect the ground side or public areas of airports.
There should be minimum standards relating to the structure of an airport,
facades, curbside protection, unattended vehicles, and armed deployment.
These standards would be especially relevant for new terminals in the
predesign stage and for terminal upgrades. Implementing security measures
26. S. Iswaran (address, TOPSIS Forum 2011 Cum Counter-Terrorism Exhibition, Singapore,
October 12, 2011), https://www.mynewsdesk.com/sg/ministry-of-home-affairs/pressreleases/topsis-forum
-2011-cum-counterterrorism-exhibition-at-cag-auditorium-changi-airport-terminal-2-speech-by-mr-s
-iswaran-minister-in-prime-693260.
27. Kim Willsher, “Dramatic Police Chase as Car Smashes onto Runway at Lyon Airport,” Guardian
(website), September 10, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/10/french-dramatic-police
-chase-as-car-smashes-onto-runway-at-lyon-airport; and CBSLA Staff, “Police Chase Down Erratic
Driver on Van Nuys Airport Runway,” CBS News Los Angeles (website), November 6, 2020,
https://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2020/11/06/police-chase-erratic-driver-van-nuys-airport-runway/.
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during the design stage of a construction project is cost-effective way
to achieve the desired level of security with a minimal impact (low single-digit
percentage) on the overall project cost.

Avoid Over-reliance on Indications and Warning Intelligence
Experience has shown most terror attacks against aviation have occurred
either without warning or with intelligence that was too general to assist
in focusing the AVSEC response. It would be prudent for AVSEC officials
to hold the basic assumption that an attack against aviation interests can
happen at any time and without any prior intelligence warning. It is also
important that relevant intelligence related to aviation threats and terrorist
capabilities be shared with the officials charged with protecting aviation
assets. It is relatively easy to keep security personnel alert and prepared
during a period of heightened threat, and it is therefore an important function
of security leaders to use tools that will maintain a high level of alertness even
when there is no intelligence warning.
Airport security departments should also develop their own f ield
intelligence-gathering capabilities, with a focus on unusual events that take
place at the airport, which could be tests of security or hostile concepts.
These events should be logged and monitored for trends. Airport f ield
intelligence should also be shared with the broader AVSEC community,
which may enable the detection of patterns of activity.

Prioritize the Human Factor: Recruitment and Training
This chapter demonstrates that aviation security is a complex system
that deals with sophisticated threats while utilizing modern technology.
In order to meet the multiple challenges the industry faces, it is imperative
that AVSEC personnel, both managers and frontline officers, are of the
right quality and receive the correct training. For too many years, airport
screeners were not adequately trained or rewarded, and in many cases the
position of an airport screener was an entry-level job. This type of personnel
management can ultimately lead to situations in which the entire system
could fail or collapse due to a single frontline security screener’s human error.
The extraordinary event that took place at Edmonton International Airport
on September 20, 2013, illustrates this point. Here, an airport screener
stopped an 18-year-old passenger after identifying what looked like a pipe
bomb in the passenger’s carry-on bag. The passenger explained that he had
constructed the item in the past as a hobby, and he had forgotten it in his bag.
Unbelievably, the screener told the passenger he could keep the item onboard
the plane. The passenger, however, insisted the item remain with the screener,
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so the screener accepted the device and allowed the passenger to board his
f light to Mexico. The device was six inches long and two inches in diameter
and filled with gunpowder. It had screws at both sides and a three-meter fuse
running through it. The pipe bomb was placed in a bin with other confiscated
items until a supervisor notified the police at the airport four days later. 28
To prevent events like this from recurring and to develop a professional,
robust security posture, it is essential to recruit the right people and also
to train and reward them. Threat-oriented exercising, or red teaming,
is another essential and powerful tool for building and maintaining the
professional readiness of AVSEC personnel and reducing the level of human
error. Integrating technology is extremely important to aviation security and
it will become increasingly so, but without professional, alert, and motivated
off icers, achieving a more secure, less vulnerable aviation industry will
not be possible.

Conclusion
This chapter focused on the particular characteristics of the civil aviation
sector as critical infrastructure on a national and global level. Aviation security
is a complex system working in an increasingly challenging environment.
Terrorists will continue to target aviation assets globally for the many reasons
discussed in the chapter and seek to exploit the different vulnerabilities the
various case studies revealed. Students and practitioners of security and risk
management must understand there is no such thing as 100 percent security,
yet the consequences of multiple, sophisticated attacks against civil
aviation can be devastating in terms of loss of life and economic impact.
Therefore, attaining a security level that mitigates these kinds of threats
while enabling the aviation industry to carry out its operations and achieve
its objectives is essential. The different recommendations discussed
provide an opportunity to improve capabilities across aviation security.
AVSEC professionals, and those who support and enable them, should
be continually seeking ways to improve performance, reduce vulnerability,
and increase deterrence against would-be attackers.

28. Charles Rusnell and Jennie Russell, “Edmonton Pipe Bomb: Airport Security Personnel Ignored
Danger,” CBC News (website), January 17, 2014, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/edmonton
-pipe-bomb-airport-security-personnel-ignored-danger-1.2500071.
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Mass Transit Railway Operations
Adrian Dwyer
This chapter considers the vulnerability of railway operations to terrorist
action. Its focus is on those methods of attack that have been used previously
yet remain relevant. Highlighted throughout is the vulnerability inherent
within open transport networks that are also tightly coupled systems. In such
systems, a disruptive incident has the propensity to ripple quickly across the
network and precipitate a range of unintended and often lethal consequences.
From the perspective of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
the targeting of rail networks across NATO member states can also disrupt
military logistics, the civilian supply chain, and economic prosperity more
generally. This chapter is not configured in the manner of a threat assessment
and does not predict future events in time or space. Instead, it is arranged
in four sections and uses plausibility as an appropriate leitmotif for managing
terrorism-related risk under conditions of uncertainty.
 Section 1 addresses the inherent vulnerability of rail and
the need for a proportionate approach when assessing risk
in context. This section discusses how to counter the
complexities of the threat in terms of addressing the perceived
threat within a framework of plausibility. It outlines one
approach to the process of strategic risk assessment.
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 Section 2 examines the multifaceted nature of railway
operations and further develops the scale and scope of the
risk management challenge. It notes that policing and security
are not interchangeable concepts, and that benefit, in terms
of public safety and managing societal risk, is maximized
when these endeavors operate seamlessly.
 Section 3 uses case study data from Great Britain, continental
Europe, the United States, Japan, and India to contextualize
how threat actors exploit inherent vulnerability. These
15 exemplars range from unsophisticated physical assaults
to large-scale mass casualty events.
 Section 4 summarizes the lessons available. It notes that
certain themes within methods of attack often recur and
that this observation is particularly relevant when attempting
to manage risk under conditions of uncertainty. The section
concludes by noting that though the threat from terrorism
is diverse, inherent vulnerability can be mitigated.

Railways Are Vulnerable by Design
Inherent Vulnerability and the Strategic Assessment of Risk
Mass transit and freight networks utilizing a permanent railway
infrastructure are inherently vulnerable to terrorist attack. Here, vulnerability
relates to open access, predictable and rigid operating parameters, and
the target-rich nature of the operating environment. Also relevant is the
strategic importance of the railway’s socioeconomic functions. The nub
of the counterterrorism (CT) challenge, therefore, is to protect passengers
and rail assets while not compromising the primary purpose of the enterprise:
to facilitate the unhindered movement of people and goods in a timely
and efficient manner. Implicit within the term efficient are the constructs
of safety and reliability.
To operate an efficient network, risk must be foreseen, prioritized, and
managed appropriately.1 As part of the CT challenge, establishing a scientific
probability for the manifestation of a malicious act, within useful temporal
and spatial parameters, is problematic. 2 There are numerous variables,
1. Blackett Review of High Impact Low Probability Risks (London: Government Office for Science, 2011),
7–8, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/high-impact-low-probability-risks-blackett-review.
2. Brian Appleton, Appleton Inquiry Report (London: Health and Safety Executive, 1992), 4, 27–29.
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some latent and others specified inadequately. 3 Under conditions of such
uncertainty, any casual use of the term likelihood can be misleading and may
be taken to represent a level of confidence that is unwarranted given the scale
of the unknowns. In contrast, determining the plausibility of a particular
method of attack (MoA) and its foreseeable impact in a defined context
is a more inclusive process that accommodates inevitable uncertainties.
Threat information is considered against reasoned judgment based upon
evidence, relevant experience, special knowledge of the operational
environment, and, by necessity, explicit assumption. Figure 7-1 illustrates
the relationship between these terms in the context of determining risk.4

Figure 7-1. Relationship between terms in risk assessment
(Diagram adapted from the UK Cabinet Office)

Developing a strategic risk assessment (StRA) involves combining multiple
risk assessments within a context-specific framework that considers plausible
MoA in concert with the range of credible intentions ascribed to threat
actors. This inclusive approach combining qualitative and quantitative data
is underpinned by the concept of the reasonable worst case (RWC).
In the United Kingdom, RWC is “the worst plausible manifestation of that
particular risk (once highly unlikely variations have been discounted).”
This form of words represents a more generalized use of language than
that noted previously, where malicious acts were defined against variables
3. For additional information, see Chief Coroner, Inquests Arising from the Deaths in the London Bridge
and Borough Market Terror Attack (London: Royal Courts of Justice, 2019), 18, https://londonbridgeinquests
.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Final-Report-on-Action-to-Prevent-Future-Deaths
-Report.pdf; National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies (London: Cabinet Off ice, 2017),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk /government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/f ile
/644968/UK_National_Risk_Register_2017.pdf; Karen L. Petersen, “When Risk Meets Security,”
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 33, no. 2 (2008): 185; and Nancy K. Hayden, “The Complexity of Terrorism:
Social and Behavioral Understanding Trends for the Future,” in Mapping Terrorism Research,
ed. Magnus Ranstorp (London: Routledge, 2006), 304.
4.

National Risk Register (2017), 69–71.
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of plausibility and impact. Likelihood was applied only to accidents and
natural hazards—that is to say, those events for which data were considered
more bountiful and reliable. 5
In assessing risk holistically, the quantified estimates of vulnerability
and a target’s perceived attractiveness to threat actors will be inf luenced
by precommitments and biases of the raters, hence the requirement for a more
inclusive and transparent process that addresses the following issues:
 Which risks are plausible, rather than everything imaginable
 The operational context in which the plausible risks are
applicable, such as which constituencies they affect, how they
may combine, or if they are spatially or temporally specific
 By what means the rationale supporting the ranking of risks
is qualified
A situation in which risk assessments are not qualified within a strategic
framework and are informed mainly by generalized intelligence material,
and in which stakeholders adhere knowingly or unknowingly to differing
worldviews, is less likely to produce the outcome desired. Such a situation
also represents an approach to risk management that can be complex to justify
in the face of hostile scrutiny. See also the useful commentary on risk
assessment and management in chapter 13.
Rail incidents, because of the nature of the tightly coupled system
in which they occur, have the potential to escalate rapidly in time and space,
and this problem is exacerbated when terrorism is the known or suspected
cause. 6 Raising the specter of terrorism places extra demands on often
hard-pressed cognitive resources of decisionmakers. For example, does initial
reporting represent the end of the attack phase or its beginning? Are terrorists
still at the scene, waiting to exploit inevitable confusion and target responders?
Are other attacks pending elsewhere on the network? These are all valid

5. National Risk Register (2017), 8–10; National Risk Register, 2020 edition (London: HMG, 2020), 8,
https://assets.publishing.ser vice.gov.uk /government /uploads/system /uploads/attachment_data
/file/952959/6.6920_CO_CCS_s_National_Risk_Register_2020_11-1-21-FINAL.pdf.
6. For additional information, see Donald Holbrook, Gilbert Ramsay, and Max Taylor, “ ‘Terroristic Content’
towards a Grading Scale,” Terrorism and Political Violence 25, no. 2 (2013): 202–23, https://doi.org/10.1080/
09546553.2011.653893; David Anderson, Report on the Terrorism Acts in 2011 (London: Stationery Office,
2012), 26; Maura Conway, “The ‘T’ Word: A Review of Richard English’s Terrorism: How to Respond,”
Irish Literary Supplement 30, no. S1 (2010): S1–S4; and Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1999), 89–92.

172

Chapter 7

Mass Transit Railway Operations

questions, but reliable answers may be unavailable, which further accentuates
the effects of uncertainty on the decision-making process.7
This chapter adopts a case study methodology, using 15 unique exemplars,
to provide an overview of the vulnerability of rail in context and highlight
some resilience-led response options. The intention of this methodology
is to communicate the essence of what happened in these situations
in a recognizable form and to help develop foresight from the lessons of others.
The approach accommodates variations noted in relation to how railways
operate and how threat actors exploit resultant vulnerabilities. The exemplars
focus on what history demonstrates are preferred targets: passengers and the
vulnerable elements of accessible infrastructure, rather than goods in transit. 8
The historical focus of these preferred targets does not mean, however, that some
types of freight movement—nuclear materials or certain types of chemicals,
for instance—do not have a special attraction for threat actors. In considering
the line of route (LoR), long-term denial through terroristic endeavor
is rare. Deliberate or hasty demolitions, particularly of monolithic structures,
require expertise and resources not possessed by many aspiring or even some
well-established terrorists. This observation is central to establishing a rational
appreciation of a threat actor’s capability and intentions—that is to say, the
plausible threat they are perceived to pose. See also the commentary on physical
threats in chapter 2.
Absent from the range of exemplars in this chapter is cyberterrorism,
which is an established area of growing concern. In terms of networked rail
systems, cyberattacks have not featured as an effective MoA and, to date,
cannot be equated with those incorporating physical means, such as improvised
explosive devices (IED), f irearms, and attacks involving sharp, bladed,
or blunt (SBB) weapons.9 Those cyberattacks recorded within the public
domain are most typically denial of service-type activities, often related
7. Terje Aven and Ortwin Renn, “The Role of Quantitative Risk Assessments for Characterizing Risk
and Uncertainty and Delineating Appropriate Risk Management Options, with Special Emphasis on
Terrorism Risk,” Risk Analysis 29, no. 4 (2009): 587–600, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2008.01175.x;
and Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgement and Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,”
Science 185, no. 4 (1974): 1124–31.
8. For additional information, see “Collection: Land Transport Security,” UK Department for
Transport (website), June 30, 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/land-transport-security;
Brian M. Jenkins and Bruce R. Butterworth, How Sophisticated Are Terrorist Attacks on Passenger Rail
Transportation (San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, 2020); Brian M. Jenkins and
Bruce R. Butterworth, Train Wrecks and Train Attacks: An Analysis of Attempts by Terrorists and Other Extremists
to Derail Trains or Disrupt Rail Transportation (San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, 2018);
and Jeremy M. Wilson et al., Securing America’s Passenger-Rail Systems (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2007).
9.

For additional information, see Jenkins and Butterworth, Terrorist Attacks on Passenger Rail.
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to extortion or the acquisition of sensitive data.10 In this respect, the value
of chapters 3–5 and 14—each of which addresses various cyber threats and
actors—is that they provide the necessary insight to inform a general risk
assessment incorporating recognized good practice, whatever the intent
of the malicious actor.

Target of Choice or Opportunity?
Potential attackers represent a broad constituency, including ideologues,
the disaffected, the disgruntled, and the disturbed. Collectively, they
appear drawn to rail locations which exhibit one or more of the following
characteristics: (1) easy to access with a limited chance of compromise
during hostile reconnaissance or immediately prior to an attack;
(2) diff icult to secure against the chosen MoA; and (3) likely to result
in disproportionate impact and media coverage for a relatively modest
attack. Highly motivated and resource-rich terrorists may execute near
simultaneous attacks on crowded trains in capital cities, such as the 1995 Tokyo
attack, the 2004 Madrid bombings, and the 2005 London bombings (exemplars
11, 10, and 9, respectively). While at the opposite end of the spectrum,
the deluded and feeble—invariably better armed than their unsuspecting
victims—may simply select the nearest station to their home or work to attack
(see exemplars 4–7). Note that in one such case, a lone actor who launched
a murderous SBB attack against civilians was eventually held at bay by a man
who armed himself with a narwhal tusk and another with a fire extinguisher
until armed police arrived and neutralized the attacker.11
The breadth of this continuum of attraction represents a challenge
to those trying to build a coherent rationale with which to prioritize risk
and deploy f inite resources. At its broad center lies uncertainty because
railways are expansive targets, open to a range of MoA. Particularly during
the prodromal phase of an impending attack, a threat actor’s motives and
intentions may be obscure. As a working assumption, the effort terrorists
must exert to achieve a particular objective—and whether they perceive the
investment as worth this effort—is likely to inf luence target selection.12
This cost-benefit analysis may be especially applicable where the cost to the
threat actor is calculated broadly, incorporating the perceived effort required
10. Dimitra Liveri, Marianthi Theocharidou, and Rossen Naydenov, Railway Cybersecurity
(Athens: European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, 2020), 14–15.
11. “Narwhal Tusk Hero a Year on from London Bridge Attack,” BBC News (website),
November 23, 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-55022920.
12. See Ignacio Sànchez-Cuenca “The Dynamics of Nationalist Terrorism: ETA and the IRA,”
Terrorism and Political Violence 19, no. 3 (2007): 289–306, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550701246981.
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to mount a complex attack, the prospect of compromise, and the chance
of achieving the outcome desired. This calculus is perhaps one reason—
possibly the reason—why railways are exploited so frequently as vectors
for indiscriminate mass casualty attacks, rather than truly strategic operations
directed against elements of critical national infrastructure.
From a historical perspective, bombing crowded trains and stations
is a well-established tactic of terror. In 1800s London, for example, the
Irish Republican Army (IRA) were particularly active on-and-about the
railway.13 The IR A’s “S-Plan” (“S” for sabotage) of the early twentieth
century noted that transport infrastructure was “probably the most important
of all” targets to attack because the resultant “serious dislocation would have
a paralyzing effect on every branch of industrial and commercial life.” 14
Particularly apparent within the contemporary ideology of jihadis,
but also attractive to actors driven by other motives, soft rail targets
represent solid targets of choice (see exemplars 9–11).15 Crowded public
places environments where a threat actor’s aggressive spirit can overcome
a lack of planning, limited technical skills, and meager resources
(see exemplars 4–7). There are also numerous examples of weak attacks
that failed to achieve the anticipated aim but which, nevertheless,
resulted in significant social dislocation and disruption and generated much
alarmist publicity (see exemplars 8 and 12). The impact of unrelated low-level
incidents can readily combine to elevate anxiety among all rail users and responders
alike. In the absence of a resilient approach to risk management, risk aversion
in the face of an ill-def ined threat can paralyze services, shut stations,
place trains out of position (thus impeding the resumption of operations),
cause cross-modal disruption, and inconvenience large sections of society
(see exemplar 13). A foreseeable consequence of such heightened anxiety is the
transfer of risk, particularly if rail users switch to less safe modes of transport.16
Risk aversion is typif ied by a response that: (1) is incoherent,
such as evacuating a station after a bomb threat without knowing if a bomb
or other hazard exists or where it might be located; (2) exhibits elements
13. Brian M. Jenkins, The Fenian Problem: Insurgency and Terrorism in a Liberal State, 1858–1874
(Liverpool, UK: Liverpool University Press, 2009), 166–67; and Vivien D. Majendie and Arthur Ford,
Circumstances Attending an Explosion at the Victoria Railway Station, Pimlico, on the 26th February 1884.
Report to the Right Honourable The Secretary of State for the Home Department (London: C. – 3972, 1884).
14. Irish Republican Army, “S”Plan (London: Public Records Office, 1938).
15. Wilson et al., Securing America’s Passenger-Rail Systems, 7–11.
16. For additional information, see Garrick Blalock, Vrinda Kadiyali, and Daniel H. Simon,
“Driving Fatalities after 9/11: A Hidden Cost of Terrorism,” Applied Economics 41, no. 14 (2009): 1717–29,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00036840601069757.
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of palpable decision inertia, when a generic plan is favored over the
management of risk in context (for example, specifying the same evacuation
point for all hazards, from f ires to bombs and everything in between);
and (3) embodies a needless overreaction, one justified against a highly selective
and speculative principle of precaution.17 Consider the example of Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab, a terrorist who sewed explosive material into his shorts to defeat
airport screening measures. See the in-depth case study in chapter 6.
That esoteric MoA, directed against an aircraft in f light, was extrapolated
by some as relevant to mass transit rail. Absent from their analysis was any
acknowledgment that access to trains and stations did not involve mandatory
screening of any passenger’s undergarments. Nevertheless, resources were,
albeit temporarily, redirected toward the now readily imaginable but implausible
use of intimately worn, wearer-activated, low-yield explosive underpants.18
In summary, railway networks are easy to access and difficult to defend,
and even a modest attack can bring about levels of disruption out of all
proportion to the effort expended. There is every reason to believe that threat
actors view railway networks in much the same way. The next section expands
the debate by characterizing the nature of the operational rail environment
and contextualizing some of the core risk management challenges.

Multifaceted Nature of Railways
Complexity
The term railway is recognized universally, but familiarity is not always
synonymous with understanding. Complex and rarely amenable to structural
change, rail systems operate not only as single and multimodal hubs and
lines of communication, they also facilitate a range of diverse functions.
These functions include commercial and industrial activities, retail business
premises, office and recreational spaces, and social meeting places. The more
complex the system, the greater the range of risk management challenges
to be overcome. See chapter 13 for overview of developing risk management
strategies. Some of the inherent complexities of railways follow:

17. Paul Slovic et al., “Preference for Insuring against Probable Small Losses: Insurance Implications,”
in The Perception of Risk, ed. Paul Slovic (London: Routledge, 2000), 51–72.
18. “ ‘Underwear Bomber’ Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab Pleads Guilty,” Federal Bureau of Investigation
(website), October 12, 2011, https://archives.f bi.gov/archives/detroit/press-releases/2011/underwear-bomber
-umar-farouk-abdulmutallab-pleads-guilty.
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 Public space is difficult to regulate. The security architecture
of railways means many established technological f ixes
used elsewhere are: (1) not feasible because the physical
structure is difficult to modify; (2) not practical because
the established culture governing rail usage is entrenched;
or (3) not even desirable because of foreseeable adverse
consequences of crowding (from slips, trips, and falls
to the inadvertent generation of an additional killing zone).
The analysis of aviation security in chapter 6 contains many
interesting parallels on this point.
 The identity of those who use the system is mainly unknown.
From a practical perspective, it is inconceivable that,
within the existing culture of rail travel, passengers would
or could arrive hours in advance of a journey and submit
to identity checks.
 There are only minimal checks to restrict what people carry
about their person and in their luggage. Due to the huge
throughput of passengers and foreseeable risks of impeding
free movement, such as crowding in conf ined spaces,
restrictions are difficult to enforce.
 Managing high volumes of timetabled rail traff ic
(passenger and freight) requires precise and centralized
coordination. Especially in terms of acts that are malicious,
this precision can be exploited to create single points
of failure. Railway systems cover a huge geographic footprint,
and boundaries between the railway and the surrounding
environment—and even bet ween different elements
of the same network—can be difficult to define. Without
care, it is possible to exacerbate working relationships and
create unhelpful turf wars and jurisdictional issues.
 Much of the dispersed infrastructure is accessible,
with minimal physical impediment, via authorized and
unauthorized points of access. The LoR is often secluded
and problematic to secure against even casual trespassers.
In terms of passenger movements, net work access
via a low-risk station will almost certainly facilitate the
unhindered movement to higher-risk locations.
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 There are multiple normative and derivative stakeholders,
and no single hierarchy of priorities is likely to exist.
This dynamic is particularly noticeable when rail services
traverse local, regional, or national borders.
 Passengers do not represent a cohesive group. The range
of behaviors deemed normal can be very broad and the
individual or group response to system instability can
be unpredictable. As core stakeholders, they are notoriously
difficult to engage, and, without great care, risk reassurance
activities could provoke risk arousal instead.
 Confirmed or suspected terrorist incidents are invariably
net consumers of CT resources. The response outlined
in exemplar 9, for example, required the prolonged
redeployment of assets drawn not just from London but from
across England, Scotland, and Wales.

Regulation and Political Direction
Railways operate within a framework of political direction at the local,
regional, and national levels, and face other competing commercial imperatives
as well. While unlikely to impact risk management activity as part of the
immediate post-attack response, political edicts can constrain operational
decision making in circumstances when an evolving and broader policy
objective expedites or delays the return to a business as usual (BaU) posture.
Such contingencies—where political, operational, and commercial imperatives
merge—benef it from being planned in advance and agreed in principle
by all stakeholders. That is to say, it is desirable to achieve a broad consensus
before foreseeable events come to fruition and certainly before any propensity
toward risk aversion stif les what opportunities do exist. Examples of this
approach include the use of decision-making templates or memoranda
of understanding setting out the conditions needed to close a rail operation
in response to a direct malicious threat or an adjacent incident, recommence
operation if that threat then fails to materialize, and manage the return
to normality after a threat has been neutralized.

Policing and Security
With respect to those practices known as policing and security,
when roles and responsibilities become confused, a vulnerability exists.
Policing, in its purest form, means maintaining the peace and upholding
the rule of law. Active policing is certainly capable of countering terrorism,
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and of deterring, detecting, or displacing its adherents, but not in isolation.19
Success is more likely where the functional structure is optimized toward policing
the railway as a specific task, and where organizational memory is accumulated
and retained. It is less apparent when the railway is simply another constituency
within the general policing effort. In contrast, security is a broader concept
that includes the range of physical and procedural measures necessary to make
an attack less likely and any response more efficient. As a BaU activity, security
is likely to be industry-led—with or without the direction of a regulator
or police—but always coordinated within the overall CT effort.
Benefit, in terms of public safety and managing societal risk, is maximized
when these endeavors operate seamlessly. This desirable outcome is most likely
to occur when information necessary to manage identified vulnerabilities
is shared through formal channels, involving conduits for both top-down and
bottom-up communication. By necessity, sharing sensitive information is likely
feasible only within a need-to-know framework involving trusted partners.
In this respect, the imposition of artificial barriers—such as security groups
that exclude railway experts simply because they are not security professionals—
is predictably counterproductive. See chapter 11 for insights on effective
information and intelligence sharing.
Railway net works were conceived at a time when terrorism,
though not unknown, was certainly of a lower profile and less potent than
it is in the twenty-first century. Many stations are not amenable to prescriptive
security regimes, such as those involving physical searches and a high reliance
on detection technologies. The use of fixed-point detectors, as a particularly
problematic example, is predicated upon the existence of a coherent operational
requirement that addresses questions such as: How will passenger throughput
be maintained while detection data are being processed or exploited?
If signal processing is not instantaneous, where might the subject of a positive
result be when the alarm is noted, and how will the target individual then
be identified and located without delay? What is the anticipated outcome
if a person-borne IED (PBIED), firearms, or SBB threat is detected, but the
threat actor has already reached a target-rich environment? If the confidence
level of a detector technology is known to be below 100 percent, then what
value does the system have? What arrangements, such as additional staffing
and the associated training burden, physical security, and blast mitigation,
are necessary to deal with positive results? There are also the broader

19. Transport Security: Travelling without Fear: Oral and Written Evidence before the House of Commons
Transport Committee, HC 191 (2008) (memorandum from the British Transport Police), 89–92,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmtran/191/191.pdf.
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questions of: who sets the standards for use? Who enforces the standards?
And, not least of all, who pays capital and running costs?

Media Impact
Attacks directed against mass transit rail, because of the nature
of the hazards they expose and the “dread risk ” they represent, are
readily comprehensible to stakeholders and the wider population. 20
Such events—because they are imbued with the salience of mortality—
invariably generate mainstream and social media coverage, which represents
an additional attraction to threat actors. 21 Even in 2005, viewing figures
released by the BBC indicated that more than 50 percent of the British
population watched BBC News coverage on the day of the 7/7 London
bombings (see exemplar 9). 22 The observation is of particular relevance now
because all-pervasive camera phone footage and instant messaging have become
mainstream sources of information. The physical attack focuses attention where
rhetoric alone may fail to gain traction, and the newsworthy incident allows
threat actors to display power in a manner that is visceral and unambiguous. 23
Moreover, public interest and outrage (see terms in figure 7-1) drive additional
exposure, thus delivering a propaganda bonus. Each new attack serves
as a reminder of previous atrocities, and all are linked by the common themes
of the railway and the vulnerability of its passengers. This ready association
can be manipulated further through the tactic of binary terrorism:
the combining of physical attacks with preceding or subsequent threatening
communications conveying false information.
Terrorist signaling of this type reinforces the spectral nature of the threat
to mass transit rail (see exemplars 3 and 13), often becoming a vector by which
public attention is diverted from the atrocity toward perceived failures in the
response. Recognizing that such exposure is a core element within the threat
actor’s motivation further reinforces the importance of avoiding overreaction,
minimizing disruption, and expediting the return to normality by reinstating
rail services as quickly as is feasible. This outcome is achieved most effectively
20. Slovic et al., “Preference for Insuring,” 137–46.
21. Aaron M. Hoffman et al., “How Does the Business of News Influence Terrorism Coverage?
Evidence from The Washington Post and USA Today,” Terrorism and Political Violence 22, no. 4 (2010): 559–80,
https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2010.493778; and Daphna Canetti-Nisim, et al., “A New Stress-Based
Model of Political Extremism: Personal Exposure to Terrorism, Psychological Distress, and Exclusionist
Political Attitudes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 3 (2009): 366, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002709333296.
22.

Transport Security: Travelling without Fear, 153.

23. Sophie A. Whiting, “ ‘The Discourse of Defence’: ‘Dissident’ Irish Republican Newspapers and the
‘Propaganda War,’ ” Terrorism and Political Violence 24, no. 3 (2012): 483–503, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546
553.2011.637587.

180

Chapter 7

Mass Transit Railway Operations

when risk is assessed in context, when the process of assessment is inclusive
(and not needlessly or cynically selective), and when uncertainty is recognized
as an inevitable consequence of dealing with a malicious act.

Plausible Methods of Attack (MoA) in the Rail Environment
This section develops the themes exposed thus far by situating
vulnerability in context by using incident exemplars. These exemplars
illustrate MoA that are plausible and representative, rather than just recent.
Collectively, the exemplars provide support for the contention that
countermeasures based upon faulty specif ication of the problem may
be ineff icient, subject to a range of unintended adverse consequences,
and problematic to defend when subject to legal challenge. In contrast to what
follows, this section commences by considering an event unrelated to terrorism
in every aspect except in the minds of some of those present and the media
sources to whom they spoke.

Fear of Terrorism
Exemplar 1: Exploding E-cigarette on the London Underground (2014)
At approximately 9:00 a.m., a male passenger on a tube train at Chancery
Lane was surprised when his man-bag produced a loud “pop” and began
to issue smoke. Upon looking inside, he saw his e-cigarette, charging via the
USB port on his computer, had failed. The battery case had ruptured due
to internal pressure and caused the noise and smoke. While he was reassured,
to some extent, by what he saw, fellow passengers were not. The following
is taken from an effervescent article in the Huffington Post:
Passengers screamed and ran out of Chancery Lane station
in central London while others were in tears following the
security scare at 9:30am. . . . “You just assume the worst, don’t you,”
[an eyewitness] said. “I didn’t know to be honest what
had happened.”24
Platform staff were alerted and talked to the surprised owner of the
bag. He was behaving normally and offered a logical explanation for events.
He showed staff the charred remnants of his e-cigarette and his computer.
24. Jack Sommers, “Suicide Bomb Scare at Chancery Lane Tube Station as Passenger’s Laptop Overheats
and Gives Off Smoke,” Huffington Post UK (website), June 19, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost
.co.uk/2014/06/19/bomb-scare-chancery-lane_n_5510544.html.
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There was no f ire and no smoke visible by this time. There were
no indications of a deliberate explosive event or that the e-cigarette had
been modified or adapted to create a weapon. Frontline staff with whom
he spoke and who checked the CCTV footage were satisfied this was a minor
accident and, in accordance with their security awareness training, they did
not report the event as suspicious behavior. The train service recommenced
with minimumal delay.
Simultaneously to the pragmatic process of assessment undertaken
by staff at platform level, passengers who had self-evacuated were tweeting
their experience of being “blown-up on the tube.” These reports led to media
interest directed at police and the rail operator. Due to the nature of the
initial information, and what was appearing on social media, the incident also
attracted the interest of specialist CT units. One witness reportedly said she
heard a massive bang and people shouted “bomb” as smoke started coming
from the backpack. 25 Yet, as was known by staff and police at the station,
there was neither a backpack nor a massive bang. Indeed, there was no bomb.
The early stages of a railway accident—particularly one involving
f ire, explosion, or derailment—may be indistinguishable immediately
from an act of terror. The ability to recognize key characteristics from early
reports from a scene is a concrete reason why a close working relationship
between rail operators and CT responders is desirable and benef icial.
Exploiting specialist knowledge concerning how the system should operate—
and therefore what is undesirable but normal, as opposed to the genuinely
unexpected and suspicious—is invaluable in terms of the collective ability
to disaggregate signal from noise (see the comments regarding early reports
of an explosion in exemplar 9). Disruption to services will invariably attract
media attention and the fear of terrorism may induce a form of contagion
among dispersed rail users, provoking well-intentioned but false reporting
over a wide area. Developing a security culture, in which frontline staff
are invested, is one means of managing this contingency, as exemplar 8
will illustrate.

Sabotage and Attacks against the Line of Route (LoR)
Most occurrences of mechanical or electrical sabotage of rail infrastructure
tend to be criminal in nature, rarely driven by a terrorism-inspired methodology.
Given the vulnerability of power supplies, signaling equipment, points, and
the permanent way generally, this may be considered surprising. There are
examples of single-issue groups and lone actors putting items on the track
25.

Sommers, “Suicide Bomb Scare.”
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or attempting to short or burn electrical cables. 26 In 1995, an entity in the
United States styling itself “Sons of the Gestapo” tampered with running
lines at a remote location. The saboteurs rigged electrical connections
to indicate, erroneously, that the track was intact. As a result, a locomotive
and 12 cars derailed, and three carriages propelled 10 meters into a ravine.
One person was killed and 60 injured. The human tragedy notwithstanding,
this event is cited most often because of its rarity rather than its impact.
More recently, jihadi publications promoted a homemade derailer: a device
fabricated from concrete and steel and weighing only a few kilograms.
This call to action appears to have failed as no trains were derailed
(see exemplar 2). From a practical perspective, and in contrast to the placement
of IEDs (a potentially rapid and more effective attack option), mechanical
sabotage may be time consuming, require the participation of several
perpetrators on-site, and, possibly, some insider knowledge. 27 It is perhaps
for this reason that explosives remain the weapon of choice (see exemplar 3).

Exemplar 2: Specter of the Jihadi Derailer
In 2017, a jihadist publication highlighted the desirability of derailing
trains in the United States and Canada using a purpose-made derailing tool
placed along the LoR. 28 The tactical use of such a device, however—including
optimal placement, attack timing, and concealment considerations—was not
addressed in detail. The method also required notable effort in terms of the
object’s construction, involving the casting of a concrete wedge reinforced
with preformed steel. Despite initial excitement within the media and some
intelligence circles, it became apparent that simpler and more plausible
derailment options existed, as the rail accident data demonstrates. It was
also far from clear whether the object as described was fit for the purpose.

Exemplar 3: British Experience of LoR Attacks
From 1991–2001, the IRA was responsible for almost 70 railway-related
incidents, 30 percent of which were directed toward LoR targets. Aside from
the running lines, attacks also involved signaling equipment, associated items
of infrastructure, and, less frequently, and unsuccessfully, bridges. In most
cases, bomb placers used the isolation of the locations selected to their tactical
advantage. Concealment of devices, if any, was rudimentary. In one case,
an IED that was simply laid on top of a ballast, but in close proximity
26.

Jenkins and Butterworth, Train Wrecks and Train Attacks, 1–2.

27. Brian M. Jenkins and Bruce R. Butterworth, Long-term Trends in Attacks on Public Surface
Transportation in Europe and North America (San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, 2016), 12–13.
28.

Jenkins and Butterworth, Train Wrecks and Train Attacks, 3–5.
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to a rail, detonated under a train that had just been brought to a temporary
halt. It is also worth noting that because of the IRA’s use of time-delay
devices and the possibility of service variations within timetabled movements,
exactly where trains would be at the time of detonation could not be known.
While derailment was not the specific intention of the bombers, it is pertinent
to note that on several occasions the possibility of a high- or low-speed
derailment seems to have been a matter of chance.
While some high-profile and highly trafficked locations were chosen, many
other targets were remote and of marginal significance. What was apparent
is that the bombers made use of the strategic roads network to travel to rail
targets, often gaining access where an existing trespass point and off-road
parking coincided. This type of analysis was generated through local railway
knowledge and post-incident investigation. It proved particularly useful when
responding to ambiguous bomb threats, allowing the prioritization of areas
of interest and providing a focus for response activity. Conceivably, it was
the “hardening” of the station environment—including the deterrent and
evidential impact of CCTV, station and train checking regimes, and proactive
police patrols—that displaced the bombers and redirected their attention.
In the British experience, such measures worked well in prioritized public
spaces. With respect to the vast number of remote and secluded locations
along the LoR, such measures were less practical.
In other parts of the world, it is apparent that those intent on mass murder
often used command-initiated devices and IEDs triggered by train movements.
A command element—such as a wire, radio or phone signal, or some form
of sensor—ensured a moving train was at or adjacent to the attack locus
and approaching at high speed. Chosen locations have often exploited the
momentum of the train with carriages being propelled into a more hazardous
situation. Notable in countries engaged in, or proximal to, civil or local
conf lict on a large scale, is armed assault against any survivors. Variations
on this theme occurred in Thailand, the Indian subcontinent, Egypt, Algeria,
and South Africa. 29

Physical Assaults against People
As a tactic of terrorism, assaulting individuals incrementally and with
lethal force is a relatively recent railway-related MoA. It may have been inspired
by beheading propaganda of the type available online, but it is reasonable
29. See Jenkins and Butterworth, Train Wrecks and Train Attacks; and Brian M. Jenkins, Protecting
Public Surface Transportation against Terrorism and Serious Crime: Continuing Research on Best Security
Practices (San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, 1997), 206–48.
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to surmise that attraction lies in the ready availability of large knives, axes,
and other such weapons. In China, the tactic was used in a rampage-style
attack in 2014, and to some notable effect. 30 In Western Europe and the
United States, however, it is clear that just as “rock beats scissors,” a police
officer’s gun beats a terrorist’s knife (it is notable that SBB weapons, however,
have been used to ambush police officers and steal their firearms). It is also
clear that attacks in confined spaces offer some tactical advantage to the threat
actor. One notable development, a crude but sometimes effective attempt
to reduce the efficacy of any armed police or military response, has been
the overt wearing of objects intended to represent a PBIED. The hoax
PBIED has proved to be of limited protective value against trained shots,
especially when following suitably robust rules of engagement.

Exemplar 4: UK Incident (2018)
During the midevening of New Year’s Eve, a lone attacker launched
an unprovoked and spontaneous stabbing and slashing attack against two
people at Manchester Victoria station. Prior to the assault, the attacker
recited Islamic verses. A single police off icer was quickly at the scene,
but Taser, Captor, and physical restraint techniques proved disappointingly
ineffective. Only with support from additional off icers was the attacker
subdued and arrested. The attacker had two knives, one in his hand and one
about his person. During the incident, he repeatedly stabbed the police officer.
Even when under restraint, he was noncompliant and maintained a jihadi-style
rant. The man reportedly suffered from mental health issues.

Exemplar 5: French Incident (2017)
During the early afternoon of a Sunday in October, a man armed
with what was described as two butcher’s knives, one of which was concealed
up his sleeve, attacked and murdered two young women in the vicinity
of the railway station in Marseille. The attacker was dispatched promptly
by soldiers on dedicated station patrol duties, supported by a number of covert
police assets. The incident was later claimed by the Islamic State (Da’esh).
The assailant, a drug addicted low-level criminal, is not thought to have been
radicalized within a formal cell structure.

30. Priya Joshi, “Kumming Station Knife Attack,” International Business Times (website),
March 1, 2014, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/kunming-station-knife-attack-authorities-claim-mass-stabbing
-was-organised-premeditated-warning-1438515.
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Exemplars 6 and 7: German Incidents (2016)
At approximately 9:00 p.m. on July 18, a lone young male—an Afghan
refugee local to the area—attacked passengers on a suburban rail service
in Germany. He was armed with an axe and a knife. During a relatively short
attack, three people were seriously injured and at least two others received
lesser injuries. The train was not operating at capacity and was not, therefore,
a target-rich environment, but it was a confined space. Media sources reported
the incident as religiously motivated because of what the youth is alleged
to have shouted and his possession of an Islamic State (Da’esh) f lag.
He was shot dead by police when he disembarked the train and assaulted
armed officers.
During the early morning of May 10, a single assailant launched
an unprovoked knife attack at a suburban railway station in southern Germany.
The attacker was a German citizen in his late twenties. At least four people
were injured, one fatally. As noted as part of previous SBB incidents,
it is alleged the assailant aligned himself to jihad during the commission
of the attack. Using batons, police officers were able to overpower the man
without firing a shot. It is not clear why the attacker chose a relatively small
suburban station or why he attacked at approximately 5:00 a.m., in advance
of the peak travel period. It is reasonable to suggest that target selection
was idiosyncratic. The man was not familiar with the area and the timing
of the attack may relate to the fact that upon his arrival at 1:38 a.m.,
the assailant was unable to find a hotel, so he simply returned to his point
of arrival. Mental health issues were considered significant with respect
to the man’s behavior.
Collectively, the exemplars illustrate that target selection can
be idiosyncratic in nature. Notably, many assailants go unchallenged prior
to the commission of the attack, with any odd activity being absorbed
within the wide range of behaviors deemed normal for a railway.
On the continuum of accessibility, assailants were sometimes drawn to targets
that may, as a part of any formal process of threat assessment, be deemed
marginal. In each of the cases discussed here, the inherent vulnerability
of mass transit rail was redressed by prompt and decisive action by police
who were either patrolling the locale or dispatched as a mobile resource.

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)
There are numerous examples of IED attacks against rail passengers,
rolling stock, and infrastructure. Where human capital is limited or otherwise
valuable, hand-placed or sometimes vehicle-borne, timer-controlled IEDs
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remain the preferred MoA. Where the intended target is perceived as difficult
to access or otherwise protected, stand-off weapons or delivered IEDs have
been utilized. When the bombers intend to give their own lives, whatever the
motive, PBIEDs may be encountered. Command-initiated devices have been
used where the target was mobile. Variations on the themes identified have
included those listed below.
 No-notice attacks (presumably, the absence of a warning
is to maximize casualties)
 Attacks preceded by an accurate warning (presumably
to minimize casualties but also as a means of claiming
a “moral” position should the attack not go to plan)
 Attacks preceded by a warning containing deliberately false
information to maximize disruption and/or create a killing
zone at predictable evacuation routes and assembly points and
divert blame (see socially engineered attacks in exemplar 13)
 Attacks involving multiple devices set to function
simultaneously or to a pattern of delay
 Attacks involving a mixture of IED types (for example,
high explosive interspersed with incendiary, vehicle-borne
IEDs and hand-placed IEDs, and time-delay IEDs protected
by anti-handling circuits)
A feature of attacks in stations is that hand-placed IEDs deposited
in public spaces were often noticed (sometimes stolen) before they functioned.
This reality seems to have led attackers, at times, to deliberately place
the devices where they were less likely to be seen and reported quickly
(such as in litter bins and lavatory cubicles). Throughout the 1990s in the
United Kingdom, instances of bombs being abandoned in public spaces
in stations declined sharply as a result of a formalized station checking
regime, implemented by trained rail staff working to a directed plan, and the
removal of areas of concealment, especially litter bins. This initiative brought
an unexpected security bonus in terms of deterrence: litter-picking activities
undertaken by staff in high-visibility apparel reinforced the impression of public
spaces being “owned.” Associated measures involved a structured campaign
of risk communication directed at passengers, prioritized police patrols timed
to support staff security activities, and enhanced CCTV coverage.

187

Dwyer

Exemplar 8: Low-level/Low-sophistication IED, London (2016)
During the midmorning of Thursday, October 20, passengers traveling
on a Jubilee Line train noticed a small rucksack that had been left in clear
public view adjacent to the train’s double doors. The bag was ignored
for several station stops but, at Canary Wharf, a passenger picked up the
bag and handed it to the train’s driver, who placed it in the cab. Only when
the train was moving did the driver become suspicious and, eventually, call
police. Following an assessment by specialist officers, an explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD) team disarmed a crude but viable timer-controlled
IED incorporating a conf ined low-explosive composition. In summary,
this incident includes the following highlights:
 The construction of the IED was rudimentary but did include
additional fragmentation.
 The timing of the attack appears not to have exploited the
peak travel period and the train was not operating at capacity.
 The bag was left in clear public view to the extent that other
passengers watched the bag’s owner exit the train.
 In contrast to more successful attacks (see exemplars 9–10),
only a single device of low mass was used.
 The item was not subject to any deliberate process of
assessment until examined by police.
It remains unclear why the bag was moved, handed to the driver, and
then—against training, documented protocols, and expectations—placed
within the cab. This action was taken despite the weight being unevenly
distributed relative to its bulk and, of greater concern, the visible presence
of wiring, a modif ied electromechanical wall clock, a dry-cell battery,
and wires entering a thermos-type f lask. Potentially, this was an example
of what Feudenburg defined as the atrophy of vigilance, since it occurred
during a period in which train bombings in London had become rare events. 31
Utilizing data from London’s extensive CCTV network, the arrest of an autistic
young man, whose interest in weapons was identified as misguided rather than
terroristic, followed quickly. There was, however, evidence presented that the
perpetrator had read an online publication of dubious technical merit but,
nonetheless, attributed to al-Qaeda.
31. William R. Freudenburg, “Nothing Recedes Like Success—Risk Analysis and the Organizational
Amplif ication of Risks,” Risk 3, no. 1 (1992): 19, https://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/viewcontent
.cgi?article=1071&context=risk.
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Exemplar 9: Expansive Attack, London (2005)
On the morning of July 7, four young men traveled from their home
counties to London by train. Upon arrival at the rail hub (King’s Cross),
three of them then boarded different underground trains. Eight minutes
into their journeys, and only when the carriages were traveling through
the closely confined environment of a relatively shallow tunnel, the first
two PBIEDs were detonated. The third explosion happened 500 meters
into a very deep section of tunnel. It is estimated that the three explosions
occurred over the course of less than one minute. The fourth bomber had
been unable to board a train before his accomplices initiated their devices;
he had to buy a new battery for the IED he carried, but may also have been
a less committed individual. Since train services were suspended, he boarded
a bus and detonated his PBIED shortly after the journey commenced.
The four explosions occurred over the course of one hour, with the train
bombs clustered temporally at approximately 8:50 a.m. and the bus bomb
functioned at 9:47 a.m. First reports were initially attributed to an accidental
power outage—a recurring and anticipated electrical supply problem—
but police off icers in close proximity recognized the characteristics
of an explosion: the distinctive noise, ground shock, and dust issuing
from the tunnels. It was not immediately clear how many trains were affected
because multiple reports pertaining to the same incidents were being received.
Within 25 minutes, all trains were brought to a halt at platforms, and
a full evacuation—in accordance with a well-practiced plan—commenced
shortly afterwards. By that stage, camera phone images of the carnage
were appearing online.
People displaced from the rapidly closing underground stations formed
large crowds in the streets. Some attempted to continue their journeys
by taxi or bus while others waited for train services to resume. For some time,
it was not clear whether other attacks were pending, and numerous reports
of suspicious behavior were received. This uncertainty was heightened when the
delayed fourth IED detonated. Due to the rapid evacuation from tube trains,
numerous unattended bags required police assessment, further stretching
resources and causing additional disruption. The vast majority of unattended
bags were dealt with quickly using a railway-specific assessment protocol called
H-O-T. 32 This simple heuristic devised in the early 1990s aims to disaggregate
noise—the discovery of an unattended bag in an environment where such
discoveries are common—from the signal, the possibility that a bag may
contain an IED. Using the H-O-T heuristic, trained rail staff or police focus
32. Transport Security: Travelling without Fear (2008), 84–86.

189

Dwyer

on three aspects of known relevance. 33 Is the item hidden? Very few passengers
who forget their belongings hide them first. Is the item obviously suspicious
in appearance or in the circumstances of its discovery (see exemplar 8)? Is the
item typical of what is usually discovered in the environment in question?
Following police search activity and the rapid redeployment of additional
officers, elements of the underground network began a phased reopening later
that afternoon. In total, 52 people had been murdered and many more injured
grievously. 34 As the underground incident scenes were particularly distressing
and challenging, those elements of the network affected directly remained
closed for several weeks. This disruption was not primarily because of bomb
damage, but because of the protocols used to manage the crime scene.

Exemplar 10: Expansive Attack, Madrid (2004)
On March 11, terrorists deployed 13 IEDs on suburban commuter trains
converging on Madrid. The bombs, visually indistinguishable from legitimate
luggage, were placed as the trains waited at relatively remote suburban
stations. Between 7:35–7:40 a.m. (note: timings vary depending upon the
source consulted), 10 explosive devices detonated in four trains along the
C-2 commuter train line running from Guadalajara to Atocha Station.
Each IED was contained within hand-carried luggage. In addition to the
10 bombs that detonated, EOD rendered safe the remaining three devices,
including one discovered among abandoned luggage some hours later.
The bombs were timer-activated and set to explode after a delay
of 30 minutes. With approximately 700 people on each of the trains,
the carriages were crowded. Witnesses mention seeing the bags being placed
on the train, but none considered the action sufficiently suspicious to report
it at the time.
The first explosion (of three on the same train) occurred on a commuter
service that had already arrived at Atocha station, killing 29 people and
wounding 176 others. A fourth IED was later located on the train and made
safe by EOD. Further explosions occurred on another commuter train that
was running two minutes behind schedule. This train was moving into Atocha
when four bombs detonated, stopping the train approximately 500 meters
away from the first bomb scene, killing 59 people and wounding 200 more.
33. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI), Recognising Terrorist Threats (London:
CPNI, March 9, 2020), 6–7, https://www.cpni.gov.uk/system/files/documents/b8/40/CPNI%20-%20Threat%20
Recognition%20Guide%20-%20WEBv2.pdf.
34. Intelligence and Security Committee, Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005 (London:
Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2006), 2, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/report-into-thelondon-terrorist-attacks-on-7-july-2005.
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Almost simultaneously, two explosions occurred on a third train, and,
sometime later, two further IEDs were made safe by EOD. As a result of these
explosions, 67 people died and there were 200 casualties. A little further away
from Atocha, a single bomb exploded in a train carriage, killing 20 people and
wounding 50 others. During the weeks after the attack, a further 26 people
died of their injuries. In total, the bombings claimed over 200 lives. 35
The inherent vulnerability associated with mass transit rail was clearly
relevant in the London and Madrid examples. Bombers entered the rail
network at points where security measures were marginal and used the
trains to bring the IEDs to more critical locations. The fact that passengers
in Madrid watched the bags being abandoned in the carriages in which they
were traveling, yet did nothing, indicates a major defect in the prevailing
culture of security (see exemplar 8). In contrast to London, train services
in and out of Atocha were not suspended, and the crime scenes were dealt
with exceptionally quickly. In Spain, a seemingly robust approach to risk
management meant minimizing disruption and expediting the return
to normalit y were established political and operational priorities.
As in exemplar 9, there was an enhanced security and police presence
after the attacks, but, unlike London, military assets were integral to the
high-profile policing function.

Quick-acting Noxious Hazard
Quick-acting noxious hazards are associated most closely, but not
exclusively, with chemical weapons. To date, terrorists’ relatively ineffective
and infrequent use of this MoA is difficult to reconcile, especially given both
their declared intention and demonstrated willingness to perpetrate mass
casualty attacks by other means. When compared to the familiarity with and
proven capability of explosives, however, a rationale based upon pragmatism
emerges. The seminal example of an incident affecting rail mass transit
occurred in Tokyo and is outlined below.

Exemplar 11: Tokyo Metro (1995)
The attack on March 20 was a resource-heavy criminal enterprise
involving the production of an approximation of sarin, a volatile nerve agent
from the World War II era. When the attackers manually disseminated
multiple containers on several trains—traveling on three different lines
yet each passing through the same hub station—it created a major incident
35. Glen Segell, “Intelligence Methodologies Applicable to the Madrid Train Bombings,” International
Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence 18, no. 2 (2005): 221–38.
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of massive proportions. 36 The attack commenced at approximately 8:00 a.m.
on a weekday morning. Initial reports of people in distress on crowded trains
were not immediately recognized as a precursor for what was to follow;
the initial belief of the railway control was that the cause must be accidental.
Despite understandable uncertainty within the response community,
it is noteworthy that local news reported the incident by 9:00 a.m.,
and international news had picked up the story by 9:12 a.m. Approximately
90 minutes after the sarin had been released, an attack was declared and
enhanced security put in place. Over the course of the day more than
4,000 people sought hospital treatment, some carrying contamination
with them into hospitals. Such was the confusion that one contaminated
train completed its journey and then began the return trip toward the
incident scene.
The relatively low efficacy of the nerve agent, combined with its inefficient
release meant anticipated lethality was reduced considerably. The sachets
in which it was contained were punctured manually—at which point the
perpetrators decamped—and dissemination then relied upon evaporation
of the pooling volatile liquid. Contemporary figures vary, but it seems likely
that the overwhelming number of self-reporting casualties were, in fact,
the “worried well.” In contrast to the multiple train bombings in Madrid and
London, the death toll was relatively small, as eight people died within the
first 24 hours from among 1,000 who displayed clinical symptoms. Over the
years, a number of victims have died as a long-term consequence of being
poisoned. The incident highlighted the relative unpreparedness of the
railway and responders when dealing with a highly volatile fast-acting and
unrecognizable chemical hazard—specifically, the challenges of detection,
identification, and monitoring. These difficulties meant many responders
became contaminated unknowingly and contaminated evacuees were
neither identified nor controlled. These challenges resulted in notable cases
of secondary contamination among taxi drivers, people at street level, and
hospital staff.
Since the Tokyo attack, the chemical MoA has become a mainstream
CT concern. Chemical attacks are generally considered in concert with
biological, radiological, and, somewhat incongruously, nuclear hazards.
Combining these four unique hazards into one acronym, CBRN, masks the
very different challenges and relative plausibility associated with the discrete
hazards the acronym seeks to encompass. Had the Tokyo attack incorporated
36. Javed Ali et al., Jane’s Chemical-Biological Defense Guidebook (Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Information
Group, 1999), 219–25.
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a biological hazard with a longer incubation period (measured in days
or weeks), the scale of the subsequent public health emergency could
have been overwhelming. Apart from a jihadi propaganda effort (the socalled Mubtakar [sic]), similar chemical attacks have not occurred in the
United States or Europe (though, somewhat unhelpfully, some databases
record incidents involving irritant sprays under the heading of chemical
attack). 37 On a smaller scale, nerve agents have been used for political
assassinations unrelated to railway travel.
In the Tokyo attack, it is clear that organizational surprise was
a signif icant factor in failing to respond to what was being reported
from the numerous incident scenes. Additionally, the nonpersistent nature
of the hazard greatly aided the swift return to normality, especially when
compared to the extended duration of the decontamination effort following
the anthrax (biological) contamination of buildings in the United States in
fall 2001. 38 Practical countermeasures adopted to date focus extensively on
ensuring potential victims (1) identify the signs and symptoms of attack,
(2) recognize the immediate need to move into fresh air and remove any
contaminated items of clothing (the existence of challenges relating to modesty,
inclement weather, and the possibility of noncompliance notwithstanding), and
(3) await specialist advice and do not act as a vector for secondary contamination.
In recognizing the need to expedite the return to normality, some
underground rail systems routinely use monitoring equipment to profile the
environmental conditions at vulnerable locations. This activity provides
baseline readings against a criterion of what is normal for that operating
environment and increases user familiarity with detection, identification,
and monitoring apparatus.

Firearms
Large-scale incidents involving f irearms on trains or in stations are
rare events. Increasingly, jihadis have incorporated automatic weapons
in an offensive role during attacks at airports and some marauding incidents,
but not usually at stations. Some threat actors have carried side arms
for personal protection, but rarely as the primary weapon of attack.

37. “Mubtakar Improvised Cyanide Gas Device Warning,” Department of Homeland Security (website),
November 29, 2010, https://publicintelligence.net/ufouo-dhs-mubtakar-improvised-cyanide-gas-device
-warning/.
38. See National Research Council, Reopening Public Facilities after a Biological Attack: A Decision
Making Framework (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2005), https://doi.org/10.17226/11324.
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Exemplar 12: Thalys Train Attack, Belgium and France (2015)
On August 21, an armed assailant emerged from the lavatory of a
train in service on the Amsterdam to Paris route. He had an assault rif le
with a folding stock (enabling him to hide it within hand luggage),
several spare magazines, a self-loading pistol, a knife, and a container
of f lammable liquid. Given the very limited options available to them,
but showing great courage, passengers on the train attempted to restrain the
man. One person suffered knife wounds and another was shot with the pistol,
but there were no fatalities. The gunman was unable to prepare his assault rif le
to fire reliably because he failed to clear a stoppage. As a consequence, he was
overpowered by the passengers he set out to kill. In reviewing this incident,
it is apparent that the element of surprise and the selection of unarmed
people in a crowded and conf ined space provides shooters with a clear
tactical advantage. This advantage extends over victims and armed
responders alike, especially if the exact location of a train in service cannot
be determined quickly.
This incident raises serious questions about the validity of official advice
suggesting that would-be victims should not challenge an armed assailant
but should run and hide instead. How passengers should follow this advice
on a train in service is not clear. Similarly, despite creditable improvisation
by some members of the train crew, the contingency had not been foreseen
and no countermeasures were in place. In particular, some of the train staff
seem to have been overwhelmed by the event and played no active part
in its resolution.
There may be no single reason for the low uptake in a firearms-based
MoA against rail targets, particularly given the exploitation apparent
in other environments, but it is possible to speculate that no-notice IEDs
are perceived as more effective. The increasingly efficient and focused action
of better-armed and better-trained responders may also be regarded as a more
credible deterrent than it once was.

Social Engineering
This chapter has already alluded to the issue of social engineering—
that is, to induce a false belief thus causing intended victims to work
against their own best interests—by highlighting examples when threat
actors wore hoax PBIEDs to distract both victims and responders.
Encountered more frequently is the use of threatening communications,
such as messages suggesting an attack is imminent and people must be
evacuated. This tactic is also encountered as a feature of extortion scams and
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only very rarely are such messages from terrorists. Even when a causal link
is established, the information these messages contain is of variable quality
or even deliberately misleading.

Exemplar 13: IRA Binary Terrorism, United Kingdom
The following example, taken from a contemporary news report,
is representative of valid bomb threats. It illustrates the range of difficulties,
often encountered simultaneously, when police or other risk managers
attempt to divine meaning from information. 39 A series of similar, but not
identical, communications marked the commencement of a campaign of binary
terrorism lasting more than 10 years. During that period, British police dealt
with 10,000 railway-related bomb threats yet fewer than 1 percent resulted
in the event they claimed to presage. The first message of the new campaign—
received after one IED had already detonated—was reported thus:
Before a bomb exploded in a trash bin at Victoria Station
during the morning rush hour, a caller with an Irish accent
told authorities, “We are the Irish Republican Army. Bombs
to go off at all mainline stations in 45 minutes[.]” . . . At least 19
false calls were received after the first explosion, which prompted
British Transport Police to begin a search of stations . . . 40
The threatening communications, delivered early on a weekday morning,
specif ied the targets as all mainline stations in London, but only two
stations were targeted (and it remains unclear why one detonation occurred
before the first threat was received). Encoding the message in this way may
have been intended to focus police attention on central London terminals
without disclosing which ones—an act possibly intended to maximize
disruption while still supporting a claim of good faith. Its meaning, however,
was interpreted in accordance with common and accepted railway usage,
and the spatial descriptor was taken to mean any station on any mainline.
This ambiguity, coupled with the imprecise reference to “in London,”
substantially increased the number of potential locations affected from single
figures to several hundred.

39. Loet Leydesdorff, “The Communication of Meaning and the Structuration of Expectations: Giddens’
‘Structuration Theory’ and Luhmann’s ‘Self-Organization,’ ” Journal of the American Society for Information
Science and Technology 61, no. 10 (2010): 2138–50.
40. Karin Davies, “One Killed, 40 Wounded in Suspected IRA Attack,” United Press International
(website), February 18, 1991, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1991/02/18/One-killed-40-wounded-in-suspected
-IRA-attack/9583666853200/.
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Also of significance was the effect of noise on the process of decoding and
understanding what the message really meant. A third party received the threat
before it was then passed to police—a process that accentuated uncertainty
about the fidelity of the message. In a different incident, it was noted that
the wording of a bomb threat was passed verbally from the original call-taker
to a manager whose recollection of the words used was then transcribed
by a third person, and only at that point did the police receive the
message. In that example—and as would often seem to be the case after
an actual bombing—police were required simultaneously to deal with noise
from competing threats of unknown origin, all of which proved to be hoaxes.
To the threat actor, the value of this MoA is that it exploits any
predisposition toward risk aversion and, as such, represents a force multiplier.
Acute vulnerability is especially notable where contingency plans are
inadequately developed or generic and where a principle of precaution is the
default position. In numerous examples of bomb threats against rail services,
the outcome has been significant disruption, sometimes resulting in casualties
attributed exclusively to uncoordinated evacuation activities.41 This situation
can precipitate copycat threats and result in the unregulated transfer of risk.
In a smaller but significant number of cases, decision inertia has led to people
being moved from a place of relative safety into a place of acute danger.
This undesirable outcome occurs when decisionmakers do not seek
to differentiate between valid and hoax communications—that is, to estimate
the credibility of the threat the being asserted.

Mixed-methods Attacks
In one of the two examples below (London), an attack incorporating
mixed weapon types had been anticipated and resources allocated accordingly
within a coordinated response plan, especially the use of armed police.42
The major station involved had measures in place to restrict vehicle access
and a tested multiagency contingency plan. Most notably, the responders
to the scene were better armed than the marauding terrorists. In the other
(Mumbai), the MoA was unexpected and delivered by heavily armed,
well-trained assailants with speed and focused aggression. The different
outcomes are readily apparent.

41. Freudenburg, “Nothing Recedes like Success,” 1–2.
42.

Chief Coroner, London Bridge and Borough Market Terror Attack, 17–18.
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Exemplar 14: Adjacent to London Bridge Station (2017)
During the late evening of June 3, pedestrians in the vicinity
of London Bridge station were struck by a transit-type van. Three men
exited the vehicle and then moved toward Borough Market, a commercial
and residential area adjacent to the station. They immediately commenced
a series of physical assaults, using long-bladed weapons that had been secured
to their wrists with adhesive tape. No firearms were discharged and no IEDs
deployed. The men were seen to be wearing bulky items on their belts—
items assumed to be PBIEDs—but which were later found to be hoaxes.
All assailants were neutralized by armed police within approximately
10 minutes. During the rampage, seven people were murdered and
48 injured, including an unarmed patrolling officer of the railway police.
London Bridge station did not become the focus of the attack, but was quickly
closed and evacuated, and given its proximity to the crime scene, the station
remained closed until the next week.

Exemplar 15: Central Mumbai Station (2008)
The attack of November 26 involved near simultaneous incidents initiated
by highly mobile, highly motivated, well-trained, and well-armed threat
actors. Multiple teams attacked several locations over a very short period
of time. The MoA included: armed assaults incorporating the use of hand
grenades, carjacking, drive-by shootings, timer-controlled IEDs, directed
assassination of armed police and selected foreigners, indiscriminate killings,
building takeovers, and barricade and hostage taking. Relevant to this chapter
are the events at Chhatrapatig Shivaji Terminus (CST), Mumbai’s central
railway station. This station was a predictably crowded and target-rich
environment, and a small number of attackers was active for approximately
25 minutes. Commencing in the late evening, more than 50 people were
killed and more than 100 injured, with the majority of casualties taking place
in the first six minutes of firing. Casualties at CST represent approximately
one-third of all those recorded throughout this incident. This high number
of casualties highlights the vulnerability of a crowded station where there
are few places to provide immediate cover from view or from kinetic effects.
The series of attacks extended across several days, nearly 60 hours in all,
before the attackers were neutralized. Despite initial claims that more than
20 terrorists were roaming the capital, there were actually 10 active shooters,
nine of whom were killed.43
43. CNN Editorial Research, “Mumbai Terror Attacks Fast Facts,” CNN World (website),
September 18, 2013, https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/18/world/asia/mumbai-terror-attacks/index.html.
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This attack was expansive and novel when measured against previous
incidents in Mumbai, which involved similar large-scale loss of life but through
the use of IEDs. The speed and aggression of the attack overwhelmed the
initial responders at the railway station; they were not expecting an armed
assault, were not trained to deal with the situation they confronted, and were
not armed or protected to take on the attackers on equal terms. It is notable
that attackers actively avoided those who could respond in kind, breaking
contact quickly when encountering serious opposition. CST exhibited the
inherent vulnerability already discussed. High levels of uncertainty meant
responders could neither immediately comprehend what was happening
on the ground nor implement a coherent response to it. The delayed response
was inevitable because of the large number of reports the police had to
process. During the initial confusion at CST, more people entered the attack
locus, both as pedestrians and on inbound trains that could not be stopped.
By the time responders were organized, the marauding attackers had moved
on to their follow-on targets.

Developing the Lessons Available
The case study section illustrates a variety of established MoA to which
railways remain vulnerable, and to which terrorists have gravitated in the
past. Whether they will do so again is beyond the scope of this chapter except
to note that threat actors often return to MoA perceived to have worked
for others, especially where exposed vulnerability remains unaddressed.
Variations noted in attack methodology, when they do arise, tend
to be in terms of scale, skill, or scope rather than novelty or originality.
This situation is problematic, because the vulnerabilities that threat actors
exploit are integral to how railway systems were designed to operate.
With the notable exception of the Tokyo subway attack, the following themes
are discernible:
 Attacks against people have most notably involved explosives,
often augmented by the addition of fragmentation. Firearms
and other close quarter attacks involving SBB weapons have
come to the fore in recent years, and determined attackers
seem to mix-and-match MoA as a deliberate tactic.
 Attacks against fixed infrastructure targets involved primarily
explosives and sometimes f lammable materials. Mechanical
sabotage has been relatively uncommon.
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 Attacks against trains in service involved explosions
in carriages or along the train’s route. In some regions
of the world, firearms have been used to attack survivors and,
occasionally, rake passing trains.
It must be assumed that terrorists will continue to build on their strengths
and exploit weaknesses in the governments and institutions of NATO member
states and partner nations. Looking beyond attacks within, or proximal
to, war zones where terrorists’ capability and capacity may be extensive,
analysis of rail incidents suggests substantial mass casualty events
represent relatively rare occurrences. This is not to suggest that aspirations
among would-be or established terrorists are not high or that unexpected and
transient successes might occur. Incidents which combine established MoA,
when encountered simultaneously or incrementally, remain of particular
concern. They exist as a warning against developing risk assessments that
only consider one specif ic MoA (see exemplar 15) without taking into
account how to respond when faced with situations involving multiple MOA.
Having separate contingency plans for SBB, f irearms, and IED attacks
is very different from responding to a scenario in which they occur
simultaneously. Terrorists consider cunningly elaborate MoA, most of which
overpromise, under deliver and, after considered assessment, are often found
to be implausible.44 In this regard, care must be taken not to overestimate the
magnitude of the risk management challenge when novelty generates heat
rather than light. The efficacy of the countermeasures deployed is affected
by a range of variables, and no single option represents a panacea, hence the
need for an integrated approach. As is readily apparent, if high levels of security
only apply to some central locations, then there is little to prevent attackers
from entering a network at its fringes and using trains to access targets
of choice (note exemplars 9–10). Realizing value in relation to any investment
in physical security relies heavily upon the quality of the concept of operations
and the defined operational requirements within which it resides.
In considering the collective substance of the exemplars provided here,
there is a strong argument against target hardening that results in open
railways becoming fortified citadels, even if such a change were possible
without destroying the societal benefits rail users have come to expect and
upon which economies depend. Instead, to maintain a credible BaU posture
in the face of an uncertain threat, spaces should be owned by those who
work in them and use them, including dedicated security and police assets.
44. For additional information, see “Australia Terror Accused Discussed ‘Kangaroo Bomb,’ ” BBC News
(website), January 28, 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-australia-35425665.
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See the recommendation in chapter 6 for airport community security programs.
Developing a strong culture of security can constrain a threat actor’s freedom
of movement and increase the likelihood of recognizing suspicious activities.
As a consequence, reports of concern become more meaningful because
of the context with which they are explicitly associated (note exemplar 1).
Moreover, the organizational response will exhibit greater cohesion and
resilience because stakeholders share an approximation of the same worldview
and are invested in the risk management process (an observation that also
represents a strong argument in favor of specialist rather than generalist
railway policing). The scale of this task should not be underestimated.
As stressed throughout the chapter, integral to the process of developing
a context-specif ic StR A is the ability to reconcile the purpose of rail
operations with a rational appreciation of exposure to plausible threats.
This is a task that requires significant input from those who understand
how railways operate as public transport networks, not just as abstract
security challenges.

Conclusion
Utilizing case study data drawn from the rail environment, this chapter
has discussed a number of contemporary debates concerning proportionate,
pragmatic, and effective options to manage terrorism-related risk.
It has addressed the nature of the inherent vulnerability of rail operations
and identified the need to develop a clear understanding of what risks are
relevant and in what context. The process outlined requires the inclusion of
multiple stakeholders, some of whom may adhere to differing precommitments.
This reality reinforces two factors: (1) the requirement for an inclusive,
coherent, and transparent process of risk assessment, and (2) the benefit
of developing a risk management doctrine—including templates to guide active
decision making under conditions of uncertainty—agreed upon in advance
by relevant stakeholders. Countering such a diverse threat against such
a diverse target involves:
 Adopting a pragmatic and, as far as is possible, transparent
and inclusive approach to the strategic assessment of risk.
 Ensuring the resultant StRA is informed by professionals
with a clear grasp of how best to achieve the primary purpose
of networked rail services.
 Devising a concept of operations that matches the
context-specific vulnerabilities and plausible threats identified.
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 Developing a security culture within which all stakeholders
are able to share an approximation of the same worldview.
 Not allowing uncertainty to ferment decision inertia.
Neither the attractiveness of rail operations to terrorists—
especially the target-rich nature of crowded trains and heavily trafficked
stations—nor the challenges of managing risk without compromising
utility have been underestimated here. All options require application
in context, particularly in the tightly coupled environment of a rail network,
because any isolated quick win is rarely synonymous with a permanent fix.
Within prevailing cultural norms and societal expectations, most railways
are structured as “turn-up and go” transport providers, and this functional
reality is not amenable to structural change in the short or even medium terms.
As one senior f igure within the British Cabinet Off ice noted after the
2005 London bombings, when explaining why terrorist bombers had faced
no identity or baggage checks when entering the rail network, “You have
to be able to travel if the purpose is to travel.”45 This statement implies
that checking the status of every passenger while facilitating almost eight
million journeys each day was an impossible task. That statement was
a refreshingly frank recognition that there will always be dynamic tension
between the needs of the mass transit operator—including the practical
constraints they face—and those charged with countering terrorism.
This chapter has set out one approach to reconciling such differences
as a means of managing risk more effectively and maintaining a BaU posture
more credibly.

45. Sir Richard Mottram GCB, Security and Intelligence Coordinator, Cabinet Office, Transport Security:
Travelling without Fear (2008 statement), 6.
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Water Sector Resilience
and the Metropolitan Washington Case
Steve Bieber

In most urbanized societies, water is taken for granted and little thought
is given to how fragile the supply of this vital resource can be. A water
emergency, however, such as a treatment plant outage, a water source
contamination event, or natural disaster has the potential for significant
disruption to society and the infrastructure that depends on water to function.
Most other sectors of critical infrastructure, as well as activities of daily
living, are highly dependent on the water sector. As a result, consequences
of a water emergency can be signif icant and may occur immediately
without notice depending on the nature of the event. Thus, the security and
resilience of the water sector is a key component of a nation’s civil preparedness
that can have military and international implications as well. Terrorist threats
to water delivery or contamination of water sources as a terrorist act can
impact a nation’s ability to move and sustain its military forces, and project
military power when required. From the perspective of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, threats to the water sector in one member state could
have ripple effects that limit or diminish NATO’s military mobility and force
projection in support of its essential core tasks.
Therefore, it is important to understand water sector risks and find ways
to effectively mitigate them. While this chapter focuses on the US water
sector and uses a case study from one of its most important metropolitan
areas, the chapter provides a helpful framework for other Allies and
partners to understand, adapt, and employ to their specific circumstances.
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To that end, this chapter includes f ive main sections to: (1) provide
an overview of the water sector; (2) identify risks and threats to the water
sector; (3) outline key steps in resilience planning; (4) illustrate challenges
and solutions to security and resilience initiatives using a case study
from Washington, DC; and (5) offer recommendations for developing
water-sector security and resilience.

Understanding the Water Sector
Water for drinking, bathing, electric power generation, manufacturing,
and other uses is a precious commodity. The amount of available freshwater
on earth is estimated to be only one half of one percent of all water on earth,
as figure 8-1 depicts.1 When it comes to the amount usable for drinking, if the
world’s supply of freshwater was 100 liters, then the usable supply of freshwater
would only be about 0.003 liters or one-half teaspoon. 2 In industrialized
countries, the term on tap is often used when talking about things that are
as freely and readily available as water. In the United States, water is inexpensive
and abundant, and the average per capita demand is about 80–100 gallons
per person per day. 3 Most of that water is used for non-potable uses such as
cooking, bathing, toilet f lushing, and doing laundry.
The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention identif ies the
availability of clean, safe water and sanitation as among the top ten public
health accomplishments of the past century.4 Engineers Abel Wolman and
Linn Enslow determined the correct formula for treating public water supplies
with chlorine in 1919, and approximately 10 years later, the widespread
adoption of chlorination, filtration, and improved sanitation systems had
essentially eliminated waterborne diseases such as typhoid, dysentery, cholera,

Acknowledgments: The author would like to thank Mr. Ahmet Ozman and the team at Black & Veatch for their
work on the National Capital Region (NCR) Water Supply and Distribution System Redundancy Study: Project No.
188286, which is the basis for this chapter’s case study. The author would also like to thank the partner water
utilities in the metropolitan Washington region for supporting and participating in the study.
1. World Bank Group, “Earth’s Water,” Open Learning Campus (website), accessed September 28, 2021,
https://olc.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/sco/E7B1C4DE-C187-5EDB-3EF2-897802DEA3BF/Nasa/chapter1.html.

2. US Bureau of Reclamation (USBR), “Water Facts – Worldwide Water Supply,” USBR (website), accessed
November 22, 2021, https://www.usbr.gov/mp/arwec/water-facts-ww-water-sup.html.
3. US Geological Survey (USGS), “Water Q&A: How Much Water Do I Use at Home Each Day?,”
USGS (website), June 20, 2019, https://water.usgs.gov/edu/qa-home-percapita.html.
4. Centers for Disease Control (CDC), “MMWR Weekly: Ten Great Public Health Achievements—
United States, 1900–1999,” CDC (website), April 2, 1999, https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview
/mmwrhtml/00056796.htm.
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and Hepatitis A. 5 Even with these improvements, waterborne diseases are
still responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths each year due to lack
of clean water and sanitation. This is a stark reminder that when disaster
strikes, one of the most urgent needs facing communities is water for drinking,
sanitation, hygiene, and firefighting.

Figure 8-1. Earth’s water
(Graphic by World Bank Group)

Since all other critical infrastructure sectors depend upon the water
sector, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) designated water
as a lifeline sector. See chapter 1 for the relationship between lifeline
sectors and other critical infrastructure sectors. 6 A study published by the
National Infrastructure Advisory Council in 2016 contains key findings
5. National Academy of Engineering, “Water Supply and Distribution Timeline,” Greatest
Engineering Achievements of the 20th Century (website), n.d., accessed September 28, 2021,
http://www.greatachievements.org/?id=3610.
6. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), NIPP 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security
and Resilience (Washington, DC: DHS, 2013), 6, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications
/national-infrastructure-protection-plan-2013-508.pdf.
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about the importance of water infrastructure, especially how the loss
of water services can impact other critical infrastructure and cause various
types of disruption. In particular, the study indicates that “among surveyed
critical infrastructure that depend upon water for core operations, services
are degraded 50 percent or more within eight hours” after losing water
or wastewater service.7 Figure 8-2 portrays this relationship between
the loss of water and the degradation of services by various sectors. 8
Despite significant dependency on the water sector, many critical infrastructure
owners and operators do not have adequate plans for alternative sources
of water or wastewater service. See chapter 12 for greater detail on the nature
of dependencies and interdependencies, and their importance in developing
risk management strategies.

Figure 8-2. Sector dependency on water
(Graphic by US National Infrastructure Advisory Council. The information provided in the
graphic is based on a limited sample of 2,661 voluntary facility assessments conducted
between January 2011 and April 2014, DHS Sector Resilience Report, 2014)
7. National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC), Water Sector Resilience Final Report and
Recommendations (Washington, DC: NIAC, June 2016), 1, https://www.cisa.gov/publication/niac
-water-sector-resilience-final-report.
8.

NIAC, Water Sector Resilience, 2.
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In the United States, more than 90 percent of the population relies
on one of about 153,000 public water systems to provide clean water
to homes and businesses. Of these systems, most people (over 80 percent) rely
on a few large or very large water systems—such as rivers, lakes, reservoirs,
or groundwater, which is treated before being distributed to customers—
for their drinking water.9 The remainder of the American population relies
on private groundwater wells for drinking water. Once the water is used,
it is discharged to a wastewater treatment system. For roughly 75 percent
of Americans, this means using a public wastewater collection and treatment
system. Of those served by a public wastewater system, most receive service
from one of 382 large and very large wastewater treatment systems serving
large urban areas of more than 100,000 people, or from one of the roughly
16,000 smaller systems serving less-populated cities. The remaining 25 percent
of people depend on individual, onsite or small community cluster (septic)
systems to treat their wastewater.10 See figure 8-3 for a depiction of the water
cycle and the relationship between water source, distribution and treatment.11

Figure 8-3. Drinking water cycle
(Diagram by University of Florida IFAS Extension)
9. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Fiscal Year 2010: Drinking Water and Ground Water
Statistics (Washington, DC: EPA, 2011), 4.
10. DHS and EPA, 2015 Water and Wastewater Sector-Specific Plan (Washington, DC: DHS, 2015), 5–6,
https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-water-2015-508.pdf.
11. Amy L. Shober and A lexander J. Reisinger, Drinking Water Source Protection
in the Tampa Bay Region: A Guide for Homeowners (Gainesville: University of Florida
IFAS Extension, Aug ust 29, 2021), 2, https://edis.ifas.uf l.edu /pdf/SS/SS493/SS493
-D3qinldqtf.pdf.
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To put this relationship into perspective on a local scale, over f ive
million people in the metropolitan Washington region are served
by 18 major wastewater treatment plants, 13 drinking water suppliers, and
27 distributors. These water utilities own, operate, and maintain about
16,000 miles of sewer pipes, 14,500 miles of drinking water mains, and more
than 114,000 fire hydrants.12 One facility, the Blue Plains Advanced Wastewater
Treatment plant, serves more than two million people and treats, on average,
about 300 million gallons of wastewater per day.13

Risks and Threats to the Water Sector
Owners and operators of drinking water and wastewater systems must
manage their assets in a manner that effectively addresses their risk profile.
Factors such as utility location, size, assets, and specific risks will determine
the risk management priorities for each utility. Common risks and threats
to the water sector can be divided into two broad categories. The f irst
category is intentional threats, such as cyberattacks; destruction (physical
or via cyberattack) of parts of a system; contamination of drinking source
water using various chemicals, toxins, microbes, or radioactive compounds;
and contamination of treated water in the distribution system. The second
category, natural hazards or unintentional events, includes extreme weather
and climate change; aging infrastructure; accidental contamination of drinking
source water, like oil or toxic material spills and combined sewer overf low;
and accidental contamination of treated drinking water, such as a treatment
plant process malfunction or human error, failed backf low prevention device,
and loss of pressure causing inf low of contaminated water.
The concept of an intentional attack or terrorist threat to water supplies
is not new. Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) Director J. Edgar Hoover wrote that “among public
utilities, water supply facilities offer a particularly vulnerable point of attack
to the foreign agent, due to the strategic position they occupy in keeping
the wheels of industry turning and in preserving the health and morale
of the American populace.” 14 In January 2002, not long after the 9/11
terror attacks, open source reporting and an alert from the FBI’s National
12. Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (MWCOG), State of the Region: Infrastructure Report
(Washington, DC: MWCOG, 2015), 24.
13. “The Largest Advanced Wastewater Treatment Plant in the World,” DC Water (website), n.d.,
accessed September 28, 2021, https://www.dcwater.com/blue-plains.
14. John Edgar Hoover, “Water Supply Facilities and National Defense,” Journal of the American
Water Works Association 33, no. 11 (1941): 1862, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41232575.
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Infrastructure Protection Center indicated that al-Qaeda members had
“sought information on water supply and wastewater management
practices” and had an “interest in insecticides and pest control products,”
possibly indicating an interest in water supply contamination.15 More recently,
a global analysis carried out in 2018 by researchers at Florida International
University found that water-related terrorism had increased 263 percent
from 1970–2016, with 68 percent of those incidents occurring in the
post-9/11 era.16 Table 8-1 highlights several of these more recent attacks,
most of which are attempts to poison water supplies with pesticides that are
available commercially and relatively easy to obtain.17
Table 8-1. Recently documented water attacks
Attacks on Water Resources
Year

Description

2002

Four men of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat are arrested in Rome
in possession of chemicals, false papers, and detailed plans for the water supply
network in the zone of the Embassy of the United States.

2002

Two al-Qaeda agents arrested in Denver with plans to poison water resources.

2004

The FBI and DHS warn that terrorists are trying to recruit employees from water
treatment plants as part of a project to poison drinking water.

2006

A water tank in Tring, England, is deliberately contaminated with herbicide.

2006

Strychnine (a pesticide) is intentionally released into a Danish artificial lake.

2007

201 people in China die after using water that had been intentionally contaminated
with fluoroacetamide (a pesticide).

2008

A man was arrested in Varney, Virginia, in possession of two vials of cyanide and
attempting to poison the water supply system.

2008

The water supply system of a Burmese refugee camp in Thailand (with a population
of 30,000) is intentionally poisoned with herbicide.

2009

In the Philippines, the group Frente Moro de Liberación Islámica poisons water
sources used by government soldiers and the general population.

15. Steven J. Duranceau, C. David Plavacan, Rick Hahn, and William J. Ackerman, “Al Qaeda and
Your Water,” 2002 Florida Section American Water Works Association Conference Proceedings (Palm Harbor,
FL, November 2002), 4, https://ssem.eku.edu/sites/ssem.eku.edu/files/files/HAHN%20-%20AWWA%20
Paper%20Al-Qaeda%20and%20Your%20Water-Final.pdf.
16. Jennifer Veilleux and Shlomi Dinar, “New Global Analysis Finds Water-Related Terrorism Is
on the Rise,” NewSecurityBeat (website), May 8, 2018, https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2018/05/global
-analysis-finds-water-related-terrorism-rise/.
17. “Locken: Understanding Terrorist Threat to Our Water Sector,” Security News Desk (website),
January 9, 2017, https://securitynewsdesk.com/locken-understanding-terrorist-threat-water-sector/;
and Agencies in Pristina, “Kosovo Cuts Pristina Water Supply over Alleged Isis Plot to Poison
Reservoir,” Guardian (website), July 11, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/11/kosovo-cuts
-pristina-water-supply-over-alleged-isis-plot-to-poison-reservoir.
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Attacks on Water Resources (continued)
Year

Description

2010

Maoist rebels poison a pond in the Kashmir region, which the Central Reserve Police
Force used as a source of drinking water.

2010

In England, two neo-Nazis are convicted of several counts of terrorism, including
castor-making and conspiracy with Serbian Nazis to poison water resources used
by Muslims.

2011

Documents seized during the raid to kill Osama bin Laden reveal plans for poisoning
water resources.

2011

In Cadiz, Spain, officials thwart a conspiracy to poison water resources in response
to the death of Osama bin Laden.

2012

Two 5,000-liter drinking water tanks in Australia are deliberately poisoned
with Diuron (a herbicide).

2012

Hundreds of girls in an Afghan school become sick after deliberate poisoning
of the water supply system.

2015

Five people linked to the Islamic State (Da’esh) arrested in Kosovo for allegedly
planning to poison a reservoir. Authorities in Kosovo cut off the water supply to tens
of thousands of people in Pristina to test the water for contaminants.

It is highly unlikely that an attack against drinking source water
(such as a river, lake, or reservoir) would be successful due to the large volume
of water, dilution of the contaminants, and their removal by water treatment.
An attack in the drinking water distribution system, however, has a higher
probability of causing harm. In one such attack in 1984, for example, members
of a religious cult contaminated a water supply tank in The Dalles, Oregon,
leading to 750 conf irmed cases of salmonella.18 While the probability
of a high-consequence attack might be low, the terrorist threat to water
systems is real.
As do all other sectors, the water sector faces a growing cyber threat
to its industrial control systems, business systems, e-mail, and information
technology infrastructure. A broad array of threat actors—including nation
states, extremists, and criminals—take advantage of expanding reliance
on and connectivity of information technology systems to launch attacks and
achieve their objectives. See chapters 3–5 for an overview of various cyber
threats and actors. Specific to the water sector, a February 2021 cyberattack
on a water treatment plant in Oldsmar, Florida, attempted to increase levels
of sodium hydroxide, a chemical used to treat the water. While the intrusion
18. Peter H. Gleick, “Water and Terrorism,” Water Policy 8 (2006): 487, https://pacinst.org/wp-content
/uploads/2013/04/water_and_terrorism_2006.pdf.

210

Chapter 8

Water Sector Resilience

was quickly detected and chemical levels returned to normal, this example
illustrates how even unsophisticated hackers can access water sector software
and control systems that are connected to the Internet, putting water sources
and people at risk.19
In the category of unintentional threats, the metropolitan Washington
region, like other areas of the world, is experiencing the impacts
of a changing climate. According to the Metropolitan Washington 2030
Climate and Energy Action Plan, “temperatures and the water surface
level in the Potomac River have been rising and will continue to rise.
Extreme weather events and increases in the number of extreme heat and
cold days will increase risks to health, energy usage patterns, plant and
animal habitats, and infrastructure.” 20 Drinking and wastewater systems will
be affected by these changes and will need to adjust management strategies
to protect their infrastructure from damage while continuing to meet water
quantity and quality requirements.
In many NATO countries, large portions of water infrastructure were
built in the early twentieth century. Much of this aging infrastructure has
reached or will soon reach the end of its useful lifespan and need to be replaced
or upgraded. In the metropolitan Washington region, one such example
is WSSC Water, which has served Maryland residents in Montgomery
and Prince George’s Counties since 1918. More than 40 percent of WSSC
Water’s 11,000 miles of underground pipes are over 50 years old. These older
pipes have reached the end of their service lifespan, but replacing these pipes—
at an average replacement cost of $1.4 million per mile—is a very expensive
and lengthy project. 21 Replacing aging infrastructure is a high-priority issue
that must be weighed against other potential threats.

Water Sector Approaches to Resilience Planning
There are numerous resources and approaches to resilience planning
in the water sector. In the United States, the Water Sector-Specif ic
Plan—an annex to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, published
in 2007, 2010, and 2015 by the DHS and the Environmental Protection
19. Andy Greenberg, “A Hacker Tried to Poison a Florida City’s Water Supply, Officials Say,” Wired
(website), February 8, 2021, https://www.wired.com/story/oldsmar-florida-water-utility-hack/.

20. MWCOG, Metropolitan Washington 2030 Climate and Energy Action Plan (Washington, DC:
MWCOG, 2020), 7.
21. “Aging Infrastructure,” WSSC Water (website), March 23, 2021, https://www.wsscwater.com/what
-we-do/major-projects/pipes-and-infrastructure-improvements-and-maintenance/aging.
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Agency (EPA)—addresses risk-based critical infrastructure protection
implementation strategies for drinking water and wastewater utilities.
It describes processes and activities to increase resilience in the sector
and prepare to prevent, detect, respond to, and recover from hazards.
The plan follows a risk management framework that sets goals and
objectives, identifies infrastructure to protect, assesses and analyzes risks
to that infrastructure, implements risk management activities, and measures
the effectiveness of these actions. The plan also sets out four goals for the
water sector: (1) sustain protection of public health and the environment;
(2) recognize and reduce risk; (3) maintain a resilient infrastructure; and
(4) increase communication, outreach, and public confidence. 22
Several guidance documents and standards for the water sector have been
developed to better understand and reduce risks to water and wastewater
services. On its website, the American Water Works Association has some
state-of-the-art standards that are available for a small fee. Three of these
standards, which NATO Allies and partners may also f ind useful, are:
(1) Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection Standard
for Risk and Resilience Management of Water and Wastewater Systems
(AW WA J100); (2) Security Practices for Operation and Management
(AWWA G430); and (3) Emergency Preparedness Practices (AWWA G440). 23
Likewise, the EPA has also developed some risk assessment tools for drinking
water and wastewater utilities of all sizes, which can help identify the highest
risks to critical operations and identify cost-effective solutions to reduce those
risks. Two useful tools, available on the EPA’s website, are the Vulnerability
Self-Assessment Tool and the Climate Resilience Evaluation and Awareness
Tool Risk Assessment Application for Water Utilities. 24
In the United Kingdom, events and risks associated with f looding,
drought, extreme cold spells, and climate change over the past decade stressed
water companies’ ability to reliably provide water and wastewater services
and have, as a result, increased the amount of attention paid to resilience.
Consequently, the English and Welsh governments gave Water Services
Regulation Authority (Ofwat) the responsibility to address resilience
22.

DHS, NIPP 2013, 15.

23. See “American Water Works Association (AWWA) Publications Catalog,” AWAA (website), n.d.,
accessed November 9, 2021, https://engage.awwa.org/PersonifyEbusiness/.
24. See EPA, “Conduct a Drinking Water or Wastewater Utility Risk Assessment,” EPA (website), n.d.,
November 9, 2021, https://www.epa.gov/waterriskassessment/conduct-drinking-water-or-wastewater
-utility-risk-assessment; and “Climate Resilience Evaluation and Awareness Tool (CREAT)
Risk Assessment Application for Water Utilities,” EPA (website), n.d., accessed November 9, 2021,
https://www.epa.gov/crwu/climate-resilience-evaluation-and-awareness-tool-creat-risk-assessment-application
-water.
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in the regulation of the water sector. The 2014 Water Act required action
to “further the resilience objective,” and Ofwat developed a policy response
to define requirements for water companies to improve the resilience of water
and wastewater services using the concept of “resilience in the round.” Ofwat used
a holistic concept of resilience—the ability to prevent, cope with, and recover
from disruptions of all kinds—that focuses on three key dimensions of resilience
in an organization: corporate, financial and operational. 25 The corporate
dimension is an organization’s governance, accountability, and assurance
processes, and its ability to anticipate trends and variability in its business
operations. The financial aspect considers the impact of an organization’s
funds and assets, while operational resilience focuses on an organization’s
infrastructure and the ability and skills to run that infrastructure.
Finally, the UK’s Water Industry Research organization published its Good
Practice Guide, which provides the water companies with planning guidelines
and outlines a framework for risk screening, resilience assessment, resilience
planning, and implementation of resilience solutions. 26
This section provided a summary of the best practice components
of the US and UK frameworks for resilience planning in the water sector.
In the next section—focused on a case study of the US National Capital Region
(NCR) water sector—the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments
(COG) adapted and employed several of these best practices in its evaluation
of the water supply system’s resilience. The COG first characterized the
system, which involved describing and understanding the physical water
system infrastructure in the NCR, evaluating its performance against recent
risk events, and determining a risk assessment approach.
The next step, risk screening and assessment, included screening and
assessment of hazards that pose a risk to service, considering how critical
assets and systems respond to these hazards, assessing the potential level
of service disruption, and estimating potential losses due to service disruption.
Then, the COG conducted a detailed resilience assessment to evaluate the
existing (baseline) level of resilience, identify and evaluate potential initiatives
for increasing resilience, and determine alternatives using a whole life cycle
cost‐benefit analysis. The final step, implementation of resilience solutions,
aimed at developing and implementing improvement initiatives to address
resistance, reliability, redundancy, response, and recovery.
25. Ofwat, Resilience in the Round: Building Resilience for the Future (Birmingham, UK: Ofwat,2017): 3–4,
https://www.ofwat.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Resilience-in-the-Round-report.pdf.
26. UK Water Industry Research (UKWIR), Resilience Planning: Good Practice Guide—Summary
Report (London: UKWIR, April 22, 2013), 1, https://ukwir.org/eng/reports/13-RG-06-2/66806
/Resilience-Planning-Good-Practice-Guide--Summary-Report.
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Metropolitan Washington Region Case Study
Background and Goals
The metropolitan Washington region is a diverse and dynamic area
centered on the nation’s capital in the District of Columbia, and surrounded
by counties in suburban Maryland and northern Virginia. It is home to more
than 5.5 million people and one of the nation’s largest economies, with more
than one million new residents and jobs forecasted between now and 2045.
In a highly urbanized area like metropolitan Washington, a water
emergency has the potential for signif icant regional disruption because
there is limited capability to transfer potable water across the Potomac River
or to areas where shortfalls might occur due to the segmented nature
of the region’s water systems. Depending on the scenario, the consequences
of such a regional water outage could be the loss of water service from days
to more than a month, while the estimated direct and economic impacts could
be several billion dollars.
Since 2007, the COG, working with water utilities across the region,
carried out three studies on water supply and distribution system redundancy.
The main purpose of those studies was to evaluate the regional water supply
system’s ability to withstand emergencies and identify potential engineering
improvements to increase the overall reliability of the system. The most recent
of these studies, completed in 2016, is the focus of this section.
The 2016 study used a risk-based methodology and employed industry best
practices to evaluate potential failure scenarios, their impacts on water service,
societal and economic consequences, and potential mitigating initiatives.
Carried out by a team from Black & Veatch, a leading water engineering
firm, this project evaluated potential improvements to enhance regional water
system resilience and assessed the reliability and safety of drinking water from
source to tap from a regional perspective. Working with COG staff and other
project participants, Black & Veatch scheduled a series of workshops from
June 2015–March 2016 with water utilities in the region. The workshops
laid the foundation for a successful study by: (1) establishing project goals
and working relationships with key water utilities; (2) identifying the level
of service goal to be achieved under emergency conditions; (3) describing failure
events that could result in widespread water supply outages; (4) quantifying
the likelihood of occurrence of failure events, duration of outages, and number
of customers affected; (5) identifying infrastructure improvements to mitigate
water supply outages in potential failure scenarios; (6) assessing and prioritizing
improvement options with respect to return on investment and benef its
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to regional resilience; and (7) reaching consensus on an improvement plan that
optimizes risk reduction with cost and level of service performance.
To help maintain consistency and common understanding, the study uses
these important terms and definitions:
 Level of service (LOS): a set of objectives that define the
service performance to be delivered
 LOS impact: failure to meet LOS goals for some number
of people for some duration because of a failure scenario and
associated asset failures
 Event: an occurrence, such as a contamination, f ire,
or catastrophic asset failure, that can act as a root cause and
create a LOS impact
 Failure scenario: the chain of incidents that occur due
to an event occurrence that creates or exacerbates
a LOS impact
 Asset failure: specific water system assets that fail as part
of the failure scenario
 Direct cost: the immediate financial impact of a failure scenario,
including the cost to repair or replace equipment
 Economic cost: collateral damage and costs not directly caused
by the failure scenario
 Financial cost: the combination of direct and economic costs
 Improvement initiatives: capital projects that can decrease the
likelihood or consequence of a failure scenario

Risk Assessment and Modeling
A key element in resilience analysis is risk analysis. See chapter 13
for an overview of risk assessment and management considerations and
strategies. Following common practice for evaluating risk, this study
calculated risk by multiplying the likelihood of an event occurring by the
consequence of its occurrence. In the initial workshops, Black & Veatch worked
with participating water utilities to identify various events that might result
in an extended loss of water service and estimate the likelihood of such events
occurring as well as their consequences. Quantifying risk and resilience
for many potential initiatives and portfolios requires a def ined process
to ensure the study alternatives are evaluated in a consistent manner.
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To that end, figure 8-4 illustrates the study approach at the macro level
while the rest of this section offers a more detailed description of each step
of this process. 27

Figure 8-4. Process for the NCR water system study
(Diagram by Black & Veatch)

Step 1: Develop System Inventory
Evaluating the regional system’s resilience required an understanding
of the NCR’s existing individual water systems. Prior to carrying out risk
assessment and modeling work, it was necessary to inventory the existing
critical regional water systems in the NCR, such as water treatment plants,
raw water sources, water storage, pumping facilities, and key interconnections.
Population and water demand projections were also obtained, as were
any available previous studies and plans by participating water utilities.
The region’s water supply system effectively serves the demands in the
NCR under normal operating conditions. Regional agreements and operational
coordination between water utilities concerning Potomac River raw water
usage, reserve raw water, treated water capacity, emergency preparedness, and
mutual aid further enhances the reliability of the system. Population forecasts

27. Black & Veatch, National Capital Region (NCR) Water Supply and Distribution System Redundancy
Study: Project No. 188286 (Washington, DC: MWCOG, July 2016).
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prepared by COG estimated modest but continued growth through 2040
in the entire region. 28
Based on these population forecasts, the 2015 Washington Metropolitan
Area Water Supply Study assessed the ability of the NCR’s current water
supply system to meet forecasted demands through 2040. The study concluded
that—given conditions similar to severe historic droughts and assuming
no impact from climate change—the “current water supply system will
experience considerable stress, with mandatory water use restrictions
required” in the Washington metropolitan area by 2035. 29 The region
has studied several raw water storage and transmission improvements
(such as conversion of quarries to off-river reservoirs) to provide additional
protection against drought risks. These options will be developed and refined
further as drought risk and impacts of climate change are better understood.
As for water treatment capacity, the region has adequate treatment capacity
to meet maximum day demands through the year 2040. Due to the segmented
nature of different water systems, there is limited capability to transfer treated
water across the Potomac River and to areas where shortfalls might occur.
For example, in the event of a water treatment plant outage, there could
be limited ability to transfer water from other treatments plants to meet
demand in the affected area.

Step 2: Define Levels of Service (LOS)
A system-level resilience analysis requires at least one baseline metric
to assess the performance of the existing system and compare it to future,
alternative systems. For this study of regional water system redundancy,
the baseline metric was the ability of customers to receive potable water when
disruptive events occur. Specifically, through the workshop process, the ability
to supply winter average demands during emergency events was identified
as the LOS.
To determine the LOS, estimates of 2040 winter average demands
were calculated for each water utility. This LOS is consistent in principle
with regional agreements such as the Potomac River Low Flow Allocation
28. MWCOG, Summary of Intermediate Population Forecasts, Final Round 9.0 Cooperative Forecasts
(Washington, DC: MWCOG, November 9, 2016), https://www.mwcog.org/documents/2018/10/17/cooperative
-forecasts-employment-population-and-household-forecasts-by-transportation-analysis-zone-cooperative
-forecast-demographics-housing-population/.
29. S. N. Ahmed, K. R. Bencala, and C. L. Schultz, 2015 Washington Metropolitan Area Water Supply
Study: Demand and Resource Availability Forecast for the Year 2040 (Rockville, MD: Interstate Commission
on the Potomac River Basin, August 2015), xiv–xv, https://www.potomacriver.org/wp-content/uploads/2015
/08/ICP15-04a_Ahmed.pdf.
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Agreement and the Metropolitan Washington Water Supply and Drought
Awareness Response Plan for the Potomac River System. 30 These agreements
call for allocation of water withdrawals in proportion to each utility’s average
winter water production when restrictions are in effect.

Step 3: Identify Failure Modes
Once the LOS was defined, a workshop was held with participating
water utilities to identify the types of major events that could impact these
levels for large numbers of customers. Numerous events were considered
and screened, including drought, earthquakes, river contamination, derecho
winds, cyberattacks, power outages, and ice storms. Terrorist attacks were
not singled out as an event, though several of the events that were considered
(such as cyberattacks, river contamination, and power outages) could
be caused by terrorism. Since this study focused on region-wide resilience,
the failure scenarios evaluated in this study must either cause water outages
across the region for more than 24 hours or affect important interconnections
between water utility systems, causing water outages in large sections
of a distribution system for more than 24 hours. Based on these criteria,
the study group selected 10 failure events to evaluate, as outlined in table 8-2. 31
Some failure scenarios—including events such as a regional power outage,
windstorm, ice storm, cold weather events, and cyberattacks—were screened
from the original list based on the workshops and subsequent discussions with
relevant utilities. Ultimately, the selection of failure scenarios to be evaluated
depends upon many factors such as the water utilities involved, existing
investments in system redundancy, and the current threat environment.

30. Potomac River Low Flow Allocation Agreement (December 15, 2017), 11, https://www.potomacriver
.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/LFAA-Annotated_2_22_2018.pdf; and MWCOG, Metropolitan
Washington Water Supply and Drought Awareness Response Plan: Potomac River System (Washington, DC:
MWCOG, June 7, 2000): 3–5, https://www.mwcog.org/file.aspx?D=%2Fy%2BiVOLXyZ%2B5oVxyNNqz
5KFEhqK%2FQWPDwi26CumRG-%3D&A=%2B14Zj%2B5VOXzO6Z7cOTabI1TKNSn8nDbIWjV0E
8pIRdk%3D.
31.

Black & Veatch, Project No. 188286.
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Table 8-2. Events and failure scenarios
Event
Water main break

Failure Scenarios
Major water main break across the Potomac River
Oil spill in the Potomac River—affects both banks

Contamination in the Potomac River

Oil spill in the Potomac River—affects west bank
Oil spill in the Potomac River—affects east bank
Chemical spill in the Potomac River—affects both banks

Fire

Airplane crash
Reservoir contamination

Fire at a water treatment plant—west side of river
Fire at a water treatment plant—east side of river
Airplane crash into a water treatment plant—west side of river
Airplane crash into a water treatment plant—east side of river
Contamination of a drinking water reservoir

Step 4: Define Likelihood of Occurrence (LOO)
To carry out a resilience and risk analysis, the likelihood of selected failure
events occurring must be determined. It is not possible to predict future events
with certainty, so one workshop focused on determining reasonable estimates
of the LOO based on the experiences of the water utilities participating
in the study and others around the industry. For resilience analysis purposes,
the most important aspect is to estimate the LOO for the various events relative
to each other and calculate the magnitude of the differences. For example,
the utilities participating in this study experienced oil spills in the
Potomac River over the past few decades, but a plane crash into a water
treatment plant has not occurred and is, intuitively, far less likely.
Consequently, Potomac River contamination events from oil were not estimated
to be similar in likelihood to a plane crashing into a treatment plant.
This study established five levels of LOO that provided large enough
intervals for resilience modeling. The LOO in this study was expressed
as having a single occurrence over a specif ic period, such as once every
30 years. Table 8-3 shows the five levels of LOO considered in the study, their
definitions, and an additional description for the frequencies considered. 32
For use in the resilience modeling approach, the study team worked
with COG to associate a specific LOO with each failure scenario described
above. All LOO levels were considered individually for each failure scenario,
32. Black & Veatch, Project No. 188286.
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but only the moderate (once every 30 years) and very low (once every 250 years)
levels emerged for the final frequencies.
Table 8-3. Five levels of likelihood of occurrence (LOO)
Rating

Definition

Frequency

Very high

There is direct evidence or substantial indirect
evidence to suggest the failure scenario has initiated
and/or is likely to occur.

Once per year

High

The failure scenario is known to exist, indirect
evidence suggests it is plausible and key evidence
is weighted more toward likely than unlikely.

Once every 10 years

Moderate

The failure scenario is known to exist, indirect
evidence suggests it is plausible and key evidence
is weighted more toward unlikely than likely.

Once every 30 years

Low

The failure scenario cannot be ruled out, but there is
no compelling evidence to suggest it has occurred
or that a condition or flaw exist that could lead to its
development.

Once every 100 years

Very low

Several events must occur concurrently or in a series
to trigger failure. Most, if not all, the events are very
unlikely to ever occur.

Once every 250 years

Step 5: Define Consequence of Occurrence (COO) to Meet Level of Service
Evaluating risk requires combining likelihood of occurrence with its
corresponding consequence. To develop the COO for the various failure
scenarios in this study, the team evaluated the impact to the NCR system
as it pertains to the average winter day demand, which was the LOS defined
in step 2. For purposes of this study, if a failure scenario would cause a utility
to be unable to supply potable water at average winter day demand levels, then
the customer would be counted as experiencing an outage. Customer outages
due to the types of events in this study can extend for several hours or days,
and the study combined the number of customers experiencing an outage
with the anticipated duration of the outage (in days) for each failure scenario.
To quantify the COO, the study team multiplied the number of customers
experiencing an outage (population) with the duration of the outage (days).
The product, referred to as population outage days (POD), was calculated
for each of the failure scenarios in the study.
To ensure consistency in the modeling over a 100-year period,
the study relied on a key assumption: it used projected water demands and
population estimates in 2040 for each of the utilities regardless of the year
a potential failure scenario might occur. This assumption allowed for the use
of a well-accepted set of population data to calculate outage impact
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over the period modeled. It is important to note one simplif ication
for this study, which was to evaluate the risks only to residential customers.
Greater weights were not assigned to critical customers and facilities or outages
that might impact mission assurance for military installations. An analysis
that focuses on critical customers or mission assurance may result in a different
prioritization of improvements.
The study also quantified risk by using a methodology that combines
direct and indirect costs to calculate the risk associated with each failure
scenario. Direct costs are the immediate financial impacts of a failure scenario
(such as the cost to repair or replace equipment). From a modeling perspective,
direct costs are not addressed by the initiatives in the study. For example,
there are repair costs associated with a water main break, but they do not
prevent the break. Instead, they serve to mitigate the number of POD after
the failure scenario occurs. Indirect (economic) costs are the collateral damage
for failure scenarios and do not include direct costs. In this study, the economic
costs were calculated by applying a per capita, per day cost to the associated
POD caused by a failure scenario. The study used an estimate of $114.38 per
day as the total impact due to the loss of potable water service per capita. 33

Step 6: Identify and Validate Feasible Alternatives
After def ining the failure scenarios and establishing the likelihoods
and consequences of occurrence, the study identif ied improvement
initiatives that address water system risk posed by the failure scenarios. The
alternatives identified were potential countermeasures that might mitigate
or prevent the effects of a failure scenario. Alternatives were selected by
analyzing the failure scenarios and identifying approaches to reduce POD.
Discussions with participating water utilities, engineering expertise and
knowledge of the NCR system all contributed to the development of suitable
alternatives. The study group then reviewed various conceptual alternatives
with participating utilities during a series of meetings. All potential
improvements were presented and considered during an improvement
alternatives workshop and during subsequent discussions with utilities
to focus on and refine potential improvement options for further consideration.
For each failure scenario, the study team developed a spreadsheetbased water supply mass balance model and post-improvement conditions.
This model was used to estimate the benefit of each potential improvement
in terms of capacity provided and reduction in water supply shortfall in each
demand area. The improvement benefit was then calculated as a reduction
33.

Black & Veatch, Project No. 188286.
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of POD from base case conditions. Types of improvements assessed included
off-river water storage, improved water transmission, treated water transfer,
and interconnections between water utilities. Estimates of costs for capital
and operations and maintenance were calculated for each improvement
option. Implementation schedules were also estimated, considering
typical durations needed for planning, design, permitting, and construction
for each improvement.
The system resilience model used in this study is a Microsoft Excel-based
model, which utilizes a Monte Carlo analysis to calculate the risk of a scenario
in which the NCR does not implement resilience measures during the study
period. This scenario is the base case. As the risk and potential impacts
to the LOS were better understood and quantified, potential infrastructure
improvement options were developed to mitigate outages and the risk involved
in the base case. These potential improvements were reviewed, screened, and
developed with input from relevant water utilities. A total of 18 potential
improvements were developed and evaluated for their benef its, in terms
of reducing the number of POD for each failure scenario. The study team also
developed cost estimates for construction, and operations and maintenance
as well as implementation schedules considering time required for planning,
design, and construction.

Results
The evaluation of the base case yielded a net present value cost
of $37 billion in monetized risk in the existing system over the 100-year
modeling period. The $37 billion value is comprised of the risk associated
in the 10 failure events outlined earlier in Step 3 (see table 8-2): large
water main failure ($0.11 billion), Potomac River contamination with oil
($20.1 billion), Potomac River contamination with oil on the east bank
of the river ($1.31 billion), Potomac River contamination with chemicals
($9 billion), a f ire at a major water treatment plant ($0.5 billion), and
reservoir contamination ($5.56 billion). Events involving contamination of the
Potomac River are responsible for a substantial amount of the total risk carried
by the existing NCR water system.
Off-river water storage combined with raw water transfer or treated
water transfer improvements were shown in this study to be effective
risk mitigating initiatives. Each potential improvement was individually
modeled to determine its benefit over a 100-year modeling period. Resulting
cost-benef it ratios were developed and used to rank improvements.
Improvements were then grouped into portfolios of improvements for selected
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spend levels to achieve the maximum possible cost-benefit ratio. A total
of 27 individual portfolios were def ined and modeled covering a capital
spend range from $1 million to roughly $330 million, as figure 8-5 illustrates. 34
As expected, model results indicate a reduction in overall risk with increasing
spend levels.
The risk modeling results provide a basis for an objective evaluation
of potential improvement options with respect to their life-cycle costs and
resilience benefits to the region. The risk analysis showed a total monetized
net present value risk of $37 billion over the 100-year modeling period
and highlighted that Potomac River contamination events are responsible
for a substantial amount of the total risk carried by the region’s water systems.
The study revealed that targeted raw water storage combined with raw water
transfer and treated water transfer improvements—generally considered
“no regrets” types of improvements—are the most effective risk-mitigating
initiatives, while providing a greater volume of raw water storage is a top
longer-range improvement.

Figure 8-5. Major improvements by portfolio
(Source: Black & Veatch)

34.

Black & Veatch, Project No. 188286.
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While the case study of the water supply system in the NCR is unique
to the Washington metropolitan area, it provides a framework and process
for risk and resilience analysis that NATO Allies and partners can adapt and
use to conduct similar studies of their water supply systems. The final section
now provides recommendations for ways allies and partners can enhance
security and resilience of local and national water infrastructure.

Recommendations and Actions for Consideration
Water plays a signif icant role in the lives of a nation’s civilian
population and in the ability of its armed forces to conduct the full range
of military operations from peacetime to conf lict. Daily conveniences
(such as taking a shower, making coffee, brushing teeth, feeding a family,
f lushing the toilet, and washing laundry) are often taken for granted,
but depend on water. The infrastructure needed to treat and convey drinking
water and wastewater, much of it buried and out of sight, is essential to keeping
businesses open and supporting other critical infrastructure sectors, including
military installations and missions. When water services are significantly
disrupted for several hours or longer, hospitals may have to close, hotels and
restaurants cease operations, factories shut down, and military installations
and the surrounding communities are disrupted. Water is a lifeline of the
world’s communities, and, as discussed throughout this chapter, it is important
to take actions to protect water infrastructure from threats such as terrorism,
cyber attacks, climate change, and more. To that end, there are four vital steps
that NATO Allies and partners can take to make their water infrastructure
more secure and resilient.
First, they can pursue regional collaboration and coordination
with trusted partners to conduct water supply and wastewater treatment
planning. Coordinated regional planning has many advantages,
including the abilit y to share benef its, risks, and resource costs.
Trusted relationships can also form the basis of a mutual aid network, helping
water utilities to respond to and recover from emergencies. 35
Second, they can conduct a condition assessment of water infrastructure
using a risk-based approach. This approach allows utilities to inventory
assets, identify high-risk assets, and determine which assets would have the
highest consequence of failure in terms of the critical customers affected,
number of customers affected, and other factors. For organizations facing
35. “Water/Wastewater Agency Response Network,” AWWA (website), n.d., accessed September 28, 2021,
https://www.awwa.org/Resources-Tools/Resource-Topics/Water-Wastewater-Agency-Response-Network.
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budgetary constraints, this step can be a relatively low-cost approach that can
be gradually expanded into a full asset management program in the future. 36
Third, they can use a risk-based approach to balance risk reduction and
cost. Every water utility or infrastructure owner or operator that depends
on water has a unique risk profile. When assessing alternatives to mitigate
risk, it is important to quantify the level of service needed in an emergency,
the likelihood of failure, and the consequence of failure, and to look
for synergies among mitigation alternatives.
Fourth, they can plan with a long-term vision in mind. Major capital
improvements to water infrastructure are costly, sometimes in the range
of hundreds of millions of dollars. Once constructed, a typical service life can
be 50 years or longer. Consequently, investments in resilience measures made
now should anticipate future conditions—to include growth in population,
water demand, and threats from climate change or extreme weather—
so the expected benefits and return on investment will be realized.
Strengthening the security and resilience of water infrastructure
among NATO Allies and partners is a tremendous challenge. As the case
study illustrates, using a risk-based approach to resilience planning can provide
a solid foundation for setting priorities and determining the timing and
funding levels of infrastructure investments to enhance an organization’s
or a region’s ability to adapt and respond to water needs during emergencies.

36. Nelson Carriço and Bruno Ferreira, “Data and Information Systems Management for the Urban
Water Infrastructure Condition Assessment,” Frontiers in Water (website), July 5, 2021, https://doi.org
/10.3389/frwa.2021.670550; and Ahmad Habibian, “Prioritizing Your Aging Water Infrastructure Needs
through a Sytematic, Comprehensive Approach,” Water Finance & Management (website), September 4, 2018,
https://waterfm.com/condition-assessment-cornerstone-asset-management/.
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Communications Resilience
Chris Anderson

Communications form the critical backbone of the modern world,
connecting more people and more devices more completely than ever before.
The benefits of this hyper-connected society drive ever-increasing reliance
on secure, reliable, and resilient communications. Potential adversaries
to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization certainly understand the importance
of communications—those they seek to target and those they use themselves—
so it is critical to fully understand the sector, the risks it faces, and the
best ways to mitigate those risks. This chapter addresses these vital issues
in four sections:
 An overview of the communications sector
 Threats to communications: a discussion of ways in which the
integrity, availability, or confidentiality of communications
systems may be degraded or compromised
 Case studies: key observations and lessons learned from several
recent examples of incidents—natural and man-made, cyber
and kinetic—that have targeted communications systems and
related infrastructure
 Recommendations: suggestions for improving communications
resilience against terrorist attacks and other threats
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Communications Sector Overview
This overview provides a foundation from which to better understand
the criticality of communications for national security and emergency
preparedness, the current state of the sector and future trends, and
common important characteristics of the sector and their implications
for security and resilience.

Critical for National Security and Emergency Preparedness
Resilient and trustworthy communications are fundamental to national
security and emergency preparedness. Communications, including public
commercial networks, play a critical role in:
 National command and control, military operations, and the
distribution of intelligence and warning
 Civil defense, law enforcement, and f irst-responder
coordination
 Citizen preparedness and resiliency during crisis
Vital central government and military communication, including classified
and unclassif ied information, f lows over commercial communications
channels. While tactical-level military communications still likely use
fully noncommercial communications such as battlef ield datalinks and
tactical radios, most other federal and military traffic—including national
command and control networks, intelligence collection and production,
big-data analysis, automation, and multimedia voice and video connectivity—
have high bandwidth and low latency requirements that are often best served
by using commercial providers. In many cases, this vital government traffic
f lows alongside or even intermixes with civilian traffic through the same
commercial fiber lines and data centers that support civilian communications.
At a more local level, civil defense, law enforcement, and other first
responders also leverage a combination of self-managed communications
systems and commercial networks to support operational coordination.
Traditional f irst-responder communications have evolved from basic
two-way land-mobile radios to include a wide range of radio frequency and
fiber-optic voice and data connectivity. Even these land-mobile radio systems
are now highly integrated systems that incorporate mesh networking and
utilize fiber optics and satellite for backhaul of data and interconnection
to other networks and data systems.
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The United States is deploying and enhancing FirstNet, a National Public
Safety Broadband Network designed to be a high-speed, nationwide wireless
broadband network dedicated to providing voice, video, and data services
in support of public safety. FirstNet is intended to be a reliable, highly
secure, and interoperable communications network for public safety agencies
and first responders, allowing them to get more information quickly and
helping them to make faster and better decisions. Commercial carriers are
offering similar “public safety grade” services to police, fire, rescue, and
response agencies across the United States and among many NATO member
states. As first-responder mission requirements increasingly incorporate data
from video cameras, autonomous vehicles, and Internet of Things (IoT)
sensors, the bandwidth needs and latency requirements for responders will
likely continue to drive demand for ever more capable and complex networks
to support them.
Communications are also essential for individual citizen preparedness.
During times of emergency, citizens must receive timely and accurate news
along with instructions from response officials on measures they should
be taking such as evacuation, shelter-in-place, and “be on the lookout
for . . .” notices. A primary means for citizens to receive this information
is through broadcast media such as radio and television (TV ).
Broadcast is useful in its simplicity in providing a one-to-many communications
path. The relatively low power demands for radio make it an excellent medium
for survivable, even self-powered, communication to a mass audience.
Cellular communications have supplanted landline telephony in most
market areas, but both are essential tools for citizens to check in on family
members and reach out for help when necessary. Even as landline telephony
has waned, high-bandwidth connectivity to the home has exploded,
bringing a host of on-demand content—including access to a vast amount
of public safety information—to consumers across the globe.
Both broadcast and cellular communications are leveraged in emergency
alerting systems that provide reliable, survivable communications pathways
for citizen critical emergency information. In the United States, the Wireless
Emergency Alert system leverages cellular delivery of alert information while
the Emergency Alert System provides alerts via radio and TV broadcast.
Starting in June 2022, Article 110 of the European Electronic Communications
Code will make it mandatory for all European Union member states to deploy
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a public-warning system using telephone networks to alert everyone located
in a specific area of an ongoing crisis or impending disaster.1

Common Sector Characteristics
Modern communications networks are highly meshed, extremely resilient
multi-mode. Equipment failures or damaged fiber-optic cables are generally
rerouted easily with little to no impact to end users. The weakest link
in a communications network is often the “last mile” to a given consumer
or enterprise. This f inal stretch, whether provided by copper lines,
fiber-optic cable, or through the airwaves, is often a single-path connection,
particularly in rural and less densely populated regions, and therefore does
not provide resilience through redundancy like more dense environments
or specifically designed survivable communications architectures.
The last several decades have seen a shift away from most analog
communications in favor of packet-based communication technologies.
Most communication today, even simple voice telephony, is digitized,
packetized, and sent over digital data net works. This transition
happened in wired voice communications as Voice over Internet
Protocol (VoIP) phones became commonplace by the early 2000s.
In the cellular space, 3G cellular services brought an initial expansion of data
connectivity to mobile devices, with a transition to VoIP for core cellular voice
calls arriving in conjunction with the transition to 4G. The digital transition
has also revolutionized TV and radio broadcasting. HD radio standards
allow up to four stations of content to share a single radio channel while still
delivering crystal clear sound, while digital TV has enabled the broadcast
of high-definition signals over the air. The next generation TV standard,
Advanced Television Systems Committee 3.0, will allow for over-the-top
datacasting, enabling the ability to provide advanced emergency alerting that
includes maps, graphics, hyperlinks, and other data to better convey emergency
situational awareness and direct specific community responses.
In most countries, the wide array of industry segments and multiple strong
companies means a highly competitive communications marketplace where
rapid innovation is leveraged to competitive advantage. At the same time,
network providers are often mutually dependent on each other’s infrastructure
in colocation spaces, for backhaul, and even last-mile connectivity to customers,
so coordination among providers is regular and routine.
1. EU Directive 2018/1972: Establishing the European Electronic Communications Code, European Parliament
and the Council of the European Union, December 11, 2018, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT
/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018L1972.
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As a lifeline sector, communications networks are tightly integrated
with other critical infrastructure sectors, with many sectors having significant
dependence on communications. See chapter 1 for an overview of lifeline
sectors and their relationship to other critical infrastructure sectors.
At the same time, the communications sector is highly dependent on power,
particularly reliable commercial electricity. During disasters and disruptions
to the electric grid, or in places where reliable power is not available,
communications systems rely upon on-site generation, making access
to fuel (gasoline, diesel, and sometimes propane) for generators vital
to communications resilience. This local generation makes the security
of generators and fuel tanks essential and places a premium on maintaining
access to remote facilities to refuel and repair generators.
Communications is also highly integrated with the information
technology (IT) sector, which provides the hardware and software necessary
to run modern communications networks. Communications providers,
IT companies, and even content producers both partner and compete to offer
massive data-handling capabilities through cloud services, edge-computing
capabilities, and content-delivery networks. Communications providers
work closely with hardware and software suppliers to manage supply-chain
security and resilience.

Communications Industry Segments
Within the broad context of the communications sector, discrete segments
or subsectors within communications have unique elements while still
sharing common characteristics outlined above. In many cases, private-sector
companies focus on a particular subsector, though communications convergence
means that the subsectors are often integrated into broader multi-segment
systems. Figure 9-1 illustrates the communications sector and role the various
industry segments play within this architecture. 2

2. US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 2015 Communications Sector Specific Plan (Washington, DC:
DHS, 2015), 5, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-communications-2015-508.pdf.
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Figure 9-1. Communications sector architecture model
(Diagram by Department of Homeland Security)

The wireline industry segment consists of circuit- and packet-switched
networks via copper, fiber, and coaxial transport media. The wireline segment
includes private-enterprise data and telephony networks, the core backbone
of the Internet (including undersea cable networks), and the public-switched
telephone network. Wireline backbone networks have largely completed
a transition to fiber-based, packet-switched core networks while using a mix
of f iber, coaxial, and twisted pair copper for last-mile connectivity.
This modern fiber-optic infrastructure is essential to support the very high
bandwidth necessary for the range of voice, video, and data connectivity
demanded by government, enterprise, and individual customers.
The cellular communications networks of the wireless segment have
undergone signif icant evolution through 2G, 3G, 4G, and now the
implementation of 5G networks. Similar to the wireline segment, most
cellular communication—even basic-voice services—is now packet-based
Internet protocol traffic. 4G networks revolutionized how cellular networks
deliver data services to individual customers. 5G networks will enhance that
connectivity, and, perhaps more importantly, will expand that connectivity
to include an expected massive proliferation of IoT devices. In addition
to cellular communications, the wireless segment also includes wireless
hot spots, personal communication services, point-to-point microwave,
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high-frequency radio, unlicensed wireless, and other commercial and
private radio services.
The satellite segment is also undergoing transformational change.
The traditional satellite market remains important, with large, expensive
platforms providing a robust suite of data, voice, video, and sensing services,
but a combination of lower-cost launch vehicles and highly miniaturized
platforms (sometimes known as “CubeSats”) has led to a burst of innovation
in small satellite network technologies and applications. Space-based position,
navigation, and timing (PNT) services from the US Global Positioning
System (GPS) and the European Galileo constellations—as well as Russian
GLONAST and Chinese BeiDou systems—have become thoroughly integrated
into a wide variety of critical infrastructure sector operations.
Today’s cable industry provides much more than simple television,
offering high-speed broadband and digital telephony over hybrid fiber–coaxial
networks. In addition to consumer services, cable providers may also supply
enterprise data networks and backhaul services for cellular providers.
The broadcast segment includes free and subscription-based over-the-air
radio and TV stations that offer analog and digital audiovisual programming
and data services. The transition from analog to digital services in TV and
radio allows transmitting of more data using less spectrum, potentially freeing
up spectrum for other uses. One such example is the US effort to “re-pack”
ultrahigh frequency TV stations into a smaller frequency band to reallocate
spectrum for other uses. Radio and TV stations also stream broadcast and
additional programming content over the Internet. From an emergency
preparedness perspective, it should be noted that traditional broadcast radio
is perhaps the most resilient means of communicating with large populations
during emergencies because radios are inexpensive and do not require much
power and transmitter sites have relatively large broadcast footprints given
sufficient transmitter power.

Threats to Communications
Natural Disasters
Natural disasters have the potential to disrupt severely or destroy
communications networks either through direct damage to facilities, towers,
and cabling or by disrupting the ability to supply power. In the United States,
hurricanes and related weather events cause significant local and sometimes
regional impacts to communications systems with high winds that damage
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aerial cables and power lines, while wind, f lood, and storm surge from the
most powerful storms devastate core network infrastructure. In some regions,
earthquakes threaten communications systems through damage to physical
facilities or destruction of conduits underground or along bridges and other
rights-of-way while also potentially impacting undersea cables and landing
stations. Regardless of the type of disaster and degree of initial damage,
communications networks can continue to degrade in the days following
a disaster because debris clearance operations often further damage aerial
and underground f iber-optic lines while the inability to access facilities
(due to physical obstacles or civil curfew) limits the ability to refuel
on-site generators and maintain essential facility equipment. Space weather
can also signif icantly degrade communications systems. During periods
of intense space weather, sensitive electronics are more likely to be hit
and damaged by charged particles. Ions striking satellites can overwhelm
sensors, damage solar cells, and degrade wiring and other equipment.
Additionally, strong geomagnetic storms can disrupt radio frequency signals
such as GPS, satellite TV, high-frequency radio, and even AM broadcast
frequencies. At extreme levels, space weather has the potential to induce
current f lows through long metallic objects, including railroad systems,
pipelines, and copper cabling.

Physical Attacks
Like any other critical infrastructure, communications facilities and
cable conduits are vulnerable to physical attacks. Remote infrastructure,
such as communications towers, mountaintop relay stations, and long-haul
fiber-optic runs, can be difficult to protect. Larger facilities, such as central
offices and other colocation facilities where network operators interconnect,
are generally more protected by physical measures, surveillance, redundant
systems, and other resilience measures, but could still experience significant
impacts if damaged or destroyed. Satellite gateways and ground stations may
also be vulnerable to attack.
Radio frequency–based communications systems—including cellular
networks, space-based PNT services, satellite communications, and
microwave links—are also vulnerable to jamming, spoofing, and interception.
Of these, jamming requires the least technical sophistication as it generally
consists of simply overpowering the target signal with a more powerful
noise generator. Spoofing is similar to jamming, except the malicious signal
mimics the characteristics of the target signal in an attempt to inject false data
into the communication system (for example, military capabilities that
cause PNT receivers to generate inaccurate location or timing solutions).
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Interception does not seek to prevent communication, but instead targets
the confidentiality of information passed along the networks.
Submarine cables have unique considerations. They are at the greatest
vulnerability in shallow water near shore up through the cable-landing facility.
While satellite and deep-water portions of undersea cables are typically
beyond the reach of terrorist organizations, advanced nation-state
adversaries may have the means to target directly even the most secure
critical communications infrastructure—not only deep undersea cables using
deep-sea submersibles, but also space-based assets with anti-satellite weaponry.
In addition to intentional attacks, accidental damage can also impact
communications networks. Underground communications conduits can
be damaged or destroyed by excavation or drilling if cable location-finding
and safety protocols are not carefully followed. Post-natural disaster debris
clearance and reconstruction in particular can put communications circuits
at risk due to the time pressure for restoration and more chaotic nature
of operations. Undersea cables, particularly in shallower water, have been
damaged by fishing and anchoring operations.

Cyberattacks
Communications systems are also vulnerable to a range of cyberattacks.
See chapters 3–5 for more detail regarding cyber threats and actors.
Communications is unique in that it can be both a target of cyberattack
but also a vector through which other critical infrastructure or systems
are attacked. Distributed denial of service attacks attempt to make virtual
resources unavailable or compromise defensive measures by f looding network
resources with bogus information that consumes bandwidth and computing
resources. Some cyberattacks seek to compromise online information systems
to target the integrity or confidentiality of data. In some cases, attackers
seek to take over control of systems to commandeer or control the operation
of critical infrastructure or other vital systems. Ransomware attacks
seek to profit by sequestering vital records and systems from their users,
then demanding payment to release the systems and data.

Case Studies
To represent the breadth of risks to communications, this section
presents f ive case studies covering different aspects of communications
threat and response scenarios across a range of cyber and physical incidents.
Each case study is meant to introduce or reinforce essential concepts
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for the security and resilience of communications systems, particularly
against threats from terrorist actors. While the individual case studies are
at a high level, in most cases the references provided will allow a much deeper
review and consideration of the specific events. The various scenarios took
place worldwide, including in the United States and Europe, within the
last 15 years.

Physical Attack: Bombing of a Central Office, Nashville, United States
At 6:30 a.m. on December 25, 2020, a large vehicle-borne improvised
explosive device exploded outside an AT&T central off ice in Nashville,
Tennessee. The building survived intact, but physical damage to the lower
f loors, along with f ire and f looding, left the building without power
for several days due to damage to commercial power connections to the facility,
the blast’s effect on the on-site generators, and concerns about internal power
distribution systems. An investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) concluded the attacker had acted alone and was not part of a larger
organization, and though the FBI noted the attacker believed in a range
of eccentric conspiracy theories, they did not find an ideological motivation
for targeting this facility. 3 Ultimately, the attacker’s primary motivation
appears to have been to end his own life in a high-impact event, while still
limiting the risk of injury to others.
Work on restoring communications began almost immediately,
with AT&T moving personnel and equipment from its Network Disaster
Recovery teams to Nashville while simultaneously working to reroute
nonterminating traffic around the facility.4 Initial onsite recovery efforts
were hindered by difficulty accessing the building due to a combination
of factors, including safety concerns related to the building’s structural
integrity and restrictions related to the facility’s status as an active crime scene.
AT&T provided regular updates on the recover y of the facilit y
on a dedicated public web page and to government and industry counterparts
through established information-sharing protocols. 5 By the morning
of December 26, AT&T had deployed portable cellular equipment
with satellite backhaul to restore connectivity in the region, ultimately
ramping up to over 25 portable cellular sites at the height of their response.
3. “FBI Releases Report on Nashville Bombing,” Federal Bureau of Investigation Memphis Field Office
(website), March 15, 2021, https://www.f bi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/memphis/news/press-releases/f bi
-releases-report-on-nashville-bombing.
4. “National Disaster Recovery,” AT&T (website), n.d., accessed September 28, 2021, https://www.corp
.att.com/ndr/.
5. “Nashville Recovery Efforts,” AT&T (website), n.d., March 31, 2021, https://about.att.com/pages
/disaster_relief/nashville.html.
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AT&T brought in large-scale mobile generators to restore power to the facility,
but due to the impacts of the blast, the company had to drill new access holes
to route power safely into the building. AT&T restored power to at least
four f loors of the building by the morning of December 27. By the morning
of December 28, just three days following the blast, AT&T stated it had
restored the majority of services.
While the attacker may or may not have intentionally selected his location
for its proximity to a communications facility, he could scarcely have executed
a more targeted attack on a critical communications node. The impacts
from the attack stretched across multiple states and affected thousands
of customers, including wireless and wireline services to consumers,
enterprise customers, and other communications carriers. The Tennessee
Emergency Communications Board noted that 66 public safety answering
points—call centers where emergency “911” calls for f irst responder
help are answered—were affected. 6 Since the facility hosted colocation
network-to-network interfaces, multiple other carriers (wireline, cable, and
wireless) had local and regional impacts lasting several days.
There are several key observations and lessons to learn from the Nashville
incident and response:
 Coordination between infrastructure operators and f irst
responders is essential, particularly with respect to access
to facilities. Where possible, procedures should be worked
out in advance regarding access and credentialing.
 Given the interconnected nature of today’s communications
net works, carrier-to-carrier coordination is critical.
In the United States, all major carriers, along with many
trade associations and smaller operators, are part of the
Communications Information Sharing and Analysis Center
(Comm-ISAC), which is partnered with the US Department
of Homeland Security’s (DHS) National Coordinating
Center for Communications. The National Coordinating
Center and Comm-ISAC immediately began sharing
information on the incident and held the f irst of several
coordination teleconferences on December 26. See chapter 11

6. Donny Jackson, “Tennessee Board Reports Nashville Bombing Impact on 911, Future Plans,”
IWCE’s Urgent Communications (website), May 21, 2021, https://urgentcomm.com/2021/05/21
/tennessee-board-reports-nashville-bombing-impact-on-911-future-plans/.
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for more information the important role agencies like
Comm-ISAC play in sharing information and intelligence.
 Physical hardening of infrastructure works. While buildings
across the street from the central off ice were completely
destroyed, the very solidly constructed central office suffered
little or no structural damage, allowing very rapid restoration
once the building was dewatered and power was rerouted
to the still intact f loors and equipment.
 The resilience of backup systems, including redundant
“last mile” connections, is essential for mission-critical
communications requirements
 The ability to reroute rapidly and efficiently, often enabled
through software-defined networking, is critical to keeping
local disruptions from impacting regional or national
communications traffic.

Physical Accident and Attack:
Egyptian Undersea Cable Outages (2008 and 2013)
When critical infrastructure extends over long distances—whether power
lines, rail links, highways, pipelines, or fiber-optic cables—it can be difficult
to protect, as there is typically no way to establish a defensive perimeter
around the asset. While both terrestrial and undersea f iber-optic cables
can be targets, undersea cables have higher risks because there are fewer
alternative pathways, they are more difficult to repair, and their capacity tends
to be highly concentrated on relatively few paths. One critical chokepoint
for undersea cabling runs along the eastern Mediterranean Sea into Egypt
and the Red Sea as figure 9-2 depicts.7 While accidental damage to undersea
cables is commonplace, two noteworthy incidents happened in the vicinity
of this chokepoint in 2008 and 2013.

7. “Submarine Cable Map,” TeleGeography (website), n.d., accessed September 28, 2021,
submarinecablemap.com.
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Figure 9-2. Submarine cable map of the eastern Mediterranean Sea
(Map by TeleGeography)

In January and February 2008, a series of apparently unrelated accidents
in the eastern Mediterranean Sea and the Middle East caused significant
impacts to global information f lows. The most consequential of the
cluster of cuts took place just off the coast of Alexandria, Egypt,
on January 30, 2008, severing two major fiber-optic lines—the SEA-MEWE 4 and the FLAG Europe-Asia cables—which together represented about
75 percent of the connectivity between the Middle East and South Asia. 8
This event, later attributed to a ship anchoring evolution damaging both
cables, degraded Internet connectivity from Egypt (by 70 percent) to India
(by 60 percent) with disruptions in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait,
and Saudi Arabia as well.9 The effects of this disruption were magnified
by several additional cuts to the FALCON cable near UAE, which occurred
both before (on January 23) and after (on February 1) the Alexandria incident.10
On December 5, 2008, another major cut hit SEA-ME-WE 4 and the
FLAG Europe-Asia cables, but this time a third cable, the SEA-ME-WE 3,
was also severed. Since SEA-ME-WEA 3 had been used to carry rerouted
8. Bobbie Johnson, “How One Clumsy Ship Cut Off the Web for 75 Million People,” Guardian (website),
February 1, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/feb/01/internationalpersonalfinance
business.internet.
9. “Severed Cables Disrupt Internet,” BBC News (website), January 31, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2
/hi/technology/7218008.stm.
10. Rene Wilhelm and Chris Buckridge, “Mediterranean Fibre Cable Cut – a RIPE NCC Analysis,”
RIPE Network Coordination Centre (website), January 30, 2019, https://www.ripe.net/analyse/archived
-projects/mediterranean-fibre-cable-cut.
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traffic during the January cuts, the December event was more impactful,
affecting the Maldives (100 percent outage), India (82 percent outage), Qatar,
Djibouti, and the UAE (70 percent outage each) and with around 50 percent
disruption in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan.11
At the time, many conspiracy theories f lourished in the affected countries
and online. While submarine cable cuts from a range of factors happen nearly
200 times per year, the conf luence of impacts to cables serving the same
regions simultaneously fueled rampant speculation until discarded ship anchors
were found near the sites of several of the cuts.12 Although a direct link had
not been demonstrated, it seems as if bad actors were paying close attention
to the events of 2008. In 2013, multiple cables in the same area off the Egyptian
coast again suffered multiple breaks; this time, however, the Egyptian Coast
Guard apprehended three divers trying to cut the SEA-ME-WE-4 cable
a few hundred yards off the coast of Alexandria.13
A 2017 publication sponsored by the US Office of the Director of National
Intelligence and the DHS Public-Private Analytic Exchange Program
highlighted a range of threats to submarine cable infrastructure. The report
assessed the risk to undersea cables at various points along a given cable
route, covering overland last-mile, near-shore, offshore, continental-shelf, and
deep-sea sections. Of particular interest in the counterterrorism context
is the threat assessed to “vandals, activists and terrorists,” which was considered
highest in the overland and near shore segments. The report specifically noted
that the “concentration of cable landing sites in very few physical locations and
the relative ease in finding documented cable routes and cable termination
points could facilitate the targeting of the submarine cable network by bad
actors.” 14 The report also noted that terrestrial portions of long-haul cable
networks are also subject to attack.

11. Kim Zetter, “Undersea Cables Cut; 14 Countries Lose Web—Updated,” Wired (website),
December 19, 2008, https://www.wired.com/2008/12/mediterranean-c/.
12. James Griffiths, “The Global Internet Is Powered by Vast Undersea Cables. But They’re Vulnerable,”
CNN (website), July 26, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/25/asia/internet-undersea-cables-intl-hnk
/index.html.
13. Paul Saffo, “Disrupting Undersea Cables: Cyberspace’s Hidden Vulnerability,” New Atlanticist (blog),
April 4, 2013, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/disrupting-undersea-cables-cyberspaces
-hidden-vulnerability/.
14. James Dean et al., Threats to Undersea Cable Communications (Washington, DC: DHS, 2017), 8,
https://www.dni.gov/files/PE/Documents/1---2017-AEP-Threats-to-Undersea-Cable-Communications.pdf.
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There are several options available to mitigate risks to communications
cables, particularly from potential targeting by terrorist groups. Some key
lessons-learned and risk mitigation options include:
 In close coordination with the private-sector operators
of cables, ensure physical and logical route diversity for all
critical communications paths and operational preparations
to reroute traffic rapidly. In the case of submarine cables,
this should also include avoiding, where possible, chokepoints
and concentrations of redundant cables, such as near the
landing sites at Alexandria, Egypt.
 Maintain suff icient capability to repair critical cables
without undue delay.
 Consider options to harden near-shore and onshore submarine
cable facilities. Examples include:
 Trench and bury near-shore segments to help alleviate
risks from accidental fishing or anchoring damage, as well
as attempts at sabotage by divers or dredgers
in shallow water.
 Harden cable landing stations.
 Establish proactive coordination among national and
local law enforcement, the Coast Guard, the Nav y,
telecommunications operators, and landing station
operators for security and incident response.
 Minimize publicly available information that provides
specif ic locations of near-shore cables and cable
landing stations.
 Harden related physical infrastructure as much
as practicable, including by encasing fiber in concrete,
welding manhole covers shut, and securing other potentially
exposed components, such as wiring closets, access panels,
and elevator shafts, in shared-use facilities.

Natural Disaster: 2017 US Hurricane Season
The 2017 hurricane season was uniquely devastating across the southeastern
United States and the Caribbean islands. In fact, the devastation was
so significant, that the US Federal Communications Commission took the
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extraordinary action of issuing a specific report detailing the many impacts
to communications infrastructure. The report focused on the damage
from three primary storms: Hurricane Harvey, which hit Houston, Texas,
in August 2017; Hurricane Irma, which hit the US Virgin Islands (USVI),
Puerto Rico, and Florida in early September 2017; and Hurricane Maria,
which decimated the USVI and Puerto Rico in mid-September 2017.
Since the most damaging and longest-lasting effects from the three storms
were from Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico and the USVI, this case study
will focus on the impacts from Maria.
Hurricane Maria almost completely destroyed the communications
infrastructure in both the USV I and Puerto Rico. At its worst,
Hurricane Maria took out over 75 percent of cellular service in the
USVI and over 95 percent of cellular service in Puerto Rico, where
48 of 78 municipios (county equivalent) had 100 percent loss of cell service.15
Figure 9-3 illustrates this devastating loss of cellular service in Puerto Rico
the day after Hurricane Maria struck.16 Further, unlike previous storms,
cellular service did not bounce back quickly after Maria; in fact, some cellular
sites were still out of service six months later. On the USVI, the primary
public-safety answering point was out of service for at least 10 days.
Radio and TV broadcasters were similarly impacted, with large numbers
off line for extended periods of time.

Figure 9-3. Cellular service in Puerto Rico the day after Hurricane Maria
15. Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season Impact on Communications:
Report and Recommendations (Washington, DC: Federal Communications Commission, August 2018), 15,
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-353805A1.pdf.
16.

2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season, 16.
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(Map by Federal Communications Commission)

While the impacts from a natural disaster may seem unrelated
to counterterrorism planning, there are several key lessons learned from these
severe weather events:
 Communications resilience is tightly linked to the availability
of reliable electric power. By far the primary cause
of cellular site failures was lack of commercial power combined
with lack of generator capability, generator failure, or lack
of fuel.
 Widespread natural disasters will impact communications
networks to some degree, and these communications
impacts will adversely affect situational awareness and
command-and-control necessary to develop and execute
response courses of action.
 Communications failures—such as cellular connectivity, the
ability to call for first responders, or lack of broadcast capability—
have a signif icant impact on communit y resilience.
The systemic stress to infrastructure systems, including
communications, from natural disasters leaves communities
more vulnerable to effects from a subsequent attack
of opportunity by terrorists, while the impacts of such
an attack could be amplified.

Cyberattack on Communication Systems: TV5 Monde
On April 8, 2015, a group claiming to be the “Cyber Caliphate”
attacked the French television network TV5 Monde. The groundwork
for the sophisticated attack actually began months earlier, with initial
network penetration happening as early as January 23, 2015. The
attackers conducted systemic reconnaissance of the TV5 Monde network
to understand how the network developed, staged, and broadcast its content.
Systematically burrowing deeply into TV5 Monde’s network, the attackers
built malicious software that corrupted the Internet-connected hardware that
controlled the station’s operations, even compromising the station’s ability
to encode content for broadcast.17 When the main attack was launched,
all 12 of the network ’s broadcast channels were initially taken off the air,
17. Gordon Corera, “How France’s TV5 Was Almost Destroyed by ‘Russian hackers,’ ” BBC News
(website), October 10, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-37590375.
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with some channels not restored for 18 hours. Nearly simultaneously,
the network’s website and social media accounts were also compromised and
used to post propaganda supporting the Islamic Caliphate.
While contemporaneous accounts of the event initially expressed alarm
at an apparently and suddenly more capable and sophisticated cyber adversary
in the Islamic Caliphate, signs began to emerge that the attack may have
been a “false f lag” operation conducted by another actor trying to shift blame
for the attack. The complex attack used multiple points of ingress in the
attempt to compromise TV5 Monde’s network, even including the station’s
Internet-connected security cameras. The computer forensics company,
FireEye, finally attributed the attack to the Russian advanced persistent
threat (APT) group known as Fancy Bear or APT 28, suggesting the false
f lag effort was “likely a Russian information operation” meant to “capitalize
on Western fears over Islamic extremism” and “draw the West’s attention
away from Russia’s ongoing role in the Ukraine crisis and towards the threat
of terrorism in the Middle East.” 18 FireEye, along with government
investigations and other cybersecurity firms, noted a range of evidence pointing
to Russian involvement, including Internet Protocol (IP) blocks adjacent
to other known AP T 28 activit y, code compilations consistent
with operations in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and a code base written
with Cyrillic keyboards.19
The net result of the incident was that the attacker took 12 TV5
Monde channels off the air and caused a direct estimated financial impact
of over 4.5 million euros. Fortunately, attackers either could not or chose not
to commandeer the broadcasts to air content of their choosing. The attackers
did, however, commandeer related TV5 Monde social media accounts
(YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook) to launch propaganda campaigns.
Some observations and lessons learned from the APT 28 attack include:
 The importance of multilayered defense. According
to multiple sources, TV5 Monde did not have good
segmentation of their internal network. Their information
technolog y and operations technolog y systems were
interconnected, allowing a breach on the business side of the
network to impact to operational systems.
18. FireEye, Cyber Threats to the Entertainment and Media Industries (Milpitas, CA: FireEye, 2016), 1–2,
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/ib-entertainment.pdf.
19. “Russian Hackers Likely behind ‘IS Group Cyber Attack ’ on French TV Network,”
France 24 (website), October 6, 2015, https://www.france24.com/en/20150610-france-cyberattack-tv5
-television-network-russia-hackers.
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 In cyber events, attribution is difficult and, even in the best
circumstances, leaves a degree of uncertainty. Further, even
where attribution is possible, publicly acknowledging the
attribution may reveal the sensitive sources and methods
through which attribution was achieved. These challenges
with attribution complicate deterrence since placing
consequences on an attacker requires some degree of certainty
that the actual attacker is bearing the cost of the retribution.
See the Ukraine case study in chapter 5 for discussion on the
difficulty of attribution and response options to cyberattacks.
 W hile communications systems are often involved
in cyberattacks designed to reach other targets,
communications are sometimes targeted directly.
As both nation-states and non-state actors continue to
view information and disinformation campaigns as a means
to achieve their ends, assuming direct control of the means
of communication will continue to be an attractive target.
 The ability to attack broadcast networks, in conjunction
with other actions in a complex attack, could greatly hinder
the ability to communicate to the public, thereby causing
significantly more impact than a simple kinetic attack alone.

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS): Mirai Botnet
In early August 2016, a new malware variant, known as Mirai, began
to circulate. This self-replicating malware specifically targeted IoT devices
such as home routers, security cameras, printers, and network-attached
storage devices. Once installed on a new device, the malware would seek
other devices to infect by randomly scanning the Internet for targets and then
attempting to gain access by trying 64 commonly used login and password
combinations. Many IoT devices at the time used default passwords that
were rarely changed by users, so the malware was able to spread remarkably
rapidly. The cybersecurity company, Cloudf lare, assessed that during its first
few days, the malware was doubling the number of devices captured every
76 minutes. 20 These captured devices (now known as bots) would form a sort
of network (a botnet) when each device would contact command-and-control
(C2) servers to receive instructions on what to do next. In the case of Mirai,
the C2 servers could provide instructions to launch DDoS attacks to f lood
20. Elie Bursztein, “Inside the Infamous Mirai IoT Botnet: A Retrospective Analysis,” Cloudflare (blog),
December 14, 2017, https://blog.cloudflare.com/inside-mirai-the-infamous-iot-botnet-a-retrospective-analysis/.
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target computers and networks with bogus traffic to overwhelm the servers’
ability to respond, thus making a site or service unavailable for legitimate use.
The first two victims of the Mirai botnet were the European web-hosting
company OVH on September 18, 2016, and the servers hosting the online
presence for noted cybersecurity researcher Brian Krebs on September 21.
At the time, the attacks were some of the largest DDoS attacks ever observed.
Later that month, Mirai’s creator posted its source code online, leading
to a massive proliferation of botnets built on the Mirai model, and it did not
take long for these new botnets to become active. On October 21, Mirai was
used to target Dyn, a domain name system (DNS) resolver. DNS resolvers
such as Dyn translate the text-based Internet addresses into the numerical
IP addresses to enable the routing of Internet traffic. Since Dyn provided
this service for so many customers, the attack on their DNS service made
large swaths of the Internet unavailable for a short period until the attack was
mitigated. In the months that followed, other attacker groups using Mirai
targeted a wide range of victims across the globe. Mirai variants remain
active to this day; in the second quarter of 2021 alone, global communications
company, Lumen, through its Black Lotus Labs threat research arm, identified
349 unique Mirai C2 infrastructures, with each Mirai C2 “family” attacking
an average of more than 15,000 victims over a typical one-month lifespan. 21
For several reasons, the Mirai botnet is an important example to understand
when considering the terrorist cyber threat to communications systems:
 Once “in the wild,” the exploit was rapidly weaponized
by a large number of groups, at least some of whom sold DDoS
services for hire, putting this kind of cyberattack capability
in the hands of any individual or group willing to pay for it.
 The malware successfully promulgates itself in environments
where basic cybersecurity measures are lacking (for example,
where Internet-facing devices with default or common
passwords are left exposed).
 The attack itself was not technically sophisticated.
The original code was written by an undergraduate student
and two friends. An FBI agent investigating the case said,
“These kids are super smart, but they didn’t do anything high

21. “Lumen Quarterly DDoS Report Q2 2022,” Lumen Technologies (website), https://assets.lumen.com
/is/content/Lumen/lumen-quarterly-ddos-report.
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level—they just had a good idea.” 22 While state-sponsored
cyber actors sometimes wield remarkably sophisticated
capabilities, cyberspace is a battlefield where smaller players
can create, borrow, or buy relatively simple capabilities that
can have outsize impacts on CI security and resilience.

Conclusion
As described in this chapter, communications systems are a foundational
component of critical infrastructure that are essential to a functioning
economy and state capacity to conduct crisis response and military action.
Based on recent incidents affecting communications systems, such as those
discussed in the case studies, there are several important actions governments
and industry can take to promote communications sector security and resilience.

Blue-sky Coordination and Relationship Building
The securit y and resilience of the communications sector is
immeasurably improved by a vibrant and strong public-private partnership
among communications providers, national-security professionals, and
public-safety officials. These relationships must be established and nurtured
well ahead of an impending disaster or actual attack. Routine and regular
interaction is necessary to build personal familiarity and establish trust.
This interaction also ensures that coordination processes and procedures are
up to date, to include even things as basic as having contact information,
distribution lists, and virtual platforms that are available and functional.
In the United States, the DHS National Coordinating Center
for Communications hosts a standing weekly call with major federal
departments, communications regulators, and dozens of communications
company representatives; during the call, developing cyber and physical
incidents are discussed, questions asked and answered, and a common
lexicon and set of understanding is established. Partnerships developed
through mechanisms such as this form a foundation upon which the range
of other problems and opportunities can be most easily addressed, such as:

22. Garrett M. Graff, “How a Dorm Room Minecraft Scam Brought down the Internet,” Wired (website),
December 13, 2017, https://www.wired.com/story/mirai-botnet-minecraft-scam-brought-down-the-internet/.
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 Establ ishing basic coord ination mechanisms v ia
teleconferences, video conferences, in-person meetings,
e-mail distributions and online portals, which are used
to sha re in for mat ion a nd coord inate response
during steady-state operations and times of crisis.
 Pre-establishing disaster-reporting processes, so all key
stakeholders understand the expected cadence of reporting
and have access to reporting templates and application
programming interfaces to build internal reporting processes.
 Creating a centralized coordination mechanism to minimize
multiple reporting and request paths between government
and industry.
 Exercising jointly developed mechanisms before using them
in crisis.
 Encouraging industr y-to-industr y coordination and
cooperation that can be leveraged during incident response.

Identification of Risks and Appropriate Mitigation Strategies
As with all critical infrastructure risk-management activities, promoting
the security and resilience of communications is most effective when the
owner-operators of communications networks are engaged early in the process.
Owner-operators, armed with the best available information about threats
to their infrastructure, are best positioned to make the most eff icient
investments in security and resilience initiatives to address those threats.
Similarly, those reliant on communications systems benefit from a clear
analysis of the risks to those systems on which they rely.
A review of recent events, including those presented in the case studies
here, show several areas where investments in resilience have been particularly
effective:
 Physical and virtual path diversity. Critical communications
should have diverse physical and logical paths to facilitate
greater resilience. Today’s meshed net works provide
excellent route diversity over long-haul core networks,
with software-def ined networking enabling f lexibility
of these routes to allow for rapid traffic engineering away
from disrupted networks. Such dynamic rerouting is only
possible, however, where physical infrastructure allows and
so presents a greater challenge in less dense areas, particularly
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over the “last mile” legs connecting end users. Those who rely
on connectivity for mission-critical military, public safety,
or business requirements should work closely with network
providers to understand and accommodate physical and logical
route diversity.
 Cybersecurity baseline practices. Ensuring a foundational
level of cybersecurity best practices—such as routine patching,
f irewall controls, intrusion detection, and multifactor
authentication—will help to prevent or at least mitigate
attacks by cyber criminals and low-level non-state actor
groups. High-level state-sponsored attackers and increasingly
capable attackers-for-hire may be able to breach even the
best cyber defenses, making impact mitigation strategies—
including zero trust architectures, network segmentation,
least privilege implementation, and data encryption—equally
important. See chapter 14 for an overview of recommended
cybersecurity best practices and tools.
 Cross-sector relationships among communications, electricity,
and information technology. Most of the significant events
affecting communications over the past 20 years involved
concurrent issues with either electric power or information
technology. It is critical that the communications sector
routinely coordinates and addresses systemic risks at the
intersection of these three sectors and that government
security and response planners factor this need for coordination
into operational and information-sharing plans.

Communications Sector Resilience Enablers
Commercial communications providers actively manage network events
on a daily basis and are the experts on protecting, maintaining, and restoring
their networks. There are, however, key areas where government and industry
can partner to foster improved sector resilience.
In addition to the partnership mechanisms described above,
the private sector can benefit significantly from regular information sharing
from governments about known threats from adversaries before incidents occur.
Understanding likely adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures will help
industry develop and implement tailored countermeasures and risk mitigations.
Where specific pre-attack tactics, techniques, and procedures or other cyber
indicators of compromise are known, they should be shared with industry
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so owners and operators can be on the lookout for signs of an impending attack.
Government and industry can also benefit from rapid sharing of prospective
defensive measures, so they can evaluate effectiveness within their industry
or facility and implement quickly where it makes sense to do so. See the
discussion of information-sharing benefits and best practices in chapter 11.
During incidents, experience has shown that industry response is improved
by close coordination among relevant government and industry partners.
Key elements of this cooperation are:
 Access. Often simply getting personnel and vehicles to the
network facilities is a challenge following an attack or disaster
or during periods of heightened tension. It is critical that
communications providers and government officials work
together to enable entry to restricted areas, coordinate road
clearance and debris removal, and clear access routes to remote
sites as soon as possible.
 Energy. Prompt and/or prioritized restoration of electric
power will significantly increase the communications sector’s
ability to recover quickly, so coordination on power restoration
priorities and estimated restoration times is essential. Where
electric power is unable to be restored quickly, access to
fuels (diesel, gasoline, and sometimes propane) for on-site
generation becomes critical.
 Security. The security of communications facilities, including
temporary assets such as portable generators, mobile cellular
equipment, work crews, and fuel depots, is vital.
 Integrit y of communications conduit and cabling.
During post-incident operations like debris removal,
past incidents demonstrate that f iber-optic and other
cables are often damaged or destroyed unintentionally.
Close coordination and clear public messaging urging care
and caution working in and around fiber conduit and overhead
cabling can help mitigate some of this risk.
 Timely information updates. As situations evolve, when
government has actionable information—intelligence
or identified protective measures, for example—it must share
this information with industry quickly so it can be put to use.
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As a lifeline sector, communications enables much of the modern world’s
core functions, including military command and control, government
operations, emergency response coordination, economic productivity,
and societal engagement. For precisely these reasons, communications
are an attractive target for terrorist groups and other adversaries.
While communications companies expend great efforts in building secure
and resilient networks, government and industry can coordinate efforts
to establish solid operational relationships, identify and mitigate critical risks,
and develop viable plans of action for disaster response scenarios.
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Comparing Policy Frameworks:
CISR in the United States and the European Union
Ronald Bearse and Alessandro Lazari

For over a quarter century the United States and the European Union have
been diligently planning and implementing policies and procedures to protect
the critical infrastructure sectors that are vital to the prosperity and security
the majority of their citizens enjoy. Given the evolving nature of threats
against critical infrastructure, recent US and EU efforts have focused
on enhancing collective critical infrastructure security and resilience (CISR)
posture. The core objective of these CISR initiatives is to strengthen
their ability to deter, prevent, reduce the consequences of, respond to,
and recover from a broad array of vulnerabilities, hazards, and threats
to critical infrastructure. Any such disruptions to or destruction of these
critical infrastructure systems and assets can have damaging impacts
on individual nations, the transatlantic economy and security environment,
and the ability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to fulfill
its core tasks.
The US and EU CISR policies and practices have long been
recognized as two of the most advanced frameworks in the world.
Since a considerable majority of national CISR policies and plans
from around the world ref lect or reference to some extent the US or EU
models, this chapter describes the key underpinnings and characteristics
of each framework. In fact, among NATO’s 30 member states,
22 of them—the United States and 21 others who are also members of
the EU—are directly impacted by these frameworks, while the remaining
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eight member states and numerous partner nations are inf luenced by them.1
This chapter will first examine the US framework and then that of the EU,
with each section outlining the fundamental elements of the respective
models, the reasons why these frameworks came into being and how they were
adapted over time, and the various ways in which they are being implemented
to strengthen national, regional, and international security, economic
prosperity, and public health and safety. The goal of this chapter ultimately
is to help Allies and partners better understand these two frameworks and
apply their key principles and tenets to enhance the CISR posture in their
respective countries.

US CISR Framework
Critical infrastructure first appeared in formal US policy in 1996 when
US President Bill Clinton signed Executive Order 13010, which established
a national commission to assess the scope and nature of the vulnerabilities
of and threats to critical infrastructure facilities and systems. The commission
also recommended a comprehensive national policy and implementation
strategy for protecting critical infrastructure from physical and cyber threats
and for assuring their continued operation. 2 Five years later, the USA Patriot
Act of 2001 took the additional step of def ining critical infrastructure
as those “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the
United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets
would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security,
national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.” 3
More than a decade later, in 2013, US President Barack Obama established
current US national policy on CISR when he signed Presidential Policy
Directive 21 (PPD-21) to advance a national unity of effort to strengthen
and maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure
against all hazards, including physical and cyber threats.4 PPD-21 formally
1. “Relations with the European Union,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (website), June 21, 2021,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm.
2. “Critical Infrastructure Protection,” Exec. Order 13010, July 15, 1996, https://www.presidency.ucsb
.edu/documents/executive-order-13010-critical-infrastructure-protection.
3. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, H.R. 3162, (2001), https://www.congress.gov
/107/plaws/publ56/PLAW-107publ56.pdf.
4. White House, Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-21—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience
(Washington, DC: Office of the Press Secretary, February 12, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives
.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil/.
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marked the distinction between critical infrastructure protection (CIP)
and making it more secure and resilient (CISR).
Critical infrastructure in the United States consists of distributed networks,
numerous types of organizational structures and operating models (to include
multinational ownership), interdependencies in the physical and cyber
domains, and unique arrangements comprised of authorities, responsibilities,
and regulations across all levels of the government and the private sector. 5
Given this complex and diverse nature of critical infrastructure, the policy
aim outlined in PPD-21 is ambitious and challenging to accomplish.
Therefore, PPD-21 recognizes the need for cooperation between the public
and private sectors, coordination among various agencies and levels of
government, and integration with the national preparedness system
across the spectrum of the prevention, protection, mitigation, response,
and recovery domains. 6
According to the current CISR policy established by PPD-21, the federal
government is responsible for strengthening the security and resilience
of its own critical infrastructure, ensuring the continuity of national essential
functions, and continuing to partner effectively with critical infrastructure
owners and operators to enhance their CISR efforts.7 In addition to its
partnership with private-sector owners and operators, the federal government
works with state, local, tribal, and territorial entities to manage risks and
strengthen the security and resilience of the nation’s critical infrastructure
against all hazards that could have a debilitating impact on national security,
economic stability, or public health and safety. PPD-21 also requires the federal
government to engage with international partners to strengthen the security
and resilience of domestic critical infrastructure as well as those facilities
or assets located outside of national borders upon which the country depends.

What Guides US CISR Policy?
PPD-21 outlines three strategic imperatives that are the foundation
for improving national CISR practices and procedures. The first imperative
is to enhance functional relationships across the federal government to advance
a national unity of effort. Key to this effort is a national plan that identifies
roles and responsibilities for sector-specific agencies; other federal departments
5. “Fact Sheet: Executive Order on Cybersecurity/Presidential Policy Directive on Critical
Infrastructure Security and Resilience,” Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (website),
February 13, 2013, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2013/02/13/fact-sheet-executive-order-cybersecurity
-presidential-policy-directive-critical.
6.

White House, PPD-21.

7. White House, PPD-21.
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and agencies with critical infrastructure roles; state, local, tribal, and
territorial entities; and critical infrastructure owners and operators. As the
vulnerabilities, risks, and threats to critical infrastructure have evolved in the
twenty-first century, CISR policy has also adapted to address these changes,
often in the form of innovative programs and initiatives addressing specific
infrastructure issues and priorities. PPD-21 outlines the need to establish
baseline capabilities that ref lect this evolution of knowledge and practice,
def ine relevant federal program functions, and take steps to facilitate
collaboration and information exchange between and among the federal
agencies. 8 As part of this updated structure, PPD-21 directed the creation
of two national centers—for physical and cyber aspects of infrastructure,
respectively—under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to be focal
points for information and situational awareness for critical infrastructure
partners. Since its creation in 2018, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency (CISA) fulfills these two functions.
The second imperative, along these lines, is to enable the eff icient
exchange of information, including intelligence, between all levels
of government and critical infrastructure owners and operators to enable
situational awareness and multidirectional sharing of threats and vulnerabilities.
To enhance multidirectional information exchange between and among the
government and private sector, this imperative highlights the importance
of identifying (1) requirements for data and information formats and
accessibility, (2) system interoperability, and (3) redundant systems and
alternate capabilities should there be a disruption in the primary systems.9
Building on the first two imperatives, the third strategic imperative calls
for the implementation of an integration and analysis function for critical
infrastructure that includes operational and strategic analysis of incidents,
threats, and emerging risks. Integration and analysis of information resides
within CISA’s purview, and it includes the capability to collate, assess,
and integrate information regarding vulnerabilities and consequences with
threat streams and hazard information. While not replicating the analysis
conducted in the broader national intelligence community, this function
(1) helps prioritize assets and manage risks to critical infrastructure,
(2) anticipates cascading impacts due to interdependencies, (3) recommends
CISR measures prior to, during, and after an event or incident, and (4) supports
incident management and restoration efforts related to critical infrastructure.10
8. White House, PPD-21.
9.

White House, PPD-21.

10. White House, PPD-21.
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This function depends on stakeholders—federal departments and agencies
as well as analytic entities at all other levels of government and in the private
sector—supplying relevant, timely, and appropriate information to CISA
so it can maintain and share near real-time situational awareness
with actionable information about imminent threats, significant trends, and
incidents that may affect critical infrastructure.11
Given these three strategic imperatives and the broader strategic direction
outlined in PPD-21, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)
2013 fulfills PPD-21’s clear call for an updated national plan. NIPP 2013
presents the vision and mission for CISR policy, for which CISA has
primary responsibility among federal agencies. According to the NIPP 2013,
the physical and cyber critical infrastructure should “remain secure
and resilient, with vulnerabilities reduced, consequences minimized,
threats identified and disrupted, and response and recovery hastened.” 12
In turn, this vision drives the basic approach to enhance CISR “by managing
physical and cyber risks through the collaborative and integrated efforts
of the critical infrastructure community.” 13
An important first step is to determine which infrastructure sectors are
both critical to maintain continued services or functionality and vulnerable
to some type of threat or hazard. The US government designated four
sectors—transportation systems, water and wastewater systems, energy,
and communications—as lifeline sectors because most other sectors depend
on these functions and services to operate. See chapter 1 for its explanation
of lifeline sectors.14 Due to these dependencies and interdependencies
between infrastructure elements, the loss of one lifeline function typically
has an immediate impact on operations in multiple sectors. See chapter 12
for greater detail on the nature of dependencies, interdependencies,
and cascading or escalating effects. Naming and off icially recognizing
lifeline sectors and identifying existing cross-sector interdependencies
facilitates collaboration and information exchange and promotes continuity
of operations and services.15
11.

White House, PPD-21.

12. DHS, NIPP 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (Washington, DC:
DHS, 2013), 5, https://w w w.cisa.gov/sites/default/f iles/publications/national-infrastructure
-protection-plan-2013-508.pdf.
13. DHS, NIPP 2013, 5.
14.

DHS, NIPP 2013, 9.

15. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), A Guide to Critical Infrastructure
Security and Resilience (Washington, DC: CISA, 2019), 4, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications
/Guide-Critical-Infrastructure-Security-Resilience-110819-508v2.pdf.
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In total, US CISR policy currently recognizes 16 sectors as critical
infrastructure. In addition to the four lifeline sectors, the additional 12 sectors
are: chemical, commercial facilities, dams, defense industrial base, emergency
services, energy, f inancial services, food and agriculture, government
facilities, healthcare and public health, information technology, critical
manufacturing, and nuclear reactors, materials, and waste (see figure 10-1).16
Although the number of identified critical infrastructure sectors is currently
16, this number is subject to change regarding the vulnerability of specific
sectors and the nature of interdependencies between them. For instance,
in 2017, the US government designated election infrastructure as a subsector
of the government facilities sector due to the importance of free and fair
democratic elections as a foundation of the American way of life.

Figure 10-1. 16 critical infrastructure sectors recognized by US policy
(Source: Diagram by DHS)

When it comes to securing these critical infrastructure sectors and making
them more resilient, it is essential to understand the nature of the threats and
hazards that can inf luence operations. Some hazards and threats are specific
to geographic regions, others affect the entire country, and a few may even
have global impacts. By using an all-hazards approach, US CISR policy begins
with an appreciation for the spectrum of threats and hazards to critical
infrastructure, an analysis of the likelihood of occurrence and their
potential impacts, and then directs efforts to focus on and prepare for those
that pose the greatest risk. Although not an exhaustive list, the government
considers the following hazards and threats when determining appropriate
16. DHS, Critical Infrastructure Threat Information Sharing Framework (Washington, DC: DHS, 2016),
6, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ci-threat-information-sharing-framework-508.pdf.
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CISR policies and practices. See chapters 2–4 for more detail on physical,
cyber, and hybrid threats.17
 Climatological, hydrological, meteorological, and geophysical
events, such as drought, wildf ires, f loods, tropical
cyclones, severe winter storms, earthquakes, tsunamis,
or volcanic eruptions
 Pandemics
 Industrial accidents like structural failures and chemical spills
 Unscheduled disruptions due to aging infrastructure
or malfunctions
 Criminal incidents and physical or terrorist attacks
 Cyber incidents, including denial-of-service attacks, malware,
and phishing
 Attacks that exploit supply-chain vulnerabilities to cause
system failure
 Foreign operations to spread misinformation, undermine
democratic processes, or make investments that give foreign
powers undue inf luence

Adopting a Sound Risk Management Framework
An essential first step in developing CISR policy is understanding the
nature of the risks to critical infrastructure and developing appropriate
measures to mitigate or respond to them. The NIPP 2013 def ines risk
as the potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event,
or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood of occurrence—given the nature
of threats and vulnerabilities—and the consequences that could follow.18
Risk management is the process of identifying, analyzing, and communicating
risk and then accepting, avoiding, transferring, or controlling it at acceptable
levels and costs.19 Risk management enhances US CISR posture in several
important ways. First, it brings attention to those threats and hazards
that are most likely to cause significant, unwanted outcomes to a specific
infrastructure or sector. Second, it informs actions and guides the application
of resources to prevent or mitigate the effects of these threats and hazards.
17.

CISA, Critical Infrastructure Security, 7.

18.

DHS, NIPP 2013, 7.

19.

DHS, NIPP 2013, 7.
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Third, risk management enables stakeholders to identify and prioritize actions
to ensure continuity of essential functions and services and support enhanced
response and recovery efforts following incidents. Finally, risk management
facilitates decision making and the setting of priorities among all stakeholders.
The current US critical infrastructure risk management framework,
described in NIPP 2013, consists of the following core tenets. 20
 Risk should be identif ied and managed in a coordinated
way within the critical infrastructure community to enable
effective resource allocation.
 Partnerships can improve understanding of evolving risk
to cyber and physical systems and assets and can offer data
and perspectives from various stakeholders.
 Understanding and addressing risks from cross-sector
dependencies and interdependencies is essential to enhancing
overall CISR posture.
 Gaining knowledge of and reducing infrastructure risk
requires information sharing across all levels of the critical
infrastructure community.
 A partnership approach, involving public and private
stakeholders, recognizes the unique perspectives
and comparative advantages of the diverse critical
infrastructure community.
 Regional, state, and local partnerships are crucial to developing
shared perspectives on existing gaps and actions required
for improvement.
 Critical infrastructure transcends national boundaries and
thus requires bilateral, regional, and international
collaboration, capacity building, mutual assistance, and other
cooperative agreements, such as the Canada-US Action Plan
for Critical Infrastructure.
 The design phase of critical infrastructure facilities or systems
should consider and incorporate measures to enhance security
and resilience.

20.

DHS, NIPP 2013, 13–14.
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A New Approach:
Managing Cross-sector Risk to Critical Infrastructure
Effective risk management depends on critical infrastructure stakeholders’
ability to engage across sectors to facilitate a shared understanding of risks
and integrate a wide range of activities to manage them. In April 2019,
CISA published a list of 55 national critical functions, which are government
and private-sector operations and services so vital to the United States
that their disruption, corruption, or dysfunction would have a debilitating
effect on physical and economic security and public health or safety. 21
Identifying these critical functions marks a shift from the previous
risk-management framework focused primarily on entity-level risk management
to more of an enterprise approach that looks instead at critical outcomes.
The national critical-functions framework captures risk and associated
dependencies that are cross-sector in nature and may have cascading impacts
within and across sectors. Using this functional approach to risk allows
the critical infrastructure community to enhance CISR posture in a more
strategic way, including more precise targeting and prioritizing of assets and
systems based on an understanding of critical functions and key dependencies
and interdependencies.
CISA organizes these functions into four domains: (1) technological
connections that enable vital communications, (2) distribution methods
for the movement of goods, people, and utilities, (3) management processes
linked to national security and public safety, and (4) supply chains and services
that secure the economy, such as water or housing. 22 The functional framework
enables CISA to better identify risks that might otherwise be overlooked,
including risks to supply chains, major cybersecurity issues like attacks to steal
intellectual property or manipulate industrial-control systems, and the need
for cross-industry engagement over complex challenges like vulnerabilities
associated with position, navigation, and timing systems. 23

Who Is Responsible for CISR Efforts?
In the United States, CISR is a collective responsibilit y that
critical infrastructure owners and operators, government entities, and
nongovernmental organizations (including industry associations) share.
21. “National Critical Functions,” CISA (website), n.d., accessed September 28, 2021, https://www.cisa
.gov/national-critical-functions.
22.

“National Critical Functions.”

23.

CISA, Critical Infrastructure Security, 8.
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Since private-sector companies own and operate most critical infrastructure,
public-private partnerships are essential for effective CISR efforts.
Although not all-inclusive, this section will introduce some of the most
important elements of collective responsibility for CISR efforts and
public-private partnerships.
Starting with the government side, sector-specific agencies are those
federal entities that have an assigned responsibility for one or several
critical infrastructure sectors. 24 For instance, the Department of Health and
Human Services is responsible for the healthcare and public-health sector,
while the Environmental Protection Agency is responsible for water and
wastewater services. Beneath the federal level, governments at the state,
local, tribal, and territorial levels play key roles in protecting public safety
and welfare, providing essential services, and planning and implementing
activities that ensure the security and resilience of critical infrastructure
within their respective jurisdictions. 25
From the nongovernmental perspective, several communities play key
roles in enabling CISR efforts. 26 The academic community’s contributions
include research and development, testing and evaluation of CISR technological
advances, and participation in the risk-analysis and management process.
Advisory councils, such as the National Infrastructure Advisory Council,
provide recommendations, advice, and expertise to government agencies
on a host of CISR initiatives and policies.
Finally, critical infrastructure owners and operators from the public
and private sectors are essential to a strong CISR posture. Private-sector
companies own and operate roughly 85 percent of the physical and cyber
infrastructure, while federal, state, or local governments manage the remaining
15 percent. 27 Since private companies own and operate the majority of critical
infrastructure, they are uniquely positioned to manage risks to their respective
systems and assets and establish effective strategies to make them more secure
and resilient.
Perhaps the strongest element of the collective responsibility for CISR
practices in the United States is the network of partnerships, beginning

24.

DHS, NIPP 2013, 43.

25.

DHS, NIPP 2013, 46–48.

26.

DHS, NIPP 2013, 48–50.

27. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Critical Infrastructure Protection (Washington, DC: GAO, 2006), 1,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-07-39.pdf.
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with the series of public-private partnership councils. 28 First, sector coordinating
councils are self-governed groups of private-sector owners and operators and
trade association representatives from the 16 critical infrastructure sectors.
Given their collective expertise and management of daily operations for
most critical infrastructure facilities, these councils provide the government
with key insights and recommendations for planning and implementing
sector-specific CISR activities.
Second, government coordinating councils are sector-specific groups
that include representatives from all levels of government that serve as the
public-sector counterpart for the private-sector councils. Beyond what
the sector coordinating councils can do on their own, these government
councils enable coordination across jurisdictions and among various
government agencies.
Third, cross-sector councils—typically comprised of the primary or vice
chairpersons from each of the sector councils—are a venue to address the
issues and interdependencies that involve multiple critical infrastructure
sectors and share general best practices. Finally, the Regional Consortium
Coordinating Council is a national forum that provides the framework and
foundation for cross-sector coordination and CISR efforts at the regional level.
Given the importance of public-private partnerships, the Critical
Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) provides the framework
to facilitate interaction between these different councils and their various
members. CIPAC directly supports NIPP 2013 and PPD-21 by providing
a forum in which government agencies and critical infrastructure owners
and operators can meet to plan, support, and coordinate CISR efforts. 29
Figure 10-2 on the next page illustrates the relationship between these various
councils, federal agencies, and the 16 critical infrastructure sectors.
While CISR programs can be voluntary, regulatory, or some combination
of both, voluntary programs are the most common in the United States because
they typically work best to promote innovative concepts, especially when vast
diversity in a sector or industry limits the ability to apply common standards. 30
Regulatory programs generally are the optimal choice to establish a common
standard in the sector or industry, to promote certain industry practices,
or to ensure that organizations do not suffer a competitive disadvantage
for compliance. The chemical sector, for instance, promotes preparedness
28. “Critical Infrastructure Sector Partnerships” CISA (website), n.d., accessed January 25, 2022,
https://www.cisa.gov/critical-infrastructure-sector-partnerships.
29. “Critical Infrastructure Sector Partnerships.”
30.

DHS, NIPP 2013, 10.
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through a voluntary framework between industry and government and
is partially subject to regulatory programs to ensure compliance to standards. 31

Figure 10-2. Partnerships: Sector and cross-sector coordination
(Diagram by DHS)
31. “Chemical Sector,” CISA (website), n.d., accessed October 4, 2021, https://www.cisa.gov/chemical-sector.
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Stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities in CISR vary widely and depend
on several important factors, such as:
 Whether the critical infrastructure is publicly or privately
owned
 Regulations governing operations within a critical
infrastructure sector
 Sector-specific threats and hazards
 Whether the sector or region prioritizes actions to protect
infrastructure, reduce consequences, or rapidly respond
to and recover from adverse events
Industry associations often play a key role in recommending practices,
while in other sectors there may be regulations that require owners
and operators to take certain actions. Some sectors have statewide
or national design standards to protect facilities and assets against damage
from events like fires, f loods, and earthquakes. Insurance providers may
also impose security requirements on their policyholders in some sectors.
Depending on the stage of CISR activity—preparation for, prevention
against, response to, or recovery from an incident or event—stakeholders
have different roles and responsibilities. For example, though first responders,
critical infrastructure owners and operators, and regional and federal resources
may drive response efforts when an incident occurs, the responsibility
for recovery in a voluntary system falls to the owners and operators who know
the infrastructure best.
This brief section shows the great value of engagement between private
industry and all levels of government and the key role councils play in fostering
mutual understanding and trust while promoting information sharing and
practical exchanges. In particular, organizations that promote planning,
prioritization of resources, exercises, and training contribute to better national
preparedness, increasingly secure and resilient infrastructure, and more timely
responses, which are ultimately the desired outcomes of CISR policy.

Effective CISR: Built on Collaboration and Information Sharing
As outlined in the NIPP 2013, security is the process of reducing
the risk to critical infrastructure from intrusions, attacks, or the effects
of natural or man-made disasters by applying physical means or defensive
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cyber measures. 32 Similarly, resilience is the ability to prepare for and adapt
to changing conditions, including the ability to withstand and recover rapidly
from disruptions, deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats
or incidents. 33 To truly make critical infrastructure more secure and resilient
requires a strong foundation of collaboration and information sharing.
Effective collaboration requires several vital elements: (1) structures and
processes to enable participants to communicate freely without releasing
proprietary information or providing unfair advantage, (2) a trusted
environment where stakeholders share information needed to strengthen
security and resilience, and (3) fair representation and engagement of relevant
stakeholders, from all levels of government, industry, emergency management,
and security. Similarly, for successful information sharing to occur, there
must be established mechanisms or channels to reach stakeholders regularly
during blue-sky conditions and the various stages of an incident.
Sharing information can take many forms, including training events, briefings,
e-mail alerts, conference calls, meetings in secure locations to discuss classified
materials about specific threats or hazards, and documents and forums that
encourage sharing lessons learned.
CIPAC is the primary framework to facilitate voluntary collaboration
and information sharing within and across critical infrastructure sectors
through the public-private partnerships and councils outlined above.
Beyond CIPAC, however, there are several other programs or venues that facilitate
collaboration and information sharing. This section will introduce two of these
programs. First, information sharing and analysis centers enable information
sharing between the government and private sector by use of a sector-based
model, meaning that organizations within a certain critical infrastructure sector
(or a specif ic segment within a sector) join to share information. 34
For organizations that do not f it neatly within an established sector
or that have unique information requirements, a more viable option may
be to join one of a number of information sharing and analysis organizations.
Focused on gathering, analyzing, and disseminating cyber threat information
among members, these organizations offer a more f lexible approach
to self-organized information sharing among specific communities of interest,

32. DHS, NIPP 2013, 7.
33.

DHS, NIPP 2013, 7.

34. “Information Sharing and Awareness,” CISA (website), n.d., accessed January 26, 2022,
https://www.cisa.gov/information-sharing-and-awareness.
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such as legal or accounting firms that support clients across several critical
infrastructure sectors. 35
Given its collective experience since the mid-1990s, the critical
infrastructure community has learned important lessons regarding
information sharing, that over time have been incorporated into US CISR
policy and practice. Some of these key lessons are: (1) to include relevant
CISR stakeholders while protecting owner and operator information,
(2) to share actionable threat information so owners and operators can take
appropriate action, (3) to encourage and practice reciprocal and multidirectional
information sharing, and (4) to pursue methods to disseminate threat
information safely and more broadly, especially with private-sector companies
without appropriate security clearances. 36 Since this list of collaboration and
information-sharing best practices in the United States is not exhaustive,
it is helpful to examine the more thorough analysis and discussion
of information and intelligence-sharing principles, frameworks, and
best practices outlined in chapter 11.

Moving Forward: Sustaining CISR Success for the Long Term
As the United States has learned over nearly 30 years of experience,
establishing and implementing a demonstrably effective national CISR policy
is one of the most difficult things a nation can do. Even with an established,
strong CISR policy, culture, and practices, the United States depends on the
continuation of strong public-private partnership, the transfer of institutional
knowledge, and the investment in its human capital to sustain and mature
this posture in the future.
Training, education, and exercises are fundamental to the long-term
success of the national CISR posture and must include government officials,
infrastructure owners and operators, first responders, and the general public
where appropriate. Training can focus on general concepts, best practices,
or specific topics and should be available in many different forms to ensure
the broadest reach, including means such as instructor-led courses, web-based
independent-study courses, and written guidance and job aids. The DHS,
for example, currently offers a range of training topics for use by government
agencies or private-sector entities, including sector-specific best practices,
dealing with insider threats or active-shooter scenarios, supply-chain risk

35. “Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs),” CISA (website), n.d., accessed
January 26, 2022, https://www.cisa.gov/information-sharing-and-analysis-organizations-isaos.
36.

CISA, Critical Infrastructure Security, 12.
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management and third-party dependency, industrial control systems and
operational technology, and incident management and response. 37
Similarly, exercises can reinforce training and education by providing
scenarios to apply knowledge and skills in an operational setting, simulate
real-world threats and appropriate response options, and strengthen trust and
understanding in relationships within and among participating organizations.
Using a variety of models—including workshops or seminars, tabletop exercises,
rehearsals of key plans, functional exercises, and full-scale exercises—
will help the United States (or any country) maintain and grow a culture
of continuous improvement in its CISR posture so the nation is prepared
for the current and next generation of threats to its critical infrastructure.
To sustain success in established CISR programs, organizations
should promote the program and periodically assess and evaluate it.
When it comes to promoting the CISR program, regardless of the level
at which it exists, the US approach highlights the importance of outreach
and awareness. While CISR programs engage their various stakeholders—
including private-sector companies, local governments, and citizens—
in different ways, ensuring they understand the risks, have sufficient
information, and can make decisions regarding risk mitigation and management
with confidence are crucial elements to ensure success. 38 Using social media,
web-based training, public media outlets, and conference presentations
are just a few ways to reach a broad range of stakeholders. The DHS-led
campaign, If You See Something, Say Something®, is a useful example.
This effort has successfully reached beyond personnel directly involved
with critical infrastructure operations to include entire communities and
increased their situational awareness. See chapter 11 for a detailed discussion
of this initiative.
Similarly, periodic evaluation of existing CISR programs is essential
to ensure they adapt to emerging threats and apply appropriate measures
to enhance security and resilience. Since CISR programs can involve
representatives from multiple sectors, several levels of government, and
owners and operators from different facilities or systems, they can also
be difficult to evaluate effectively. The US CISR framework recognizes
and seeks to balance two competing imperatives for program assessment. 39
First, CISR programs should have measurements that are simple
37. CISA, Critical Infrastructure Security, 19.
38. CISA, Critical Infrastructure Security, 21.
39.

CISA, Critical Infrastructure Security, 20.
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to conduct consistently over time, document and compare actual performance
across sectors and regions, and identify shortcomings or gaps in performance
along with corrective measures to address them. Second, they should
have customized performance metrics that can work in any reporting
situation. Thus, a blend of performance measures common to each sector,
along with nuanced metrics for the subsector level, can help meet these needs.
Together, these steps of education and training the human work
force, promoting the program to a broader population, and developing
suitable frameworks for assessing and evaluating performance contribute
to CISR programs that can succeed in the future as new threats, risks,
and vulnerabilities emerge. While the US CISR framework endorses these
steps, they are not unique to the American situation. In many respects,
the EU CISR framework faces similar challenges to those in the
United States and undertakes similar measures to address them.
Whereas the US CISR policy relies on coordination across various levels
of government and jurisdictions and strong partnerships between the
public and private sectors, the EU must coordinate CISR efforts across its
27 member states, each with its own blend of critical infrastructure facilities,
public-private partnerships, and questions of national sovereignty.
The next section will explore the CISR policy and practices used in the EU,
which not only affects the member states but also other European nations that
are not EU members but are located adjacent to or within the EU’s borders.

EU CISR Policy Framework
A series of terrorist attacks in the early years of the twenty-first century
served as the primary motivation to develop a policy for enhanced collective
CISR posture in Europe. In 2004, the EU launched its first joint CISR
measures in the wake of the bombings of the train network in Madrid,
with the 9/11 terrorist attacks still fresh in the West’s memory and just
one year before the attacks against the London underground system.
See chapter 7 for its detailed case studies of the Madrid and London railway
attacks. These attacks convinced the EU, both at the institutional and
member state levels, of the importance of establishing common rules,
mechanisms, and tools to foster better governance, management, and protection
of national and European critical infrastructures (NCI and ECI, respectively).
The EU’s objective is not to interfere in matters of national security,
which remain the exclusive responsibilit y of each member state.
Instead, EU CISR policy fosters the security and resilience of critical
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infrastructures in the EU through a program that harmonizes efforts
across the member states and enables a more mature CISR posture overall.
In 2004, the maturity of member states’ individual CISR policies and
practices was very uneven. A small number of countries, such as France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom, already had a national framework
in place at this time, while the vast majority of member states relied
on a basic set of rules or very embryonic approaches. Even though most
countries had various elements of CISR programs within their national
legislation, they were very fragmented and lacked long-term objectives
consistent with the unique nature of European critical infrastructure.
For instance, national CISR programs overlooked measures to prevent
trans-boundary externalities and domino effects, which are some of the drivers
of the EU’s current approach.
Given these conditions, the EU established the European Programme
for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) in 2006 and, since then,
this program has served as the foundation for planning, executing, and
consolidating most European CISR activities. In response, EU institutions—
particularly the European Commission—have played key roles in setting the
conditions for the overall improvement of CISR capabilities across Europe
by fostering a risk-based approach. Using risk assessment and management
as the foundation for CISR efforts has now become so ingrained that this
mentality influences even the most recent directives and regulations addressing
cybersecurity, such as the 2019 EU regulation that updated the mandate
of the EU Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA)
to address emerging risks and threats in the cyber domain.40
The EPCIP has improved the security and resilience of critical
infrastructures in both the public and private sectors by persuading
member states to establish or renew their national frameworks and improve
their cooperation with private-sector operators and critical infrastructure
stakeholders in neighboring states. Although the EPCIP has been a successful
program, the objectives of the plan have taken longer to materialize than
originally envisaged. One example that illustrates this ambitious timeline is the
EU’s commitment to review Directive 114/08/EC—which called on member
states to complete an assessment to identify and designate facilities or sectors

40. Regulation (EU) 2019/881: On ENISA (the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on Information
and Communications Technology Cybersecurity Certification and Repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013
(Cybersecurity Act), European Parliament and the Council, April 17, 2019, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli
/reg/2019/881/oj.
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that qualify as critical infrastructure—four years after its entry into force.41
The review planned for 2012 never took place because some member states
had only recently transposed the directive into their national legislation and
still needed to complete the operative phase of identification, designation,
and protection of critical infrastructure. Directive 114/08/EC is still
in force, though it will likely be repealed by 2023 and replaced by the directive
on critical entities resilience introduced in late 2020.42
The harmonization of numerous national approaches toward the
identif ication, designation, and protection of both NCIs and ECIs
has proven to be quite challenging. This diff iculty is due not only
to the various levels of CISR posture and capability among member
states, but also to these 27 individual countries having processed the
security objectives outlined by the EU through their respective cultures,
governance models, histories, economies, and preexisting priorities.
At an institutional level, the EU is governed by the principle of subsidiarity,
which ensures member states retain the ability to make decisions and
act in areas in which the EU does not have exclusive competence. 43
These circumstances have deeply inf luenced the way each country has
responded to the common security agenda outlined in the EPCIP.
In this way, the pursuit of a strong European CISR posture presents unique
challenges when compared to the United States given the substantial difference
in their respective governance models.
To date, the EU institutions, member states’ national governments,
critical infrastructure owners and operators, academia, and research centers
have worked together to increase baseline levels of security and resilience
across Europe. The slow and steady progress the EU and its member
states have achieved in improving awareness and developing more mature
CISR policies and practices ref lects a mentality of continuous improvement,
which has led the EU to adopt several additional measures and
sector-specific policies beyond the EPCIP. When considered in a holistic
manner, these advances offer an encouraging snapshot of progress
from a CISR program that was initially focused on protection and
41. Council Directive 2008/114/EC: Identification and Designation of European Critical Infrastructures
and the Assessment of the Need to Improve Their Protection, Council of the European Union, December 8, 2008,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:345:0075:0082:EN:PDF.
42. Sebastijan R. Maček, “EU Members Agree on Resilience of Critical Infrastructure,” Euractiv (website),
December 21, 2021, https://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-council-presidency/news/eu-members-agree-on
-resilience-of-critical-infrastructure/.
43. “The Principle of Subsidiarity,” European Parliament (website), October 2021, https://www
.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/7/the-principle-of-subsidiarity.
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characterized by isolated national approaches to a framework that prioritizes
resilience and is increasingly harmonized, coordinated, and comprehensive
across EU member states. Figure 10-3 below illustrates the progression
of EU CISR policy since 2004.

Figure 10-3. Milestones in EU CISR policy development (2004–20)

The following sections will provide a macro-level description of the
phases and milestones depicted in figure 10-3, which have characterized
the evolution of the EU’s CISR policy framework over the last two decades.
The section will focus on the main milestones and will not discuss
sector-specif ic measures, such as the policy, directives, and regulations
in key areas like port security or civil aviation.44

2004: Embryonic Stage Motivated by Fight against Terrorism
The terrorist attacks of Madrid, which took place in 2004, were the
spark that ignited the launch of a joint EU program on critical infrastructure
protection (CIP). These tragic events unveiled the fragility of daily life
in European society, including the strategic assets and critical infrastructures
that enable its prosperity and provide essential services each day. They also
provided the context and motivation for the EU at an institutional level
to pursue several initiatives that would eventually form the foundation
44. See Directive 2005/65/EC: Enhancing Port Security, European Parliament and the Council
(website), October 26, 20 05, https://eur-lex.europa.eu /eli /dir/20 05/65/2019-07-26; and
Regulation (EC) No 300/2008: Common Rules in the Field of Civil Aviation Security and Repealing
Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002, March 11, 2008, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN
/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32008R0300.
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and objectives of the EPCIP. Several important communications by the
European Council and the EU Commission throughout 2004 illustrate this
new trajectory.
From the perspective of the Council, two vital documents capture the
essence of the early and developing nature of CIP policy. First, the presidency
conclusion from the Brussels European Council sessions on July 17–18
directed the Council and the Commission to “pursue with determination
the objective of building a shared area of freedom, security and justice”
for the coming years and to develop proposals for a new program that would
achieve this strategic goal.45 At the same time, the Council also charged
the Commission to work with the Council in preparing an overall strategy
to enhance the protection of critical infrastructures and integrate the fight
against terrorism fully into EU external relations policy. The second important
event came four months later, when the Council published an update to the
EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism. The highlights of this plan
are listed below.46
 Enhance international efforts and will to combat terrorism.
 Reduce the access of terrorists to f inancial and other
economic resources.
 Maximize the capacity within EU bodies and member states
to detect, investigate, and prosecute terrorists, prevent terrorist
attacks, and deal with the consequences of a terrorist attack.
 Secure international transport and ensure effective border
control systems.
 Address factors that contribute to support for and recruitment
into terrorism.
 Target actions under EU external relations toward priority
third countries that need to enhance their commitment and
capacity to combat terrorism.
Similarly, the European Commission published four specif ic
communications to the Council and the European Parliament
45. Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions—Brussels, 17 and 18 June 2004 (Brussels:
European Council, 2004), 2, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10679-2004-REV-2/en/pdf.
46. Council of the European Union, EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism—Update (Brussels:
Council of the European Union, 2004), 2, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14330-2004
-REV-1/en/pdf.
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on October 20, 2004. Together, these communications demonstrated
the Commission’s commitment to moving beyond individual, national
approaches to a more structured, wide-ranging, and collective EU framework
that could facilitate a timely, adequate, and more coordinated response
to all terrorist scenarios. Together, these communications introduced
several priority topic areas, such as the availability of common alerting
systems for prompt and effective communications with citizens and measures
to improve the exchange of information, strengthen transparency, and
enhance the ability to trace terrorists’ financial transactions.47
Perhaps the most important of these communications, Critical Infrastructure
Protection in the Fight against Terrorism, clarified the definition of critical
infrastructure, designated specific sectors as critical infrastructure, and outlined
the fundamental concepts and requirements that became the foundation
for the EPCIP. This communication def ined critical infrastructures
as “those physical and information technology facilities, networks, services
and assets which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact
on the health, safety, security or economic well-being of citizens or the
effective functioning of governments” in the various EU member states.48
The communication also identified nine sectors as critical infrastructure:
(1) energy installations and networks, (2) communications and information
technology, (3) finance, (4) health care, (5) food, (6) water, (7) transport,
(8) the production, storage, and transport of dangerous goods, and
(9) essential government services and functions.49
A lthough this initial list of critical infrastructures is quite
comprehensive, the Commission determined that further refinement and
definition were necessary. The Commission specifically directed member states
to identify and designate which critical infrastructures qualify as national
(NCI) and charged EU institutions to determine which are European (ECI)
by the end of 2005. Identifying NCIs and ECIs was a critical first step
because it allowed the EU—in line with the principle of subsidiarity and
recognizing the highly connected and interdependent nature of these services
and networks—to focus its efforts on those sectors that most impacted
the functionality of critical infrastructure in the member states. To guide
47. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament on the Prevention of and the Fight against Terrorist Financing (Brussels: European Commission,
2004), 3, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52004DC0700&from=EN.
48. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament: Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Fight against Terrorism (Brussels: European Commission,
2004), 3, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52004DC0702&from=GA.
49.

Commission, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 4.
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EU institutions and member states in designating NCIs and ECIs,
the Commission recommended the three factors outlined below
for consideration. 50
 Scope. The geographic area—international, national, or local,
for example—affected by the loss or unavailability of a critical
infrastructure.
 Magnitude. The degree of the impact or loss of a critical
infrastructure can be assessed as none, minimal, moderate,
or major. Useful criteria to evaluate potential magnitude
include the impacts on: the general population, the economy,
the environment, other critical infrastructure sectors
or facilities, and the government’s ability to function properly.
 Effects of time. At what point the loss of a critical
infrastructure could have serious impact: immediately,
in a matter of days or weeks, or other.
Finally, this crucial communication justified the need for an EU-wide
CIP program consisting of a common framework, but with clear
responsibilities for the member states and the EU, respectively. Citing the
impossible task of trying to protect all possible infrastructures the member states
might identify as critical, the Commission asserted that, at an institutional
level, the EU must prioritize the protection of infrastructures that have
a transboundary effect, leaving all others under the purview of the member
states.51 This focus on transnational networks and cross-border connectedness
was at the core of EPCIP from the start, and it remains one of the enduring
elements and guiding principles of the EU CISR framework. On this point,
the Commission also outlined three metrics by which it would measure the
success of an eventual EPCIP: (1) member states identifying and establishing
inventories of critical infrastructures according to EPCIP priorities,
(2) businesses collaborating within sectors and with government to share
information and reduce the likelihood of major incidents disrupting
critical infrastructures, and (3) an EU-wide common approach to tackling
the security of critical infrastructures through public-private cooperation. 52
These three criteria constitute the initial pillars upon which EU institutions

50.

Commission, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 5.

51.

Commission, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 7.

52.

Commission, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 9.
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and member states established the EPCIP and were the basis for their intensive
discussions on how to mature the program.

2005: From the Fight against Terrorism to an All-hazards Approach
In the timeline of events, 2005 is a key year because it is when the
EU adopted an all-hazards approach as the basis for an EPCIP and its efforts
to protect critical infrastructures from the wide variety of threats that could
disrupt operations or destroy facilities and assets. The matter of a strong,
collective CISR posture has become more prominent in the European policy
agenda as the fear emerged that negative effects caused by the disruption,
failure, or destruction of a critical infrastructure in a single member state
could spread to others as well. While the key initiatives of 2004 introduced the
mandate to prepare a strategy to protect critical infrastructures and eventually
establish an EPCIP, the Commission’s immediate actions aimed at gathering
a critical mass of stakeholders involved in the lifecycle of critical infrastructures.
The Commission organized two seminars in 2005 during which member
states shared the status and progress of their CIP programs and exchanged
information with private-sector representatives on how to better define the
respective competencies and domains of interest.
As a result of the discussions at these two seminars, the Commission
published the Green Paper on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure
Protection, which included the analysis of numerous policy options
for how to respond to the Council’s 2004 request to establish an EPCIP.
As set out in the initial stages of 2004, focus of an EPCIP would be
to achieve an adequate level of protection for all the critical infrastructures
with priority focus on those which, if disrupted, would cause severe impacts
across multiple EU member states. Perhaps most importantly, the paper argued
that the optimal way to strengthen critical infrastructure in the EU was
to establish a common EPCIP framework and facilitate the exchange
of best practices and ways to monitor compliance. 53
In the green paper, the Commission also included two essential elements
of a future EPCIP: a potential definition for ECI and a continued emphasis
on the importance of assessing transboundary effects. First, the paper
retains the definition of critical infrastructure as those resources, services,
facilities, networks, and assets, which, if disrupted or destroyed would have
serious impacts on health, safety, security, economic, or social well-being.
53. Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on a European Programme for Critical
Infrastructure Protection (Brussels: EU Commission, 2005), 2–5, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content
/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0576&from=EN.
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When it comes to qualifying areas that should be European critical
infrastructure, the Commission has presented two options to consider when
designating ECI: those which if disrupted or destroyed (1) would have
a serious impact on two or more member states or (2) would involve three
or more member states. 54 The emphasis on transboundary effects constituted
the main driver of the future EU policy as a part of the def inition and
a requirement for identifying and designating ECIs.
Given the transboundary and interdependent nature of critical
infrastructures across the EU, the Commission proposed that a common
EPCIP framework—though primarily focused on ECIs—should also form
the basis for how member states identify, designate, and protect their NCIs.
The Commission recommended this top-down approach from the standpoint
of providing critical infrastructure owners and operators a more simplified
and eff icient framework and serving the best interests of the individual
member states and the EU as a whole. 55 Although the Commission suggested
member states had the f lexibility to create national CIP organizations that
could apply additional, more demanding measures than those outlined
in an EPCIP, the core issue was the application of the principle of subsidiarity.
While member states generally endorsed a collective EU approach,
they also had a strong desire to retain control over those critical infrastructures
in their respective national borders that would be designated as ECIs.
While the green paper’s policy recommendations initiated this tension
over EU-level management of certain critical infrastructures and national
control of others, the EU Council Directive 2008 would later provide
more clarity. On this point, the council directive aff irmed the member
states’ sovereignty to designate which critical infrastructures located
within their national borders could also be designated as an ECI and clarified
the Commission’s role to support the member states in this process. 56
Similarly, many other elements and best practices introduced in the green
paper would later form the foundation of the EPCIP in 2006 and inform
the guidance outlined in the Council Directive 2008, which today
constitutes the core element of the EPCIP.

54.

Commission, Green Paper, 6–7.

55.

Commission, Green Paper, 9–10.

56. Council Directive 2008/114/EC: Identification and Designation of European Critical Infrastructures
and the Assessment of the Need to Improve Their Protection, European Council, December 8, 2008,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008L0114&from=EN.
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2006: EU Formally Creates EPCIP
Following the consultations and discussions triggered by the green paper,
the Communication from the Commission on a European Programme for Critical
Infrastructure Protection, published in 2006, formally created the EPCIP
as the framework to protect critical infrastructure across the EU,
outlined the principles, procedures, and tools to implement it, and promised
a council directive to ensure the achievement of the joint protection objectives.57
Although it recognized terrorism as the priority threat to critical infrastructure,
the basis of the EPCIP was an all-hazards approach. As the framework
for EU-wide critical infrastructure protection, the EPCIP consisted of several
essential elements to guide future efforts. 58 The list below contains the key
concepts put forth in the EPCIP:
 A procedure to identify and designate ECIs.
 A common approach to assess and enhance protection
of ECIs.
 Support for member states to identify, designate, and protect
their NCIs.
 Contingency planning to minimize the effects of disruptions
of ECIs or NCIs.
 An external dimension to assess impacts of CIP outside
of EU borders.
 Financial measures to provide for initiatives and efforts related
to CIP.
 Several measures to further develop and implement the
EPCIP.
Among the measures to implement the EPCIP were several ways
to exchange best practices, share information, and improve dialogue between
relevant CIP stakeholders. These measures consisted of expert groups at the
EU level, CIP information-sharing processes to promote trust and protect
sensitive information, a process to identify and analyze interdependencies based
on geography and sector, and the critical infrastructure warning information
network (CIWIN). The framework also included the EPCIP Action Plan
57. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission on a European
Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (Brussels: EU Commission, 2006), 2–3, https://eur-lex.europa.
eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52006DC0786&from=EN.
58.

Commission, European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection, 3–4.
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based on three main work streams: (1) to provide a strategic platform
for overall EPCIP coordination and cooperation across the EU institutions and
member states via the EU CIP contact group, (2) to enhance the protection
of ECIs by reducing their vulnerability, and (3) to support member states
in all efforts regarding NCIs. 59 One of the strongest elements of the action
plan was the creation of the EU CIP contact group. This group, comprised
of one CIP representative from each member state charged to coordinate
national CIP issues, provided a forum chaired by the EU Commission
in which member states could discuss issues and make decisions with each
other and with the Council and Commission. 60
Finally, the EPCIP made progress on the contentious issue of NCIs
by clarifying that the responsibility for NCIs rests with member states and
NCI owners and operators, and that the Commission would support
member states as requested. The EPCIP encouraged each member state
to draw up a national CIP program, based on the process and approach used
for ECIs, to protect the NCIs located in its respective national territory.
According to the EPCIP, the national programs should address:
(1) the identification and designation of NCIs based on the geographic extent
of damages and the severity of consequences resulting from the disruption
or destruction of these infrastructures, (2) the identification of geographic and
sectoral interdependencies, (3) the establishment of dialogue with the owners
and operators responsible for protection of NCIs, and (4) the development
of contingency plans as needed. 61 To some extent, elements of these
national CIP programs are still under development since, under its practice
of continuous improvement, the EU aims to consolidate collective results
and then set new objectives and thresholds for success as the overall maturity
of CIP allows.

2008: Identifying, Designating, and Protecting ECI
The year 2008 marks the next critical milestone in EU CISR policy.
In this year, the EU Council Directive established the procedure to identify
and designate ECIs and outlined a common approach to assess how to improve
the protection of those ECIs. For clarity, the Council Directive defined
an ECI as an infrastructure located in a given member state, the disruption
or destruction of which would have a significant impact on at least two
member states in terms of several crosscutting criteria, such as those that result
59.

Commission, European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection, 5, 10–13.

60. Commission, European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection, 4.
61. Commission, European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection, 7.
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from cross-sector dependencies on other infrastructure sectors or systems. 62
Figure 10-4 illustrates the step-by-step procedure for the identification and
designation of ECIs and the common approach for their protection.

Figure 10-4. Process for identifying, designating, and protecting ECIs

As anticipated, the Council determined to use the energy and
transport sectors for the purpose of implementing the directive because these
two sectors involved the most substantial connections, interdependencies,
and transboundary effects—the key concepts established throughout the
evolution of EU CISR policy since 2004. Concerning the sectoral criteria
for identifying ECIs, table 10-1 describes the directive’s focus on the energy
and transport sectors and their respective subsectors. 63

62.

Council Directive 2008/114/EC.

63. Council Directive 2008/114/EC.
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Table 10-1. ECI sectors and subsectors
Sector

Subsector

Energy

Electricity

Infrastructures and facilities to generate and transmit electricity (supply
of electricity)

Oil

Oil production, refining, treatment, storage, and transmission by pipelines

Gas

Gas production, refining, treatment, storage, and transmission by pipelines,
including LNG terminals

Road
Rail
Transport

Air
Inland waterways
Ocean and short-sea shipping and ports

When applying the sectoral criteria to identify potential ECI,
the directive foresees that member states would need to consider alternatives—
those infrastructures or services that could function as backup options
(such as alternate ports or LNG terminals)—if proposed ECIs are not
available. The lack of a well-defined criterion for appropriate alternatives
has effectively limited the number of identif ied ECIs and served
as a work-around to avoid a designation.
After the sectoral criteria outlined above, the next step in identifying
ECIs is to apply several crosscutting criteria. These criteria include:
(1) casualties by the potential number of fatalities or injuries, (2) economic
effects assessed by the signif icance of potential economic loss and/or
degradation of products or services, including environmental effects, and
(3) effects on the public in terms of the impact on public confidence, physical
suffering, and disruption of daily life, including the loss of essential services. 64
Finally, the last steps of the identification process require member states
to apply the def initions of critical infrastructure and ECI and the
transboundary criterion to determine which infrastructures, if disrupted
or destroyed would have a significant impact on at least two member states.
The formal ECI designation process is more political in nature than
technical since it implies the cooperation of the EU member states with the
member state on whose territory the ECI is located making the final decision.
Such procedure in the initial phase of the application of the directive led
64.

Council Directive 2008/114/EC.

281

Bearse and Lazari

to several failures to designate ECIs. These failures were due to several
factors, including: (1) insuff icient cross-border CIP cooperation
between member states, (2) certain member states’ unwillingness to put
additional pressure on critical infrastructure owners already engaged
in national security projects, and (3) the requirement for designated ECI
to prepare an operator security plan (OSP) and appoint a security
liaison officer.
Among these reasons, the need for proper security management
through the OSP and an appointed security liaison off icer are essential
elements of the process to protect ECI. Based on a risk-driven approach derived
from basic international standards on risk management, the OSP consists
of three key steps: (1) identify the critical infrastructure’s vital processes and
assets that ensure functionality, (2) conduct a risk analysis based on threats,
vulnerabilities, and possible impacts, and (3) develop, prioritize, and employ
control measures to mitigate risk and enhance overall protection. Figure 10-5
provides an overview of the purpose and key steps of the OSP.

Figure 10-5. Approach for developing an operator security plan

2013: EPCIP 2.0—A New Approach
Since the inception of its first collective CIP efforts, the EU’s approach
has been one of steady progress aimed at incrementally improving the
framework over time and highlighting the respective focus areas for the
EU, member states, and critical infrastructure owners and operators.
Although the initial steps of the European journey embraced terrorism and
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protection as the main priorities, relevant stakeholders eventually came
to recognize the importance of topics like the all-hazards approach, resilience,
and cybersecurity. When the EU began pursuing collective CIP efforts
in 2004, the member states did not share a common framework or approach,
and their CIP capabilities were at very different levels. By taking these
realities into consideration, the EU calibrated its efforts to avoid
overwhelming member states that were updating their respective CIP
frameworks, strategies, policies, and procedures—sometimes from scratch.
By 2013, EU institutions and member states recognized they had
collectively achieved an acceptable level of CIP maturity and should consider
the introduction of new EU-wide policies and objectives to enhance CIP.
In this spirit of continuous improvement, a series of EU-level discussions
led to the EU advocating the initial elements of a new concept: the resilience
of critical infrastructure. The embrace of resilience as a formal concept
first appears in the EU Commission’s Staff Working Document (SWD) 318,
which focused on a new approach and more practical implementation
of the EPCIP. SWD 318 began with the premise that ensuring a high
degree of protection of EU infrastructures and making them more
resilient to all hazards and threats can minimize the consequences of loss
of services across Europe. 65
In addition to the topic areas previously covered under the EPCIP,
SWD 318 called on member states to consider and integrate prevention,
preparedness, and response into their national approaches. These three
areas formed the pillars upon which the Commission desired to build future
initiatives after consolidating the achievements to date under the EPCIP.
These initial elements of the path toward a resilience-based approach
provided a new way for the member states to interpret and implement the
EU’s framework for critical infrastructures. In this way, SWD 318 effectively
marked the EU’s shift from critical infrastructure protection (CIP)
to security and resilience (CISR) because it asked member states to extend
their efforts beyond only preventing attacks to also taking the necessary steps
to prepare for such attacks and develop the capability to respond to and recover
from them as quickly and smoothly as possible.

65. European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document on a New Approach to the European
Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection: Making European Critical Infrastructures More Secure
(Brussels: European Commission, 2013), 2, https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register
/detail?ref=SWD(2013)318&lang=en.
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2016: Directive on Network and Information Security
Consistent with its continuous improvement mentality, the EU took
a major step forward to improving the cybersecurity of critical infrastructures
in 2016 when the European Parliament and the Council published its
directive on network and information security (NIS). By 2016, member states
had already been focusing on cybersecurity issues and adopting measures
to mitigate risks in the cyber domain in their national frameworks. After all,
the 2008 Council Directive anticipated the need to include sectors other
than just energy and transport, specif ically citing the information and
communication technology–sector as one of these areas of emerging interest. 66
Similar to the 2008 Council Directive on ECIs, the central objective of the
2016 NIS directive was to harmonize the identification and designation phases,
including the path to achieve better security of network and information
systems and the provision of mechanisms to foster qualified and effective
cooperation among member states. 67 The NIS directive, however, applied
a dramatic change to understanding and enhancing CISR because it proposed
an approach focused on essential services instead of critical infrastructures.
The rationale for this decision was to differentiate the pillars of physical
security (critical infrastructures) and cybersecurity (essential services)
while also signaling clearly the need to focus on protecting the services that
rely on network and information systems.
As under the ECI Directive, the designation phase for network and
information systems relies in part on a sectoral approach. While the ECI
Directive only covered the energy and transport sectors, the NIS Directive
expanded its focus to include seven sectors: energy, transport, water, banking,
financial-market infrastructures, health care and digital infrastructures.
The wider range of sectors included in the NIS Directive indicates how
member states’ commitment to CISR efforts has grown since the Council
published the ECI Directive in 2008.
The NIS Directive aims to improve the overall level of security of network
and information systems across the EU. In practice, this objective means
network and information systems can resist any action that “compromises the
availability, authenticity, integrity, or confidentiality” of stored, transmitted,
or processed data as well as any services those systems may offer or enable. 68
66. Council Directive 2008/114/EC.
67. Directive (EU) 2016/1148: Measures for a High Common Level of Security of Network and Information Systems
across the Union, European Parliament and the Council, July 6, 2016, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN
/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2016.194.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2016:194:TOC.
68. Directive (EU) 2016/1148, Article 1.
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To achieve this objective, the NIS Directive addressed these vital areas:
(1) member states’ preparedness through means such as developing a national
NIS strategy or creating computer security incident response teams (CSIRT),
(2) enhanced cooperation among the member states via the Cooperation Group,
(3) an improved EU culture of NIS security, (4) the adoption of security
measures to mitigate risks to systems, and (5) the development of a mechanism
to notify national authorities of NIS security incidents. 69
Given the NIS Directive’s focus on essential services, it proposes
a procedure to identify which entities meet these qualif ications.
Entities that qualify as operators of essential services are those that: (1) operate
in one of the seven sectors outlined above, (2) provide a service essential
for the maintenance of critical societal and/or economic activities,
(3) depend on network and information systems to provide these services,
and (4) would face significant disruptive effects on their ability to provide
these services in the event of a NIS security incident.70 To define the term
significant disruptive effects, the directive outlines several cross-sectoral factors
to consider, such as the number of users who rely on the service, the extent
to which other sectors are dependent upon the service, the impact that
incidents could have on the economy, society, or public safety, and the
geographic area that could be affected by an incident. Additional considerations
are the entity’s market share of the service provided and its importance
for maintaining a sufficient level of the service when taking into account
alternate means.71
Beyond outlining the process for identifying and designating operators
of essential services, the NIS Directive also establishes several security
requirements. First, operators of essential services should take appropriate
and proportionate measures to manage the risks to their NIS security.
Next, operators should take steps to prevent and minimize the impact
of incidents affecting their NIS security and seek to ensure continuity
of these essential services. Lastly, they should notify the competent national
authority or the CSIRT of incidents that seriously impact the continuity
of their services and provide information that enables these authorities
to determine any cross-border impacts that may have resulted. 72
During the preparation of the f inal text of the NIS Directive,
stakeholders intensely debated the requirement for incident notif ication
69. Directive (EU) 2016/1148, Article 1.

70. Directive (EU) 2016/1148, Article 5(2).
71. Directive (EU) 2016/1148, Article 6.
72.

Directive (EU) 2016/1148, Article 14.
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because it effectively created a new kind of social contract between operators
and member-state governments. Such a notif ication mechanism cannot
achieve its full potential without the cooperation of operators and the
appropriate response measures governments undertake to minimize the
effects of the incident. Governments can improve prevention, preparedness,
and overall security only when they have timely access to vital information
regarding incidents.
In this way, the NIS Directive proposes an unprecedented effort,
especially in its establishment of the Cooperation Group and the CSIRT
network. The Cooperation Group—comprised of representatives from the
member states, the Commission, ENISA, and other relevant stakeholders
as required—serves to exchange NIS security information and best practices,
discuss levels of capability and preparedness, and provide strategic guidance
to the CSIRT network.73 Similarly, the CSIRT network—consisting
of member states’ CSIRTs and the EU’s computer emergency response team,
with the Commission in an observer role and ENISA as the secretariat—
exists to deepen confidence and trust between member states and promote
effective operational cooperation in NIS security.74 Together, these two
entities take pivotal actions to address both the strategic and tactical domains
of cybersecurity while also enabling prompt and effective information
sharing across the EU and between the public and private sectors.
The promulgation of the NIS Directive represents the EU’s first full
cycle of efforts to address the physical security of critical infrastructures
and the cybersecurity of the essential services they provide. Since 2016,
member states’ commitment in these domains has been growing consistently.
The EU’s pursuit of an impact assessment and public consultation on the
NIS Directive, despite its relatively short existence, is one example that
demonstrates this commitment.75 The next section will build on this theme
of continuous improvement in EU CISR policies and practices.

2020: Proposal for Directive on Resilience of Critical Entities
December 16, 2020, should be included among the landmarks of the
EU’s CISR history because the Commission published two proposals
for new CISR-related directives on this date. With the release of these
73.

Directive (EU) 2016/1148, Article 11(3).

74.

Directive (EU) 2016/1148, Article 12.

75. “Cybersecurity—Review of EU Rules on the Security of Network and Information Systems,”
European Commission (website), n.d., accessed on October 12, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better
-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12475-Cybersecurity-review-of-EU-rules-on-the-security-of-network
-and-information-systems_en.
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two proposals, the EU opened a new cycle aimed at drastically improving
security in the physical and cyber domains of critical infrastructures and
the essential services they provide. First, the Commission submitted
a proposal to the European Parliament and the Council to repeal the
original NIS Directive and adopt an updated version—the so-called
NIS 2.0—that brings further improvements, especially in ways to facilitate
cooperation.76 Second, the proposal for a directive on the resilience of critical
entities proposed a recalibration of the focus on physical security, which was
still governed by the 2008 ECI Directive and therefore considered obsolete
and too limited in scope since it only covered the energy and transport
sectors.77 With this double proposal, the Commission sought to harmonize
its efforts in the domains of physical security and cybersecurity as well as its
processes for identifying and designating essential services and critical entities,
which were previously covered by two different directives.
This harmonization also constitutes a major step forward in improving
the scope and nature of the EU CISR policy framework, with a new focus
on enhancing security and resilience but still based on cross-sector and
cross-border interdependencies. With the proposal for a resilience directive,
the Commission’s intent was to propose an all-hazards framework
to increase the ability of critical entities “to prevent, resist, absorb and recover
from disruptive incidents, no matter if they are caused by natural hazards,
accidents, terrorism, insider threats, or public health emergencies” like
the COVID-19 pandemic that has challenged the EU and the rest of the
world since early 2020.78 The proposal for a directive on resilience would
expand the sectoral scope to include 10 sectors: energy, transport, banking,
f inancial-market infrastructure, health, drinking water, wastewater,
digital infrastructure, public administration, and space.79
To enhance the EU’s collective CISR posture, the proposal includes
specific measures to improve organization and oversight at the EU level and
requirements for member states and critical entity operators to minimize
vulnerabilities and ensure continued services. 80 Specifically, the proposal
76. European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Measures for a High Common Level of Cybersecurity across the Union, Repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148
(Brussels: European Commission, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=72166.
77. European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Resilience of Critical Entities (Brussels: European Commission, 2020), 1–2, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs
/system/files/2020-12/15122020_proposal_directive_resilience_critical_entities_com-2020-829_en.pdf.
78.

European Commission, Resilience of Critical Entities, 14.

79.

European Commission, Resilience of Critical Entities, 15.

80. European Commission, Resilience of Critical Entities, 10–12.
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would require member states to have a strategy to ensure the resilience
of critical entities, to conduct a national risk assessment, and to identify
critical entities based on this risk assessment. The resilience proposal
would also compel critical entities to conduct their own risk assessments,
take appropriate technical and organizational measures to boost resilience,
and report any disruptive incidents to their respective national authorities.
At the EU level, the proposal would create oversight mechanisms,
including advisory missions organized by the Commission, for critical entities
providing services to or in at least one-third of member states. The Commission
would offer different forms of support to member states and critical
entities, such as an EU-level risk overview, best practices, methodologies,
cross-border training activities, and exercises to evaluate the resilience
of critical entities. Finally, the proposal would create the Critical Entities
Resilience Group, comprised of experts, to facilitate regular cross-border
cooperation to implement the directive.
The future of the EU CISR policy framework is at a critical juncture,
as the European Parliament and the Council will likely issue these two
directives by 2023 after discussing, negotiating, and updating the language
put forth in the proposals. Initial indications suggest the process of negotiation
will preserve most of the provisions envisaged in the proposals because the
EU clearly needs to adopt these new measures to address the current and
upcoming challenges pertaining to critical infrastructures, essential services,
and critical entities.

EU’s Future: Continuous Improvement and Adapting to New Threats
With the introduction of the NIS 2.0 and critical entity resilience directives
in 2020—and their expected acceptance and implementation in the near
future—the EU will have established an innovative, comprehensive, and
inclusive framework that will prepare the member states to face the challenges
to their critical infrastructures in the years to come. All the work conducted
to improve security and resilience against physical and cyber threats will also
pave the way for helping the EU and its member states prepare for and respond
to hybrid threats, which pose a significant, complex, and concerning challenge
for the EU. See chapters 2–4 for an overview of each of these types of threat.
Since 2016, the EU has been increasingly active in understanding
the nature of hybrid threats and adopting measures to better prepare
for and counter them. In particular, the Commission published two relevant
proposals: (1) the Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats in 2016 and
(2) the 2018 Joint Communication on Increasing Resilience and Bolstering
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Capabilities to Address Hybrid Threats. 81 More recently, in November 2020,
the EU Commission’s Joint Research Centre, together with the European
Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, published a conceptual
framework which describes the components of hybrid threats in terms
of threat actors, their objectives, and their tools, as well as the domains they seek
to compromise and the distinct phases of action in targeting these domains.
This conceptual framework for hybrid threats constitutes another pillar
of the recent innovations incorporated into the EU’s CISR framework
and already enables the member states to take initial steps to address the
ever-evolving threat.
The timeline of the events described in this section on the EU provides
an overall snapshot of the evolution and the current state of European
CISR policies and practices. Consistent with its mentality of continuous
improvement, the EU since 2004 has focused on adapting to address emerging
threats, pursuing incremental changes, and allowing member states sufficient
time to adopt and implement each improvement at their respective national
levels. The EU approach has ensured a secure environment in which each
critical infrastructure stakeholder has been able to discuss the most important
matters, share information, become more familiar with the CISR efforts
of other nations and within other sectors, get access to various best practices,
and ask for bilateral or multilateral support as necessary. In this way,
the EU’s adaptive and comprehensive CISR framework puts the EU and
its member states in a strong position to deter, prevent, reduce the
consequences of, respond to, and recover from a broad array of threats
to critical infrastructures and entities in the years to come.

81. European Commission, Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats (Brussels: European
Commission, 2016), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/GA/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52018JC0016;
and European Commission, Increasing Resilience and Bolstering Capabilities to Address Hybrid
Threats (Brussels: European Commission, 2018), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN
/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016JC0018.
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Information and intelligence sharing are essential to the success
of any critical infrastructure security and resilience (CISR) effort across
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization because no single entity holds
all the information necessary to fully understand:
 Threats—including intent, capability, and tactics, techniques,
and procedures (TTPs)—from nation states and non-state
actors, such as terrorists and criminals
 The vulnerabilities of infrastructure systems to those threats
 The far-reaching primary and cascading impacts of the
degradation or loss of critical infrastructure, including
dependencies and interdependencies across infrastructure
facilities and sectors
 The most effective mitigation strategies against constantly
evolving adversary TTPs
Given the complex and evolving information necessary to promote CISR,
it is fundamentally important that the key infrastructure stakeholders endeavor
to share information to fully understand comprehensive infrastructure risk
so that they can determine the most efficient and effective means to mitigate
these dangers. This process involves building trust, shared and practiced
communications methods, and structured, multidimensional sharing.
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Information-sharing Foundational Concepts
Effective information-sharing programs must be tailored to the legal,
cultural, and social environments in which they operate. There is no
“one-size-fits-all” approach to information sharing, but successful programs
should consider how to incorporate the following foundational concepts
of information sharing: value-added partnerships, the importance of trusted
relationships, multidirectional sharing, and getting timely information
to those who can act on it. This section will provide greater detail
into each of these foundational concepts and conclude with a discussion
on factors that can act as disincentives or barriers to sharing information,
which successful information-sharing programs must take into account and
strive to overcome.

Value-added Partnerships
Perhaps the most critical concept in building and maintaining
an information-sharing program is that it provides information of value
to all the participants. To make the necessary investments in personnel
and processes, and be willing to share otherwise potentially sensitive
information, members of an information-sharing group must be incentivized
to continue participation, typically by ensuring that all participants have
something to gain from the exchange of information. Information-sharing
arrangements that are imbalanced risk losing participants who perceive
no value in the investment if they are not receiving information of use.
This point does not imply that mutual benefit is always balanced in the short
term or even the long term, but without a clear reason for all participants
to continue, programs will naturally decay over time.
In the most effective form of the value-added partnership, all participants
develop and share information within their core area of expertise while
benefiting from the expertise of others. Governments excel at collecting
and maintaining large data sets of statistical or geospatial information.
Military, law enforcement, and intelligence organizations often have the
best (or the only) insight into adversary intentions and planning,
while infrastructure operators maintain a deep understanding about the
vulnerabilities and interdependencies that underpin systemic risk to the
complex systems and processes they design and operate.
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Intelligence, Information, and Data
While intelligence collection and information analysis lie beyond the scope
of this chapter, there are two key concepts important to information-sharing
frameworks. The first factor is the assessed credibility of information to be shared.
Particularly when creating intelligence products about potential adversaries,
information may be difficult to obtain and the adversary may seek to intentionally
mislead such efforts. The second factor is the extent to which raw data must be
analyzed and contextualized into information and intelligence to enable decision
making and action.
These concepts are relevant to information sharing in critical ways.
Robust information-sharing networks can greatly facilitate both credibility
assessment and contextual analysis of raw data. But perhaps most importantly,
accurate communication of the credibility and degree of analysis within a shared
product is essential in building and maintaining the trust of recipients; there may
be good reasons to share low-confidence or raw information, but it should always
be communicated as such.

Importance of Trusted Relationships
Whether in a one-on-one conversation or a large, process-driven
organization, the willingness to share information is related to the level
of trust among the participants. Information that is of value is almost always
of its nature sensitive to the holder of that information. Sharing may jeopardize
the sources and methods by which it was developed, reveal strengths
or weaknesses of a critically important facility or process, or allow information
to be misused to build or erode competitive advantage. To overcome these
sensitivities, participants in an information-sharing exchange must trust that
recipients will use shared information for its intended purpose and will protect
shared information from subsequent exposure or misuse.
Perhaps the most basic step in building levels of trust is to establish
relationships ahead of time. Information-sharing circles should be established
in steady state blue-sky conditions so that the participants and the
organizations can get to know each other, group norms can be established,
and basic processes can be developed, honed, and ingrained. Establishing these
relationships early allows for time to identify and engage all the appropriate
participants in each information-sharing group. With participants identified,
mechanisms can be developed to share contact information so that information
can be exchanged via e-mail, online forums, and through group meetings
(in-person or virtual) as appropriate to the participants and the type
293

Anderson and Mey

of information being shared. Regular engagement also ensures participants
learn each other’s professional jargon and facilitates rapid exchange of
mission information in later situations when time may be of the essence.
Finally, this blue-sky engagement allows for establishing processes, templates,
and information-sharing rules that are critical to share information rapidly,
effectively, and securely.

Multidirectional Sharing
To implement the two preceding concepts fully, an information-sharing
regime must allow for, and even encourage, multidirectional information
sharing. While any sharing arrangement may have times when the one-way
f low of information is necessary—for example, governments may hold military,
intelligence, or law enforcement information not in the public domain that
is vital to infrastructure owners and operators—programs that are
effective in the long term incorporate bidirectional information sharing.
Information sharing cannot be limited to simply what government “pushes”
to industry or programs that solely rely on industry to provide information—
such as infrastructure vulnerabilities or suspicious activity related to their
facilities or systems—to government partners without receiving information
of value in return.
Multidirectional sharing goes even further than just two-way sharing
between government and industry. At a foundational level, a government must
work out how it shares information within itself (agency to agency) as well as
across jurisdictions, from national to regional to local governments. Similarly,
industry should examine available methods to share security information
among various companies and across organizations within these companies.
This multidirectional sharing often happens informally in cybersecurity
circles as information security professionals leverage their personal networks
and at the local levels among physical security professionals. As important
as these methods are, they should not be relied upon as a substitute for more
repeatable, formal, and survivable processes. Commercial providers of threat
and risk information, particularly in the cyber realm, are increasingly vital
in ensuring critical infrastructure operators are suff iciently informed
of evolving threats.
To enable multidirectional sharing fully, participants must determine
and follow norms regarding how shared information may be used, repackaged,
combined with other elements, and disseminated without compromising
any restrictions on sharing from the original provider of the information.
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Timely Information to Those Who Can Act
Whether it is destined for the security guard at a facility gate in advance
of a potential terrorist attack, a firewall administrator responsible for blocking
potentially dangerous Internet traffic, or a first responder who can track down
a suspicious person conducting possible surveillance of critical infrastructure,
information is often extremely time-critical, particularly operational
counterterrorism information. Given this time pressure, it is crucial to develop
and improve processes constantly to speed the f low of information and get
actionable information to those who will use it.
Speeding the f low of information requires careful analysis of every step
in the intelligence- and information-sharing process. A common framework
to evaluate a comprehensive intelligence process includes tasking, collection,
processing, exploitation, and dissemination of information. While the first
four steps in this process may also offer significant chances to decrease the
time required to get information to recipients, this chapter primarily focuses
on dissemination. Within the dissemination process, organizations should
build procedures that push authority to release information to the lowest
possible level. For highly time-sensitive information, this step may necessitate
providing release authority to a watch operation center that runs 24 hours
a day, seven days per week. Information shared on a recurring basis should
have preestablished templates and formats known in advance so those who send
the information and those who receive it can do so as rapidly and efficiently
as possible. Within cybersecurity sharing efforts, these templates should also
include machine-readable formats. Finally, information-sharing participants
should develop common syntax and lexicon to facilitate rapid communication
and understanding.
While getting information pushed out quickly is important, it is only
part of the solution. The receiving organization needs to have procedures
established to further route information to those within the group who
will actually use it (if the initial recipients are not those who will act
on the information). At the same time, transmitting organizations need
to be careful not to overly classify or otherwise restrict how information can be
further shared and disseminated. For example, passing classified or restricted
information to a single cleared point of contact at a company may be of limited
value if the information cannot then get to those who will ultimately take
action. When sharing information with the private sector, this often means
critical information should be at the lowest possible classification level or
at a minimum have a “tear line” that conveys the most essential elements
of information with the fewest restrictions. The blue-sky foundations
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noted above enhance both the speed of information sharing and the
standardized procedures that ensure information is shared in an actionable
format to the right people at a critical infrastructure facility who can use it.

Information-sharing Disincentives
Any comprehensive discussion of information sharing must also
address factors that deter or discourage information sharing. It is important
to understand these natural disincentives and create programs and policies—
including legislation or regulation where appropriate—that minimize their
impact on the information-sharing environment.
The private sector has several potential disincentives to share information.
In general, industry may be reluctant to share information voluntarily
with the same government that is responsible for regulating the industry out
of fear that sharing may invite enforcement action or encourage additional
regulation. Antitrust or competitiveness law and regulation may preclude
industry from sharing certain information with peers and competitors or even
meeting with a group of competitors within the same sector. Industry may
have concerns about voluntary disclosures that then become public and could
create or exacerbate liability exposure by releasing nonpublic information later
used in litigation against the releasing company. In some cases, laws or specific
contract provisions may require that certain information is kept confidential,
particularly customer proprietary network information or information related
to health status. Industry may be reluctant to share perceived risks from other
companies, such as supply-chain security concerns, due to defamation liability.
For publicly traded companies, securities laws may limit public disclosure
of material information about the company’s operations or risks.
Finally, industry may be concerned that proprietary information will
fall into the hands of competitors, thereby damaging a company’s position
in the marketplace.
Government partners also have information-sharing impediments.
Information held by intelligence agencies about nation-state or terrorist threats
is often highly classified or otherwise tightly controlled, and the penalties
for disclosing this type of information are severe because such information can
in turn expose sources and methods used to gather the information.
Federal and local law enforcement agencies are also concerned
about compromising sources and information sensitive to ongoing investigations,
leading to a reluctance to share timely information, and creating a gap
between law enforcement and the private sector. To correct these deficiencies,
efforts should focus on building trusting relationships and establishing
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mechanisms such as “tear-line” products to share information and intelligence
without compromising ongoing investigations, law enforcement effectiveness,
and intelligence community tradecraft. Governments often have limits
to naming a person or company as a threat without due process of law.
Additional obstacles to government information sharing vary widely:
(1) government agencies may be limited by law or regulation in sharing
of certain types of information; (2) agencies may be reluctant to share
information that may ref lect negatively on their operations or capabilities; and
(3) potential political or public relations fallout may make some government
agencies hesitant to share potentially controversial information.

Information-sharing Subcategories
While these foundational concepts apply nearly universally, there are some
specific considerations when dealing with certain types of information sharing.
This section will describe the more narrowly defined information-sharing
subtypes separately as they may offer distinct benefits to participants or may
be amenable to specific types of information-sharing programs.

Cybersecurity
Defending against cyber threats offers one of the clearest examples
of benef icial multidirectional information sharing. Within industry,
many companies already share information with other companies within the
same sector and even across sectors. Network defenders talk to counterparts
at other companies to share observations about new threats and their associated
TTPs. Private companies develop critical information about new vulnerabilities
and mitigations for ongoing cyberattacks and often share this information
openly in an effort to prove their bona fides and solidify their place in the
market for cybersecurity prevention and mitigation services.
A core element of cyber information sharing is identification of the digital
signatures of malicious activity and other ways to detect bad actors. Since cyber
threats move at the literal speed of light, machine-to-machine sharing of this
data is essential to the concept of getting timely information to those who
can act. Information regarding common or newly discovered vulnerabilities
is often critical, especially when accompanied by ways to eliminate or mitigate
the vulnerability. When newly discovered malware is observed in the wild,
critical infrastructure operators also benefit from, and are critical contributors
to, shared information on corrective response actions that are effective
against that specific cyber adversary or intrusion set.
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Finally, robust information-sharing regimes will ensure private-sector
companies—particularly in the communications and information technology
sectors—are willing and able to share their situational awareness of the
cyber environment with government in ways that enable all parties
to observe, identify, correlate, and counter adversary activities in a rapid
manner. Companies in the information-technology and communications
sectors often have the best visibility into the cyber ecosystem over a large
range of issues.

Physical Security
Organizations responsible for defending against terrorist attacks and other
physical threats also benefit from robust information sharing. As adversary
TTPs evolve, it is vital infrastructure defenders learn these new threats and then
develop the most effective mitigations against them. Similar facility types often
benefit from sharing best practices on defensive measures and benchmarking,
a sort of comparison that can help identify where a facility’s physical
security posture is not as strong as its peers. Ensuring a baseline defensive
level helps facilities from being singled out as the easiest or softest target.
Since many critical infrastructure operators constantly observe the areas
around their facilities, their vigilant observation and reporting may help
identify suspicious activity or pre-attack planning. Reporting suspicious
activities (such as photography of perimeter defenses or unmanned aerial
vehicle overf lights) may indicate ongoing surveillance or planning activity.
Regular information sharing may help identify an adversary team operating
in a region and surveilling multiple facilities to select a target. Military, law
enforcement, or intelligence services may have the best information available
regarding the TTPs of potential adversaries through battlefield observation,
group infiltration, or intercepts of planning activity. Sharing these TTPs
with critical infrastructure owners and operators will enable them
to understand the potential consequences of new attack methods and develop
appropriate countermeasures.

Risk Analysis and Mitigation
Government and industry partnership is essential to understanding risks
to critical infrastructure and informing both public and private investments
to mitigate these risks. Without industry insights, it can be extremely difficult
for government planners to understand the vulnerabilities of highly complex
infrastructure facilities or the consequences of various attacks on them,
whether in the physical or cyber domains. Even more challenging is gaining
a full appreciation of the cross-sector dependencies and interdependencies—
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the critical connections that can increase or mitigate risks. See chapter 12
for an overview of the nature of interdependencies and of using a system
of system approach to enhance resilience. Good information sharing can greatly
contribute to mutual appreciation of common vulnerabilities, which can serve
to identify areas for industry action, government research and development,
or other mitigation measures. Recent events have placed a spotlight
on supply-chain risks for both physical hardware and critical software.
Shared government and industry analysis and data sets can help uncover
potential risks within both physical and cyber supply chains from complex
cross-sector relationships, physical or virtual chokepoints, and concentration
of critical industrial sources in a single supplier, country, or region.

Information-sharing Regimes and Programs
This section describes a range of existing information-sharing regimes
currently in operation in the United States and Europe. Many of these
programs are designed to maximize the benefits or address the disincentives
described earlier in this chapter. While some of these programs overlap
areas of responsibility—because information sharing can be highly dependent
on relationship building—it can be beneficial to have a range of programs
which provide “defense in depth” and help ensure broad dissemination
of crucial information.
In the United States, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
is charged with coordinating CISR efforts.1 Working with other federal
departments, DHS operates a range of programs and initiatives intended
to build a robust public-private voluntary partnership founded on information
sharing. This section will brief ly introduce four types of these programs,
the first of which is the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council
(CIPAC). CIPAC is a legal framework that allows interaction between the
government and critical infrastructure owners and operators, enables industry
representatives to develop and share consensus recommendations with the
federal government, and facilitates government and industry discussions
on security and resilience topics in nonpublic engagements. 2 In countries
where antitrust restrictions or disclosure requirements limit the government’s
ability to meet nonpublicly with private companies individually or as a group,
1.

Homeland Security Act of 2002, H.R. Rep. No. 107-609, pt. 1 (2002).

2. “Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council,” Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency (website), n.d., accessed September 29, 2021, https://www.cisa.gov/critical-infrastructure
-partnership-advisory-council.
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a framework such as CIPAC may facilitate forthright government-industry
discussions necessary to solve security and resilience challenges.
A second information-sharing program is the Protected Critical
Infrastructure Information (PCII) program. One major obstacle
in government-industry information sharing is the general reluctance
among private-sector companies to provide the government information
that could later be used against them in regulatory or liability actions.
To overcome this obstacle, the United States adopted the PCII legal
framework. The PCII program protects information voluntarily provided
by industry against use for regulatory purposes and disclosure under some
“Freedom of Information” government obligations to disclose information
to the public. 3
Given that information held by governments regarding threats to critical
infrastructure may well be classified, it is important to work through ways
to share this information with industry to help prevent attacks or mitigate
potential consequences. As noted above, the most important strategy
to overcome this challenge is to develop processes to create tear-line products
that can be shared at an unclassified level. This step is particularly important
with any recommended protective measures so these measures can be shared
within and across private-sector companies freely. In addition to using
tear-line products, DHS has also adopted the Private Sector Clearance Program,
which grants a limited number of clearances to private-sector personnel who
are responsible for securing critical infrastructure facilities so classification
issues do not hinder the government from sharing vital information when
necessary. Since some information simply cannot be declassified, some Allies
and partner nations may find it useful to pursue programs similar to this one.
While the previous programs apply to both cyber and physical information
sharing, a fourth type of program—cybersecurity information sharing—
has some unique characteristics that require specialized approaches
to information sharing. Recognizing this need led the DHS to develop the
Cyber Information Sharing and Collaboration Program, which enables
timely exchange of unclassif ied threat and vulnerability information
through trusted public-private partnerships. 4 With cybersecurit y
information sharing, defining a common language and syntax is important,
particularly if information sharing is to be done from machine to machine—
3. “Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) Program,” Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency (website), n.d., accessed September 29, 2021, https://www.cisa.gov/pcii-program.
4. “Cyber Information Sharing and Collaboration Program (CISCP),” Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency (website), n.d., accessed September 29, 2021, https://www.cisa.gov/ciscp.
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a critical capability given the speed at which new cyber threats proliferate.
One such system is the Automated Indicator Sharing, which facilitates the
exchange of machine-readable cyber threat indicators and recommended
protective measures. 5 This sharing capability uses open standards, such as
the Structured Threat Information Expression for cyber threat indicators
and defensive measures information, and the Trusted Automated Exchange
of Indicator Information for machine-to-machine communications. 6
Similarly, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) coordinates
several additional information-sharing programs, including the three
examples discussed here. The first program is the Joint Terrorism Task Force
( JTTF) concept. When the FBI’s New York Division established the first
JTTF in 1980, the task force—comprised of members from the New York
Police Department and the FBI—enabled the sharing of vital information
pertaining to bank robberies conducted by a terrorist group in New York.
Given its success in addressing the need to share information and intelligence
in support of these investigations, the JTTF concept proved valid for future
use as well.
In 1998, the FBI formed a JTTF to begin security preparations for the
2002 Winter Olympic Games hosted in Salt Lake City, Utah. From 1998–2002,
this task force focused its investigation on a right-wing, anti-Semitic group
known as the Sons of Aryan Culture, which was operating a criminal enterprise
throughout the Salt Lake City metropolitan area. The JTTF’s investigative
efforts revealed the gang was developing plans to attack the Olympics,
but over the course of four years, the JTTF was effective at dismantling
this group and interrupting its plans to target the games. As part of the
JTTF effort, over 100 leaders in the public-safety community received
top-secret security clearances to facilitate the legal sharing of sensitive
information and intelligence. This effort proved to be highly effective
in countering terrorism threats to the Olympics and establishing an efficient
and unif ied public-safety effort in support of this major event. Perhaps
the most significant JTTF effort occurred after the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
when the JTTF included over 100 different groups and incorporated
5,000 local, state, and federal officers.
Notably, the scope of JTTF membership after 9/11 expanded and now
can incorporate public-safety organizations within a given jurisdiction.
5. “Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS),” Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (website), n.d.,
https://www.cisa.gov/ais.
6. “Sharing Threat Intelligence Just Got a Lot Easier!,” OASIS Cyber Threat Intelligence Technical
Committee (website), n.d., accessed September 29, 2021, https://oasis-open.github.io/cti-documentation/.
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The critical component of individual JTTF success has been the proven willingness
to share intelligence and information among participating agencies.
Members of the JTTF undergo extensive security background checks
before being allowed to join a JTTF. Although costly and time consuming,
the background checks and security clearances required of each JTTF
member allow for coordinated interagency investigations and sharing
of vital sensitive information and intelligence. JTTFs have a tremendously
effective law enforcement mechanism for sharing information and sensitive
intelligence and have greatly contributed to counterterrorism success in the
United States since 9/11.
The second signif icant information-sharing program under the
FBI is a geographically focused network for critical infrastructure
information sharing known as InfraGard. The network provides a vehicle
for public-private collaboration intended to expedite the timely exchange
of information and promote mutual learning opportunities relevant to critical
infrastructure defense. One of the program’s key strengths is the connection
of local InfraGard chapters to the local FBI field offices. This geographic
connection allows for blue-sky relationship building and the establishment
of relationships based on mutual trust. During steady-state operations,
InfraGard focuses on training and information sharing through webinars,
unclassified threat briefings, and document sharing through a protected
online portal. InfraGard operates around 80 chapters across most of the major
US metropolitan areas and engages leaders, often at the facility level, who are
on the “front lines” of infrastructure protection.
A third information-sharing program run by the FBI is the
Domestic Security Alliance Council (DSAC). In contrast to InfraGard’s
focus on building trusted relationships with operators at a local level,
the DSAC provides an executive-level mechanism to enhance
communication and promote timely and effective exchange of security and
intelligence information between the federal government and the private
sector.7 To accomplish this objective, the DSAC brings together senior
government leadership from the FBI and DHS along with private-sector
executives. The DSAC, formed in 2005, was modeled after the US Department
of State’s Overseas Security Advisory Council, which works with the
private sector to help ensure US private-sector companies operating
overseas are aware of threats to international operations.

7. “About DSAC,” Domestic Security Alliance Council (website), n.d., accessed December 21, 2021,
https://www.dsac.gov/about.
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A range of programs in the European Union focus on sharing critical
infrastructure security and resilience information for both cyber and physical
security. The European Commission established one of the more recent
programs on June 23, 2021, when it announced the establishment of the
Joint Cyber Unit ( JCU) to foster cooperation between the cyber communities
across the EU institutions, agencies, bodies, and authorities in the member
states. Specifically, the JCU aims to enhance cooperation and information
sharing among the various resilience, law enforcement, defense, diplomacy, and
private-sector entities—collectively, the users and providers of cybersecurity
solutions and services—in response to the increase in major cyber incidents
impacting citizens and businesses across the EU. To achieve its goals
of facilitating an EU coordinated response, improving situational
awareness, and guaranteeing joint preparedness, the JCU will develop
capabilities over four planned stages of growth and is expected to become
fully operational by mid-2023. 8
One information-sharing program common in the United States
and Europe is an Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC),
which is a critical infrastructure sector-specif ic organization to share
information about threats and vulnerabilities. The EU Agency for Cybersecurity
is a proponent of ISACs in Europe, and its cooperative models guide
provides a comprehensive description of ISAC operations in Europe,
including country and sector-specific models as well as internationally focused
ISACs.9 In the United States, many infrastructure sectors and subsectors
self-organize into an ISAC that meets the needs of the member companies.
Some ISACs provide fee-for-service, while others closely coordinate
and leverage government operations centers for information sharing.
Some ISACs, such as the US Communications ISAC, are broad in scope and
cover an entire sector, while others are highly focused, like the Downstream
Natural Gas ISAC. ISACs can also coordinate to share information
from ISAC to ISAC, enabling cross-sector information exchange to promote
greater infrastructure security and resilience.
Information-sharing programs are by no means limited to those
directed top-down from government agencies. Many of the most effective
arrangements grow organically to meet the needs of participants linked
by a common geography or similar operational environments. While federal
8. “Shaping Europe’s Digital Future: Joint Cyber Unit,” European Commission (website), n.d., accessed
September 28, 2021, https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/joint-cyber-unit.
9. “Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISACs)—Cooperative Models,” European Union
Agency for Cybersecurity (website), n.d., February 4, 2018, https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications
/information-sharing-and-analysis-center-isacs-cooperative-models.
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government programs described earlier can be important to the overall
information-sharing success, many programs have evolved without leadership,
support, or sometimes even involvement of a federal government. A variety
of local, state, national, and international groups advance information-sharing
capabilities for their members through operational support or simply defining
templates, standards, and processes that facilitate information sharing.
For example, FIRST—an international partnership focused on bringing
together cyber incident response and security teams—has documented a simple
“traffic light protocol” that specifies how a given report or piece of information
can be further shared or restricted.10 This system provides some degree
of security to the sharer of information, but also clarity to the recipients
about whether and with whom the information can be shared. In the
United States, state and local fusion centers promote law-enforcement
information sharing across federal, state, local, and private sector communities
within a given state or region. National and international professional
associations, such as the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
and the American Society of Civil Engineers, help share information
about securit y and resilience of their respective infrastructures.
Finally, industry groups often unite to share information on key topics
of interest in critical infrastructure resilience, such as the Council to Secure
the Digital Economy’s International Botnet and IoT Security Guide or the
American Waterworks Association’s sharing of information vital to securing
the water sector.11

Case Studies: Information Sharing in Action
This section brief ly outlines several real-world examples of information
sharing. Each case study will highlight one or moreof the concepts and
programs highlighted in the previous section.

Cyber Health Working Group: Public-Private Information Sharing
The Cyber Health Working Group (CHWG) was established in 2015
by the FBI Washington Field Off ice, the InfraGard National Members
Alliance, the InfraGard National Capital Region chapter, and the Executive
Partnership for Integrated Collaboration, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit in Charlotte,
North Carolina. Using a simple Listserv technology, the CHWG provides
10. “Traffic Light Protocol,” FIRST (website), n.d., accessed September 29, 2021, https://www.first.org/tlp/.
11. “International Botnet and IoT Security Guide,” Council to Secure the Digital Economy (website),
n.d., accessed September 29, 2021, https://csde.org/projects/international-anti-botnet-guide/.
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a two-way, real-time information-sharing platform for cyber practitioners
in the health care and public-health sectors. Members share best practices,
emerging threats and trends, and indicators of compromise. Since the group’s
inception, membership has grown from approximately 200 at the beginning
to more than 1,300 members.
Participants are InfraGard members at the intersection of the
information-security and health-care sectors who use a Listserv and online
portal to share information about risk, compliance, emerging threats,
and best practices in cybersecurity. As InfraGard is a public-private
collaboration program, the CHWG expressly includes members from both
the private and public sectors. The CHWG’s steering committee, comprised
of CHWG private-sector participants who represent multiple subsectors
of the health-care sector, provide basic governance for the group and set
the mission, scope, and parameters for membership. Among its various
private and public-sector members, CHWG’s mission is to develop, foster,
and facilitate a community comprised of cybersecurity-focused professionals
working in the health-care sector, those who have responsibilities (such as
physical facility cybersecurity) and those who can share real-time information
about risk, governance, threats, indicators, trends, and best practices.
Membership of the CHWG, as established by the steering committee,
is open to any individuals who meet the following criteria:
 Is a current InfraGard member or has an application pending
with the local InfraGard chapter.
 Works in cybersecurity for an organization in the health-care
sector or handles cybersecurity for a physical facility.
 Is at least partially responsible for cyber threat, risk,
governance, or compliance issues.
 Can access and potentially share threat information and/or
cybersecurity best practices.
 Does not have a role that is primarily focused on business
development or sales of products and services and will not
use the group to market or promote products and services.
The CHWG, according to the FBI’s Washington Field Off ice,
has aided the FBI in its mission by predicating cases, enhancing
ongoing investigations, identifying new victims of cyber intrusions,
and contributing to several intelligence products. For example,
during a recent cyberattack on a major health-care provider, the CHWG
identified the attack before the FBI’s 24/7 cyber operations watch center
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and group members in multiple states shared substantive information and
identified other information-sharing networks that had relevant information,
including indicators of compromise. Following the success of the CHWG,
additional working groups using the same model have been established
for the commercial facilities sector (cybersecurity), the f inance sector
(cybersecurity), and the data center sector (physical security).

If You See Something, Say Something®
Originally implemented and trademarked by the New York Metropolitan
Transportation Authority, If You See Something, Say Something®
is a US national anti-terrorism outreach program licensed to the DHS.
In partnership with the Department of Justice’s Nationwide Suspicious
Activity Reporting Initiative, the DHS officially launched this campaign
in July 2010 with the goal of raising awareness of the indicators of terrorism
and terrorism-related crime and training law enforcement at the state and
local levels to recognize these types of behavior and indicators.12 The Nationwide
Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative developed a standard process
for documenting and analyzing the observations the campaign generates,
and it routinely shares these reports with relevant FBI-led JT TFs
for investigation and with state fusion centers for analysis.
Since its beginning, the If You See Something, Say Something
campaign has been expanded to include states, counties, cities, and
transportation entities (such as airports and mass transit, major
entertainment venues and sports events, colleges and universities,
private-sector businesses, and media outlets). Program partners promote
the campaign as part of their larger safety and security plan using internal
advertisements for employees (for example, in employee common areas,
breakrooms, restrooms, and via e-mail) in addition to public-facing
areas. Organizations that join the campaign have access to public-service
announcements, educational materials, signage, and relevant and enduring
social media content.
The campaign has been responsible for disrupting several terrorist plots
and saving lives.13 One example is the case of Alexander Ciccolo of Adams,
12. “If You See Something, Say Something,” Department of Homeland Security (website), n.d.,
accessed September 28, 2021, https://www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something.
13. Bridget Johnson, “5 Times Terrorists Were Thwarted by ‘If You See Something, Say Something,’ ”
Homeland Security Today (website), September 25, 2018, https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas
/counterterrorism/5-times-terrorists-were-thwarted-by-if-you-see-something-say-something/.
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Massachusetts. The son of a Boston police captain, Ciccolo went by the
name Ali Al Amriki and developed an admiration for the Islamic State
(Da’esh) terrorist group. Based on a tip from Ciccolo’s father, the FBI initiated
an investigation during which Ciccolo was recorded talking about plans
to engage in terrorist activity, inspired by the Islamic State (Da’esh),
that involved filling pressure cookers with black powder, nails, and ball
bearings. Following a July 2015 sting operation, Ciccolo was arrested and
subsequently pleaded guilty to several charges, including attempting to provide
material support to a foreign terrorist organization. In September 2018,
he was sentenced to 20 years in prison and a lifetime of supervised release.14

Attack on the US Capitol: An Information-sharing Failure?
On January 6, 2021, rioters attacked the US Capitol building
in an attempt to disrupt a joint session of Congress, during which
members of Congress were to count the electoral votes for president and
vice president of the United States, and then announce the official results
of the 2020 election. The attackers breached the Capitol building, vandalized
and stole property, ransacked offices, attacked members of law enforcement,
and threatened the safety and lives of elected US leaders. Capitol police officers,
along with federal, state, and local law enforcement partners, reestablished
control of the building, and the President of the Senate, Vice President
Mike Pence, announced Joseph R. Biden Jr. and Kamala Harris as the
president-elect and vice president-elect of the United States in the early
morning hours of January 7. Tragically, seven individuals, including three
law enforcement officers, lost their lives.
The US Senate investigated the security, planning, and response
failures and critica l breakdow ns at various federa l agencies,
particularly the FBI, the DHS, and Department of Defense. The Senate
investigation documented a number of failures that set the stage for the
breach of the Capitol. Of interest here, the report specifically highlighted
two information-sharing failures as being significant to the overall failure
to protect the Capitol.
First, the Senate report found the federal intelligence community—
led by the FBI and the DHS—failed to issue a threat-assessment warning

14. “Massachusetts Man Inspired by ISIS Sentenced for Plotting to Engage in Terrorist Activity,”
Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs (website), September 5, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/opa
/pr/massachusetts-man-inspired-isis-sentenced-plotting-engage-terrorist-activity.
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of potential violence targeting the Capitol on January 6.15 The report
documents how enforcement entities, including US Capitol Police (USCP)
law, rely on the intelligence community to assess and communicate homeland
security threats. While the FBI and DHS disseminated multiple written
documents detailing the potential for increased violent-extremist activity
and targeting of law enforcement personnel and government facilities
and employees at other lawful protests throughout 2020, no such reports
were released regarding the threats on January 6. Although online calls
for violence at the Capitol were observed and assessed by the agencies,
FBI and DHS officials stated that observed activity was possibly constitutionally
protected free speech instead of actionable, credible threats of violence.
In their testimony, officials from both the FBI and the DHS acknowledged
the need to improve handling and dissemination of threat information
from social media and online message boards. This f irst Senate report
f inding shows how disincentives—in this case a combination of unclear
legal guidelines and concern for political second-guessing—can limit
a government agency’s willingness to share information.
Second, the Senate report found the intelligence components within
the USCP, which are responsible for generating their own intelligence
analysis, did not convey the full scope of threat information they possessed.16
The report documented that—despite the lack of FBI and DHS
Intelligence and threat information—USCP’s lead intelligence component,
the Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division (IICD), was aware
of the potential for violence in the days and weeks ahead of January 6,
based on multiple information sources regarding the large crowds expected
to gather in Washington on January 6 and specif ic threats of violence
focused on the joint session of Congress and the Capitol building complex.
Even though IICD had the necessary information internally, it failed
to incorporate this information fully into internal assessments
about January 6 and the joint session. As a result, USCP officers and other
law-enforcement partners did not have this critical information regarding
threats of violence. This finding shows how damaging it can be when vital
information is not shared with those who need it to take protective actions
to mitigate risks and threats, and secure critical infrastructure.

15. Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs and Committee on Rules and
Administration, Examining the U.S. Capitol Attack: A Review of the Security, Planning, and Response Failures
on January 6 (Washington, DC: US Senate, 2021), 1, https://www.rules.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Jan%20
6%20HSGAC%20Rules%20Report.pdf.
16. Committee on Homeland Security, Examining U.S. Capitol Attack, 2.
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Further, the Senate report asserts USCP’s preparations for the joint session
suffered because of the decentralized nature of its intelligence components
and lack of sharing across those elements.
On January 5, an employee in a separate USCP
intelligence-related
component
received
information
from the FBI’s Norfolk Field Office regarding online
discussions of violence directed at Congress, including that
protestors were coming to Congress “prepared for war.”
This report, which was similar to other information received
by IICD and could have served as corroborating information,
was not distributed to IICD or USCP leadership before
January 6.17
This is an unfortunate example of the importance of multidirectional
information sharing; had different components within the same structure
been more effective at lateral information sharing, the outcome of the events
on January 6 might have been very different.

National Terrorism Advisory System
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the government
determined a need for a standard way to share information regarding
terrorism threats with the general US population. The f irst of these
programs, the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS), was established
on March 12, 2002.18 This program was intended to be a simple means
to communicate threat levels and, as such, provided f ive basic
color-coded threat levels (see figure 11-1).19 In addition to the threat levels,
HSAS also provided recommended protective measures for federal agencies
but, notably, not for state and local governments, the private sector, or the
general public. The simple, preestablished color-coded system leveraged one
of the key principals for information sharing, which is to establish templates
and definitions in advance to facilitate quicker sharing of complex information.
However well-intentioned, HSAS fell victim to several pitfalls common
to information-sharing programs. One of the primary issues with HSAS
17.

Committee on Homeland Security, Examining U.S. Capitol Attack, 2.

18. Congressional Research Service (CRS), Homeland Security Advisory System: Possible Issues for
Congressional Oversight (Washington, DC: CRS, January 29, 2008), 1, https://crsreports.congress.gov
/product/pdf/RL/RL32023.
19. “Gov. Ridge Announces Homeland Security Advisory System,” White House Office of the Press
Secretar y (website), March 12, 2002, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news
/releases/2002/03/20020312-1.html.
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was that its warnings were vague and, for most users, came without specific
actionable protective measures. As discussed earlier, information-sharing
programs function best when they place timely, actionable information
in the hands of those able to implement protective measures. While HSAS
changes were shared through a range of mechanisms, none of these were wholly
satisfactory, and many users reported to congressional oversight committees
their primary source for HSAS notifications was open-source news media.
Raising HSAS levels often created significant costs for federal agencies,
state and local responders, and the private sector as they implemented tighter
protective measures. Those responsible for determining HSAS levels were
therefore reluctant to raise the levels, while, at the same time, they did not
want to lower the threat level only to be surprised by a hard-to-detect terrorist
attack and be accused of letting down their guard at precisely the wrong
moment. The net result was HSAS threat levels did not change very often;
the guarded and low levels were never used, and the highest level (severe),
was used only for three days but only specif ically for inbound f lights
from the United Kingdom immediately following an attack there. 20

Figure 11-1. Homeland Security advisory system

In January 2011, DHS retired HSAS and replaced it with a new system,
the National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS). The new system eliminated
the color-coded levels in favor of two specific products: elevated alerts that
warned of credible threats and imminent alerts that warned of a near-term
credible threat that suggested a need for immediate protective actions.
Both types of alerts had a high threshold to prevent the overuse of the system,
20. “Chronology of Changes to the Homeland Security Advisory System,” Department of Homeland
Security (website), September 13, 2017, https://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-advisory-system.
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which might cause recipients not to take alerts seriously. This approach had
a downside, however, as it precluded the sharing of lower-level information
that did not meet these high thresholds, but could still be of use in defending
against threats. To fill this gap, DHS later added a new category of advisory,
known as bulletins, to share information regarding “terrorism trends, events,
and potential threats in those situations where additional precautions may
be warranted, but where the circumstances do not indicate a threat against the
United States of sufficient credibility, or specificity and credibility” to justify
issuing an alert. 21 While NTAS has offered some substantive improvements,
it has not entirely overcome the vagueness, lack of specific protective measures,
and disincentives to use that hindered its predecessor. 22

National Special Security Events
and Special Event Assessment Rating
Since major events—such as presidential inaugurations, the Olympic
Games, the World Cup, and the Super Bowl—attract millions of spectators and
worldwide attention or bring critical leaders together in one place, they demand
special security considerations to protect against terrorist attacks adequately.
In fact, several of these types of events have been the past targets of terrorist
plots and attacks. In preparation for these events, host nations may designate
such events as matters of national security and allow for special national
funding, authorities, and resources—including information-sharing efforts—
to assist in planning and operational requirements. In the United States,
the federal government may designate certain events as national
special-security events (when the president, foreign heads-of-state, or other
dignitaries under Secret Service protection will be present) or assign a special
event activity rating (when large crowds or symbolic events may elevate the
threat and consequence of a terrorist attack).
As previously stated, trust is a critical element that must be developed
for agencies and organizations to be motivated to share information
and intelligence. Designating these major events provides the resources
and focus necessary to allow agencies to interact, share jurisdictional
planning and operational responsibilities, and develop trusting relationships
through integrated, coordinated security and counterterrorism efforts.
21. “NTAS Frequently Asked Questions,” Department of Homeland Security (website), n.d., accessed
June 15, 2021, https://www.dhs.gov/ntas-frequently-asked-questions.
22. Matthew Wein, “Back to Threat-Level Orange and the Need to Update the National Terrorism
Advisory System,” Lawfare (blog), December 6, 2016, https://www.lawfareblog.com/back-threat-level
-orange-and-need-update-national-terrorism-advisory-system.
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CISR is key to the success of these major events because the security
of the participants and successful execution of the event always rely on core
infrastructure services, such as reliable power, communications, transportation,
and water. Building trust and coordinating operations between different
critical infrastructure sectors require a close working relationship with the
private sector, law enforcement, and security components. The inclusion
of critical infrastructure owners and operators in the planning and operational
coordination is no small feat, but such efforts develop the foundation
for trust for all involved, encourage the sharing of information and intelligence,
and ultimately assist in securing the critical infrastructure and, as a result,
the event itself.

Summary and Actions for Consideration
Information-sharing programs will always present operational and policy
challenges because so many of their elements hold internal tension and must
therefore be constantly balanced. Sharing too much can result in information
fatigue, but providing too little can mean critical knowledge does not get
where it can be put to use. Similarly, shared information must f ind the
happy medium between (1) reporting that is too exhaustive and therefore
obscures the critical points in irrelevant data, and (2) superficial reporting that
lacks sufficient detail to inspire confidence and allow for rapid and appropriate
decision making.
As discussed throughout the chapter and drawn out in detail in the case
studies, several keys to building effective information-sharing programs
are listed below.
 Build trusted relationships with the right partners.
The importance of trusted relationships to effective operational
information sharing cannot be overstated. This trust often
can be cultivated through regular contact during blue-sky
or steady-state conditions. Built into this consideration
is careful identif ication, recruitment, and cultivation
of the critical members of an information-sharing community,
namely, those who have critical pieces of information
and those who can take action based on the information
to be shared.
 Establish the sharing norms within a community. Community
norms include: (1) guidelines or rules for use and further
sharing of information received through the network;
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(2) a common lexicon and terminology, including thresholds
and criteria for when and how to share information; and
(3) templates and formats for information-sharing products.
These templates could be as specific as machine-readable
cybersecurity message formats like STIX /TA XII or
human-readable report formats that include critical
information where recipients expect to see it.
 Evaluate the incentives and disincentives to share
information and tailor programs to maximize benefits and
minimize drawbacks for all participants. It is not sufficient
to encourage information sharing and expect it to occur
suddenly and naturally. Establishing an effective program
requires understanding the different perspectives on incentives
and disincentives different stakeholders hold and then
devising specif ic programs to extend the advantages and
limit the disadvantages.
 Consider the medium in which sharing activity will take place.
Information-sharing mechanisms often involve tradeoffs,
particularly between security and ease-of-use. Depending
on the needs of a community, sharing could take place
in person only; through multifactor authenticated
online forums; through e-mails, phone calls, and texts;
or by leveraging open-source news and broadcast media.
 Constantly reassess effectiveness. No information-sharing
program perfectly meets the needs of its community, and even
so, community needs evolve over time. Regular reassessment
allows the chance to ensure sharing processes are as rapid as
possible and that information is actually getting to those who
can use it most.
To secure NATO critical infrastructure effectively against the full
range of threats, including terrorism, decisionmakers in militar y,
law enforcement, and owner-operator communities must collaborate to share
the different puzzle pieces of information each may hold. Only through
trusted sharing relationships in an established, secure environment will
a comprehensive risk picture materialize. This process will allow risk-informed
decisions about protective measures and resilience investments to drive more
secure critical infrastructure.
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Critical Infrastructure Interdependency
Modeling and Analysis:
Enhancing Resilience Management Strategies
Duane Verner
North Atlantic Treaty Organization member states and partner nations
face significant challenges in formulating and implementing effective strategies
to address the risks posed by natural, man-made (to include terrorist), and
socio-technological hazards. Extreme weather events have the potential
to cause massive damage to multiple sectors of infrastructure following
a single storm.1 Disruptive effects have resulted from the mismanagement
and lack of investments in infrastructure supporting lifeline community
needs. 2 Perhaps the most pressing of these challenges, climate change,
poses signif icant threats to coastal communities as well as shifting
environmental conditions across the world—such as temperature and
precipitation—for which current infrastructure design and performance has not
Acknowledgments: The submitted manuscript has been created by UChicago Argonne, LLC,
Operator of Argonne National Laboratory (“Argonne”). Argonne, a US Department of Energy Office
of Science laboratory, is operated under Contract No. DE-AC02-06CH11357. Frédéric Petit,
Joshua David Bergerson, Matthew Berry, Lawrence Paul Lewis, and Duane Verner contributed to this chapter.
Duane Verner served as the corresponding author for the duration of the CISR handbook project. The authors
are particularly grateful to the late Dr. James Peerenboom. Thank you, Jim, for setting the stage for homeland
security research. We hope to be able to follow your example and contribute to the advancement of critical
infrastructure interdependencies assessments.
1. Ricardo Rosselló, Build Back Better Puerto Rico: Request for Federal Assistance for Disaster Recovery
(San Juan: Government of Puerto Rico, 2017), 2, https://media.noticel.com/o2com-noti-media-us-east-1/document
_dev/2017/11/13/Build%20back%20better%20Puerto%20Rico_1510595877623_9313474_ver1.0.pdf.
2. Flint Water Advisory Task Force, Final Report (Lansing, MI: Office of Governor, March 21, 2016), 1–2,
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/snyder/FWATF_FINAL_REPORT_21March2016_517805_7.pdf.

315

Verner

been adapted. 3 The complexity involved in assessing these risks and managing
the potential disruptive impacts of these events to critical infrastructure
increases when considering the inherent interdependencies that exist
between infrastructure assets and systems. Critical infrastructure assets
operate in concert with one another. Catastrophic events can therefore cascade
across these interconnected systems and hamper the ability of critical
infrastructure operators to remain operational.
Policy guidance across disciplines, from homeland security principles
to business continuity standards, ref lects the importance of considering
interdependencies to enhance the security and the resilience of critical
infrastructure systems.4 The majority of these documents, however, do not
comprehensively define methodologies to understand complex interactions
among critical infrastructure and to support resilience management strategies.
In recent years, research and development in modeling critical infrastructure
interdependencies has developed considerably. These approaches generally
use systems engineering and safety engineering techniques. 5 Applying these
techniques to critical infrastructure systems, however, is challenging due to the
difficulties associated with obtaining all the data necessary to run combined
simulation models of multiple infrastructure systems. 6
To address these challenges, a system of systems service-oriented approach
can help to establish the appropriate scope of an interdependency analysis and
prioritize the specific assets and/or subsystems for which resilience-related
information should be collected. Using this approach, analyses consider the
high-level context—socioeconomic fragility, for example—of a given region,
the characteristics of critical infrastructure assets providing resources to
the region, and the capabilities of both the critical infrastructure and the
3. Megan Clifford et al., “Closing the Gap between Climate Science and Critical Infrastructure
Adaptation,” George Mason University Center for Infrastructure Protection and Homeland Security
(website), August 6, 2015, https://cip.gmu.edu/2015/08/06/closing-the-gap-between-climate-science-and
-critical-infrastructure-adaptation/.
4. For additional information, see White House, Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-21—Critical
Infrastructure Security and Resilience (Washington, DC: Office of the Press Secretary, February 12, 2013),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical
-infrastructure-security-and-resil; and ASIS International, Organizational Resilience: Security, Preparedness,
and Continuity Management Systems—Requirements with Guidance for Use (Alexandria, VA: ASIS
International, 2009), https://www.ndsu.edu/fileadmin/emgt/ASIS_SPC.1-2009_Item_No._1842.pdf.
5. For additional information, see Min Ouyang, “Review on Modeling and Simulation of Interdependent
Critical Infrastructure Systems,” Reliability Engineering & System Safety 121 (January 2014): 43–60,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2013.06.040.
6. For additional informatoin, see Megan Clifford and Charles Macal, Advancing Infrastructure
Dependency and Interdependency Modeling (Argonne, IL: Argonne National Laboratory, 2016),
https://anl.app.box.com/s/3t7mnesdajzl708xy9xo4vczj2qv1wom.
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regional emergency management. By specifically addressing stakeholders’
requirements and building a collaborative environment, a f lexible analysis
framework can enable the development of a comprehensive and interactive
resilience assessment of critical infrastructure interdependencies.
This framework can also serve to integrate multiple areas of expertise—
such as engineering, social sciences, business continuity, and emergency
management—in a combination of top-down (system-level) and bottom-up
(asset-level) approaches.
This chapter explores the potential of this analysis framework approach
in the following five sections. The first section discusses the importance
of considering interdependencies to improve the security and resilience
of critical infrastructure systems. The next section provides a general
overview of the main characteristics and dimensions of critical infrastructure
interdependencies. The third section summarizes general approaches to model
and assess critical infrastructure. The next section proposes a f lexible critical
infrastructure analysis framework to inform the development of resilience
management strategies. The final section identifies elements to operationalize
the consideration of critical infrastructure interdependencies for managing
critical infrastructure systems. NATO Allies and partners can use the proposed
analysis framework and complementary considerations for operationalizing
its results to reduce the risks posed to critical infrastructure and to foster
greater resilience through cross-sector collaboration.

Risk, Resilience, and Interdependencies
Analysts frequently identify risk and resilience as essential aspects
in ensuring the continued safe operation of infrastructure in a cost-effective
manner. Although some variation exists in the scholarship as to its definition,
risk is generally the combination of the magnitude of a consequence—
such as a loss following a disruption event—and the probability or likelihood
of the consequence occurring.7 Stanley Kaplan and B. John Garrick
f irst identif ied three key questions that could drive risk assessments.
What are the problems that could occur in the system? What is the
probability that those problems could occur? What would be the consequences
of those occurrences? 8 Risk management is a name for a wide range
7. American Society of Civil Engineering (ASCE), Guiding Principles for the Nation’s Critical
Infrastructure (Reston, VA: ASCE, 2009), 15–16, https://www.asce.org/uploadedFiles/Issues_and_Advocacy
/Our_Initiatives/Infrastructure/Content_Pieces/critical-infrastructure-guiding-principles-report.pdf.
8. Stanley Kaplan and B. John Garrick, “On the Quantitative Definition of Risk,” Risk Analysis 1, no. 1
(1981): 13.
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of methodologies for operating and maintaining a system in a manner that
yields an acceptable level of risk to all relevant parties, including the system
owners, operators, and regulators. See chapter 13 for an overview of risk
assessment and management strategies. Effectively assessing and managing
risk requires the identification of potential adverse events that could result
in consequences for the system and its users.9
Unlike risk, resilience does not have a universal definition in the scholarly
literature.10 The definition of resilience varies by topic—economic resilience,
critical infrastructure resilience, and social resilience, for example—
and by object of analysis, such as community, infrastructure system, and
infrastructure asset. Variations in the definition of resilience affect how
decisionmakers measure and evaluate resilience.11 In their thorough literature
review on resilience definitions, L. Carlson et al. identified two major schools
of thought, with the primary difference being whether actions taken prior
to the occurrence of an adverse event would be considered as enhancing
resilience.12 Nearly all literature def ines resilience, in part or in whole,
as the ability to absorb a disturbance and adapt to or quickly recover from the
changes caused by the disturbance to resume functionality.13 Some literature
further defines resilience as encompassing the ability to plan for, mitigate
against, and withstand a hazard to reduce overall vulnerability and thus
the likelihood of a threat or hazard causing a disruption.14 By considering
a subset of these pre-event actions that are taken under the assumption that
an adverse event is going to occur, Carlson et al. defined resilience as “the ability
of an entity—asset, organization, community, region—to anticipate, resist,
absorb, respond to, adapt to, and recover from a disturbance.” 15
Risk and resilience are highly interrelated concepts; actions taken to reduce
the risk of a system will likely increase the resilience of the system and vice
9.

Kaplan and Garrick, “Definition of Risk,” 13.

10. Stanley W. Gilbert, Disaster Resilience: A Guide to the Literature (Washington, DC: National
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2010), 9–11, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP
/nistspecialpublication1117.pdf.
11. L. Carlson et al., Resilience Theory and Applications (Argonne, IL: Argonne National Laboratory,
2012), 17–20, https://publications.anl.gov/anlpubs/2012/02/72218.pdf.
12. Carlson et al., Resilience Theory, 15–17.
13. Joseph Fiksel, “Sustainability and Resilience: Toward a Systems Approach,” Sustainability: Science,
Practice and Policy 2, no. 2 (2006): 16, https://doi.org/10.1080/15487733.2006.11907980.
14. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report:
A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland (Washington, DC: DHS, 2010), 59–64; and Adrian V. Gheorghe
et al., Critical Infrastructures, Key Resources, Key Assets (Cham, CH: Springer International
Publishing, 2018).
15. Carlson et al., Resilience Theory, 17.
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versa. Assessing and informing risk reduction and resilience enhancement
measures requires the identification of potential natural hazards and man-made
threats as well as an assessment of system vulnerabilities, hazard mitigation
actions, and response and recovery capabilities following a disruption event.16
These steps also necessarily implicate broader community and regional
characteristics that the infrastructure serves. Infrastructure systems provide
the commodities and services required by a population, either directly
or indirectly. The seminal work on individual needs by A. H. Maslow
conceptualized human needs as a pyramid with each of the lower levels serving
as a foundation for higher-order development.17 At the most foundational
levels, Maslow’s hierarchy describes the physiological and safety needs
of individuals (such as water, food, sheltering, and security). These needs
must be satisfied in order for individuals to find belonging, esteem, and
self-actualization as matters of psychological development.18
A parallel construct that applies Maslow’s hierarchy to societal development
may help to define the questions of greatest importance for community and
regional decision makers in formulating resilience strategies.19 In this construct,
various infrastructure systems (including water infrastructure, agricultural
infrastructure, and emergency services) provide these basic societal needs. 20
In turn, these infrastructure systems require services and commodities
provided by other infrastructure systems. For example, water treatment
infrastructure, which processes raw water into safe, potable water, requires
chemicals (such as chlorine and f luoride) provided by chemical infrastructure.
As such, chemical infrastructure producing water treatment chemicals
indirectly supports the needs of individuals. The quality of infrastructure
systems and the goods and services they provide may have a strong inf luence
on the quality of life and strength of a society. 21

16. Frédéric Petit, “Resilience Assessment in Homeland Security,” in IRGC Resource Guide on Resilience: Domains
of Resilience for Complex Interconnected Systems, vol. 2, ed. Benjamin Trump, Marie-Valentine Florin, and Igor Linkov
(Lausanne, CH: EPFL International Risk Governance Center, 2018): 119–20.
17.

A. H. Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” Psychological Review 50, no. 4 (1943): 370–96.

18. M. Joseph Sirgy, “A Quality-of-Life Theory Derived from Maslow’s Developmental Perspective,” American Journal
of Economics and Sociology 45, no. 3 (1986): 329.
19. For additional information, see M. R. Hagerty, “Testing Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs: National Quality-of-Life
across Time,” Social Indicators Research 46, no. 3 (1999): 249–71.
20. For additional information, see Jochen Markard, “Infrastructure Sector Characteristics and Implications for
Innovation and Sectoral Change,” Journal of Infrastructure Systems 17, no. 3 (2011): 107–17.
21.

For additional information, see Gheorghe et al., Critical Infrastructures.
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Critical Infrastructure Interdependency Taxonomies
and Concepts
The definitions of what constitutes a critical infrastructure are relatively
consistent around the globe. Table 12-1 contains examples of critical
infrastructure definitions used in the West.
Table 12-1. Definitions of critical infrastructure
Country

Definitions

Australia

Physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies and
communication networks, which if destroyed, degraded, or rendered
unavailable for an extended period, would significantly impact the social
or economic well-being of the nation, or affect Australia’s ability to conduct
national defense and ensure national security.22

Canada

Processes, systems, facilities, technologies, networks, assets, and services
essential to the health, safety, security or economic well-being of Canadians
and the effective functioning of government.23

European Union

Asset or system that is essential for the maintenance of vital societal
functions. The damage to a critical infrastructure, its destruction or disruption
by natural disasters, terrorism, criminal activity, or malicious behavior, may
have a significant negative impact for the security of the EU and the wellbeing of its citizens.24

United Kingdom

Those facilities, systems, sites, information, people, networks, and processes,
necessary for a country to function and upon which daily life depends.25

United States

Infrastructure so vital that its incapacity or destruction would have
a debilitating impact on defense and national security.26

Even if all these definitions recognized critical infrastructure as the main
components supporting the well-being of the society, they would not ref lect
a consensus on which sectors comprise critical infrastructure. See chapter 1
for a discussion of the sectors generally identified as critical infrastructure.
22. Australian Government, Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy (Canberra: Commonwealth
of Australia, 2010), 8.
23. “Critical Infrastructure,” Public Safety Canada (website), n.d., accessed December 17, 2021,
https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/crtcl-nfrstrctr/index-en.aspx.
24. “Critical Infrastructure,” European Commission: Migration and Home Affairs (website), n.d.,
accessed December 17, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism
/critical-infrastructure_en.
25. “Critical National Infrastructure,” Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI)
(website), April 20, 2021, https://www.cpni.gov.uk/critical-national-infrastructure-0.
26. President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical Foundations: Protecting
America’s Infrastructures (Washington, DC: White House, 1997), 3, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=986.
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Table 12-2 provides examples of the various ways in which Western countries
organize and classify sectors as critical infrastructure.
Table 12-2. Critical infrastructure sector taxonomy
Country

Sectors

Australia

7 sectors: energy, water services, communications, transport, food chain,
health, banking and finance27

Canada

10 sectors: health, food, finance, water, information and communication
technology, safety, energy and utilities, manufacturing, government,
transportation28

European Union

2 sectors: energy (i.e., electricity, oil, and gas), transport (road, rail, air, inland
waterways, and ocean and short sea shipping and ports)29

United Kingdom

13 sectors: chemical, civil nuclear, communications, defense, emergency
services, energy, finance, food, government, health, space, transport, water30

United States

16 sectors: chemical, commercial facilities, communications, critical
manufacturing, dams, defense industrial base, emergency services, energy,
financial services, food and agriculture, government facilities, health care
and public health, information technology, transportation systems, water and
wastewater systems, and nuclear reactors, materials, and waste31

All these taxonomies include at least the lifeline sectors—energy,
water, communications, and transportation—that support the physiological
needs def ined by Maslow. The diversity of characterizations of critical
infrastructure sectors is symptomatic of the complexity of these systems and
of their strong interconnections.
Critical infrastructure assets constitute a system of systems
in which resources—namely goods or services—supplied by one network
constitute the raw materials supporting the operations of other networks.
Figure 12-1 provides a high-level example of interdependencies among lifeline
infrastructure systems. 32

27.

Australian Government, Critical Infrastructure Resilience, 10.

28.

“Critical Infrastructure,” Public Safety Canada.

29. “Critical Infrastructure,” European Commission.
30. “Critical National Infrastructure,” CPNI.
31.

White House, PPD-21.

32. Duane Verner, Agnia Grigas, and Frédéric Petit, Assessing Energy Dependency in the Age of
Hybrid Threats (Helsinki: European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, 2019), 5,
https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Assessing_Energy_Dependency_in_the_Age_of
_Hybrid_Threats-HybridCoE.pdf.
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Figure 12-1. Interdependencies among lifeline systems
(Diagram by Argonne National Laboratory)

As illustrated in figure 12-1, interdependencies are characterized by the
exchange of resources constituting both the inputs and outputs of different
infrastructure assets. Therefore, understanding interdependencies existing
within and among critical infrastructure systems involves characterizing
the relative importance of upstream, internal, and downstream dependency
categories. Figure 12-2 illustrates the interaction between a critical
infrastructure and its environment. 33

33. Frédéric Petit et al., Analysis of Critical Infrastructure Dependencies and Interdependencies
(Argonne, IL: Argonne National Laboratory, 2015), 9, https://doi.org/10.2172/1184636.
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Figure 12-2. Critical infrastructure and its environment
(Diagram by Argonne National Laboratory)

The operation of a critical infrastructure system requires commodities
and services provided by other infrastructure systems. Dependency can
be def ined as a unidirectional link between two infrastructure assets
in which the service or commodity provided by the first asset to the second asset
is necessary for operations of the latter. 34 An interdependency can be characterized
as a combination of two dependencies; it is a bidirectional link between two
assets. 35 In practice, understanding an interdependency requires understanding
the two dependencies between the two assets comprising the interdependency. 36
Figure 12-3 illustrates the concepts of dependency and interdependency. 37

Figure 12-3. Dependency and interdependency between assets
(Diagram by Argonne National Laboratory)

34. S. M. Rinaldi, J. P. Peerenboom, and T. K. Kelly, “Identifying, Understanding, and Analyzing
Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies,” IEEE Control Systems Magazine 21, no. 6 (2001): 13–14,
https://doi.org/10.1109/37.969131.
35.

Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly, “Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies,” 14.

36.

Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly, “Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies,” 14.

37.

Petit et al., Analysis of Critical Infrastructure, 8.
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The types of dependencies and interdependencies may be of a different
nature and have specif ic characteristics. Several authors have developed
ta xonomies for infrastructure interdependencies. The classif ication
developed by S. M. Rinaldi, J. P. Peerenboom, and T. K. Kelly, however,
is the most comprehensive and the most widely used for critical
infrastructure analysis. This taxonomy defines the four classes of dependencies
listed in table 13-3. 38
Table 13-3. Dependency classes
Classes

Definition

Physical

Operations depend on material output(s) of other infrastructure through
a functional and structural linkage between the inputs and outputs
of two assets.

Cyber

Operations depend on information and data transmitted through the
information infrastructure via electronic or informational links.

Geographic

Operations depend on the local environment, where an event can trigger
changes in the state of operations in multiple infrastructure.

Logical

Operations depend on the state of other infrastructure via connections
other than physical, cyber, or geographical. Logical dependency is
attributable to human decisions and actions and is not the result of physical
or cyber processes.

Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly argue that these four classes are not
the only characteristics to consider when assessing critical infrastructure
dependencies. Table 13-4 lists several other dimensions that the assessment
process must take into account. 39
Table 13-4. Dependency dimensions
Dimensions

Definition

Operating environment

Characterize how external factors can influence infrastructure
operations and connections

Coupling and
response behavior

Characterize how an infrastructure would react to infrastructure
connection disruptions or changes

Type of failure

Characterize the propagation of consequences resulting from a
disruption

Infrastructure
characteristics

Characterize the infrastructure organization and operation

State of operation

Characterize the critical infrastructure state of operations

38.

Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly, “Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies,” 14–16.

39. Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly, “Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies,” 16–23.
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Enhancing the resilience of critical infrastructure requires a better
understanding of the interdependencies among critical infrastructure assets
and the inf luence of these interdependencies on the operations of different
infrastructure systems. This level of understanding requires consideration
of the categories, classes, and dimensions that characterize infrastructure
dependencies and interdependencies. Integrating the characterization
of infrastructure interdependencies into an infrastructure’s risk management
process enables an understanding of how interdependencies inf luence all
components of risk: threats, vulnerabilities, resilience, and consequences.
Interdependencies can increase the intensity of man-made threats and
natural hazards. They can also expand the set of facility vulnerabilities,
which are those vulnerabilities that a facility may be unable to address
effectively because interdependency elements are often outside a facility’s
control. Interdependencies also inf luence mitigation and response capabilities.
Finally, interdependencies are the main factor inf luencing propagation
of consequences—cascading and escalating failures—across infrastructure
systems and regions.
Cascading failures (or domino effects) represent the succession
of disruptions within an infrastructure system and across infrastructure
systems.40 For example, the failure of a transformer in an electric power
distribution substation may make it impossible to operate the substation,
and ultimately lead to a power outage in the substation service area. The loss
of electricity will potentially impact other infrastructure assets located
in this area and therefore affect the operations of their respective
infrastructure systems. Escalating failure (or snowball effect) represents
an increase of severity or time to respond to an existing infrastructure failure.41
For example, considering the dysfunction of the electric power distribution
substation, if the loss of power affects the transportation system—
such as dysfunctions of traff ic control centers and traff ic lights—
these problems can result in a delay for the repair crew to access the substation
to replace the failed transformer.
Even though research addressing critical infrastructure interdependencies
started in the United States more than 20 years ago with the President’s
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, modeling, simulation,
and visualization tools still perform at an intermediate analysis level.42
40. Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly, “Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies,” 22.
41. Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly, “Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies,” 22.
42. See Frédéric Petit et al., “Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resilience—Integrating Interdependencies,”
in Security by Design: Innovative Perspectives on Complex Problems, ed. Anthony J. Masys (Cham, Switzerland:
Springer International Publishing, 2018), 193–219.
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Data collection and analyses generally operate in isolation to address
first-order physical and cyber dependencies.43

Critical Infrastructure Modeling
Given the importance of critical infrastructure systems in supporting
the needs and operation of communities, analyses of critical infrastructure
systems are vital to ensuring the resilience and health of communities. 44
Infrastructure interdependency assessments, however, can be analytically
complicated, time consuming, and costly, which in turn can limit
stakeholders’ abilities to understand and use this information to make
risk-informed decisions.
Numerous infrastructure analysis methodologies have been developed
to provide infrastructure owners and operators with various information.
These methodologies—including infrastructure vulnerability, risk, and
resilience assessments, infrastructure expansion studies, and infrastructure
interdependency analyses—help inform infrastructure investment planning,
business continuity planning, and operational decision making.
Generally, risk assessment and system engineering methodologies are
also useful for analyzing critical infrastructure interdependencies. Examples
of common methodologies for assessing infrastructure systems include:
 Network modeling and graph theory, including Voronoi or
Thiessen polygons, Huff modeling, and cellular automata45
 System of systems modeling,
infrastructure network46

such

as

multilayer

 Simulation-based modeling, such as agent-based modeling47

43.

Petit et al., Analysis of Critical Infrastructure, 24–25.

44. Carlson et al., Resilience Theory and Applications, 31–38.
45. For additional information, see Irene Eusgeld et al., “The Role of Network Theory and Object-oriented
Modeling within a Framework for the Vulnerability Analysis of Critical Infrastructures,” Reliability
Engineering & System Safety 94, no. 5 (2009): 954–63, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2008.10.011.
46. For additional information, see Pengcheng Zhang and Srinivas Peeta, “A Generalized Modeling
Framework to Analyze Interdependencies among Infrastructure Systems,” Transportation Research Part B:
Methodological 45, no. 3 (2011): 553–79, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trb.2010.10.001.
47. For additional information, see Michael J. North, “Multi-agent Social and Organizational Modeling
of Electric Power and Natural Gas Markets,” Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory 7 (2001):
331–37, https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013406317362.
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 Economic modeling, including input-output modeling48
 Multi-criteria decision analysis49
 Game theory50
Infrastructure interdependency modeling methodologies can be generally
categorized as mathematics, geospatial, system dynamics, economics, or
physics-based. Developed for specif ic types of critical infrastructure
or for specific conditions, each of the modeling and simulation approaches
presents advantages and limitations. These models, which can be deterministic
or probabilistic in nature, may evaluate the performance of an infrastructure
system at a single point in time (static) or over a given period (dynamic).
Each infrastructure modeling methodology has advantages and disadvantages,
including data requirements, assumptions, level of granularity, model
complexity, and model development and execution times. No single model
type is best for all types of infrastructure assessments. Rather, infrastructure
analysts should weigh the advantages and disadvantages of different modeling
methodologies against the needs of the stakeholders and limitations of the
analysis when selecting an infrastructure modeling methodology.
Analysis of infrastructure systems conventionally occurs in a siloed manner,
which means that directly modeling the assets within the infrastructure system
is the basis for the evaluation of the system’s operation. If the traditional
siloed approach considers dependencies and interdependencies, it is only in an
indirect manner, such as via input models or explanatory variables informed
by expert opinion, elicitation, or historical data. Assessing infrastructure in
a siloed nature significantly inhibits a broader understanding of the dynamics
between different infrastructure systems, including cascading and escalating
failures and impacts to supply chains. By explicitly modeling dependencies
using a system of systems approach, analysts can gain a better understanding
of the interconnected operations of infrastructure systems, which may
enable the identification of single points of failure that conventional siloed
analyses may not identify. Recent works characterize interdependencies
across infrastructure systems, but they generally focus on lifeline networks
and require the support of organizations with research and development
48. For additional information, see Y. Haimes and P. Jiang, “Leontief-Based Model of Risk in Complex
Interconnected Infrastructures,” Journal of Infrastructure Systems 7, no. 1 (2001): 1–12.
49. For additional information, see Darwin Marcelo et al., Prioritizing Infrastructure Investment:
A Framework for Government Decision Making (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2016),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/24511.
50. For additional information, see Pengcheng Zhang, Srinivas Peeta, and Terry Friesz, “Dynamic Game
Theoretic Model of Multi-layer Infrastructure Networks,” Networks and Spatial Economics 5, no. 2 (2005):
147–78, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11067-005-2627-0.
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capabilities.51 Furthermore, most of the existing methodologies focus primarily
on physical interdependencies and, to some extent, on cyber dependencies;
few works incorporate geographic or logical dependencies. 52
Approaches to infrastructure modeling typically fall into one of two
categories: top-down or bottom-up. Top-down modeling approaches focus
on the operation of the entire infrastructure system, and then estimate the
performance and significance of infrastructure subsystems and assets based
on the overall system dynamics. Bottom-up modeling approaches focus on the
attributes and operation of the individual assets comprising an infrastructure
system, and then estimate the overall operation of the system based on the
performance of the individual assets. Top-down modeling may provide greater
accuracy of the overall system operation with less detail on the functioning
of individual assets within the system. Conversely, bottom-up approaches
provide a high level of detail on the functioning of individual assets but
provide less information on overall system operation. Combining top-down
and bottom-up approaches can yield high levels of detail on the operation
of both the overall system and the assets comprising the system.
A system of systems approach combining top-down and bottom-up
assessments within and across critical infrastructure systems helps to establish
the appropriate scope of interdependency analyses and identify specif ic
security and resilience management strategies. 53 Figure 12-4 illustrates how
combining different analysis approaches can better characterize critical
infrastructure interdependencies. 54

51. For additional information, see Constantinos Heracleous et al., “Hybrid Systems Modeling for Critical
Infrastructures Interdependency Analysis,” Reliability Engineering & System Safety 165 (2016): 89–101.
52.

For additional information, see Petit et al., Analysis of Critical Infrastructure.

53. Igor Linkov et al., “Risk-based Standards: Integrating Top-down and Bottom-up Approaches,”
Environment Systems and Decisions 34 (2014): 134–37, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10669-014-9488-3.

54. Frédéric Petit, Duane Verner, and Leslie-Anne Levy, Regional Resiliency Assessment Program Dependency
Analysis Framework (Argonne, IL: Argonne National Laboratory, 2017), 9, https://doi.org/10.2172/1475551.
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Figure 12-4. Resilience interdependency analysis overview
(Diagram by Argonne National Laboratory)

Developing a systemic approach to move toward an advanced infrastructure
analysis capability presents several challenges. 55 These challenges include:
 Lack of understanding of infrastructure system operations and
of the interactions existing between infrastructure systems.
 Lack of understanding of how infrastructure interdependencies
affect the resilience of a region.
 Difficulty in combining simulation models originally developed
in silos and specific to certain critical infrastructure systems.
 Difficulty in obtaining the data for running the simulation models.
Some data are proprietary and some are unknown due to the lack
of knowledge.
Promoting a collaborative approach based on trust and information
sharing can overcome most of these challenges and the intrinsic complexities
of critical infrastructure interdependencies.
55.

Clifford and Macal, Advancing Infrastructure Dependency, 2–7.
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Critical Infrastructure Interdependency Analysis Framework
The signif icance of critical infrastructure systems in supporting the
needs of the public and broader communities and regions underlies the need
for a standardized methodology for systematic assessments of infrastructure
systems. Given the diversity of infrastructure systems and assets, and the
breadth of infrastructure analysis methodologies, f igure 12-5 proposes
a generalized critical infrastructure interdependency analysis framework.

Figure 12-5. Interdependency analysis framework

Identification of Key Stakeholders’ Needs
A starting point is to determine the key stakeholders, such as infrastructure
system owners and operators, government agencies, nongovernmental
organizations, and the public. Then, the first step in the critical infrastructure
interdependency analysis framework is to identify the operational and
organizational needs of these key stakeholders. Key stakeholder needs include
both upstream dependencies, such as utilities providing critical resources,
and downstream dependencies, including customers and other infrastructure
systems that require the commodities or services provided by key stakeholders.
Although dependency analyses generally focus on the impact of the loss of
upstream dependencies, it is equally important to consider the impact of the
loss of an infrastructure system on downstream users and the community and
societal environment in which the system operates. Following a disruption
event, the shifting needs of downstream users and the operating environment
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can—and, perhaps, should—significantly inf luence the operation of key
stakeholders’ infrastructure. 56
One of the primary goals of the framework is to provide key stakeholders
the information needed to inform decision making for improving
infrastructure resilience. As such, it is important to identify and delineate the
decision-making process of the key stakeholders in order to identify the types
and granularity of data requirements for informing stakeholder decision making.
Part of this step involves initial stakeholder outreach and engagement in order
to open lines of communication and garner support from key stakeholders and
the critical infrastructure owners and operators managing infrastructure that
are upstream dependencies of primary stakeholders’ infrastructure.

Identification of Major Assets and Systems
Based on specific stakeholders’ needs, their desired level of information
granularity, and the particular social systems and communities in which their
infrastructure systems operate, the second step is to identify the relevant
infrastructure systems and assets of interest. A key part of this step is the
prioritization of the assets within the primary stakeholders’ infrastructure
systems and within the infrastructure systems that are upstream dependencies
of these systems. Prioritizing infrastructure assets and systems should ref lect
the expected impacts to the operation of the stakeholders’ infrastructure and
to the downstream users and customers following the disruption or damage
of the assets or systems. Part of the goal of this step is to guide the data
collection process.

Data Collection
The third step consists of collecting data on the prioritized infrastructure
assets and systems in order to characterize the upstream and downstream
dependencies of key stakeholders. Publicly available, open source datasets—
published by governmental, nonprofit, educational, trade, research, and other
nongovernmental organizations—are a good starting point for data collection.
Infrastructure data collected by private organizations may be available
for purchase in proprietary datasets. Restrictions on the use of these datasets,
however, may prohibit the sharing of pertinent information and analysis results
with key stakeholders, thus limiting the utility of the data. Before purchasing
proprietary datasets, it is important to evaluate carefully the limitations
on the use of proprietary data. Beyond combing public and proprietary datasets
56. Roberto Guidotti, Paolo Gardoni, and Nathanael Rosenheim, “Integration of Physical Infrastructure
and Social Systems in Communities’ Reliability and Resilience Analysis,” Reliability Engineering & System
Safety 185 (May 2019): 476–78, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2019.01.008.
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for relevant infrastructure data, the collection process also involves requesting
data directly from key stakeholders and the utilities that provide them essential
commodities. Additionally, surveys, site visits, facilitated discussions, and
structured interviews with key stakeholders are all viable means to collect
data. Data of interest includes information on infrastructure vulnerabilities,
dependencies, and operations, as well as information on the political and
socioeconomic environment in which these infrastructure assets exist
and operate.

Infrastructure Analysis
Once all pertinent data is collected, the next step is to evaluate
the performance of infrastructure systems. The specif ic needs of the
key stakeholders identif ied in the f irst step of the framework informs
which type of infrastructure analyses to conduct in this fourth step.
System-level (top-down) analysis methodologies can provide information
on the operation of infrastructure systems and can assess the cascading
failures in an infrastructure system following the disruption of assets
within the system. Asset-level (bottom-up) approaches can assess
the vulnerabilities and resilience of specif ic infrastructure assets.
Combining system- and asset-level approaches enables assessment of the
cascading and escalating failures across infrastructure systems following the
disruption of infrastructure assets, and facilitates the identification of critical
infrastructure assets to prioritize for resilience enhancements and investments.

Definition of Resilience Strategies
The fifth step of the framework is the development of strategies to address
resilience deficiencies identified throughout all other steps of the framework.
Resilience measures can address the vulnerabilities and dependencies
of critical assets owned by key stakeholders and utilities. This final step seeks
to propose resilience strategies applying at both asset and regional levels.
When key stakeholders have a major vulnerability due to upstream dependencies,
resilience strategies often involve evaluation of potential alternative
or back-up capabilities as well as increased communication with the relevant utilities
and infrastructure owners and operators. One of the primary objectives
of this step is to disseminate important findings and proposed resilience
strategies via out briefs, public forums, facilitated discussions, workshops,
presentations, reports, and other communication methods.
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Operationalization of Critical
Infrastructure Interdependencies
In order to be effective, risk reduction efforts should target the broader
enhancement of community or regional resilience, which requires the
consideration of interdependencies within and across infrastructure systems.
The proposed framework leverages classical risk management approaches
and may appear simplistic for considering all elements—that is,
categories, classes, and dimensions—characterizing critical infrastructure
interdependencies. This simplicity is also a strength of the framework.
Analysts are familiar with this specific assessment structure, and it provides
sufficient f lexibility to adapt the level of assessments to the users’ needs and
analysts’ capabilities.
To be truly effective, the analysis framework requires:
 A working environment based on trust.
 Processes to deal with sensitive information.
 Community or regional coordination.
Developing trust among key stakeholders and analysts is necessary
to promote a collaborative and multidisciplinary working environment.
Diverse participation also enables the analysis to incorporate social,
economic, and technical considerations. The process is fully effective when
it considers all key stakeholders involved in critical infrastructure management
and emergency management, including the public. Beyond developing
trust, it is also important to adopt mechanisms to operationalize
standards and policies that promote collaborative approaches and
partnerships between critical infrastructure owners and operators, and
government representatives.
When the environment of trust is established, communication mechanisms
must be implemented to maintain a balance between protecting sensitive
information—from a business sensitivity and/or national security perspective—
and providing key stakeholders, emergency managers, and government
agencies necessary information to support resilience management strategies.
See chapter 11 for a discussion of information and intelligence sharing
principles involving key stakeholders. Understanding regional capabilities
is paramount for coordinating resilience strategies. Malevolent actors,
however, can exploit infrastructure interdependencies information to create
security vulnerabilities. By identifying system weaknesses and admitting
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their system can fail, infrastructure owners and operators could also
generate a loss of public conf idence, potentially leading to serious
economic ramifications.
Community or regional coordination is important for def ining
what constitutes an acceptable level of consequences, not only for the
critical infrastructure assets themselves, but also for the entire area served
by the critical infrastructure systems. Understanding critical infrastructure
interdependencies and defining tolerable levels of disruptions is important
to prioritize protection, mitigation, response, and recovery efforts.
Securing critical infrastructure, especially in complex urban areas
often targeted by terrorists, should focus on identifying and prioritizing
potential failure points that would have the most severe consequences.
Community or regional coordination, combined with criticality analysis,
will help infrastructure system owners and operators and government agencies
identify priority assets for in-depth security and resilience assessments, and
inform resilience investment decisions.

Conclusion
Infrastructure interdependencies are important elements for NATO
member states and partner nations to consider for managing critical
infrastructure systems, enhancing their security and resilience, and maintaining
societal functions. Several elements inf luence infrastructure interdependencies,
from the different classes of dependencies to the characteristics of their
socioeconomic environment. Even though modeling critical infrastructure
interdependencies may appear overwhelming, it is possible to assess these
complex and dynamic relationships by combining top-down and bottom-up
assessment techniques in an adaptive and f lexible analysis framework. Building
on a collaborative process promoting information sharing and prioritizing
critical infrastructure assets, the assessment framework can facilitate a better
understanding of infrastructure operations and help stakeholders anticipate
and prepare for potential cascading and escalating failures.
The objective of assessing critical infrastructure interdependencies
is to go beyond traditional, isolated risk assessment and management
approaches. The framework proposed in this chapter may help analysts
to move toward the development of coordinated resilience strategies that
integrate key stakeholder needs, diverse infrastructure data, and the combination
of analytical techniques—including inter-Alliance modeling and stress
testing—that will ultimately guide more effective decision making.
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In light of the risks posed by the complex natural, man-made, and socio-technical
hazards NATO faces, infrastructure interdependency analysis will equip
member states and partner nations with a transdisciplinary and multidimensional
understanding of how critical infrastructure operates. Leveraging this
deeper understanding of how these infrastructure assets and systems work
in concert—both under normal and stressed conditions caused by terrorism—
will be essential in order to build and maintain the long-term viability
of NATO into the twenty-first century.
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How can the North Atlantic Treaty Organization best manage and assess
security risk in a constantly changing environment? In some ways, security
risk management is an intuitive and natural set of judgments that people
make every day. Using information on the weather or current events to inform
decisions about whether to carry an umbrella, bring certain valuables, or cancel
an activity entirely, for example, is a common way to consider the things that
may happen and take precautions against them. Complex, long-term, or high
consequence decisions cannot rely on intuitive or ad hoc processes, however,
with the hope of consistently positive results. Organizations and communities
need formal processes to determine what the risks are, prioritize them, and
address them. Continuous improvement in these processes and their results
requires documentation and cyclic review. These seemingly simple concepts
can become complex as they address complicated risks, such as natural disasters
and terrorism, but they underpin the discipline of security risk management
nonetheless. This chapter explores these concepts and how they translate
to governmental programs for securing critical infrastructure against a range
of threats, highlighting the role that a national-level risk program should play
to coordinate the constellation of public- and private-sector organizations
involved in critical infrastructure operations, and emphasizing the necessary
characteristics of high-quality national risk programs.
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Defining Security Risk Management
In the mid-1990s, the United States established a Joint Security Commission
to review the decision-making processes that underpin governmental physical
and information security investments. The commission noted the Cold War
mentality had led to security investments based on unrealistic assumptions
of the threat and an emphasis on risk elimination. The result of this mentality
was that security measures were ad hoc, difficult to justify, and very expensive.
The commission recommended an approach to balance the risk of loss
or damage against the costs of countermeasures: a “rational, cost-effective,
and enduring framework using risk management as the underlying basis
for security decision-making.” 1 In many ways, the vision established
by the commission remains as an ideal, not yet achieved or perfected.
The commission’s work remains relevant decades later because the challenges
it identified persist.
The US Government Accountability Office (GAO)—which supports
Congressional oversight of executive branch agencies and departments, among
other responsibilities—considers security risk management to be a fundamental
part of decision making. The GAO has said that implementing “principles
of risk management can help policymakers reach informed decisions regarding
the best ways to prioritize investments in security programs so that these
investments target the areas of greatest need.” 2 In this sense, security risk
management is an essential part of planning and communication. It allows
leadership to see the competing security needs and prioritize the investments
in policies, people, equipment, or systems. Communicating these priorities
in strategic planning and organizational activities helps set the culture
for an agency, location, or community.
Part of that communication is the adoption and consistent use
of terms and their def initions. There are many ways to def ine risk.
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) def ines risk
as “the effect of uncertainty on objectives.” 3 Although this ISO definition
has the benefit of wide applicability to many fields, it may be too general
to allow simple adoption in a security context. NATO’s Science and
Technology Organization def ines risk for qualitative risk assessment
1. Joint Security Commission, Redefining Security: A Report to the Secretary of Defense and the Director
of Central Intelligence (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1994), 4.
2. Norman J. Rabkin, Risk Management: Strengthening the Use of Risk Management Principles
in Homeland Security (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2008), 1.
3. International Organization for Standardization, ISO 31000: Risk Management Guidelines
(Geneva: International Organization for Standardization, 2018), 1.
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as “the potential of loss to an organization or entity.”4 Similarly, NATO’s
Allied Joint Publication on force protection def ines risk as “a function
of the value of the asset and . . . compared to the potential impact of the
exploitation of vulnerabilities by threats and hazards.”5 The important elements
of all of these definitions is that security risk considers the relative likelihood—
including both threat and vulnerability—and consequences of unwanted events.
These terms are especially important in the realm of critical infrastructure
security and resilience (CISR) because CISR involves a consortium of
organizations: military and civilian and public and private, each with its
own culture and vocabulary. The diversity of types of infrastructure to
protect—and the types of threats that demand consideration—presents a
dizzyingly complex situation for governmental and industry leaders. Clear
communication, therefore, requires clear terminology. Language is not enough.
The GAO states that risk management is a “strategic process for helping
policymakers make decisions about assessing risk, allocating finite resources,
and taking actions under conditions of uncertainty.”6 Leaders need a deliberate
analytic approach to help them understand the short- and long-term risks
so they can make informed decisions about resource allocation.
Security risk analysis can serve as that approach for an organization and
its stakeholders to the extent that the organization uses sound methods,
implements repeatable processes, and documents its data and assumptions.

Risk Management Frameworks
The promise of risk management is that with sufficient uniformity and
consistency, leaders can make better decisions through the ability to aggregate
risks at different levels. That is, if tactical risk assessments are compatible,
then a leader can begin to characterize the risk at the operational or strategic
level. The inherent difficulty, however, is that threats, attack methods, and
infrastructure assets and systems can differ widely. An overly specific set
of instructions for how to measure risk in one area can be meaningless
in another. The approach to assessing the risk of an explosive attack
on a building by terrorists is very different in terms of data and analysis
from the risk of a cyberattack on intellectual property by a foreign intelligence
service. For these reasons, the CISR community has long relied on security
4. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Science and Technology Organization, Mission Assurance
for Autonomous Unmanned Systems (Brussels: NATO, 2018), 7-5.
5. NATO Standardization Office, Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection, Allied Joint Publication 3.14
(Brussels: NATO, 2015), B-3.
6.

Rabkin, Risk Management, 1.
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risk frameworks, rather than detailed guidance. Properly constructed,
a framework presents the irreducible minimum of parts or characteristics
of a risk management process that ensure due diligence rather than specifies
a model or approach.
Table 13-1 presents the specific steps described in a set of selected risk
frameworks—from the ISO, NATO, GAO and the US National Infrastructure
Protection Plan (NIPP)—that have been designed or adapted for security
risk management. There are many similarities across the frameworks, and
individual frameworks may combine one or more steps that other models
separate. Their commonalities show the key areas of agreement (as these
frameworks have developed over the years) and how the ISO model makes
some steps explicit that other models imply. For example, communicating
the results of the risk assessment and the decision processes are crucial
to a coherent program, but the ISO framework identifies it as a specific
phase or action to emphasize its importance. Seeing the steps side-by-side
clarifies the minimum phases, including those that some models combine
or imply.
Table 13-1. Comparison of phases outlined in select risk frameworks
Risk Frameworks
Phases
Purpose and
context

GAO

NIPP

1. Strategic goals,
objectives, and
constraints

1. Set security goals

Screening and
scope

NATO

ISO
1. Establish context

2. Identify assets,
systems, networks,
and functions

1. Identify
hazards and
threats

2. Risk identification

Risk assessment

2. Risk
assessment

3. Assess risks

2. Assess
hazards and
threats

3. Risk analysis

Risk management
analysis

3. Alternatives
evaluation

4. Prioritize

3. Develop
controls

4. Risk evaluation

Management
decision

4. Management
selection

4. Implement
controls

5. Risk treatment

Implementation

5. Implement and
monitor

5. Supervise
and evaluate

6. Monitoring and
review

Monitoring

5. Implement
protective programs
6. Measure
effectiveness

Communication

7. Communication
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A crucial aspect to a functional risk framework is its cyclic nature.
First, it builds organizational maturity. As organizations become increasingly
familiar with the analysis and management cycle, they become more
attuned to the need for information and data and shared understanding
of the their own goals. As an organization assesses a risk multiple times
over the years, it should obtain or generate the data required for a clearer
understanding of that risk. In other words, implementing a cyclic risk
framework emphasizes the need for evidence-based decision making and
prioritizes institutional learning and accumulation of information for the
underlying evidence base.
Second, it encourages a culture of continuous improvement.
The periodic review of risk management decisions communicates that
management is a process that must be maintained. Evaluating past investments
helps clarify their purpose by linking them to metrics or criteria that determine
success. This evaluation highlights the need for equipment maintenance,
personnel training, and the periodic refreshing of procedures.
Third, a cycle of analysis does not guarantee an organization will
detect emerging threats. It creates the conditions for a regular scan
and evaluation of emerging threats (such as the hybrid threats discussed
in chapter 4). The intent is not to generate an unceasing list of risks
that require investment, but rather an organizational understanding
of the highest priority current, future, and potential risks.

National Risk Programs
Every nation faces a range of security threats that must be addressed.
Many—if not all—of these threats require specialized knowledge, skills,
and data that drive organizational design to focus on single risks or a narrow
range of risks. It makes sense, for example, to establish centers that study
hurricanes, wildfires, earthquakes, or other natural hazards, as well as law
enforcement, intelligence, or academic centers focused on organized crime
or terrorism. Industry, too, has specialization by sector and subsector, and,
in some cases, specific technologies used in processes (such as industrial
control systems or supervisory control and data acquisition systems).
The different types of organizations responsible for CISR represent nodes
of expertise or knowledge sets, and as they mature, they develop links
among them. See chapter 10 for a discussion of the various stakeholders and
organizations involved in CISR. They are unlikely to create a coherent network
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of nodes and links without deliberate planning and coordination, which should
be one of the primary roles of a risk program at the national level.
A national risk program not only entails producing risk analysis,
but also guiding and encouraging the generation and aggregation of data useful
for risk analysis, as well as providing the frameworks necessary to compare
and combine analysis where appropriate.7 In this way, a national risk
program can serve as a central hub to assist public and private partners with
authoritative and reliable sources for either data or analysis. In some cases,
the government can serve as a conduit or convening authority that allows and
encourages information sharing among private sector entities. See chapter 11
for an overview of the foundational concepts that should underpin
CISR information-sharing programs.
By building trusted partnerships and a network of credible data,
the national risk program supports evidence-based policy making.
Risk frameworks enable information from one field to be applied in another.
A clear example of this trust is enabling the translation of intelligence,
law enforcement, and open-source analysis to structured threat analysis,
so that public and private partners understand the relative threat levels and
how to incorporate them into risk analysis appropriately. This partnership
requires an understanding and respect for the specialists and a willingness
to serve as an ambassador, guiding specialists so their analysis is useful
to the other stakeholders. Threat analysis that is too vague (or that does
not further the understanding of a group’s intent, capability, or targets) has
very limited value to the organizations that require insight into the threats
to complete their risk assessments.
Beyond making connections among public and private sector partners,
a national risk program must evaluate the aggregate value of those
connections and determine where there are gaps in metrics, data, analytic
capability, or assessments and then coordinate action to address the gaps.
Any segmentation of infrastructure, whether bottom-up or top-down,
is likely to have gaps or contain areas of overlap. These areas require
a risk governance process to oversee the identification of the gaps and overlaps,
their prioritization, and their amelioration. In some cases, these gaps and
overlaps may have a geographic component as well, where an infrastructure
function is spread among jurisdictions and no single part is a local
government priority even though the overall function is critical, or where
7. Edward J. Jopeck and Kerry L. Thomas, “Security Risk Management: Implementing a National
Framework for Success in the Post 9/11 World” in Critical Infrastructure Protection: Elements of Risk
(Arlington, VA: George Mason University School of Law, 2007), 1.
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one jurisdiction benef its from an infrastructure function but a separate
jurisdiction incurs some cost without receiving the benefit.
Finally, a national risk program should also play a strategic role in managing
risk. Managing risks at the national level begins with fostering the ability
of local government and infrastructure sectors to assess risk, building
on the steps outlined above. Although the foundation is information sharing,
a national risk program has a responsibility to provide or guide the development
of tools that assist with coherent and consistent risk assessments. The benefit
is not only to the local governments and sector-specific entities, but also
to the nation. As local governments build comparable risk assessments,
the national risk program can obtain a more thorough understanding
of the types of risks the nation faces, differences in perception, and
variances in risk management. Sharing insights and best practices
propagates effective responses and minimizes less effective or negligent
approaches. This bottom-up approach can also inform national threat analysis;
local government and law enforcement are likely to encounter members
of criminal and terrorist organizations, see the effects of their operations,
or receive suspicious activity reports. Local insights can be highly
informative to building the national-level perspective.
Although national risk management begins with a risk governance
function, ensuring that risks are properly identified, prioritized, and managed,
it does not end there. A national-level entity is best positioned to see the
potential for collective action. In some cases, these actions may be major
capital investments, but often they may be policy mechanisms that incentivize
behaviors that maximize community resilience and minimize short-sighted
actions or investments that benefit a small number of organizations and
reduce the resilience of the infrastructure sector or surrounding community.
See table 13-2 for examples of governmental risk controls.
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Table 13-2. Government risk controls in the critical infrastructure environment
Organizations seeking to control risks may invest in facilities, equipment, or people,
among other options. Government programs, for example, can build governmental
capabilities in threat detection, specialized response, or communications. CISR, however,
is a collective effort that involves individual organizations making decisions that affect
others. The related governmental agencies can work together to influence the collective
effort but are rarely in a position to direct investments or action. Governmental influence
often comes through policy, guidance, standards, and regulations. Two primary challenges
in this area are: (1) providing effective incentives, and (2) holding individual organizations
accountable when they have not addressed security risks in a responsible manner.
Effective incentives encourage organizations to consider risks, document decisions, and
make proportionate investments. Ineffective incentives can lead to wasteful investments,
or encourage the acceptance of risks where the consequences to the community greatly
outweigh the consequences to the organization.
Sources:
Rick Nunes-Vaz, Steven Lord, and Daniel Bilusich, “From Strategic Security Risks
to National Capability Priorities,” Security Challenges 10, no. 3 (2014): 23–50.
Peter R. Orszag, “Critical Infrastructure Protection and the Private Sector: The Crucial Role
of Incentives,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 26 (2003): 231–49.

The following section will now describe the fundamental ways a national
risk program can encourage and guide risk management practices to foster
a mutually supportive environment for CISR.

Managing Security Risks
Too often, the treatment of risks is perceived to be a relatively
straightforward process of addressing the identified risks in priority order.
In reality, the analysis required to support risk management decisions
is as complex as the analysis required to characterize and compare the risks
in a coherent manner. A national risk program has a responsibility to assist
local, regional, and national entities in managing risks, which can begin
with characterizing and comparing them properly. Some risks are directly
comparable, whereas others can be only indirectly compared, due to very
different bases for considering threat, vulnerability, or consequences.
Some risks are best considered in an immediate time frame, for example,
while others require a longer-term perspective. Some threats are constant,
in contrast to others that are rare or episodic. A national risk program can
assist in the management of risks by organizing risk into portfolios.
Portfolios of risks contain directly comparable risks because they
have similar considerations for risk factors. Natural hazards, for example,
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can be meaningfully described through expected frequency of occurrence,
structural vulnerabilit y, communit y resilience, and a common set
of consequences. Risks from terrorism, in contrast, usually consider
relative threat, which involves understanding different terrorist groups,
their opportunity, intent, and capability, which then heavily inf luences the
assessment of vulnerability and consequence. Cyber threats, similarly, require
a different manner of thinking about the likelihood that an organization
or geographic region will encounter them. See chapter 3 for a discussion
of infrastructure-specific intricacies of cybersecurity risks. Although there
are some commonalities through all of these risks, it is best to define them
within portfolios. Cross-portfolio analysis is relevant primarily in the
evaluation of risk management solutions. That is, risk treatments or controls
may affect risks in multiple portfolios, which helps decisionmakers account
for the high-level comparisons among the portfolios without directly
comparing individual risks across portfolios. See table 13-3 for an example
of cross-portfolio analysis.
Table 13-3. Managing risks at the regional level
In 2008, the US National Capital Region (NCR) conducted a security risk assessment
to examine the community’s security risks. Working with the Office for National Capital
Region Coordination within the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the NCR
obtained input from federal, state, local, and private-sector partners in collaboration
with the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Risk Management and Analysis.
The risk analysis ranked potential critical infrastructure hazards by scenario and provided
options for risk reduction.
The risk approach divided the risks into two portfolios, natural hazards and terrorism,
allowing a direct comparison of risks with similar data availability. The visual comparison
of risks within the portfolios enabled decision-makers not only to understand their
relative severity, but also the risk factors that drove the severity. Beyond helping build
a common understanding of the risks the NCR faced, the assessment helped leaders
evaluate risk management investments. The analysis allowed the creation of strategic
investment themes and identified the scenarios in both portfolios that would be affected.
This process helped leaders understand how broad an investment’s effects might be,
as well as the extent to which it potentially reduced risk by addressing threat,
vulnerabilities, or consequence.
Sources:
William O. Jenkins, Jr., National Capital Region: 2010 Strategic Plan Is Generally
Consistent with Characteristics of Effective Strategies (Washington, DC: Government
Accountability Office, 2011).
Elizabeth Jackson, William L. McGill, and Christopher Geldar, “Regional Risk Analysis:
A Coordinated Effort” (presentation, Security and Risk Management Association Annual
Conference, Arlington, VA, June 18, 2009).
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To foster an environment in which each entity’s efforts support and
augment the efforts of related stakeholders, a national risk program should
embrace two high-level approaches. First, it should help guide local efforts
to maximize information exchange and compatibility of risk approaches so that
higher level perspectives can be built from the bottom up. Second, it should
ensure validity and accuracy when organizations communicate risk results
to build a common understanding of risk. The following sections discuss these
two approaches in more detail.

Building from the Bottom Up
Security risk assessments completed at the local level can benef it
from the natural advantage of drawing on local experts who know the
geography, hazards, and population well. At the local level, decisionmakers
tend to be concerned primarily with the most immediate risks: those
that occur frequently or those that are particularly pertinent to the area.
This makes sense from the perspective that emergency managers want
to maximize the investments that will bring the most assistance to addressing
the most common problems. For a national risk program to benefit from
the local expertise, it needs to standardize the risk analysis suff iciently
to be able to compare different assessments but without being so rigid
or complex that it draws resources away from emergency management
efforts. To some extent, the most fundamental requirement is that the basis
for considering threat, vulnerability, and consequence is suff iciently
documented so external reviewers understand the criteria for evaluation
and prioritization.
A national program may still provide guidance to help align these
assessments by stipulating the time period for evaluation (for example,
one to five years) or the scope (for example, the portfolios of risk or types
of hazards considered). Where government agencies have regulatory
or oversight authority over sectors of infrastructure, a national risk program
can encourage information sharing with local governments to maximize
a common understanding of the risks that infrastructure assets and systems
have, while minimizing duplication of effort. Building a community that
produces sound and comparable risk assessments enables the understanding
of more complex risks, such as the dependency and interdependency analysis
discussed in chapter 12. Local government may have its own requirements
for how to evaluate risk management investments, but the national
government can help make this consistent as well by stipulating the
analyses of alternatives, including initial costs, out-year costs, opportunity
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costs, the scenarios that benefit from the investment, and the degree to which
the investments reduce risks. 8
It is important that national risk programs enhance the relationship
between various levels of government and delineate the responsibilities
among them for assessing and managing security risks. Figure 13-1
is a conceptual model that depicts these relationships and responsibilities
to assess and manage risk based on the likelihood of the risk occurrence
and the severity of the consequence. It shows how local government is best
suited to focus on likely and locally manageable events whereas international
cooperation is required for the most probable, highest consequence events.
State or regional governments augment and broaden local government risk
management efforts while national-level government programs address the
higher consequence events, even if they are low probability.
By ensuring local-level risk assessments are compatible and
incorporating sector-specif ic information already collected, a nationallevel risk program can aggregate information to build regional and
national-level perspectives.9 Building this cross-jurisdiction comparison brings
multiple advantages. First, it ensures due diligence for risk analysis at the local
level. By comparing the risks that local jurisdictions identify and evaluate, the
national program will gain a more comprehensive understanding of possible
risks, encourage the inclusion of overlooked risks where appropriate, and
share best practices, including potential data sources and analytic techniques.
Second, the cross-jurisdictional perspective also enables gap analysis,
identifying risks that are too strategic for local jurisdictions to consider
(as f igure 13-1 illustrates). Third, building a strong foundation for risk
assessment in the near term allows the opportunity for an examination
of longer-term risks. See table 13-4 for an example of one approach
to assessing long-term risks. National risk programs should be able
to think about investments more broadly, either over large geographic areas
or across multiple risks.

8. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and Prioritize
Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure (Washington, DC: GAO, 2005), 106–7.
9. Michael H. Brody, “Enhancing the Organization of the United States Department of Homeland
Security to Account for National Risk,” Homeland Security Affairs 16 (2020): 21.
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Figure 13-1. Levels of governmental responsibility for risk management
Table 13-4. Exploring low-likelihood, high-consequence risk scenarios
Considering risks that are in the future or that are extant but with low likelihood requires
decisionmakers to cope with the high degree of uncertainty inherent in those scenarios.
There are multiple ways of exploring these risks, one of which is an approach known
as alternative futures analysis. This approach focuses on identifying two primary drivers
of uncertainty and then exploring their interaction. The US National Intelligence Council
has used this approach for its long-term analysis. A visual depiction of the two drivers
of uncertainty creates a simple matrix, and exploring specific scenarios within each quadrant
can make the risks more apparent.
It is important to understand the distinction between these structured analytic
exercises and predictions. These types of analyses can offer many benefits to leadership,
but not if they limit understanding and action to focus on a few specific scenarios.
Instead, this approach should allow leadership to explore the longest-term effects that
the emerging trends may have, envision the outcomes or innovations most beneficial
to homeland or national security, and consider the partners required to shape those risks.
Leaders can then examine certain aspects of emerging risks more closely and identify policies,
guidance, or other tools to maximize resilience in the critical infrastructure community.
Sources:
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence
Analysis (Washington, DC: CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2009).
National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence
Council’s 2020 Project (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004).
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Neither threats nor infrastructure systems are bound to national
borders. Transportation, energy, and telecommunications have inescapable
international dimensions that must be addressed. Without cross-border
coordination, attempts to secure a single part of an international system risk
being wasted effort. Work with allies can be straightforward if not simple.
Agreement on policy and standards can bridge many of the potential
gaps in security. Information sharing and reciprocity, and even shared
technology, can minimize the friction in some systems as they cross borders.
See chapter 10 for a discussion of how the European Union has addressed this
aspect of risk management.
Countries must work with their allies but also with their competitors
and adversaries. In these cases, signif icant constraints will impede
sharing some technologies, and potentially even security standards,
but the basic foundation is the same. Information sharing and
communication that establish a shared understanding of the benef its
of secure, resilient infrastructure can open pathways to parallel programs
or even shared investments that secure transportation modalities, supply
chains, and access to energy and telecommunications systems, among others.

Building a Common Understanding of Risks
As previously mentioned, a national risk program has a responsibility
to coordinate and integrate risk analysis among the myriad public and
private-sector partners involved in CISR. This coordination does not
mean forcing a one-size-fits-all approach, but it does mean encouraging
a common vocabulary for security risk professionals so the constituent parts
of the community can communicate readily with each other. It also means
creating mechanisms or rubrics for making risk analyses comparable where
they cannot be uniform.
There are numerous ways to def ine security risk, its factors, and
their combinations.10 Several factors inf luence what approach any
organization will adopt, especially the organization’s capabilities and level
of organizational maturity. External factors include whether data are
available and whether acceptable quantitative approaches exist. For security
risk, it can be considerably challenging to quantify threat, vulnerability,
and consequence, and qualitative or semi-quantitative approaches are the
only approaches to assessing emerging risks. The COVID-19 pandemic
is an example of a situation in which decisions required security risk
10. Julian Talbot and Miles Jakeman, Security Risk Management Body of Knowledge (Hoboken, NJ:
John Wiley & Sons, 2011), 142–47.
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analysis before data were available, but qualitative approaches could
provide insight.11
Quantitative approaches are best suited for organizations with a high
level of maturity in applying risk to decision making, and where data exist
to compare scenarios that are suff iciently similar. When combining
or comparing risk analyses from multiple organizations or for different
risks, quantitative approaches may be difficult to create or potentially not
possible.12 National risk programs, therefore, must promulgate best practices
in the CISR field to maximize comparability, create ways to meaningfully
compare and combine individual risk assessments, and clarify when
to avoid such integration. By helping stakeholders and leaders understand
the relative severity of risks, the ways they differ, and which risks are
categorically different, national risk programs can build a common understanding
of risk and promote educated discussions on how to manage them.
Key to this common understanding is the reality that the majority
of security risks cannot be eliminated but only managed, and that management
requires a discussion of trade-offs. For example, airport security can be raised
significantly, at great cost and at reduced passenger throughput, but societies
are unlikely to tolerate such conditions for long. See chapter 6 for detail
on the trade-offs involved in aviation security and chapter 7 for a discussion
of how the multifaceted nature of railways complicates security investment
decisions. In any operational environment, risk controls bring an initial
cost, as well as opportunity costs, which must be addressed directly.
For critical infrastructure environments especially, the risk control’s effect
on the functioning of the infrastructure asset or system is also a necessary
consideration when identifying, comparing, and selecting alternative
investments. See chapter 8 for an example of such risk management decisions
for the water sector. A national risk program can help the CISR community
implement concepts (such as managing risk to “as low as reasonably practicable”)
or other standards that help stakeholders understand their individual
and shared responsibilities.

11. See Rachael J. Oakenfull and Anthony J. Wilson, Qualitative Risk Assessment: What is the Risk of
Food or Food Contact Materials Being a Source or Transmission Route of SARS-CoV-2 for UK Consumers
(London: Food Standards Agency, 2020).
12. Peter Månsson, “Uncommon Sense: A Review of Challenges and Opportunities for Aggregating
Disaster Risk Information,” International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 40 (2019): 6–9.

350

Chapter 13

Security Risk Assessment and Management

Necessary Characteristics of High-quality Risk Programs
Risk analysis and risk management approaches can accommodate
different levels of maturity and quantif ication. An entirely qualitative
approach to risk, for instance, can be both useful and credible, especially with
issues where key data or a valid method of quantification are not available.13
There are three key aspects of a risk program, however, that are not negotiable.
As NATO member states and partner nations consider and update their
national risk programs, this concluding section will highlight the need
to include these three elements: the transparency of the decision-making
process, clear risk communication, and coherent risk governance.

Transparency
Managing risk affects a large number of stakeholders. While the benefits
should convey to a large number of people, the costs may be unevenly
distributed. Not only are there opportunity costs—the investments in people,
equipment, or training that could have been used in other areas—but some
stakeholders may be exposed to higher risks for the overall management
of a greater risk. The construction of a biosafety laboratory, for example,
may help the nation fight dangerous pathogens in the long term but it may
not be welcome in a community in the short term. Building an additional
power plant may strengthen the electric power grid but its construction also
brings environmental or other concerns to the communities nearby. Incomplete
or poorly documented risk assessments preclude any external entities—
including people affected by the risk-based decisions—from understanding
the risk analysis, invalidating the analysis regardless of the quality
of the conclusions.14
If the communities are to support the risk management decisions,
then leaders need to involve stakeholders at several key steps. This involvement
includes the generation of risk scenarios, the evaluation of consequences,
the evaluation of risk treatments, and the monitoring of effectiveness.
If communities understand the basis for the decisions, they are much more
likely to accept the decisions. Where communities have been excluded
from these stages of risk management, they have sometimes balked
at the final decisions, leading to delays or cancellation of the risk controls.
13. National Research Council, Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society
(Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 1996), 97.
14. National Research Council, Technical Input on the National Institutes of Health’s Draft Supplementary
Risk Assessments and Site Suitability Analyses for the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory,
Boston University (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2007), 11–12.

351

French

Building in opportunities for appropriate engagement with stakeholders
improves the quality of the processes and makes the outcomes more likely
to be accepted.15

Risk Communication
Communicating the results of risk analysis can be particularly
challenging. Conveying the findings in terms that the widest range of
stakeholders can understand often requires moving away from the scientific
or technical language that analysts use, and adopting plain language.
The challenge is that risk analysis often has nuanced conclusions, and stating
the findings too simply may over- or understate the likelihood of the risk
or the severity of the consequences. A failure of risk communication can cause
panic or complacency. Situations where political sensitivities overrule scientific
or professional consensus undermine the public’s understanding of risks,
which can lead to catastrophic consequences.16 Risk communication must
begin prior to the emergence of a specific threat or crisis; building
relationships prior to a crisis increases trust and can increase a community’s
risk tolerance level.17
Organizations must plan to communicate to the public through multiple
methods to get specific messages out effectively to appropriate audiences,
especially during times of crisis. See chapter 15 for an in-depth discussion
of crisis management capabilities and tools. When crises do arrive, risk advisory
organizations must ensure timely notification of risks and provide specific
information on the nature, location, and timing of threats, as well as guidance
on actions to take in response to threats.18 When risk communications are late,
vague, or perceived to be arbitrary, they erode public confidence and increase
the barriers for future communication efforts.19

15. Bruce Altevogt, Megan Reeve, and Theresa Wizemann, eds., Engaging the Public in Critical
Disaster Planning and Decision Making: Workshop Summary (Washington, DC: National Academies
Press, 2013).
16. Stephen S. Hall, “Scientists on Trial: At Fault?,” Nature 477, no. 7364 (2011): 264–69.
17. Melissa Janoske, Brooke Liu, and Ben Sheppard, Understanding Risk Communication Best
Practices: A Guide For Emergency Managers and Communicators (College Park: National Consortium
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland, 2012), 20–21.
18. GAO, Homeland Security: Communication Protocols and Risk Communication Principles Can Assist
in Refining the Advisory System (Washington, DC: GAO, 2004), 12–13.
19. Jacob N. Shapiro and Dara Kay Cohen, “Color Blind: Lessons from the Failed Homeland Security
Advisory System,” International Security 32, no. 2 (2007): 121–54.
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Risk Governance
As mentioned above, most nations will have a number of different
organizations contributing to the understanding of security risks,
and a national risk program should connect them into a coherent network.
Part of that effort includes clearly assigning roles and responsibilities to local
or regional government organizations and other partners in the private and
public sectors. Ensuring that each organization has a clear understanding
of which risks it should take into account helps build a collaborative
environment where individual organizations see their roles in relation
to other partners. 20 This connection fosters a culture of accountability and
encourages organizations to raise risks where there are shared responsibilities.
Regular reports to oversight off ices will help senior leaders understand
which risks are being addressed (as well as which need additional action)
and maximize the probability that risks where there is not clear authority
or responsibility can be identified and directed. When national risk programs
allow high degrees of ambiguity, they minimize the likelihood senior
leaders will recognize situations where responsibilities overlap but suffer
from a lack of collaboration or where signif icant risks fall between the
authorities of multiple agencies. Clear, coherent, strategic-level assessments
of risks in each major portfolio can be one of the primary mechanisms that
allow national governments to understand the security risks they face and
whether risk management actions are sufficient. 21

20. GAO, Enterprise Risk Management: Selected Agencies’ Experiences Illustrate Good Practices in Managing
Risk (Washington, DC: GAO, 2016), 6.
21. Thomas Cooper, Strategic Risk Management in the Municipal and Public Sector: An Exploration
of Critical Success Factors and Barriers to Strategic Risk Management within the Province of Newfoundland
and Labrador (St. John’s, Canada: Memorial University, 2010), 69–75.
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Due to the advancement of information and communications technologies,
most modern critical infrastructure operates electronically. Malevolent forces
could exploit any weaknesses or vulnerabilities in the devices and equipment
that comprise these critical infrastructure systems to launch cyberattacks
that adversely affect the society and its national security. For instance, cyber
incidents targeting lifeline sectors—such as electricity, water supply, and
transportation—may not simply lead to inconvenience and financial losses
for people and businesses, they can also cause social turmoil, disruption
of military operations, and human casualties or fatalities. For these reasons,
most countries regard the cyber defense of critical infrastructure systems
and assets as a top priority, and they are undertaking extensive efforts
to enhance their critical infrastructure security and resilience (CISR) posture.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization identifies cyberattacks against
critical infrastructure as a possible instability situation, defined as a future
event significant enough to reach the threshold requiring the Alliance to use
military forces.1 As national and societal functions rely heavily on information
technology, improving cybersecurity has become a signif icant element
of member states’ efforts to enhance national CISR. Similarly, NATO has
identif ied the important link between cybersecurity and the Alliance’s
1. NATO, Framework for Future Alliance Operations: 2018 Report (Norfolk, VA: Allied Command
Transformation, 2018), 15, https://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/media/doclibrary/180514_ffao18.pdf.
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ability to fulf ill its core tasks. At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, NATO
off icially recognized cyberspace as a domain of operations in which the
Alliance must “defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land, and
at sea.” 2 At Warsaw, the Allies also pledged to strengthen and enhance the
cyber defenses of national networks and critical infrastructure as a matter
of priority, highlighting that NATO as an organization is only as strong
as its weakest link. 3 NATO now serves as a venue in which Allies can
consult on cyber defense issues, share information on cyber threats,
exchange best practices, and coordinate activities including education, training,
and exercises.4
Depending on its scale and severity, a cyberattack against a NATO
member state’s critical infrastructure could be regarded in the same way
as an armed attack that would justify the targeted country’s right
to self-defense. 5 A destructive cyberattack also could lead Allies to invoke
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty—the mutual defense clause that states
an attack against one Ally is an attack against all Allies—though such
a decision would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-bycase basis. 6 In response to the evolving cyber threat landscape, NATO’s
stance against cyberattacks was further extended at the Brussels Summit
in 2021, where Allied leaders recognized that the impact of cumulative,
malicious cyber activities could amount to an armed attack.7 The term
cumulative implies several lower-impact cyberattacks by the same adversary
over time could be as destructive as a single, massive cyberattack. 8
Regarding cyber operations against adversaries, NATO doctrine introduces
a concept known as Sovereign Cyber Effects Provided Voluntarily
by Allies, a mechanism that allows individual member states to support
voluntarily other Allies’ offensive cyber capabilities in the case of armed
2. “Warsaw Summit Communiqué,” NATO (website), July 9, 2016, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq
/official_texts_133169.htm.
3. “Cyber Defence Pledge,” NATO (website), July 8, 2016, https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/official
_texts_133177.htm.
4. “Fact Sheet: NATO Cyber Defence,” NATO (website), August 2020, https://www.nato.int/nato_static
_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/8/pdf/2008-factsheet-cyber-defence-en.pdf.
5. Michael N. Schmitt, general ed., Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber
Operations, 2nd ed., managing ed. Liis Vihul (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 339–48.
6. “Wales Summit Declaration,” NATO (website), September 5, 2014, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq
/official_texts_112964.htm.
7. “Brussels Summit Communiqué,” NATO (website), June 24, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq
/news_185000.htm.
8. Stefan Soesanto, “When Does a ‘Cyber Attack’ Demand Retaliation? NATO Broadens Its View,”
Defense One (website), June 30, 2021, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/06/when-does-cyber-attack
-demand-retaliation-nato-broadens-its-view/175028/.
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conf licts, and outlines the procedures for defensive cyber operations,
including self-defense and collective defense.9
Although NATO is taking steps to improve its collective ability
to defend against and respond to cyberattacks against Allied critical
infrastructure, it should be kept in mind that individual member states form
the first line of defense. Thus, enhancing cyber defense capabilities and
enhancing CISR policies and procedures are the primary responsibilities
of each Ally. With these objectives in mind, this chapter aims to provide
an overview of the major cybersecurity issues surrounding critical infrastructure
with a special focus on industrial control systems (ICS). Based on this
understanding, the chapter will offer best practices and tools for critical
infrastructure stakeholders, owners, and operators to protect their systems
and enhance security and resilience against cyberattacks.

An Overview of Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
To understand cybersecurity requires a proper knowledge of ICS.
The term ICS includes various control systems typically found in industrial
sectors and critical infrastructure. Also known as operational technology
(OT), an ICS consists of combinations of different control components
(electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, and pneumatic, for instance) to achieve
an industrial objective, such as manufacturing, transportation, or energy.10
Examples of ICS include power plants, electrical grids, water and water
treatment systems, energy transport, and railways. While an ICS can
be configured and operated in a variety of ways, there are three common
control systems that merit further explanation.11
 Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems
are used to control dispersed assets centrally. Typical examples
are water distribution, wastewater collection, power grids,
railways, and other public transportation systems.

9. NATO Standardization Office, Allied Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations, Allied Joint Publication
3.20 (Brussels: NATO, 2020), 5, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/allied-joint-doctrine
-for-cyberspace-operations-ajp-320.
10. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
Security (Washington, DC: Department of Commerce, 2015), B-8, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs
/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf.
11.

NIST, Industrial Control Systems, 2-5–2-13.
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 Distributed control systems (DCS) manage continuous
production processes within the same geographic area.
Examples include oil ref ineries, water and wastewater
treatment facilities, power plants, chemical plants, and
pharmaceutical processing facilities.
 Programmable logic controllers (PLC) are devices that
control discrete processes, such as automobile assembly lines.
While a PLC is often used as a component for a SCADA
system or DCS, it can also be implemented as the primary
controller in a small ICS.
While actual ICS architectures vary widely based on the nature of the critical
infrastructure sector and type of facility, the Purdue reference architecture
is widely recognized as the standard model for common control systems.12
Having a model that depicts the control system architecture and shows
the various interconnections between technological components can help
organizations segment the various networks, develop zones with clear
boundaries, and create layers of cyber defense measures. The US Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) recommends this process of developing
a secure network architecture as a means to limit cyber threat actors’ ability
to exploit ICS, which is far easier when the systems are integrated and no zones
or boundaries exist.13 The Department of Homeland Security endorses
developing a layered cyber defense consisting of five unique zones, as outlined
in figure 14-1.14

12. Theodore Williams, “The Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture,” IFAC Proceedings 26, no. 2 (1993):
559–64, https://doi.org/10.1016/S1474-6670(17)48532-6.
13. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Recommended Practice: Improving Industrial Control
System Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies (Washington, DC: DHS, 2016), 16–20, https://us-cert.cisa
.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf.
14.

DHS, Recommended Practice, 18.
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Figure 14-1. ICS reference model
(Diagram by US Department of Homeland Security)

The first section, the enterprise security zone, is not directly related
to the ICS. This zone provides employees the connectivity to the Internet,
remote sites, and business networks that comprise the intranet, e-mail
servers, web servers, and other business systems. The enterprise security zone
is also known as the informational technology (IT) system. See chapter
3 for its helpful explanation of operational and informational technology
[OT and IT] systems. Next, the manufacturing security zone is where a
vast majority of monitoring and control takes place. Depending on the size
of the ICS, this zone may contain multiple cell zones. The third section,
the cell zone, contains local human-machine interfaces (HMI), controllers, and
field devices to be monitored and controlled. The HMI is a desktop computer
with control software through which operating personnel manipulate
the ICS. The cell zone also may include a safety instrumented system,
which is a special controller designed to automatically take actions in the event
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of dangerous conditions like excessive pressure or temperature. Fieldbus protocols
with hard wiring are t y pically used bet ween f ield devices and
controllers, whereas Ethernet is common between controllers and HMIs.
Finally, a demilitarized zone (DMZ) is a subnet work that acts
as an intermediary to protect the inside network. Within the ICS,
the DMZ is where the data historian, antivirus or patch, and remote access
gateway are located. A data historian is a time-series database to capture all
production and process data for monitoring and analysis troubleshooting.

Security Concerns in ICS
In the past, critical infrastructure facilities operated ICS strictly in a closed
network environment. To ensure real-time monitoring and efficient and effective
resource planning at the enterprise level, however, the prevalent practice
in modern critical infrastructure is to operate ICS in a more open,
interconnected network with business networks. Examples of business
applications that may connect to ICS include production planning and
scheduling applications, manufacturing execution systems, inventory
management systems, and maintenance management systems. 15
Furthermore, the Ethernet and other open standard technologies are also
becoming more prevalent in ICS. As a result, attackers can understand
and exploit system components more easily than they could in the past.
These realities raise security concerns because ICS are more vulnerable
to cyberattacks than ever before. When compared to IT systems, the following
system characteristics make it more challenging to secure ICS in the face
of the numerous vulnerabilities, risks, and threats in the cyber domain.16
 Timeliness and performance requirements. As ICS are usually
time-critical, security measures causing an unacceptable delay
and/or threatening the functionality of the system cannot
be deployed.
 Availability requirements. Patches cannot be applied
on time as they have to be tested thoroughly for stability and
reliability. Outages of systems to install patches typically must
be scheduled weeks in advance.
 Risk management requirements. Security measures that
impair safety are unacceptable.
15. Eric D. Knapp and Joel T. Langill, Industrial Network Security (Waltham, MA: Syngress, 2014), 20.
16.

NIST, Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) (2015), 2-14–2-17.

360

Chapter 14

Enhancing Cybersecurity of Industrial Control Systems

 Physical effects. As ICS have complicated physical processes,
good communications between experts in the control system
and the physical domain are necessary.
 System operation. Since ICS operating systems and networks
are often quite different from IT counterparts, they require
different skill sets, experience, and levels of expertise.
 Resource constraints. Many components are resourceconstrained in memory and processing power. As a result,
typical contemporary security capabilities may not apply.
 Communications. Communication protocols and media
for f ield devices (sensors and actuators) are different
from those used in IT environments and thus require
other specialties.
 Managed support. Given the fact that maintenance is often
performed by a single vendor, the use of third-party solutions
requires the vendor’s approval or the ICS will no longer
be under warranty.
 Component lifetime. The lifetime of the ICS components
is often over 15 years, while IT components require upgrades
and patches much more frequently.
 Component location. In some cases, ICS components may
be located at remote sites that require extensive transportation
effort to reach. Each site needs to be appropriately protected.
Beyond the limitations and restrictions in applying sufficient security
measures due to the inherent nature of ICS, there are also several security
concerns and problems commonly found in most ICS.

Vulnerabilities in ICS Components
According to a recent cybersecurity survey, organizations disclosed
893 vulnerabilities specif ic to their ICS in 2020—a steady increase
from the 672 reported in 2018 and the 716 in 2019.17 Surprisingly,
in 76 percent of these disclosed vulnerabilities, threat actors were able
to launch attacks without needing to be authenticated. These figures, however,
do not include v ulnerabilities found in common IT components,
such as employees’ personal desktops, servers, databases, and network switches.
17. Claroty Research Team, Claroty Biannual ICS Risk & Vulnerability Report: 2H 2020 (New York:
Claroty, 2020), 4–11, https://security.claroty.com/biannual-ics-risk-vulnerability-report-2H-2020.
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These components are predominantly commercial-off-the-shelf products
or custom-made models based on these products. Traditionally, vendors have
not considered security an integral part of a product development process,
but this dynamic is changing. Despite the recent rise in concern regarding
security of control system components during product development, the level
of security in ICS lags behind and is not as comprehensive when compared
to the security of IT products.18 Therefore, there are many weaknesses
in ICS components, including susceptibility to denial-of-service attacks and
lack of security checks for firmware updates. Even IT components used
in control systems are often conf igured to enable insecure services,
such as Telnet, by default.19

ICS Components Exposed to the Internet
Many ICS components are connected to the Internet without proper
security measures like firewalls or remote access gateways. In 2019, a search
on Shodan—a special search engine often used to find devices connected
to the Internet—revealed more than 2.6 million ICS components around the
globe were connected to the Internet. 20 Most of these devices were likely used
in schools for research or by small private companies. Poor security practices
or breaches in security protocols (such as opening a firewall port for remote
access and then forgetting to close it or connecting to the Internet intentionally
to reduce work burdens) may occur even in national critical infrastructure,
making these facilities and organizations equally vulnerable.

Connection with Business Systems
According to the SANS Institute’s 2019 survey of 338 organizations,
57 percent connected their ICS to business systems while 35 percent connected
their ICS to the Internet either through the DMZ or directly. 21 When such
a connection is inevitable, it must be secured to prevent malicious traffic
from entering the ICS network. A firewall can be used for this purpose,
but a unidirectional network device—a special security gateway that is also
18.

DHS, Recommended Practice, 4.

19. Joseph Weiss, Protecting Industrial Control Systems from Electronic Threats (New York: Momentum
Press, 2010), 29.
20. David Hasselquist, Abhimanyu Rawat, and Andrei Gurtov, “Trends and Detection Avoidance
of Internet-Connected Industrial Control Systems,” IEEE Access 7 (2019): 155504–12, https://doi.org
/10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2948793.
21. Barbara Filkins, SANS 2019 State of OT/ICS Cybersecurity Survey (Rockville, MD: SANS Institute,
2019), 12.
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known as a data diode—is the optimal solution because it is allows data
to travel in only one direction. 22 Organizations may also consider using
an intrusion detection system (IDS). If such security devices are in place,
however, there is still a risk of allowing malicious traffic due to misconfiguration.
Moreover, an IDS cannot be used if the control system vendor does not
approve because of potential degradation in network performance. An IDS
is more commonly found in IT networks than in ICS networks and, even when
installed, it may not be able to fully understand ICS protocols. 23

Outdated Components
As an ICS typically has a very long lifespan, it is common to find ICS
components already past end of life, such as when HMIs run on outdated
programs like Windows XP or 7. Even if organizations want to upgrade
old components, they cannot be upgraded if application software does not
support the latest operating system or the vendor does not guarantee reliability
after an upgrade. Installing antivirus programs on old desktops may not
be feasible because of performance and stability issues. Moreover, when old hardware
is damaged, it may not be easy to find replacement options that meet the
same specifications.

Remote Access to Control Networks
With the recent development of cloud technology, cloud-based management
services for IT systems have emerged, and similar movements are also emerging
for ICS. According to the 2019 SANS survey previously cited, more than
40 percent of respondents used cloud-based services for their ICS.
Respondents gave three main reasons for why they used these services:
(1) remote monitoring, (2) configuration, and (3) analysis, which accounted
for 44 percent of the reported uses. 24 Regardless of the types of outsourced
services, all remote accesses must be controlled in a highly secure manner.

Insecure Nature of ICS Protocols
All major fieldbus protocols—such as Modbus, DNP3, Profinet, and
EtherCAT—are susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks because they
generally lack suff icient authentication or encryption. 25 Such attacks
can disrupt network operations or manipulate input-output messages
22.

NIST, Industrial Control Systems, 5–21.

23. European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), Communication Network Dependencies for ICS/
SCADA Systems (Athens: ENISA, 2016), 30, https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/ics-scada-dependencies/.
24.

Filkins, OT/ICS Cybersecurity Survey, 13–14.

25.

Knapp and Langill, Industrial Network Security, 166.
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to cause failure. Protocol gateways, including serial-to-Ethernet converters,
that translate one ICS protocol to another could provide an additional attack
vector as they may contain security f laws and vulnerabilities. 26

Major Cyber Incidents
Due to insecure configuration and management, cyber incidents in ICS
have unfortunately become a common occurrence. This section will now
examine some of the significant cyberattacks that targeted ICS.

Stuxnet (2010)
The most historic cyber incident associated with ICS was the infection
of Iran’s nuclear program with Stuxnet, a worm designed to penetrate
air-gapped control networks via USB f lash drives and then propagate
through self-replication. The Stuxnet worm, which was discovered in 2010,
precisely targeted the centrifuges used in Iran’s uranium enrichment process
to change the frequencies of the frequency converters covertly that adjust
motor speed. It is activated only when the same software—namely, Siemens
WinCC and Step7—and frequency range as the Iranian facility are found. 27
While the physical consequences of Stuxnet were limited in that Iran took
just one year to recover fully from the effects of the attack, this incident
demonstrated that separating the ICS network from the Internet can no longer
be considered a sufficient security measure. 28

BlackEnergy (2011)
In 2014, the US Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response
Team (ICS-CERT) alerted that BlackEnergy malware had been targeting users
of HMI products, such as GE Cimplicity, Advantech/Broadwin WebAccess,
and Siemens WinCC, since 2011. 29 Attackers targeted the Internet-connected
HMIs and then exploited a vulnerability of the software to install BlackEnergy
26. Marco Balduzzi et al., Lost in Translation: When Industrial Protocol Translation Goes Wrong
(Irving, TX: Trend Micro, 2020), 48–49, https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Wednesday/us-20-Balduzzi-Industrial
-Protocol-Gateways-Under-Analysis-wp.pdf.
27. William Maclean, “Stuxnet Study Suggests Iran Enrichment Aim: Experts,” Reuters (website),
November, 16, 2010, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-security-cyber-stuxnet-idUSTRE6AF2F320101116.
28. Marie Baezner and Patrice Robin, “CSS Cyber Defense Hotspot Analysis Issue 4: Hotspot
Analysis: Stuxnet,” Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich (website), October 2017, https://css.ethz.ch
/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Cyber-Reports-2017-04.pdf.
29. “ICS Alert: Ongoing Sophisticated Malware Campaign Compromising ICS (Update E),”
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) (website), July 22, 2021, https://us-cert.cisa.gov
/ics/alerts/ICS-ALERT-14-281-01B.
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malware. Although no malicious activity was identified, the malware could
have damaged, modif ied, or disrupted the targeted systems. A security
company found that some of the command and control (C2) servers used
in this attack were the same as those used by the Russian Advanced
Persistent Threat (APT) group known as Sandworm. 30 In July 2021,
the US government officially attributed the BlackEnergy attack to Russian
nation-state cyber actors. 31

Havex (2013)
The Russian APT group known as Dragonf ly used Havex in a cyber
espionage campaign targeting ICS in a variety of countries, including
several NATO member states. 32 Havex is a remote access Trojan that
leveraged the Open Platform Communications—the data exchange protocol
bet ween Windows systems and controllers—to collect information
on the targeted devices. The attackers Trojanized software available
for download from three ICS manufacturer websites and gained access
to the networks of systems that had installed the software. 33 A security
company later found 88 variants were communicating with 146 C2 servers,
which made connections with 1,500 different Internet Protocol addresses,
each of which represents a possible victim of the attack. 34 Although the primary
usage of Havex was espionage, its C2 server could have also been used in other
attacks. 35 In 2021, the US government attributed the Havex attacks to Russia. 36

German Steel Mill (2014)
According to the annual report issued in 2014 by Germany’s Federal Office
for Information Security (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik,
or BSI), unspecif ied threat actors attacked a German steel mill,
compromising individual ICS components and causing a furnace to shut down
30. Kyle Wilhoit and Jim Gogolinski, “Sandworm to Blacken: The SCADA Connection,” Trend Micro (blog),
October 16, 2014, https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/sandworm-to-blacken-the
-scada-connection/.
31.

“Ongoing Sophisticated Malware Campaign.”

32. Symantec, Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks against Energy Suppliers (Mountain View, CA: Symantec,
2014), 5, https://docs.broadcom.com/doc/dragonfly_threat_against_western_energy_suppliers.
33. “ICS Advisory (ICSA-14-178-01): ICS Focused Malware,” CISA (website),updated on July 20, 2021,
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/ICSA-14-178-01.
34. Daavid Hentunen and Antti Tikkanen, “Havex Hunts for ICS/SCADA Systems,” F-Secure Labs
(website), June 23, 2014, https://archive.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html.
35. “ICS Alert (IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01): Cyber-Attack against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure,”
CISA (website), updated July 20, 2021, https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/alerts/IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01.
36.

“ICS Focused Malware.”
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in an abnormal manner. 37 The attackers used spear-phishing e-mails to steal
login credentials and then used them to gain access to the mill’s control system.

Ukraine Blackout (2015)
The Ukraine blackout in December 2015, which caused electricity
disruption to 225,000 people in western Ukraine for up to six hours,
was the first known successful cyber intrusion to take a power grid off line and
one of the most severe incidents in cybersecurity history. The attackers,
part of the Sandworm group, conducted a remote intrusion into three power
distribution companies. 38 The attackers reportedly used spear phishing
to obtain credentials in advance, which enabled the intrusion into the
companies and then to the various substations. 39 Moreover, they infected
Windows systems with KillDisk malware to erase f iles and the master
boot record and corrupted the firmware of serial-to-Ethernet converters
at substations to make them inoperable. As with the BlackEnergy and Havex
attacks, the US government also attributed the 2015 blackout to Russia.40

RWE’s Nuclear Power Plant, Germany (2016)
Computer viruses Conficker and W32.Ramnit were discovered in German
utility company RWE’s nuclear power plant near Munich in April 2016.
The infected system was a computer used to view the movement of nuclear fuel
rods, but the infection did not cause any harm as the plant was disconnected
from the Internet.41 The same malware was found on 18 removable drives
used for office computers, implying that at least one of the office drives was
inserted into the infected system. The official investigation also concluded
the malware probably came from a USB drive.42

37. Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), Millionenfacher Identitätsdiebstahl
in Deutschland (Bonn: BSI, 2014), https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/
Lageberichte/Lagebericht2014.pdf.
38. Michael Assante, “Confirmation of a Coordinated Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid,” SANS
Institute (website), January 6, 2016, https://www.sans.org/blog/confirmation-of-a-coordinated-attack-on
-the-ukrainian-power-grid/.
39. “Cyber-Attack against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure.”
40. “Cyber-Attack against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure.”
41. Christoph Steitz and Eric Auchard, “German Nuclear Plant Infected with Computer Viruses, Operator
Says,” Reuters (website), April 26, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclearpower-cyber-germany
/german-nuclear-plant-infected-with-computer-viruses-operator-says-idUSKCN0XN2OS.
42. “Virus in the Gundremmingen Nuclear Power Plant Came from a USB Stick,” CIO (website),
June 3, 2016, https://www.cio.de/a/amp/virus-im-akw-gundremmingen-kam-ueber-usb-stick,3229370.
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CrashOverride (2016)
During its cyberattack against a Ukrainian substation in December
2016 that caused a small-scale power outage, the Sandworm group used
CrashOverride malware (also known as Industroyer).43 This attack, like the
several of the previous examples, was later attributed to Russian nation-state
cyber actors.44 Although this cyberattack was smaller in scale and duration
than the one that caused the Ukraine blackout, CrashOverride was developed
to create a far more widespread outage than the one that occurred in 2015.
The CrashOverride malware has capabilities to issue malicious commands
directly to remote terminal units—the controllers used for SCADA systems
(such as power grids)—by exploiting the lack of authentication and authorization
in the ICS protocol. The malware can also prevent legitimate communications
with f ield devices, cause the shutdown of a relay, and employ its wiper
module to render windows system inert and thus require a rebuild or backup
restoration.45 After the Stuxnet attack, the use of CrashOverride malware
in 2016 is only the second known case of malicious codes intentionally
built to disrupt physical systems. For a more detailed explanation and
assessment of cyberattacks on Ukraine’s power grid, see the overview provided
in chapter 5.

TRITON (2017)
Following the mysterious shutdown of an entire petrochemical plant
in Saudi Arabia in 2017, the subsequent investigation found the attackers gained
remote access to an engineering workstation—a computer used for configuring
a safety instrumented system (SIS)—using TRITON malware. TRITON,
also known as TRISIS, is a malware that attacks the Triconex SIS fabricated
by the company Schneider Electric. The TRITON malware allowed
the attackers to reprogram the SIS, causing the controllers to shut down
automatically.46 Although it is not certain who is responsible for the cyberattack,
evidence suggests Russia’s Central Scientific Research Institute of Chemistry
and Mechanics supported the development of TRITON.47 In October 2020,
43.

Assante, “Confirmation of a Coordinated Attack.”

44. “Alert (TA17-163A): CrashOverride Malware,” CISA (website), updated on July 20, 2021,
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-163A.
45.

“Alert: CrashOverride Malware.”

46. Blake Johnson et al., “Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework ‘TRITON’ and Cause
Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure,” FireEye (blog), December 14, 2017,
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/attackers-deploy-new-ics-attack-framework-triton.html.
47. FireEye Intelligence, “TRITON Attribution: Russian Government-Owned Lab Most Likely Built
Custom Intrusion Tools for TRITON Attackers,” Mandiant (website), October 23, 2018, https://www.mandiant
.com/resources/triton-attribution-russian-government-owned-lab-most-likely-built-tools.
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the US Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on this Russian
research institution for its involvement with TRITON.48

Water Treatment Plant, United States (2021)
In February 2021, an unidentified attacker hacked the water treatment
plant in Oldsmar, Florida. After accessing the plant remotely, the attacker
tried to increase the level of sodium hydroxide in the water supply
to 100 times greater than normal. Fortunately, operating personnel quickly
spotted this abnormality and returned the sodium hydroxide to the normal
level. The investigation later found the attacker accessed the system via remote
access software called TeamViewer, which plant employees had installed and
used to check system status and respond to alarms.49 City officials noted that
automated safeguards, such as pH testing, would have triggered an alarm
before anyone was harmed, even if the employee had not noticed and stopped
the attack. 50 The incident clearly showed, however, that sabotage attacks
targeting national critical infrastructure could occur at any moment. For more
information on the Oldsmar cyberattack, see chapter 8.

Colonial Pipeline (2021)
Colonial Pipeline, the largest pipeline company in the United States,
had to shut down its 5,500-mile pipeline on the east coast for six days due
to the ransomware attack by the Russian criminal group called DarkSide. 51
Since the pipeline typically transported more than 110 million gallons
of fuel per day, the attack had devastating results: 88 percent of gas stations
in Washington, DC, ran out of fuel as did more than 50 percent of gas
stations in South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia. 52 Although the
attack was targeted at IT systems only, the company had to halt its pipeline
operation because it could not bill its customers. The fundamental issue

48. “Treasury Sanctions Russian Government Research Institution Connected to the Triton Malware,”
US Department of Treasury, October 23, 2020, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1162.
49. CISA, “Alert (AA21-042A): Compromise of U.S. Water Treatment Facility,” February 12, 2021,
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-042a.
50. Andy Greenberg, “A Hacker Tried to Poison a Florida City’s Water Supply, Officials Say,” Wired
(website), February 8, 2021, https://www.wired.com/story/oldsmar-florida-water-utility-hack.
51. “FBI Statement on Compromise of Colonial Pipeline Networks,” Federal Bureau of Investigation
(website), May 10, 2021, https://www.f bi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/f bi-statement-on-compromise
-of-colonial-pipeline-networks.

52. Jonathan Garber, “Colonial Pipeline Fiasco Foreshadows Impact of Biden Energy Policy,” Fox Business
(website), May 15, 2021, https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/colonial-pipeline-fiasco-foreshadows-impact-of
-biden-energy-policy.
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with this incident is that the data necessary for pipeline operations should not
be resident on the IT network. 53

Security Recommendations for ICS
To defend against cyberattacks targeting a critical infrastructure’s
ICS, organizations need to have good cyber hygiene practices and properly
implemented defensive techniques.54 This section provides an overview of basic
cyber hygiene practices and recommended ICS security measures.

Basic Cyber Hygiene Practices
As a fundamental principle of cybersecurity, proper cyber hygiene
establishes simple and routine measures to reduce risks from cyber threat
actors. 55 In the United Kingdom, a government report in 2015 indicated
that 80 percent of cyberattacks could have been prevented if organizations
had implemented simple security controls. 56 Although this percentage is not
specific to attacks against an organization’s ICS, a similar 80-20 rule can
be equally applied. Most of the incidents mentioned above were due
to inadequate security practices, such as connecting an ICS to the Internet
or business network without proper security measures, leaving remote
access points open without monitoring, and lack of security controls
over removable drives.
There is no clear scope for cyber hygiene. According to a survey
on cyber hygiene practices conducted by the European Union Agency
for Cybersecurity (ENISA), cyber hygiene generally includes these
common practices. 57
 Identification of hardware and software to determine what
to manage.
 Application of secure configuration and hardening for all
devices.
53. Joe Weiss, “The Colonial Pipeline Cyberattack—Did IT/OT Convergence Contribute to the Attack,”
Control Global (blog), May 11, 2021, https://www.controlglobal.com/blogs/unfettered/the-colonial-pipeline
-cyberattack-did-itot-convergence-contribute-to-the-attack/.
54.

“Alert: CrashOverride Malware.”

55. ENISA, Review of Cyber Hygiene Practices (Athens: ENISA, 2016), 5, https://www.enisa.europa
.eu/publications/cyber-hygiene/.
56. Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, “Cyber Security Boost for UK Firms,” GOV.UK
(website), January 16, 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cyber-security-boost-for-uk-firms.
57. ENISA, Review of Cyber Hygiene Practices, 15.
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 Patching systems to keep them current.
 Management of inbound and outbound data.
 Scanning of all incoming e-mails.
 Minimization of the number of administrative accounts.
 Conduct of regular data backup.
 Establishment of an incident response plan.
 Enforcement of security across the supply chain.
 Placement of appropriate securit y controls in any
service agreements.
Similar to these recommended measures in the EU, the US Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) published its Cyber Essential
Starter Kit in 2021 to promote basic cyber hygiene practices and a strong culture
of cyber readiness. The CISA guide highlights essential steps
for an organization to establish cyber readiness in six key areas: management,
employees, critical systems, surroundings, data, and an incident
response plan. 58

Essential Cybersecurity Measures Specific to ICS
As Allies and partners consider how to enhance their cybersecurity posture,
there are many guidelines, references, and standards that ICS operators
and system integrators can refer to for ICS cybersecurity next steps and
recommendations. Representing a spectrum of perspectives and best practices
employed in various NATO member states, such documents include:
 Canada and the United States: North American Electric
Reliability Corporation’s Critical Infrastructure Protection
Standards 59
 EU: ENISA’s Protecting Industrial Control Systems 60

58. CISA, Cyber Essential Starter Kit (Washington, DC: CISA, 2021), 2, https://www.cisa.gov/sites
/default/files/publications/Cyber%20Essentials%20Starter%20Kit_03.12.2021_508_0.pdf.
59. “CIP Standards,” North American Electric Reliability Corporation (website), accessed on
November 5, 2021, https://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/CIPStandards.aspx.
60. ENISA, Protecting Industrial Control Systems (Athens: ENISA, 2011), https://www.enisa.europa.eu
/publications/protecting-industrial-control-systems.-recommendations-for-europe-and-member-states/.
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 France: The National Cybersecurity Agency’s (ANSSI)
Detailed Measures: Cybersecurity for Industrial Control
Systems 61
 Germany: Federal Office for Information Security’s (BSI)
ICS Security Compendium 62
 International: International Electrotechnical Commission
62443 standard series, which currently includes nine
standards, technical reports, and technical specifications
to secure industrial automation and control systems 63
 United States:
 DHS’s Cata log of Control Systems Securit y:
Recommendations for Standards Developers 64
 DHS’s Recommended Practice: Improving Industrial
Control System Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth
Strategies 65
 National Institute of Standards and Technology’s Guide
to Industrial Control Systems Security 66
As these documents contain vast amounts of information, it is not feasible
to examine them more thoroughly in this chapter. Instead, a more helpful
framework for Allies and partners seeking to strengthen the security and
resilience of ICSs in their critical infrastructure is the Seven Steps to Effectively
Defend ICSs. After assessing the nearly 300 reported cyber intrusions in 2015,
this DHS report identifies seven essential security principles that could have

61. Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d’information (ANSSI), Detailed Measures: Cybersecurity
for Industrial Control Systems (Paris: ANSSI, 2014), https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/2014/01/industrial
_security_WG_detailed_measures.pdf.
62. BSI, ICS Security Compendium (Bonn: BSI, 2013), https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/
EN/BSI/ICS/ICS-Security_compendium.html.
63. “Understanding IEC 62443,” International Electrotechnical Commission (website), February 26, 2021,
https://www.iec.ch/blog/understanding-iec-62443.
64. DHS, Catalog of Control Systems Security: Recommendations for Standards Developers (Washington, DC:
DHS, 2011), https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CatalogofRecommendationsVer7.pdf.
65.

DHS, Recommended Practice.

66. NIST, Guide to Industrial Control Systems.
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prevented 98 percent of these incidents. 67 The principles and corresponding
security measures outlined in the DHS report are listed below. 68
 Implement application whitelisting. This step allows only
applications and programs predesignated by an administrator
to execute, effectively preventing the execution of malware.
 Ensure proper conf iguration and patch management.
Since unpatched systems are more vulnerable to adversaries,
this step emphasizes the import and implementation
of trusted patches. It includes tracking required patches
for each IT asset, obtaining updates from verified sources,
validating their authenticity against digital signatures and
hash values, testing them on a system equipped with malware
detection features, and limiting the connection of external
laptops to ICS.
 Reduce attack surface areas. To minimize vulnerabilities,
this step seeks to isolate the ICS network from any
untrusted networks, lock down all unused ports, disable all
unused services, limit external connectivity, use one-way
communications for external connectivity if applicable, and
employ measures such as restricting a network port or path
when bidirectional communications are necessary.
 Build a defendable environment. To limit damages due
to breaches of the network, this step calls for segmenting
networks into smaller logical enclaves (virtual LANs),
restricting host-to-host communications paths, and using
a secure means for data transfer from control networks
to business networks.
 Manage authentications. Since adversaries seek to gain
control of legitimate credentials, this step aims to limit
this illegitimate access. Key steps include implementing
multifactor authentications when possible, granting users the
fewest privileges required to complete duties, enforcing strong
password management policies, and not sharing authentication
servers between ICS and business networks when centralized
authentication is used.
67. DHS, Seven Steps to Effectively Defend ICSs (Washington, DC: DHS, 2015), 1–2, https://us-cert.cisa.gov
/sites/default/files/documents/Seven%20Steps%20to%20Effectively%20Defend%20Industrial%20Control%20
Systems_S508C.pdf.
68. DHS, Seven Steps to Defend ICSs, 2–5.
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 Implement secure remote access. To counter adversarial
attempts to gain unauthorized access to ICSs, this step
aims to remove remote access wherever possible. Important
actions include limiting any access that remains continuously,
implementing read-only access using hardware-t ype
unidirectional network devices, requiring remote access
to be time limited and controlled by operating personnel,
applying the same remote access paths for vendors and
employees, and using two-factor authentication with different
types of tokens.
 Monitor and respond. In the modern cyber operating
environment, active monitoring is essential. This step
recommends monitoring Internet Protocol traffic on ICS
boundaries and within the ICS networks, using host-based
security solutions to detect malicious software, reviewing
login activities to detect stolen credential usage, monitoring
changes in access controls, and establishing a sound
response plan.
Regarding current threats and vulnerabilities, and the corresponding
security measures to mitigate them, various organizations worldwide—
including cybersecurity authorities, computer emergency response teams,
computer security incident response teams, ICS vendors, and security
companies—are continuously issuing advisories, warnings, alerts, and reports.
ICS operators and system integrators can stay up to date on evolving cyber
threats and appropriate security measures by referencing these documents.

Risk Management for ICS Cybersecurity
The process of risk management is a fundamental task to achieve
cybersecurity because it can identify assets that are exposed to risks, assess
the level of these risks, implement appropriate measures commensurate
with the levels of risks, and continuously monitor and manage the effectiveness
of these mitigation steps. When considering risk management practices
for IT systems in general—not ICSs in particular—perhaps the most
authoritative standard document is Information Security Risk Management
(ISO/IEC 27005). 69 This document supplements Information Security
Management Systems—Requirements, the international standard for establishing,
69. Information Security Risk Management, ISO/IEC 27005 (Geneva: International Organization
for Standardization, 2018), https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso-iec:27005:ed-3:v1:en.
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implementing, operating, monitoring, and maintaining IT security.70 As depicted
in Information Security Risk Management, the general risk management process
consists of five essential steps, which are outlined below.
 Context establishment. This steps involves preparation
activities, such as setting basic criteria, defining the scope,
and establishing a risk management team. The basic criteria
include risk evaluation criteria (how to evaluate risks), impact
criteria (how to measure impacts), and risk acceptance criteria
(thresholds for a desired target level of risk).
 Risk identification. This stage begins with the identification
of assets, to include hardware, software, data, information,
systems, and process. Then it proceeds with identifying
the following information: threats to these assets, existing
countermeasures, vulnerabilities that threats can exploit, and
potential consequences or damage that could result.
 Risk analysis. This step can be performed in varying degrees
of detail. Its methodology can be qualitative—the magnitude
and likelihood of an incident are described as low, medium,
or high—or quantitative, which uses numerical values
rather than descriptions. A combination of likelihood and
consequence determines the level of risk for each incident.
 Risk evaluation. This stage helps determine whether risk
treatment activities should be carried out for each risk and
prioritizes the activities in order of risk level.
 Risk treatment. There are four options available for risk
treatment. First, risk modification looks to implement security
measures to mitigate risks to an acceptable level by referencing
a set of standards and best practices. Next, risk retention
accepts risks only when the consequences are negligible
or within a range of tolerated outcomes. Third, risk avoidance
leads stakeholders to change conditions or cease activities that
encounter risks. Finally, risk sharing employs methods like
insurance to prepare for residual risks that remain.
Information Security Risk Management recommends organizations perform
the risk management process iteratively, starting from an initial high-level
assessment to succinctly identify the most critical risks with a broader view.
70. Information Security Management Systems—Requirements, ISO/IEC 27001 (Geneva: International
Organization for Standardization, 2013), https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso-iec:27001:ed-2:v1:en.
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Organizations should then perform a detailed assessment that comprehensively
analyzes assets, vulnerabilities, threats, and consequences in the second iteration
and beyond. Furthermore, organizations should perform risk management
regularly, given the evolving nature of the modern security environment.
See the thorough explanation of the risk assessment and management process
outlined in chapter 13.

Risk Assessment Methodology for ICS
In 2020, the International Electrotechnical Commission published the
international standard for ICS risk assessment—Security Risk Assessment
for System Design (IEC 62443-3-2)—and adopted it as part of the broader
Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems series.71 A key
concept in Security Risk Assessment for System Design is the consideration
of ICS zones and conduits. A zone is a collection of logical and physical assets
posing the same characteristics from the perspective of security requirements,
criticality, and logical and physical relationships. A conduit is a logical grouping
of communications channels that have the same security requirements,
and each conduit represents the connection between two or more zones.
Another distinguishing aspect of IEC 62443-3-2 is that it utilizes the
concept of security level (SL)—a measure of confidence that the ICS is free
from vulnerabilities and is functioning as intended—to assist organizations
in identifying required security measures. Derived from the international
standard System Security Requirements and Security Levels (IEC 62443-3-3),
a standard practice is to assign a label to each security measure ranging
from SL1 (basic securit y) to SL4 (most sophisticated securit y). 72
After assigning these labels, organizations then use them to identify
recommended security measures commensurate with their target level
of protection. For example, as for the security requirements related to
“system log storage capacity,” IEC 62443-3-3 suggests that using a storage
with sufficient capacity would be just sufficient for SL1 and that a warning
function against low disk space should be added to achieve SL2 or above.
Similar to the iterative approach used in Information Security Risk
Management, the ICS risk assessment process outlined in IEC 62443-3-2
is also divided into two levels, namely, initial risk assessment and detailed
71. Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems—Part 3-2: Security Risk Assessment
for System Design, IEC 62443-3-2 (Geneva: International Electrotechnical Commission, 2020),
https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/30727.
72. Industrial Communication Networks—Network and System Security—Part 3-3: System Security
Requirements and Security Levels, IEC 62443-3-3 (Geneva: International Electrotechnical Commission,
2013), https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/7033.
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risk assessment. The process for ICS risk assessment consists of seven steps,
which are described below and illustrated in figure 14-2.

Figure 14-2. Workflow diagram for ICS risk management
(Diagram by the International Electrotechnical Commission)

 Identif ication of system under consideration (SUC).
Step 1 identifies the SUC, including identification of the
ICS boundary, access points, and all ICS assets.
 Initial risk assessment. Step 2 identif ies the worstcase scenarios by assuming the likelihood of occurrence
to be 100 percent certain. The purpose of the initial assessment
is to identify and prioritize the areas for detailed assessments.
 Partitioning of the SUC into zones and conduits.
Step 3 includes a grouping of ICS assets based
on the initial assessment results so that assets with the
same characteristics are grouped into the same zones.
Organizations are recommended to group unordinary
devices (such as wireless devices and devices connected
to external networks) into separate zones because they require
special care.
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 Risk comparison. In Step 4, organizations determine
if an additional detailed risk assessment is required for the
SUC (or part of it) by comparing the initial assessed risk
to the level of risk the organization can tolerate. If the assessed
risk exceeds the tolerable risk, then the organization should
perform a detailed risk assessment.
 Detailed risk assessment. Step 5 builds on the previous
steps and goes into greater examination of the system, using
a series of micro-steps. Here, organizations (1) identify all
threats that could affect the assets within the zone or conduit,
(2) identify areas in which assets are vulnerable to these
threats, (3) develop a worst-case estimate of potential impacts,
(4) estimate the likelihood of such incidents occurring,
(5) assess the level of risk for each threat, (6) compare the
assessed risk to the tolerable risk to determine whether
to accept, transfer, or mitigate the risk, (7) assess residual
risks that remain after applying mitigation measures, and
(8) identify additional measures when the residual risks exceed
the tolerable risks.
 Documentation of security requirements, assumptions, and
constraints. Step 6 is about documenting all the findings
from previous steps. The cybersecurity requirements
specif ication contains the description of mandator y
security measures as well as details of the SUC, zones and
conduits, threat environments, organizational policies, and
tolerable risks.
 Asset owner approval. At the final step of each iteration
of risk assessment, asset owners in charge of the safety and
reliability of control processes review and approve the result.

Detailed Risk Assessment Approach
Since it provides an in-depth understanding of the nature of risks,
a detailed approach to risk assessment is at the heart of managing risks
to ICS and securing them more effectively. The risk assessment process
requires an organization to estimate the likelihood of a threat and impacts
of potential incidents for every pair of assets and threats. This process can
be tedious and consume time and resources because it requires tremendous
effort to have meaningful and valid results.
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Qualitative or descriptive measures such as high, medium, and low
can be used in estimation; however, they still require a detailed guideline
to reduce subjective and ambiguous judgments as much as possible.
Moreover, the impact has multiple attributes, requiring in-depth review
from various perspectives, such as an outage of service, loss of process
accuracy, and the impacts on health, safety, and environment. Once the
organization estimates the maximum potential magnitude of impact and its
likelihood for every asset-threat pairing, the organization can then determine
the level of risk.
Qualitative analysis, on the other hand, uses simple mapping logics
to determine the risk level. For instance, the risk is high if the likelihood
and impact are both assessed as high. These logics are generally
expressed in a matrix, called the risk matrix, with rows representing
qualitative values for likelihoods and columns representing qualitative values
of impacts. Quantitative analysis uses numerical metrics (such as annual loss
expectancy), which is the monetary loss amount multiplied by the probability
of occurrence. The measurement and assessment of risks serve as a basis
of deciding which risks to prioritize in order of importance.

Scenario-based Approach for Security Baseline
For organizations with no experience or expertise in detailed risk
assessment, the scenario-based risk mitigation approach may be helpful
as a starting point toward developing more robust and effective
ICS cybersecurity. This approach considers past incident cases or potential
scenarios to identify required security measures to prevent such incidents
from occurring. It can also be used to assess the effectiveness of the current
security posture with relatively less time and resources.
Under the scenario-based approach, an organization first needs to identify
assets, zones, and conduits within the ICS, and then build a catalog of threat
scenarios applicable to them. To build a quality catalog of threat categories,
organizations can compile incident reports and security warnings or advisories
from various sources. Then, the organization should identify required security
measures by referencing best practices and standards or by brainstorming
with relevant stakeholders and experts. The next step is to evaluate the
feasibility of the identified security measures. When any specific security
measure cannot be implemented due to budget or technical restrictions,
the organization should seek alternative or compensating controls
(such as adding manual control procedures or physical controls).
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The key advantage of the scenario-based approach is that no additional
analysis skills are required for risk mitigation, so organizations can complete
this type of assessment more quickly than a detailed risk assessment.
The main disadvantage, however, is that some important risks could
be overlooked, especially those risk scenarios that have not occurred
elsewhere and thus are not considered as being in the realm of possible.73
Another disadvantage is that there is little justification for chosen security
measures from the viewpoint of cost-effectiveness because this approach does
not consider the impact and likelihood of incidents. A robust catalog of threat
scenarios could reduce these shortcomings to some extent.
When building a catalog of threat scenarios, Allies and partners may
find the MITRE Corporation’s Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common
Knowledge (ATT&CK) for Industrial Control System (ICS) quite helpful
as a tool and guide.74 MITRE started building the ATT&CK for IT systems
in 2013 and it is now widely accepted as a framework for documenting and
analyzing tactics and techniques used by cyberattackers. MITRE’s ATT&CK
for ICS, launched in 2020, contains details of 78 attack techniques that
threat actors employed in the wild along with corresponding mitigation
measures organizations can take to enhance their cybersecurity posture.
Another valuable source of information is the Top 10 Threats and
Countermeasures for ICS, which the German BSI began publishing in 2014
to highlight the most severe but common cyber threats and outline appropriate
security measures for organizations to adopt.75

Defending against Cyberattacks: Looking to the Future
The steps critical infrastructure owners and operators take to manage
security risks and threats in their respective operational environments are vital
to achieving cybersecurity. Their governments should also play a proactive role
to build resilience and prepare for potential cyberattacks at both the national
and international levels. The following section discusses the important efforts
governments should undertake.
73. Industrial Communication Networks—Network and System Security—Part 2-1: Establishing an Industrial
Automation and Control System Security, IEC 62443-2-1 (Geneva: International Electrotechnical Commission,
2010), 48, https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/7030.
74. “Techniques,” MITRE Corporation (website), January 2, 2020, https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics
/index.php/All_Techniques.
75. BSI, Industrial Control System Security Top 10 Threats and Countermeasures (Bonn: BSI, 2019),
https://www.allianz-fuer-cybersicherheit.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/Webs/ACS/DE/BSI-CS/BSI-CS
_005E.pdf.
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National-level Efforts for CISR
To varying degrees, national governments conduct cybersecurity governance

activities through central ministries or authorities, and develop and update
their respective cybersecurity strategies that stipulate necessary measures
to protect critical national infrastructure. In 2016, ENISA published a list
of good practices through a detailed analysis of various governance activities
across 15 EU member states. Some of the key practices that the report
recommends EU member states adopt are listed below.76
 Partnerships with private stakeholders. As private companies
manage many critical infrastructure systems and assets,
it is essential to have a strong partnership between the
government and the private sector in an institutional form,
such as a national critical infrastructure protection committee
or advisory meeting. See chapter 11 for its recommendations
for public-private partnerships.
 Information-sharing scheme. Cyber threat information should
be disseminated to all relevant government agencies and
private critical infrastructure operators through preestablished
information-sharing schemes. These established procedures
allow relevant stakeholders to obtain up-to-date information
promptly and take appropriate security measures.
 Develop the community of computer security incident
response teams. Establishing the institutional foundation
for cooperation among public and private response teams can
lead to mutual benefits, such as increased knowledge and more
efficient allocation of resources.
 Risk assessment. The government should guide and support
private operators to identify risks and implement security
measures as requested.
 Cyber crisis management. Cyber crisis management should
include the def inition of roles and responsibilities, and
decision-making procedures between relevant stakeholders.

76. ENISA, Stocktaking, Analysis and Recommendations on the Protection of CIIs (Athens: ENISA, 2016),
16–19, https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/stocktaking-analysis-and-recommendations-on-the
-protection-of-ciis/.
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 Comprehensive legal framework. Countries should have laws
and regulations pertaining to securing critical infrastructure
that stipulate the mandatory requirements for implementing
essential security measures and notification of cyber incidents.
All of the steps listed above are important, but the most vital practice
is information sharing. Private operators generally do not want their incidents
to be disclosed to the public, while national and military intelligence agencies
typically are reluctant to share their confidential information with the private
sector. To overcome this problem, it is necessary to build trust that the shared
information will never be leaked to other parties. The government should
establish a formal information-sharing policy, including a sanitization process
to remove sensitive content when disseminating information from a specific
operator to other operators. Additionally, signing a nondisclosure agreement
between parties can also build trust. For an in-depth discussion on helpful
information- and intelligence-sharing practices, see chapter 11.
For effective and efficient dissemination of information, the government
should use IT-based communications means. Depending on the size of the
country, there may be thousands of critical infrastructure facilities, making
the timely dissemination of threat information to all owners and operators
almost impossible with manual handling procedures. In most situations,
information technologies provide a more eff icient and timely venue
for multidirectional information sharing between the government and all
relevant stakeholders. There are two examples of such programs used in the
United States: the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) and
the Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS), operated by the DHS and the
CISA, respectively. The HSIN is an information portal for trusted information
sharing between federal, state, local, international, and private-sector partners.77
In contrast to the HSIN, the AIS is a real-time automated dissemination
mechanism that sends machine-readable cyber threat indicators of compromise—
artifacts observed on a network or operating system that indicate a cyber
intrusion—to the participants of the AIS community.78 Examples of these
indicators include Internet Protocol addresses, domain names of C2 servers,
and hash values of malware.
Beyond the recommendations in the ENISA report, two additional
best practices are the use of cyber exercises and supply-chain security.
Since critical infrastructure systems and sectors are highly interrelated,
77. “Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN),” DHS (website), December 3, 2021,
https://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-information-network-hsin.
78. “Automated Indicator Sharing,” CISA (website), accessed on October 23, 2021, https://www.cisa.gov/ais.
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an attack on a particular facility can affect other infrastructures rather
than simply being confined to the initial target of the attack. In particular,
attacks against the lifeline sectors (such as electricity and telecommunications)
may affect all other sectors. To prepare for national-level cyber crises,
the government should host exercises regularly with all relevant stakeholders.
These exercises should include the procedures of decision making and
communications across all government areas as well as the procedures
for individual operators to respond to cyberattacks and report them
to the government. Cyber Storm, which focuses on cyberattack crisis
management, is the largest cyber exercise in the United States. 79
Similarly, Cyber Europe is a large-scale cyber exercise that tests procedures,
communications, and decision making at the EU level. 80
Supply-chain security is a relatively new area of concern. The supply chain
of hardware and software used for critical infrastructure should be protected
against intentional and accidental modif ication that could be incurred
during entire life cycles of products, including development, delivery,
and maintenance. Malicious interference by a nation-state in cooperation
with manufacturers located in its territory—by implanting a backdoor
within IT/OT components, for example—is incredibly difficult to discover.
Moreover, criminal or terrorist groups can also cause harm to IT/OT
components by inf iltrating manufacturers’ development environments
to modify source codes. Therefore, the government should establish
a framework to screen the trustworthiness of manufacturers and ensure the
security of products for their entire life cycles.

International-level Efforts for CISR
International cooperation is also essential to protect critical
infrastructure because of the borderless nature of cyberspace. It is almost
impossible for a single country to thoroughly analyze cross-border attacks and
block further ones because attacks generally take place over multiple stages
across several countries. Moreover, one country may possess intelligence
that another country does not have. A complete analysis, investigation,
and attribution of an attack thus require close international cooperation.
Ideally, all government agencies involved in securing critical infrastructure
(such as the national cybersecurity authority, national and military intelligence
agencies, cyber commands, law enforcement agencies, and computer security
79. “Cyber Storm: Securing Cyber Space,” CISA (website), accessed November 3, 2021,
https://www.cisa.gov/cyber-storm-securing-cyber-space.
80. “Cyber Europe,” ENISA (website), accessed on November 3, 2021, https://www.enisa.europa.eu
/topics/cyber-exercises/cyber-europe-programme.
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incident response teams) should have close international cooperation
channels with relevant counterparts in foreign countries. Multilateral treaties
or agreements—like the Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of
Europe, also known as the Budapest Convention—can play a crucial role
since all members would be obliged to cooperate without having to make
separate bilateral agreements with each other. 81 The Budapest Convention,
currently signed by 66 countries, is the international treaty on cybercrimes
to obtain a series of powers and procedures required for law enforcement.
Article 23 of the convention stipulates that international cooperation
is to be provided among participants to the widest extent possible.
Likewise, participating in international malware information-sharing
platforms (MISP), such as the MISP sponsored by NATO and the EU,
will provide the participating countries with up-to-date global threat
information and relevant indicators of compromise on a real-time basis. 82
MISP is an open-source information-sharing platform developed by a team
of cybersecurity experts from the Computer Incident Response Center
in Luxembourg, the Belgian Ministry of Defense, and NATO. MISP can
share, store, and correlate indicators of compromise, threat intelligence,
vulnerability information, and even counterterrorism information. 83
Allies and partners may also consider participating in HSIN and AIS,
as access can be granted to non-US entities under certain conditions.
Areas for international cooperation are not limited to exchanging
threat information, sharing intelligence, and supporting investigations.
Instead, it should include exchanges of various cybersecurity know-how
and best practices, such as lessons learned from certain types of cyber
incidents, detailed information on technical cybersecurity measures, policies
for securing supply chains against cyber threats, and tools for assessing
an organization’s cybersecurit y level. As countries exchange such
information and provide technical support and consultation to one another,
if requested, their cooperation will help build common capabilities
to achieve cyber security, defense, and resilience at sufficient levels to secure
critical national infrastructure. International cooperation is of paramount
importance in general, but especially for EU member states, because many
81. “Details of Treaty No. 185,” Council of Europe (website), accessed November 3, 2021,
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/185.
82. “Who Is behind the MISP Project?,” MISP Threat Sharing (website), accessed on November 5, 2021,
https://www.misp-project.org/who/.
83. “What Is Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP)?,” Cyware (website), September 17, 2020,
https://cy ware.com/educational-guides/cyber-threat-intelligence/what-is-malware-information
-sharing-platform-misp-b28e.
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European critical infrastructure sectors and systems are interconnected.
The European power grid as well as oil and gas pipelines are two key
examples of this connectivity. 84 An incident in one country may affect other
countries, potentially leading to a cascade effect. See chapter 12 for more
detail on the nature of dependencies and interdependencies among critical
infrastructure sectors. 85

Conclusion
This chapter provided a brief overview of the characteristics of ICSs,
major cyber incidents against ICSs, essential cybersecurity measures, and risk
management methodologies. Cyber incidents against critical infrastructure
continue to occur due to inadequate security management practices,
system misconfigurations, and human errors. Since critical infrastructure
plays an important role in social well-being and national security,
operators should maintain a sense of mission to cybersecurity, keep vigilant
against cyberattacks and incidents, and make continuous efforts to strengthen
the systems.
Governments should also make tremendous efforts to protect their
critical infrastructure by establishing mandatory security requirements
for critical infrastructure, ensuring owners and operators comply
with these requirements, and providing security advice as needed.
In addition, governments should be transparent about security matters and
promptly share threat information with the critical infrastructure operators.
Government organizations, security companies, and manufacturers have
different capabilities and specialties. It is, therefore, necessary to create
an institutional cooperation mechanism (such as a public-private critical
infrastructure security council and a joint cyber response team) so stakeholders’
unique capabilities can be integrated at the national level. Each country
should also build trust with international partners and actively share
information and intelligence. This cooperation will allow like-minded
countries not only to detect, prevent, and investigate attacks in a timely
manner, but also to build a framework for international collaboration
in which they can work together to improve cybersecurity and resilience,
84. “ENTSOE-E Transmission System Map,” ENTSO-E (website), January 1, 2019, https://www.entsoe
.eu/data/map/; and “Europe Pipelines Map,” Theodora (website), March 31, 2017, https://www.theodora
.com/pipelines/europe_oil_gas_and_products_pipelines.html.
85.

ENISA, Communication Network Dependencies, 23–24.
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determine attribution for cyberattacks, and take harmonized actions
against threat actors who perpetrate them.
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Crisis Management and Response
Malcolm Baker

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization describes crisis management as the
“coordinated actions taken to defuse crises, prevent their escalation into armed
conflict and contain hostilities if they should result.”1 As such, crisis management
is an essential component of the Alliance’s Strengthened Resilience Commitment
announced in June 2021 as part of the NATO 2030 initiative. Integral to this
commitment is the philosophy of Article 3—Allies’ individual and collective
capacity to resist armed attack—and NATO’s ability to fulfill its three core tasks
of collective defense, cooperative security, and crisis management.2 This commitment
reemphasizes that resilience within NATO member states and partner countries
is both a “national responsibility and a collective commitment.”3 Specific to critical
infrastructure, the official announcement of NATO 2030 also references increasing
efforts to “ensure the resilience of our critical infrastructure (on land, at sea, in space
and cyberspace) and key industries, including by protecting them from harmful
economic activities.”4

1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standardization Office, NATO Glossary of Terms and
Definitions, AAP-06, Edition 2020 (Brussels: NATO, 2020), 36.
2. “Crisis Management,” NATO (website), October 8, 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics
_49192.htm.
3. “Strengthened Resilience Commitment,” NATO (website), June 15, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps
/en/natohq/official_texts_185340.htm?selectedLocale=e.
4.

“Strengthened Resilience Commitment.”
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Within the overall construct of resilience and NATO’s comprehensive
approach to its core missions, however, is the Alliance’s current philosophy of crisis
management keeping up with mainstream developments in contemporary crisis
management and thought leadership? More importantly, within the construct
of critical infrastructure security and resilience (CISR) efforts, is the NATO 2030
approach to crisis management still fit for purpose or could it be improved to meet
the future challenges of interconnected critical infrastructure systems?
In response to these questions, this chapter will examine the broad issue
of crisis management within the context of CISR programs at the Alliance’s
organizational level and among its Allies and partners. For example, how does
crisis management fit within the broader concept of resilience and therefore
CISR? The chapter will also explore how effective CISR measures can
be improved further by developing and implementing robust crisis management
structures and processes. Therefore, it is important when considering CISR and
crisis management to focus on the role that critical infrastructure plays within
NATO, its member states and partner nations, and the potential impacts
or consequences to NATO operations that can arise if critical infrastructure
services are hindered or otherwise unavailable. Finally, the chapter will review
new developments and emerging themes in resilience and crisis management,
and offer suggestions for how NATO could better align its activities in this
discipline to support NATO 2030.

Critical Infrastructure
As chapter 1 outlined in the beginning of this book, NATO Allied
Command Operations defines critical infrastructure as “a nation’s infrastructure
assets, facilities, systems, networks and processes that support the military,
economic, political and/or social life on which a nation and/or NATO
depends.” 5 This definition presents three different subcategories of critical
infrastructure—critical national infrastructure, mission-vital infrastructure,
and key infrastructure—to communicate the importance of these facilities
or services to national security and/or Allied operations.
By its def inition, critical infrastructure implies the essential supply
of services to a nation-state and its economy, communities, and citizens.
It follows, therefore, that any disruptive event that adversely affects critical
infrastructure will result in corresponding negative impacts on the continued
supply of these vital services. Many modern critical infrastructure facilities
5. Allied Command Operations (ACO), Infrastructure Assessment, ACO Directive 084-002 (Mons, BE:
ACO, 2019), 4.
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are highly dependent and interdependent on other critical infrastructure
sectors, and they rely upon power, telecommunications, and other services—
such as emergency services, law enforcement and potentially local, regional,
and state utility services—to function properly and efficiently. See the in-depth
discussion of dependencies and interdependencies in chapter 12.
Critical infrastructures are often complex, and over time they have become
more resilient to threats, hazards, and risks in general. State and national
programs have made progress in enhancing security of critical national
infrastructure assets and increasing their resilience to incidents, emergencies,
and crises. Each sector, however, tends to build its resilience in isolation
rather than holistically—a practice driven in part by those sectors subject
to state regulation.

Why Is Crisis Management and Response Important?
Since it provides services that impact modern life and national security,
critical infrastructure is economically important to NATO member
states and partner nations and to the citizens who rely on these services.
Critical infrastructure may be owned either by a state or by a corporate entity
in the private sector. In many cases, the state regulates or governs critical
infrastructure in terms of how it operates, what it produces, or what prices
it charges for the good and services it delivers. Therefore, chief executives,
board members, and company directors of a critical infrastructure facility
may answer to outside entities such as the state, government departments,
regulators, or investors.
Depending on the nature of the critical infrastructure or the sector
in which it operates, there may also be international treaties or other
multilateral agreements or conventions that govern how the organization
or facility should maintain services, safety, and security obligations.
Such treaties and conventions also place similar obligations on critical
infrastructure owners, managers, and operators, beyond their traditional roles
and responsibilities. Directors and board members may well have fiduciary
duties to manage organizations effectively and efficiently, including crisis
management and response plans when things go wrong.
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Incidents, Emergencies, and Crises: What Is the Difference?
The terms incident, emergency, and crisis are often used erroneously
as interchangeable or synonymous words to describe an event that occurs
or a scenario that unfolds. Although different, each of these terms is used
to explain negative or unwelcome consequences. Incidents, emergencies,
and crises can bring about not only negative consequences, but they can also
sometimes positive outcomes or opportunities for organizations.
Academics have long written about crises and crisis management and
developed definitions for what constitutes a crisis. NATO, however, does
not have an agreed or published def inition of a crisis. If NATO and its
member states and partners are to develop crisis management structures
and processes, then it is vital to share a common understanding of the
term crisis. Specifically, what types of scenarios are the Alliance, member
states, and partner nations seeking to manage, and how can these events—
whether they are incidents, emergencies, or crises—be managed or resolved
and their consequences be mitigated or minimized? Is there a one-size-fits-all
solution that could manage all events?
The academic literature offers multiple definitions of what makes a crisis.
Based on his extensive literature review, Patrick Lagadec describes the anatomy
of a crisis as a combination of uncertainty, unknowns, the unthinkable,
the unimaginable, and the unforeseeable. 6 Steven Fink def ines a crisis
as “an unstable time or state of affairs in which a decisive change
is impending—either one with the distinct possibility of a highly undesirable
outcome or one with a distinct possibility of a highly desirable and extremely
positive outcome.” 7 Another definition describes a crisis as “a damaging
event or series of events that display emergent properties which exceed
an organization’s abilities to cope with the task demands that it generates and
has implications that can effect a considerable proportion of the organization
as well as other bodies.” Denis Smith and Dominic Elliott explain further
how crises can manifest or are triggered by internal or external incidents that
expose an inherent latent vulnerability embedded with the organization. 8
These definitions are only three among a myriad of others offered in the

6. For additional information, see Patrick Lagadec, Preventing Chaos in a Crisis: Strategies for Prevention,
Control and Damage Limitation (London: McGraw-Hill, 1993).
7. Steven Fink, Crisis Management: Planning for the Inevitable (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse Inc., 2002), 15.
8. Denis Smith and Dominic Elliott, Key Readings in Crisis Management: Systems and Structures
for Prevention and Recovery (New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2006).
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academic literature, but Lagadec suggests personnel responsible for responding
to, and managing, a crisis need a more practical, less theoretical description.9
Therefore, in search of a more practical and real-world def inition
that suits the needs of readers, table 15-1 offers the following definitions
based on published crisis management guidance and best practices
in the United Kingdom.10
Table 15-1. Key definitions in UK crisis management
Incident

An adverse situation that might cause disruption, loss or emergency,
but which does not meet the organization’s threshold, or definition
of, a crisis.

Emergency

An incident that requires an immediate response to minimize loss
of life or serious injury/harm; or serious damage to property.

Crisis

An inherently complex, abnormal and unstable situation that due
to its scale, duration and impact threatens the organization’s strategic
objectives, operations, reputation or viability, or has strategic
implications for the organization.

Crisis management

The developed capability of an organization(s) to prepare
for, anticipate, respond to, and recover from crises.

These definitions are more likely to be understood by owners and operators
of critical infrastructure. Additionally, the definition of crisis management
here is more appropriate and relevant to critical infrastructure than the
NATO definition mentioned at the beginning of the chapter. The commitment
to strengthen resilience, which undergirds NATO 2030, envisions a broad
approach working across the “whole of government, with the private and
non-governmental sectors, with programmes and centres of expertise
on resilience established by Allies, and with our societies and populations,
to strengthen the resilience of our nations and societies.” 11 Given the Alliance’s
pursuit of the NATO 2030 initiative, understanding crisis management
exclusively in terms of armed conf lict and other hostilities may no longer
be appropriate or optimal, especially in when considering the various
physical, cyber, and hybrid threats outlined earlier in chapters 2–4.
Therefore, NATO 2030 presents an opportunity to renew the Alliance’s
9.

For additional information, see Lagadec, Preventing Chaos in a Crisis.

10. British Standards Institution (BSI), Crisis Management—Guidance and Good Practice: BS 11200:
2014 (London: BSI Standards Limited, 2014), 2.
11.

“Strengthened Resilience Commitment.”
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efforts to develop greater resilience and update how it views and exercises
civil-military cooperation and crisis management.
The def initions in table 1, based on a NATO member state’s
government-sponsored standards, may prove helpful and useful in supporting
NATO 2030. Developed as a result of learning from the experiences
of managing complex, interconnected, and interdependent crises
over a long period of time, they represent a modern and refreshed approach
to resilience and crisis management.
It is also benef icial to examine the nature of crises so that when
critical infrastructure stakeholders and decisionmakers face such events,
they understand the typical characteristics of a crisis and are better
postured to respond effectively. Table 15-2 highlights the unique nature
of crises by contrasting them with incidents or emergencies on the basis
of six characteristics.12
Table 15-2. Differences between crises and incidents or emergencies
Characteristics

Incidents/Emergencies
• Generally foreseeable and
managed with predetermined
response or contingency plans

Predictability

• The timing, extent, type of
incident, and its impact is variable
and unpredictable in terms of detail

Crises
• Often rare, unpredictable, and
inherently complex and unstable
• May escalate from the
mismanagement of events
• Pose strategic challenges that
threaten an organization’s survival
• Do not respond to emergency
plans and predetermined
responses

Onset

• Can occur suddenly with little or
no notice

• Can occur suddenly with little or
no notice or warning

• May emerge over time due to a
gradual failure or latent defect in
systems and processes

• Can form a rising tide event linked
to an incident that escalated and
now presents organizational threats
and strategic challenges

• Sometimes indicators and warning
of an issue can be monitored and
• May manifest due to latent
recognized as a potential trigger or
unresolved issues or systemic faults
actual problem
in the organization
• Present unparalleled reputational
challenges to the organization

12.

BSI, Crisis Management, 4.

392

Chapter 15

Crisis Management and Response

Table 15-2 (continued). Differences between crises and incidents
or emergencies
Characteristics

Incidents/Emergencies
• Duration of the event and requisite
response are usually short-lived

Urgency and
pressure

• Timely resolution prevents an
incident from exposing longer-term or
malign impacts of the organization

Crises
• Require greater sense of
organizational urgency and strategic
attention
• May manifest over weeks, months,
or longer
• Organization must work for a longer
period to mitigate and minimize
impacts

• Often occur with relative frequency

so that they are understood and
predictable
• Organizations often have

Complexity:
Scale, duration,
and impacts

predetermined plans and response
mechanisms that can be implemented
• May have wider impacts on occasion

• Can transcend organizational and
territorial boundaries
• Have potential and propensity to
disrupt multiple organizations or
different sectors (government, private
sector, or communities)
• Often associated with uncertainty
and little, imprecise, or ambiguous
information
• True extent and impact may not be

known immediately

• Mostly positive and supportive when
dealt with robustly and professionally
and resolved speedily

Reputation:
Media scrutiny and
public outcry

• Can be negative even if they are

resolved successfully

• Create intense, sustained public
attention and media interest
• Continued, negative coverage has
the potential to harm an organization’s
reputation

• Adverse coverage can escalate them • Social media and “citizen journalism”
into an organizational crisis
may increase inaccurate reporting
• Post-event inquiries, hearings, or
trials may prolong media interest

• Often resolved using predetermined
plans, procedures, and response
arrangements

Resolution:
Manageability with
existing plans and
procedures

• May include activities to preempt
an incident as well as mitigation, and
recovery
• In most cases adequate resources
are available

• Seldom resolved using
conventional, predetermined plans
and procedures due to their inherent
complexity, instability, infrequency,
and unpredictability
• Require flexible and innovative
strategic command and control over
sustained period of time
• May require more resources and
over a longer period
• Response should achieve strategic
objectives of all organizations involved
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Based on the characteristics outlined in table 2, it is clear crises are more
complex and challenging in terms of their nature and the steps required
to respond to them effectively. Figure 15-1 combines parts of different crisis
management models to provide a pictorial representation of the anatomy
of a crisis and the subsequent response phases.

Figure 15-1. Anatomy of a crisis

As figure 15-1 illustrates, the initiating event or trigger starts the response
process, but the event could be a slow burn or incremental event rather than
one with a sudden impact. The diagram represents a general depiction
to illustrate the key phases of a crisis. Achieving consolidation and control
over a crisis could take time—a point made all too clear during the outbreak
of the COVID-19 pandemic—and would be prolonged further by the public
inquiries and hearings that would likely follow.
With this foundation established for understanding the nature
of a crisis, it is now appropriate to consider the elements of responding
to and managing a crisis. In a helpful framework, Fink identifies the four key
stages in crisis management, explained in further detail below.13
 Prodromal crisis stage. This is the warning stage, sometimes
referred to as the pre-crisis stage. There is not always
a pre-crisis stage, as there are times when a crisis arrives
without any warning. If there is a warning, however, and
13. Fink, Crisis Management, 26.
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it is missed, then the next stage is possibly the first indication
that an organization is in a crisis. In figure 15-1, this stage
roughly equates to the events preceding the initiating event
and the trigger event itself.
 Acute crisis stage. This stage is sometimes described
as the “point of no return” because if an organization has not
reacted during the early warning stage, then it has lost that
opportunity. The organization may be able to control some
aspects of the crisis, however, by implementing mitigation
or damage limitation measures. The acute stage is synonymous
with the activation stage, initial and follow-on response
phases, and the consolidation phase in figure 15-1.
 Chronic crisis stage. This is the phase in which the
investigations, inquiries, and post-event reviews take place,
often leading to either recriminations and assigning blame
or to acknowledging successes and opportunities.
 Crisis resolution stage. This stage generally ref lects the
resolution of the crisis and, if successful, it should be as close
to the prodromal phase in terms of time. This stage signifies
the organization has recovered from the event.
Therefore, if a crisis cannot be managed by predetermined plans and
procedures or does not lend itself to successful resolution by applying
such measures, then it demonstrates the need for a different crisis
management construct. Indeed, a crisis management capability is required.
Figure 15-1 as a simplif ied model is consistent with Fink ’s framework
and answers Lagadec’s call for a less theoretical description of crisis
management. The key elements of effective crisis management are early
warning, an effective strategy, good communication, leadership, and swift
decision making.

Developing Crisis Management Capability
During the past decade, many countries have adopted a framework
similar to the UK concept of integrated emergency management to develop
their respective national resilience programs. Based on potential threats,
hazards, and risks, this concept embraces six stages: (1) anticipation,
(2) assessment, (3) prevention, (4) preparation, (5) response, and (6) recovery
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management.14 In many ways, this doctrine and approach can be applied
to building a crisis management capability, though the capability outputs
are different. Rather than developing incident and emergency response plans
as the products, applying this process in a similar manner assists in developing
a crisis management framework. This framework, in turn, helps establish
a management structure and process to manage crises effectively. NATO,
as an institution, and the armed forces of its member states, in general,
are well versed in the concept and practice of developing capability and
capacity. Capability development in crisis management can follow
established, recognized good practice in developing capability requirements,
identifying capability gaps, and determining the key steps required to build
capability and capacity.
Figure 15-2 provides NATO, its member state governments, and
private-sector entities (including owners and operators of critical
infrastructure) with a proven crisis management framework.15 Based on the
previous examination of the nature of a crisis in table 15-2, this framework
does not include the prevention stage found in the six-step concept
of integrated emergency management because crises can seldom be prevented.
The framework provides an iterative model that suggests continuous
improvement to the extent that organizations should always learn
from experience. The remainder of this section will discuss each phase
or stage of the framework.

Figure 15-2. A general framework for crisis management
(Diagram by the British Standards Institution)
14. Civil Contingencies Act Enhancement Programme: Emergency Preparedness (London: Cabinet Office,
2012), 16–18, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data
/file/61024/Chapter-1-Introduction_amends_16042012.pdf.
15.

BSI, Crisis Management, 9.
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Anticipate and Assess
These f irst two stages in the crisis management framework require
an organization (such as NATO, its member states, and partner countries,
or critical infrastructure owners and operators) to acknowledge and understand
the causal relationships between its strategic objectives, risk management,
and identified challenges to the organization. In effect, the organization
should have a well-defined and developed risk register. It is likely most Allies
or partners have already established a register similar to a National Risk
Register (NRR), including a list of identified and assessed risks to the state.
The failure to develop a reliable and meaningful appreciation of risk means
the organization will be inevitably prone to failure if a crisis occurs.
Typically, an all-hazards, all-threats approach would be appropriate
and allow a government to consider the full range of potentially disruptive
events it could face. See the discussion of an all-hazards, all-threats approach
in chapter 2. This process of anticipation includes identifying risks, assessing
likelihood or probability of occurrence, understanding the immediate impact,
and extrapolating the impact to understand the longer-term consequences.
As part of an organization’s risk assessment methodology, there should
be a well-developed, rigorous, and demonstrable horizon-scanning process,
together with active early warning, that ensures the organization recognizes
an identified risk at an early stage.
Horizon scanning provides Allies and partners with a useful tool
to assist in the development or updating of a National Risk Assessment (NRA).
Global events and crises may trigger or initiate the process of an organization
asking itself to what extent it is prepared if such a crisis occurred.
To develop NRRs and the NRA, governments typically build multidisciplinary
teams, assisted by relevant subject-matter experts according to the topic.
In the case of malicious threats, it would be prudent to include national
security, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies in the process.
Risk registers are built from the bottom up, effectively incorporating the
risks organizations and departments face at different levels of government.
States then compile and assess the risk registers at a national level to form
the NRR and identify the top-tier risks that should be included as the
foundation for the NRA. The NRRs and NRA form the basis of developing
an early warning system to identify the emergence of any of the top-tier risks,
aiming to respond to them before they manifest in a crisis.
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Prepare
The emphasis in the preparation stage should be to develop generic
or specific capabilities to enable an organization to respond to any situation.
The so-called “golden thread” running through this stage is the linkage
between the risk registers, the NRA (or the private sector, organizational
version of it), and the strategic blend of capabilities required for an effective
response. Here, a set of national resilience planning assumptions (NRPA)
is required. The NRPA—or a similar set of planning assumptions at the
organizational, owner, and operator levels of a critical infrastructure—
identif ies and predetermines a set of parameters against each risk.
These parameters may include, for example, estimates of likely fatalities,
casualties, damage estimates, and predictions of how long an organization
can tolerate a disruption before it causes serious harm or damage.
There are opportunities to include financial data (such as estimated costs
due to the loss of life, projected losses caused by disruptions and damage,
reputational cost, and risk appetite) against each parameter.
This set of planning assumptions, supported by data in the NRPA
(or its equivalent for an organization), informs the characteristics outlined
in table 15-2 and will assist in identifying early warning requirements.
As mentioned above, the NRPA will also inform capability resource
requirements. There are four key elements within this stage: (1) a crisis
management plan (CMP), (2) information management and situational
awareness plans and processes, (3) crisis management team (CMT)
with a clear, accepted structure, composition, and levels of authority,
and (4) resilience and capacity within the CMT, including personnel who are
well trained, competent, and adequately resourced.
Essential to effective crisis management is the development of an agile,
f lexible, and current CMP that is concise and well understood by all those
who may need to implement it. The CMP should contain key information,
to include:
 Authority levels and delegated authorities
 Key CMT staff contact details
 Crisis communications
 Details of how to activate the CMP and CMT
 Information on the organizational crisis response, together
with actions to be taken
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 Logistical details about where the CMT will convene,
its aim and objectives, and logistics support in terms
of decision logs, and information management and situational
awareness templates
One of the key characteristics of a crisis outlined in table 15-2 is the
inherent level of uncertainty that forces responders to operate with ambiguous
or insuff icient information. This lack of information hinders effective
decision making. An imperative during any crisis is to provide policymakers
and decisionmakers with as comprehensive an information set as possible
or to highlight the difference between (1) what information is known,
(2) what information is missing or unknown, and (3) what working assumptions
are driving decision making until concrete information is available.
Therefore, it is critical to develop information requirements early on to assist
decisionmakers and ensure when decisions are made the levels of uncertainty
are logged.
Situational awareness is a term that describes the status of knowledge
about the event, which may be based upon the team’s best efforts
during a heightened crisis. To resolve a crisis successfully, it is pivotal to
generate and maintain situational awareness and achieve levels of shared
situational awareness among those managing the crisis and those responding
to it. There may be many barriers to achieving high levels of awareness because
of rapidly changing circumstances, the scale of the crisis, technological
limitations, and organizational conf licts and differences. In some cases,
subject-matter experts may be required to explain data or national security
issues may prevent routine sharing of information. It may be prudent
to establish an information cell, a situational awareness cell, or a fusion
cell staffed by different agencies working collaboratively to coordinate
the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information. See chapter 11
for a discussion on information and intelligence sharing best practices.

Response and Recovery
Due to the nature of the crises outlined in table 15-2, it is diff icult
to prescribe the response to a particular crisis before or while it occurs.
Therefore, it is imperative the CMP and CMT are both activated as soon
as possible. While there may be some generic first steps or actions that can
be implemented right away, the CMT must establish a command center
as quickly as possible, generate shared situational awareness, and develop
a working strategy. By identifying the issues, making decisions, and
assigning or tasking actions, the strategy will be translated into effective
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tactical and operational plans. The CMT should record all the decisions
made, the actions that were tasked and completed, and key notes
from all relevant meetings. As part of the CMP and CMT, an early
battle rhythm or operating tempo should be established so that all
agencies may report progress and develop shared situational awareness.
Paradoxically, the need for quick response and early decision making
is often set against a height of uncertainty and lack of information.
Delaying decision making and deployment of resources early on in a crisis
while waiting for more clarit y or certaint y to develop, however,
will be detrimental to early resolution and recovery.
Strategic planning for an early recovery should be initiated as early
as possible. As is often the case during an operation involving multiple
government agencies and private-sector representatives, roles and
responsibilities change over the duration of managing any incident, emergency,
or crisis. Therefore, it is important to include such handover protocols and
plans in the CMP.

Crisis Management Team and Leadership
Effective leadership within the CMT is essential during crisis management.
As discussed previously, the CMT will have to mobilize quickly and often
at short notice. Due to the nature and characteristics of a crisis, the situation
does not present ideal conditions in which leaders can make decisions
comfortably. Among the many constraints of a crisis, leaders must negotiate
a rapidly developing situation, often with an environment characterized
by imprecise or unclear information, ambiguity, sometimes chaos,
and a fundamental lack of time to balance caution against delay.
In such an environment, leadership within the CMT is crucial
to an effective resolution and recovery following a crisis. Leaders and the
CMT will face extraordinary pressure and complexity as they tackle the
crisis, but a successful resolution depends on timely decision making and
good communications. Indeed, these words ring true: Striking the correct
balance is critical. Generally, a workable solution delivered on time is more
effective than a perfect solution delivered even a little too late.16

Training, Exercising, and Learning from Crises
The most effective way to select and develop leaders and the CMT
members is through a process of immersive, rigorous, and realistic training
and exercising. Organizations should demonstrate a genuine commitment
16.

BSI, Crisis Management, 16.
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to providing the personnel on the CMT with the requisite skills and
knowledge to perform their expected duties. The CMP should include
a coherent strategy that ensures leaders and the CMT have adequate
opportunity to learn, develop, and rehearse the various aspects of the plan.
The organization should provide sufficient occasions for repeated training
and exercising so the CMT can practice several scenarios, options, and
variables to hone their crisis management skills, knowledge, and attitudes.
It should be clear that training is for the personnel who serve as leaders and
CMT members, while exercising is about rehearsing the plan and interaction
with other agencies.
Owners and operators of critical infrastructure, together with those
charged with protecting national assets, should appreciate the value of rigorous
training and structured exercising in supporting and developing effective
crisis management arrangements and plans. Exercises provide a “process
to train for, assess, practice, and improve performance in an organization.” 17
Effective exercises involve appropriate facilities and entities at local, regional,
and national levels to ensure all partners understand, develop, and implement
the necessary response plans, including the relevant CMPs. Exercises provide
unique opportunities for various response agencies, stakeholders, and local
government organizations to validate policies, plans, and procedures while
assessing training, equipment, and interorganizational arrangements.
This validation and assessment should include systems and processes
for developing and implementing information and intelligence-sharing
agreements and mechanisms.18 Intelligence and information sharing
among and between partners will assist decision making and ensure
effective crisis management by contributing to shared situational awareness.
Properly planned and conducted exercises are a low-cost but high-value
investment in relative terms. The process of learning from experience yields
many benefits to organizations, and it is essential to incorporate this learning
into updated versions of the CMP and renewed guidance to the CMT
to ensure continuous improvement. It is also important the owners of the
CMP and CMT regularly review post-incident reports and reviews
of crises that occur elsewhere. Learning from others’ successes, mistakes,
and identified areas for improvement will assist an organization in developing
and improving the CMP and CMT.

17.

BSI, Societal Security – Guidelines for Exercises (London: BSI Standards Limited, 2013), 2.

18.

BSI, Societal Security, 8–9.
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NATO and Crisis Management
NATO identifies crisis management as one of its fundamental security
tasks, and the 2010 Strategic Concept outlines the Alliance’s role in crisis
management. As part of its organizational crisis management and response
options, NATO can use traditional military means or civil-military cooperation
to operate in a myriad of different crises. NATO regularly trains, exercises,
and tests its crisis management capability, which it can employ in response
to a range of crises initiated by natural or humanitarian disasters or other
disruptive events stemming from the political-military realm.
NATO respects the role of sovereign states and does not deploy forces
unless it receives political authority to do so. NATO member states and partner
nations determine on a case-by-case basis whether to support NATO crisis
management operations. NATO also recognizes a military solution alone
will not resolve a crisis; rather, a comprehensive suite of political, civilian,
and military response options is required to deliver effective crisis management.
Today’s international operating environment is evolving, however, and
increasing in complexity, with conf lict, ungoverned states, protests, pandemics,
climate change, extreme weather events, globalization, natural hazards,
and emerging threats among these new dynamics. Against this backdrop,
NATO is experiencing greater challenges as the apparent shift
in the balance of power globally threatens the international rule of law.
Therefore, NATO may find opportunities to strengthen the national capability
of its Allies and partners to manage crises on a regional or country basis.

Developments in Crisis Management and Resilience
Owners and operators of critical infrastructure face increasingly
complex structures, systems, and components that deliver essential services
to critical infrastructure systems. Critical infrastructure sectors are becoming
more dependent and interdependent on supply chains and other critical
infrastructure sectors. See the detailed examination of these dependencies
and interdependencies in chapter 12. As the complexity of structures,
systems, and components increases not just in their respective sectors but
also within the supply chain, the inherent vulnerabilities increase, as does
the potential for a single threat to disrupt several critical infrastructure
sectors simultaneously. This tight coupling—a key element of normal
accident theory that highlights the vulnerabilities and associated frailties
arising from interconnected and interdependent technological advances—
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is on the rise in most critical infrastructure sectors.19 Consequently, previous
studies involving high-reliability organizations (HRO) are now being revisited
by academics and operators of such organizations. HRO theory explains that
the conventional understanding of critical infrastructure fails to recognize
the complexity of HROs and advocates for a different approach to security
and resilience. 20 The following f ive principles are typically prominent
characteristics of HROs:
 Preoccupation with failure. Predominantly highly regulated
industries where technical, human, or process failures are
addressed, and risk aversion may be high.
 Reluctance to simplify. Some industries are complex
by nature, such as aviation, transportation, energy, water,
and telecommunications.
 Sensitivity to operations. With a clear focus on what
the organization delivers, this front-line view informs
decision making.
 Commitment to resilience. The capability and capacity
to anticipate the onset of incidents, emergencies, and crises,
and to adapt to and overcome them.
 Deference to expertise. Recognizing the importance of
expertise rather than authority, they use specialists and experts
to tackle uncertainty and rapidly changing circumstances and
develop situational assessment on the ground.
Within the context of enhancing CISR posture, capabilities, and policies,
these five principles may prove quite helpful to NATO as an organization
and to its member states and partner nations. This chapter also highlighted
the relevance and utility of the United Kingdom’s national standard for crisis
management, which Allies and partners may find to be an excellent framework
for developing or updating crisis management capability at the local, regional,
or national level. Additionally, the chapter advocated the use of exercises
to train personnel and validate plans and procedures as a means to enhance
CISR in a government or an organization. Allies and partners may find this
international standard—published by the International Standards Organization
19. Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1999), 4–6.
20. Karl E. Weick and Kathleen M. Sutcliffe, Managing the Unexpected: Resilient Performance
in an Age of Uncertainty (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2007).
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and used by the United Kingdom and other countries—useful for guidance
on planning, conducting, and learning from exercises. 21
There has also been a shift within nongovernmental sectors, including
critical infrastructure and other regulated sectors, to contend with key issues
such as risk management principles, crisis management, asset management,
information management, assurance and security, business continuity,
reputation management, environmental management, and, increasingly, other
forms of regulation. Consequently, there has been an emerging trend and
interest in combining some of these disciplines together. The drive by the
corporate sector and governments to harmonize or synchronize such disparate
but connected and interdependent activities has led to an increased interest
in the concept of organizational resilience. Organizational resilience is
defined as the ability to “anticipate, prepare for, and respond and adapt to
incremental change and sudden disruptions in order to survive and prosper.” 22
At its core, organizational resilience allows an organization to adapt to
evolving conditions while retaining its essential values, purpose, and vision.
Sometimes, this adaptation means an organization implements response
options that it developed prior to a disruption. At other times, it requires the
organization to adapt its structures or actions to adjust to new conditions.
Given NATO’s June 2021 announcement of the Strengthened
Resilience Commitment, there may be an opportunity for the Alliance
to integrate its crisis management doctrine with other essential functions
and reinforce this commitment by adopting organizational resilience
as a new core task. Additionally, NATO also has a central role
in civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), and its CIMIC Field Handbook
outlines the defense contribution to resilience and assistance to civil authorities.
Together, the focus areas of organizational resilience and CIMIC offer
potential next steps for NATO to enhance its collective CISR posture.

Summary and Conclusion
In summary, this chapter examined the unique aspects of managing
a crisis in contrast to conventional incident and emergency management,
and why those traditional approaches will not resolve a crisis effectively.
While the first portion of the chapter presented the various stages and phases
of crises and the appropriate responses, the following sections discussed the
21.

BSI, Crisis Management; and BSI, Societal Security.

22. “Organizational Resilience,” BSI (website), accessed on January 6, 2022, https://www.bsigroup
.com/en-US/our-services/Organizational-Resilience/.
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key role NATO plays in effective crisis management and the opportunities
posed by the Alliance’s recent commitment to strengthen resilience.
The chapter also identif ied new initiatives in developing organizational
resilience and revisited previous organizational theories relevant to CISR
policies and practices. These concepts, particularly organizational resilience,
could help NATO in two significant ways. First, they can improve the support
NATO as an institution provides to its member states and partner nations
when crises arise or emerge. Second, they can assist critical infrastructure
stakeholders among the Allies and partners to enhance security and
resilience, which benefits national security and resilience and enables NATO
to fulfill its core tasks. In conclusion, crises do not remain static nor does
the technology that delivers essential services from critical infrastructure.
Therefore, the structures, processes, and thinking that underpin CISR and
crisis management need to evolve to counter the threats of disruption countries
face today.
Given the announcement of the June 2021 resilience commitment and the
work toward an updated Strategic Concept commensurate with the current
international security environment, there are key CISR and crisis management
opportunities for NATO to pursue. Specifically, NATO should review the
development of organizational resilience guidance and the existing crisis
management standards to support its Strengthened Resilience Commitment.
This review would enable benchmarking of current NATO doctrine to identify
areas for improvement in the Alliance’s core task to support member states
and partner countries in responding to and managing crises.
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